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1A new Social Contract
In recent history, the ongoing pro­democracy move­
ments in a number of Arab states and the fall of the 
Berlin Wall have served as proof of the power and 
dynamics of transformative processes. There are several 
lessons to be learned from these upheavals for the tran­
sition to sustainability: firstly, unsustainable situations 
can lead to dramatic collapse. Moreover, transformative 
forces often remain hidden below the surface for quite 
some time. This is evident today not least in the quan­
tifiable global change in values to embrace sustainabil­
ity. After all, the downfall of dictatorships whose main­
stay has been the extraction of crude oil and natural gas 
(Soviet Union, Libya) also reveals the formerly hidden 
costs of a ‘fossil’ industrial metabolism.
Normatively, the carbon­based economic model is 
also an unsustainable situation, as it endangers the cli­
mate system’s stability, and therefore the natural life­
support system for future generations. The transforma­
tion towards a low­carbon society is therefore as much 
an ethical imperative as the abolition of slavery and the 
condemnation of child labour. 
For quite some time now, the fossil economic system 
has been changing all over the world. The WBGU views 
this structural transition as the start of a ‘Great Trans­
formation’ into a sustainable society, which must inevi­
tably proceed within the planetary guard rails of sus­
tainability. Long­term studies show clearly that world­
wide, an ever­increasing number of people desire this 
move towards sustainability and a long­term approach. 
Moreover, the nuclear disaster in Japan makes it clear 
that we must choose the fast lane towards a low­carbon 
future without nuclear energy. 
Now, it is first and foremost a political task to over­
come the barriers of such a transformation, and to 
accelerate the change. In the WBGU’s view, a long­term 
oriented regulatory framework must be developed for 
this to ensure that prosperity, democracy and security 
are achieved with the natural boundaries of the Earth 
system in mind. Above all, development paths must be 
pursued which are compatible with the 2 °C climate pro­
tection guard rail agreed upon by the global community 
at Cancún in 2010. This drastic change in direction must 
be accomplished before the end of the current decade 
in order to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to 
a minimum by 2050, and thereby to maintain the pos­
sibility of avoiding dangerous climate change. Hence, 
time is of the essence here. 
In its flagship report, the WBGU elaborates explic­
itly on the fact that the technological potential for 
comprehensive decarbonisation is available, outlines 
business and financing models for the transition, and 
points out that the political instruments needed for a 
climate­friendly transformation are widely known. The 
council also describes how the requisite transformation 
encompasses profound changes to infrastructures, pro­
duction processes, regulation systems and lifestyles, 
and extends to a new kind of interaction between poli­
tics, society, science and the economy. Various multi­
level path dependencies and obstacles must be over­
come. Furthermore, the transformation can only suc­
ceed if nation states put global cooperation mechanisms 
before their own short­term oriented interests, in order 
to make a trend reversal, particularly as far as the glo­
bal economy is concerned, towards climate­friendliness 
and sustainability possible. And not least, from a global 
perspective, this is also about issues of fairness – issues 
that need resolving.
This ‘Great Transformation’, then, is by no means 
an automatism. It very much depends on ‘organising 
the unplannable’ if it is to succeed within the available 
tight timeframe. This is unique in history, as the ‘world’s 
great transformations’ (Jürgen Osterhammel) of the 
past were the result of gradual evolutionary change.
Adding together all of these challenges involved in 
the transformation to come, it becomes clear that the 
upcoming changes go far beyond technological and 
technocratic reforms: the business of society must be 
founded on a new ‘business basis’. This is, in fact, all 
about a new global social contract for a low-carbon 
and sustainable global economic system. It is based on 
the central concept that individuals and civil societies, 
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states and the global community of states, as well as 
the economy and science, carry the joint responsibility 
for the avoidance of dangerous climate change, and the 
aversion of other threats to humankind as part of the 
Earth system. The social contract consolidates a culture 
of attentiveness (born of a sense of ecological respon­
sibility), a culture of participation (as a democratic 
responsibility), and a culture of obligation towards 
future generations (future responsibility).
One key element of such a social contract is the 
‘proactive state’, a state that actively sets priorities for 
the transformation, at the same time increasing the 
number of ways in which its citizens can participate, 
and offering the economy choices when it comes to act­
ing with sustainability in mind. The social contract also 
encompasses new forms of global political will forma­
tion and cooperation. The establishment of a ‘UN Coun­
cil for Sustainable Development’, on par with the UN 
Security Council, and the forming of international alli­
ances of climate pioneers between states, international 
organisations, cities, corporations, science and civic 
organisations, would be examples of this. 
The WBGU has developed the concept of a new 
social contract for the transformation towards sustain­
ability – not so much on paper, but rather in people’s 
consciousness – as an analogy to the emergence of the 
industrialised societies during the course of the 19th 
century. Karl Polanyi (1944) referred to this process, 
too, as a ‘Great Transformation’, and showed that sta­
bilisation and acceptance of the ‘modern industrialised 
societies’ were only successful through the embedding 
of uncontrolled market dynamics and innovation pro­
cesses into a constitutional state, democracy and the 
creation of the welfare state – i. e. through the emer­
gence of a new social contract. 
The WBGU, by highlighting the technical and eco­
nomic feasibility of the transformation, by describ­
ing the change agents, by identifying barriers, and by 
developing political and institutional approaches to 
overcome these, illustrates the transition to climate­
friendliness and sustainability’s ‘conditions of possibil­
ity’ (Immanuel Kant). In doing so, the WBGU wants to 
encourage policy­makers, but also the economy and the 
social protagonists, to dare to make the change.
Low-Carbon Challenge 
Climate protection plays a particularly important part 
in the transformation towards sustainability, as it is 
a conditio sine qua non for sustainable development: 
although climate protection alone cannot guarantee 
the conservation of the natural life­support systems on 
which humanity depends, it is nevertheless foreseea­
ble that without effective climate protection, mankind 
will soon have to do without some essential develop­
ment opportunities. 
During the past few years, anthropogenic climate 
change has become a central topic of social discourse. 
There is a global political consensus that rapid global 
warming by more than 2 °C would overtax our socie­
ties’ ability to adapt. The consequences would be envi­
ronmental crises with major social, economic and secu­
rity­political risks. The avoidance of dangerous climate 
change has therefore become one of the biggest chal­
lenges facing humankind.
If restricting global warming to a mean temperature 
change of 2 °C is to succeed with a probability of at least 
two­thirds, then, by the middle of this century, no more 
than around 750 Gt of CO2 from fossil sources may 
still be released into the atmosphere (WBGU, 2009). 
This global CO2 budget would already be exhausted in 
around 25 years’ time if emissions were to be frozen at 
current levels. We therefore need fast, transformative 
counteraction. By the middle of the century, the global 
energy systems must largely be decarbonised. 
Search processes going in this direction can be 
observed in many countries worldwide. Europe, South 
Korea, China, Indonesia, India and some of the USA’s 
states, amongst others, are endeavouring to decou­
ple prosperity growth from greenhouse gas emissions. 
Many companies realise that in an increasingly pros­
perous world with soon­to­be 9 billion people, the 
next global innovation cycle must be low­carbon and 
resource friendly. Long­term investments, particularly 
in renewable energy sources as well as in energy and 
resource efficiency, not only serve atmosphere protec­
tion, but also reduce the numerous dependencies on 
the import of fossil fuels, at the same time determin­
ing future innovation centres and the reordering of glo­
bal economic hierarchies. The remodelling process will 
open up new prospects, including for European socie­
ties whose strength lies in innovation. 
A Future without Nuclear Energy
The WBGU’s analyses in this report show that ambitious 
global climate protection is possible even without using 
nuclear energy. At the centre of any decarbonisation 
strategy must be the massive extension of the renew­
able energies, and the infrastructure they need. How­
ever, the move towards sustainable energy systems can 
only succeed if, concurrently, the huge potentials for 
efficiency increase are fully tapped, and changing our 
wasteful lifestyles is no longer a taboo subject, particu­
larly in the industrialised and industrialising countries. 
3Several countries are currently planning to increase 
their use of nuclear energy. The WBGU urgently 
advises against this, above all because of the not neg­
ligible risk of serious damages, the still unresolved 
issues concerning final storage, and the danger of 
uncontrolled proliferation. Existing plants should be 
replaced by sustainable energy technologies as soon 
as possible, and, in the case of evident safety defi­
ciencies, be closed down immediately. However, the 
phase­out of nuclear energy must not be compen­
sated by renewed or intensified brown or black coal 
based energy generation.
Climate Protection in Three Key Transformation 
Fields
The transition to climate­friendliness within the scope 
of sustainable development mainly concerns the fol­
lowing three key supporting pillars of contemporary 
global society. These pillars should be the starting 
point for any political agenda: firstly, the energy sys­
tems, including the transport sector, which the entire 
economy depends on, and which are currently facing 
a new wave of growth due to the fast­paced dynam­
ics of the development of the industrialising coun­
tries. The energy sector causes around two­thirds of 
today’s long­lived greenhouse gas emissions. Secondly, 
the urban areas, currently responsible for three­quar­
ters of global final energy demand, and whose popula­
tion will double to 6 billion by 2050. Thirdly, the land­
use systems (agriculture and forestry, including defor­
estation), which are currently responsible for almost 
a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions. Land­
use does not just have to provide enough food for a 
world population that continues to grow, and becomes 
more demanding, but also has to deal with a growth in 
demand due to the increasing use of bioenergy and bio­
based raw materials. 
In all three of the fields described, the world is still 
far away from setting a clear course towards sustain­
ability. The mitigation actions announced by the major­
ity of governments within the scope of the international 
climate negotiations so far will certainly not be enough 
to comply with the 2 °C guard rail. Nevertheless, the 
dynamics of a transformation that is already in progress 
should not be underestimated. The debate on the lim­
its to growth, ongoing since the 1970s, and the quest 
for low­carbon development paths have now taken 
central stage in our societies. This opens up opportuni­
ties for extending the low­carbon experiments, indus­
tries, niches and efficiency islands that already exist in 
many countries, and gives us the chance to speed up 
the change in economic strategy, from dependence on 
the use of fossil energy carriers to a low­carbon way of 
doing business. Measures which, taken on their own, 
appear not to be particularly ambitious can, in such a 
dynamic situation of change, develop significant impact 
as a whole, and trigger the tipping points of develop­
ment. Nevertheless, the transition to climate­friendli­
ness in all three fields is a great challenge.
 > The transformation field ‘energy’ is so significant 
because the world is still continuing down a ‘high­
carbon growth path’ with rapidly increasing CO2 
emissions. If the 2 °C guard rail is to be observed, 
though, the global emissions trend must be reversed 
by 2020 at the latest, as the drastic reduction rates 
which would otherwise be necessary later would 
overtax societies. A global energy turnaround that 
also takes global development dynamics into account 
is what is required. More than 80 % of the world­
wide energy supply is still based on environment 
and climate damaging fossil energy carriers, whilst 
around 3 billion people still do not have access to 
essential modern energy services. The challenge lies 
in giving these people access to modern energy serv­
ices as soon as possible, whilst at the same time sig­
nificantly reducing global CO2 emissions from the 
use of fossil energy carriers. This can only succeed if 
energy efficiency is drastically increased and life­
style changes are triggered, leading to a limitation of 
the overall energy demand. The requisite decarboni­
sation of energy systems means that the pressure is 
on to act, not just in the indust rialised countries, but 
also in the dynamically growing newly industrialis­
ing and developing countries. Even the poorer devel­
oping countries must veer towards a low­emission 
development path in the medium­term. The era of 
fossil energy carrier reliant economic growth must 
be brought to an end.
 > The transformation field ‘urbanisation’ is so signifi­
cant because the urbanisation process is the major 
driving force behind energy demand. Urban expan­
sion creates new, long­lived infrastructures that are 
going to impact on the energy demand for a long 
time to come. Currently, already around half of the 
world’s population lives in cities. In Asia, the urban 
population will double to 3 billion people within the 
next couple of decades. It is likely that by 2050, as 
many people will be living in cities as there are on 
Earth today. The current urbanisation wave must 
therefore be redirected towards low­carbon urban 
development very quickly indeed – and that in a 
situation where we do not have one single, function­
ing, low­carbon model city that we might learn from. 
The modification of existing urban structures is also 
very important; it needs a lot of time, and therefore 
a determined approach. 
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 > In the transformation field ‘land-use’, the conversion 
of natural ecosystems (forests, grasslands, wetlands) 
into agricultural land is one of the major sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions. The main focus must 
therefore be on stopping deforestation and forest 
degradation as quickly as possible. Worldwide, for­
est areas are currently being reduced at a rate of 
about 13 million hectares per year. According to pro­
jections by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of 
the United Nations (FAO), in order to secure the food 
supply for a growing world population, global food 
output must increase by up to 70 % by 2050. Agri­
culture’s challenge is covering the strong growth in 
demand for agricultural produce in a sustainable 
way, including biodiversity protection, and, at the 
same time, to mitigate emissions along the whole life 
cycle, from field to consumer. One particular chal­
lenge here is the change in eating habits in favour of 
animal products in many regions of the world. 
Conducive and Impeding Factors
One positive aspect is that many of the alternatives for 
putting sustainable progress in the three transforma­
tion fields as described into action are already availa­
ble. The respective technologies are already in use or 
under development. Thanks to modern communication 
technologies and worldwide knowledge networks, cli­
mate­friendly innovation and learning processes can be 
shared fast, even with countries where this is not polit­
ically wanted. The policy and economic steering instru­
ments are also well­known and could, assuming a cor­
responding public willingness to create the framework 
conditions, soon be adapted to decarbonisation. 
The financial challenges of the transformation are 
significant, but controllable. Globally, the additional 
investment required for transformation into a low­car­
bon society, compared with the cost of ‘just carrying on 
as we are’, probably lies somewhere in the region of at 
least US$ 200 to up to 1,000 billion per year by 2030, 
and would significantly exceed this amount between 
2030 and 2050. These investments will be offset by 
later savings of a similar size, and the avoidance of the 
immense costs of dangerous climate change. Through 
innovative business models and financing concepts, we 
can resolve these issues. 
Not least, a positive fact in the WBGU’s view is that 
an ever­growing part of the world population is devel­
oping value systems that include focusing on the pro­
tection of the natural environment, or that this aspect 
is at least gaining in significance. Policy­making should 
acknowledge this trend, and show much more cour­
age when it comes to making pro­climate protection 
 decisions. 
However, this positive development is hindered by 
factors that impede a transformation.
Political, institutional and economic path depend­
encies, interest structures and veto players make the 
change into a sustainable society more difficult. Annual 
consumption subsidies for fossil­based energies are 
estimated to range between US$ 300 to over 500 bil­
lion worldwide. However, this is not just about a lot of 
money and the corresponding interests of the estab­
lished high­carbon sectors of the economy. The eco­
nomic model of the past 250 years, with its rules and 
regulations, research environments, training and quali­
fication systems and social role models, and its foreign, 
security, development, transport, economic and inno­
vation policies, was almost without exception geared 
towards the use of fossil energy carriers. This complex 
system must now be fundamentally modified with a 
view to the decarbonisation of energy systems and rad­
ical increases in energy efficiency. John Maynard Key­
nes put it in a nutshell when describing one of the key 
challenges of this kind of profound system change: ‘The 
difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas as in 
escaping from old ones.’
Moreover, the transformation must be achieved 
within a very tight timeframe, which, for complex soci­
eties, particularly in the context of international nego­
tiation systems, poses a significant challenge. At the 
same time, our societies must be willing to act in an 
anticipatory manner, on the basis of scientific findings. 
For this to happen, politics, economy and society must 
wholeheartedly embrace long­term orientation.
The urbanisation waves in the developing regions, 
a significant proportion of which are caused by high­
carbon growth in many parts of the world, are a further 
huge challenge for the transformation process, but also 
a great opportunity. Particularly in the rapidly growing 
economies of the newly industrialising countries, the 
change into low­carbon cities has to be effected within 
a very short period of time. On the one hand, this is 
asking a lot in terms of the transformation and learn­
ing capacities of those countries. On the other hand, in 
most of those countries, the prevailing tenet is that cli­
mate change has primarily been caused, and continues 
to be caused, by the OECD countries, and that there­
fore, the presumably costly investments into climate 
protection measures must, for the most part, be made 
in the established industrialised countries. This issue 
has so far not been resolved by a global burden sharing 
agreement. The situation is made more difficult by the 
availability of cheap coal in many of the newly indus­
trialising countries. 
5The WBGU analysis also shows that current glo­
bal governance institutions are not very well prepared 
for the transformation. This applies in particular to the 
three key transformation fields energy, urbanisation 
and land­use. Furthermore, no truly assertive climate 
pioneer alliances exist to accelerate the establishment 
of post­fossil, transnational structures.
Overall, though, the WBGU’s central message is that 
the transformation into a low­carbon global society is 
essential, and achievable. In some sectors, regions and 
countries, it has already begun. Above all, we must now 
refrain from preventing the transformation, and instead 
forge ahead with initiatives that serve its acceleration. 
Transformation Concept and Implementation 
Strategy
Characteristics of Great Transformations
The WBGU views this worldwide remodelling of econ­
omy and society towards sustainability as a ‘Great 
Transformation’. Production, consumption patterns and 
lifestyles in all of the three key transformation fields 
must be changed in such a way that global greenhouse 
gas emissions are reduced to an absolute minimum 
over the coming decades, and low­carbon societies can 
develop. The extent of the transformation ahead of 
us can barely be overestimated. In terms of profound 
impact, it is comparable to the two fundamental trans­
formations in the world’s history: the Neolithic Revo­
lution, i. e. the invention and spreading of farming and 
animal husbandry, and the Industrial Revolution, which 
Karl Polanyi (1944) called the ‘Great Transformation’, 
meaning the transition from agricultural to industrial­
ised society. 
The WBGU’s Transformation Strategy
The great transformations the human race has so far 
experienced were, for the most part, the uncontrolled 
results of evolutionary change. The challenge, unique 
in history, with regard to the upcoming transformation 
into a climate­friendly society is advancing a compre-
hensive change for reasons of understanding, prudence 
and providence. The transformation must be antici­
pated, based on scientific insights regarding the risks of 
continuing on high­carbon development paths, in order 
to avoid the ‘standard historic reaction’, a change of 
direction in response to crises and disasters. The quest 
for suitable strategies has gained hugely in importance 
for corporations, in politics, in science and for society 
as a whole. 
Figure 1 illustrates a possible course the transforma­
tion could take. To achieve decarbonisation, misguided 
incentives must be abolished, and the number of obsta­
cles must be diminished. Figure 2 illustrates the tempo­
ral dynamics of the transformation into a low­carbon 
society, possible paths leading to failure to achieve the 
transformation, and the different levels of action. 
Europe and the whole world currently stand at a 
crossroads. By now, there are change agents in all areas 
of society; in many countries, they even hold positions 
that can claim acceptance by the majority. The Ger­
man federal government, the EU, the governments of 
the People’s Republic of China, India, the USA, South 
Korea, Japan and Indonesia are all pro sustainable 
development, and have presented corresponding strat­
egies, ‘green growth’ models or energy sector remodel­
ling plans. In addition, all over the world, a number of 
low­emission technologies have seen dynamic devel­
opment over the past few years. Renewable energies 
have become an important economic and employment 
factor. Globally, many cities have already implemented 
climate­friendly future concepts, in some major corpo­
rations, formerly small departments for corporate social 
responsibility have grown into ‘innovation centres for 
sustainable markets’, and in science, research alliances 
dealing with the transformation into a climate­friendly 
society have been formed. 
So there is a lot of movement, and in the right direc­
tion. Nevertheless, there is a very real danger that 
the dynamics between change and dogged insistence 
on the established will lead into a lock­in (fig. 2); the 
transformation into a low­carbon society could also fail. 
For example, the increasing energy efficiency of vehi­
cles could be overcompensated by a rebound effect, 
e. g. the more rapid growth in their number. Or states 
could agree on mitigating their greenhouse gas emis­
sions, but these could nevertheless be far below the 
required ambition level. Renewable energies could gain 
in significance, but they might only be an addition to 
the still dominating fossil energy carriers, rather than 
replacing them. If the transformation were to be imple­
mented in this kind of half­hearted and slow manner, 
it could lead to a ‘3­4 °C world’ with the respective, 
almost uncontrollable consequences for nature and 
society. The important thing now is to set the course in 
such a way that a result like this becomes improbable.
Historical analyses show that a ‘concurrence of mul­
tiple change’ (Osterhammel, 2009) can trigger historic 
waves and comprehensive transformations. The social 
dynamics for a change in the direction of climate pro­
tection must therefore be created through a combina­
tion of measures at different levels:
 > It is knowledge­based, based on a joint vision, and 
guided by the precautionary principle.
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 > It relies heavily on the change agents, who can test 
and advance the options for leaving behind an econ­
omy reliant on the use of fossil resources, thus help­
ing to develop new leitmotifs, or new visions, to 
serve as guiding principles for social transition. Ini­
tially, the change agents are involved as marginalised 
protagonists; they could, however, develop into an 
effective force, greatly advancing the transforma­
tion (fig. 2). 
 > It needs a proactive state to allow the transformation 
process to develop into a certain direction by provid­
ing the relevant framework, by setting the course for 
structural change, and by guaranteeing the imple­
mentation of climate­friendly innovations. The 
proactive state gives the change agents leeway, and 
supports them actively. 
 > It also counts on the cooperation of the international 
community and the establishment of global govern­
ance structures as the indispensable driving force for 
the intended transformation momentum.
The Decarbonisation of Energy Systems is 
Achievable
The most important starting point for the transforma­
tion towards sustainability is the reduction of CO2 emis­
sions from the use of fossil energy carriers. Apart from 
decarbonisation, a second major goal of a remodelling 
of the energy systems is overcoming global energy pov­
erty.
The WBGU shows explicitly that the decarbonisa­
tion of energy systems on a global level is feasible, 
both from a technical and an economic point of view. 
The long­term economic costs of such a transformation 
amount to just a few percent of the global GDP. For 
the transformation to succeed, it is imperative that the 
reduction of the carbon dioxide intensity of the glo­
bal GDP is greatly accelerated. Assuming an economic 
growth of 2–3 %, if a development path were to be fol­
lowed that would lead to not more than 750 Gt CO2 
emissions from fossil sources by 2050, then, over the 
next few years, the speed at which the CO2 intensity of 
the global economic output is reduced would have to be 
at least twice as fast as it has been in the past.
However, there is more than one way to transform 
energy systems in the direction of climate protection. 
Decarbonisation level
Low-carbon technology development
- Financially viable
- Changing values towards sustainability
- Potential co-benefit of transformation
- Global knowledge networks
Favourable factors
- Path dependencies
- Tight timeframe
- Barriers obstructing global cooperation
- Rapid urbanisation 
- Easily available cheap coal supply
Barriers
Status quo
S
oc
ia
l c
os
ts
Complete decarbonisation
Figure 1
Topography of the transformation: the first step towards turning the global society’s status quo into low­carbon (complete 
 decarbonisation) is the overcoming of obstacles, shown here as an increase in social costs. This increase is currently intensified 
through barriers (red): the social costs of the status quo appear to be lower than appropriate, due to, for example, misguided 
 incentives such as subsidies for fossil energy carriers, or environmental costs that are not internalised. At the same time, the 
barriers to be overcome appear to be higher than they actually are: although overcoming various barriers requires a high degree 
of effort, for example, the costly overcoming of path dependencies, this is compensated by favourable factors: many low­carbon 
technologies are already available, and their deployment is financially viable. Aided by the favourable factors, barriers can be 
diminished to pave the way for the transformation. Once the decisive barriers have been overcome, the move towards low­
carbon can be expected to develop its own dynamics.
Source: WBGU
7The actual energy paths followed will differ between 
states and regions, depending on political, technological 
and cultural circumstances and preferences, and indi­
vidual geographical features. The use of nuclear power 
and the relevance of carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
in particular could develop in very different directions, 
both regionally and nationally – especially through 
policy decisions. The WBGU advises against the use of 
nuclear power. CCS, on the other hand, is a necessary 
climate protection measure for countries that continue 
to use fossil energies. In combination with the use of 
bioenergy, CCS could also turn out to be an important 
option for actively withdrawing CO2 from the atmos­
phere during the second half of the 21st century. In 
its recommendations, however, the WBGU focuses on 
development paths where these two technologies play 
only a marginal role. Rather, the WBGU recommends a 
strategy that relies primarily on an accelerated use of 
renewable energies, with a medium­term prospect of 
covering 100 % of demand. This goal requires a simul­
taneous pursuit of drastic improvements in energy effi­
ciency.
In the WBGU’s opinion, a look at the various trans­
formative scenarios suggests that the global final 
energy demand should not rise to more than 400–500 
EJ per year by 2050; it currently amounts to approx. 
350 EJ per year. Without a change in political direc­
tion, though, the final energy demand could more than 
double. Hence, downsizing this demand in the industr­
ialised and the economically fast growing newly indus­
trialising countries is a crucial task. 
Utilise Changing Values 
Creating the relevant attitudes and preferences is an 
indispensable premise for a successful transforma­
tion to a low­carbon society. Politicians must make 
the intended transition agreeable to the vast majority 
(acceptance), obtain their consent (legitimation), and 
invite cooperation (participation). There is ample evi­
dence, such as the results of the international World 
Values Survey, which has been conducted since 1981, 
or the debate on alternatives to GDP as a prosperity 
indicator, to suggest that the core values of a large part 
of the world population include the protection of the 
natural environment. There is a relatively broad, cross­
cultural consensus to transform the predominant eco­
nomic strategy so that it becomes embedded in sustain­
able environmental management. Political options that 
pick up on post­materialistic values and sustainability­
oriented attitudes are therefore not antitheses to the 
majority view in industrialised societies. They are also 
popular amongst opinion leaders in the newly industri­
alising countries, seeking to catch­up in terms of eco­
nomic development. For all of the reasons mentioned, 
it is clear that policy­makers can certainly be more cou­
rageous when it comes to making pro climate protec­
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Figure 2
The transformation’s temporal dynamics and action levels. The goal of the transformation is a low­carbon society. Central to the 
transformation is the decarbonisation of energy systems. Left: The proactive state and the change agents are the key players. 
As far as the change agents are concerned, they must move away from a marginalised existence and increase their impact 
through widespread inclusion in social routines. Right: Decisive action for a change of course towards transformation must be 
taken within the next decade if the conversion is to succeed within the next 30 years. The sustainable path (green) manages 
the transition from high­carbon to low­carbon society in time. Overcompensation for decarbonisation advances (for example 
through rebound effects) could lead to rendering climate protection measures ineffective, so that the transformation fails 
(yellow).  Moderate endeavours only carry the risk of path dependencies that will lead to a global climate crisis (red). 
Source: WBGU, modified acc. to Grin et al., 2010
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tion decisions. People are far more willing to tackle this 
issue than generally thought.
A New Global Social Contract
The idea of a new social contract refers to the necessity 
of humankind taking collective responsibility for the 
avoidance of dangerous climate change and other dan­
gers to the planet. For one thing, this needs a voluntary 
capping of the usual options for economic growth in 
favour of giving the people in those parts of the world 
already suffering the consequences of our irresponsible 
behaviour, and particularly future generations, room 
to manoeuvre. For another, the transformation needs a 
powerful state, counterbalanced by extended participa­
tion on the part of its citizens. 
The idea of a social contract takes the original con­
cept found in the natural law theories of early mod­
ern history one step further, and today’s revised edition 
must address four major challenges: 
1. Because of progressive economic and cultural glo­
balisation, the nation state can no longer be con­
sidered the sole basis for the contractual relation­
ship. Its inhabitants must responsibly take transna­
tional risks and natural dangers, and the legitimate 
interests of ‘third parties’, i. e. other members of the 
world community, into account. 
2. Traditional contract philosophy presupposed the 
fictitious belief that all members of a society are 
equal. Considering the disproportionate distribu­
tion of resources and capabilities in today’s interna­
tional community, we must have effective, fair glo­
bal compensation mechanisms in place.
3. The natural environment should be given increased 
consideration when revising the social contract. 
4. The contract has to bring two important new pro­
tagonists into the equation: the self­organised civil 
society and the community of scientific experts.
The new social contract is an agreement to change: the 
global citizenship consents to expecting innovations 
that have a normative link to the sustainability postu­
late, and, in exchange, agrees to surrender the instinct 
to hang on to the established. The guarantor in this vir­
tual contract is a proactive state that involves its citizens 
in future decisions requisite to the agreement of sus­
tainability targets. This in turn is linked to a culture of 
attentiveness (born of a sense of ecological responsibil­
ity), a culture of participation (as a democratic respon­
sibility), and a culture of obligation towards future gen­
erations (future responsibility). It is by no means the 
case that the contract calls for a merely superficial or 
even resigned acceptance on the part of civil society: 
rather, the civil society is acknowledged as an active 
partner with shared responsibility for the success of the 
transformation process, and mobilised, thereby legiti­
mising the process. The concept of a proactive state is 
therefore indelibly intertwined with the acknowledg­
ment of civil society, and the innovative forces in the 
economy, in science and in administration. 
Ten Measure Bundles with Major Strategic  
Leverage: Recommendations for Action
Strategic Perspectives
The transformation into a low­carbon society means 
nothing less than a paradigm shift from fossil to post­
fossil society that must take place in the form of a 
societal search process. Although specific sustainabil­
ity objectives can be defined (like restricting anthro­
pogenic global warming to a temperature rise of 2 °C, 
or stopping deforestation globally), it is not possible 
to provide an exact description of the ultimate desired 
state of economy and society. However, the objectives 
and direction of global economic development can take 
their lead from globally established and, for the most 
part, universally accepted standards (Human Rights, 
UN Conventions, Rio Declaration, Millennium Develop­
ment Goals, etc.). Widely accepted, above all, is also the 
imperative, voiced by Hans Jonas, amongst others, that 
current actions should not result in irreparable dam­
ages for coming generations to deal with, i. e. that we 
should not leave them worse basic conditions for sur­
vival, but rather improved conditions for survival, if at 
all possible. 
The global perspective also dictates that despite all 
our differences and unique cultural characteristics, the 
global societies’ development opportunities should not 
diverge too much. The principle of common but differ­
entiated responsibilities set down in the Rio Declara­
tion and the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) means that for the time being, the 
developing countries shall be given more leeway with 
regards to the transformation than the newly industri­
alising or industrialised countries. The agreed parame­
ters allow plenty of room for a range of different strat­
egies. In accordance with each country’s specific condi­
tions, every sector and society should develop and fol­
low its own individual transformation path. The WBGU 
sees two ideal, typical transformation options for this:
1. Polycentric strategy: The current climate protection 
endeavours in the different sectors and at differ­
ent levels are bundled and considerably stepped up. 
The WBGU is convinced that this strategy can be 
implemented soon, and with the existing means, 
and is reasonably realistic. Measures which, taken 
9on their own, have little transformative impact can, 
through clever mixing and skilful combination, have 
a far greater impact and generate unexpected move­
ment, far more than a simple addition might lead 
us to believe. Taken in total, a societal tipping point 
can be reached, beyond which resistance to the 
transformation significantly decreases, the requis­
ite political willingness grows, and the acceleration 
gains considerable momentum. 
2. Focused strategy: Here, the focus is on concentrat­
ing on just a few major course changes that can 
have high transformative impact – but which a 
great number of the protagonists currently view as 
unrealistic, because they would need to be pushed 
through in the face of powerful forces insistent on 
preserving the status quo. Some of these major 
course changes are however necessary to achieve 
the scale and speed the transformation into a low­
carbon society needs to reach. 
Both polycentric and focused transformation strategy 
are aiming for a ‘Great Transformation’, though, hence 
both differ from the incremental politics of short­term 
crisis management and the ever­procrastinating nego­
tiation of compromises.
In this report, the WBGU advocates an intelligent 
combination of both strategies. There are concrete rec­
ommendations for the intensification of current climate 
protection endeavours with regards to the three trans­
formation fields of energy, urbanisation and land­use. 
The more small­scale measures show results, and the 
more change agents become actively involved, start 
networking, and start to initiate changes on different 
levels, all working towards a transformation, the sooner 
decision­makers will be encouraged to tackle the major, 
supposedly unpopular course changes. In a societal 
environment as dynamic as this, measures which are 
still viewed as unrealistic today could certainly become 
realisable tomorrow. The WBGU has therefore ranked 
its recommendations according to ambition level, i. e. 
according to their transformative impact and politi­
cal achievability. This provides for explicitly including 
major course changes in our recommendations which 
may still seem unrealistic from today’s point of view, 
but which may well turn out to be inevitable in the long 
term. 
Practical Recommendations for Action: Ten 
Transformative Measure Bundles
The scale and speed of the current transformation 
endeavours are by far not enough to avoid a danger­
ous climate change, and the risk of an irreversibly 
unsustain able global development. We are still a long 
way away from reaching the tipping point with regards 
to sustain able global resource conservation and value 
generation. In the following, the WBGU therefore out­
lines ten measure bundles with major transformative 
impact to accelerate and spread the transformation to 
sustainability. 
Bundle 1: Improve the Proactive State with 
 Extended Participation Opportunities
A central element in a social contract for transformation 
is the proactive state with extended participation in a 
multilevel system of global cooperation. It entails two 
aspects, frequently thought of as separate or contra­
dicting: on the one hand empowering the state, which 
actively determines priorities and underlines them with 
clear signals (for example with bonus/malus solutions), 
and on the other hand, giving citizens more extensive 
opportunities to have a voice, to get involved in deci­
sion­making and to take a more active role in politics. 
A powerful (eco­)state is often thought of as restricting 
the autonomy of the ‘man in the street’, whilst at the 
same time, any meddling on the part of the citizen is 
viewed with misgivings as a disturbance factor to polit­
ical­administrative rationality and routines. A precon­
dition for a successful transformation policy, though, is 
the simultaneous empowerment of state and citizens 
with regard to the common goal of sustainable policy 
objectives. 
The proactive state is firmly anchored in the tradi­
tion of a liberal and constitutional democracy, but it 
develops this democracy further with a view towards 
the future sustainability of democratic communities 
and liberal civil societies, and takes into account the 
boundaries imposed on economic and social develop­
ment by a finite planet. Whereas climate protection is 
often regarded as a restriction and unreasonable dep­
rivation, a proactive and enabling form of government 
has the explicit task of preserving available choices and 
the current room to manoeuvre for future generations 
and even, if possible, to extend these.
The WBGU recommends the approach of these goals 
on four interconnected levels: substantive through pro­
vision of climate protection targets in climate protec­
tion legislation; constitutionally, through the setting of 
a respective national objective regarding climate pro­
tection; procedurally, through extending the oppor­
tunities for citizens and civil society organisations for 
public participation in decision­making, access to infor­
mation and legal protection; and institutionally through 
mainstreaming the climate policies of government insti­
tutions (for example, by way of the establishment of 
a joint ministry for environment, climate and energy).
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The level of ambition, and therefore the transforma­
tive impact of these elements, increases through combi­
nation, and a corresponding definition of content with 
regard to the following elements: as a central meas­
ure, the WBGU suggests climate protection legisla­
tion with ambitious mitigation targets, to be reached 
by 2050 (bundle 9), along the lines of the WBGU’s 
budget approach. Another important legislative meas­
ure would be the introduction of a comprehensive, 
obligatory climate impact assessment scheme for any 
legislative proposal. Contrary to the existing planning 
and approval procedures, the public should be informed 
at the earliest opportunity about projects that have a 
major impact on climate protection and the transition to 
sustainable energy systems, and be given the chance to 
become actively involved in the planning and approval 
process. Further avenues for legal redress in the form 
of supra­individual collective actions should be opened 
up, in addition to the existing legal remedies, to allow 
judicial examination of planning and approval deci­
sions. The use of ombudsmen and ombudswomen with 
a ‘right to remonstrance’ and a ‘right to monitor’, as well 
as prompt, iterative deliberation proceedings with the 
corresponding inclusion of scientific expert knowledge 
and non­professional expertise would, in the WBGU’s 
view, complete the procedural system for climate pro­
tection relevant decisions by administrative and legis­
lative authorities. 
The German federal administrative bodies should 
undergo a climate mainstreaming at federal, state and 
local level. All of the measures described above that 
are of a material, legal, procedural­legislative and 
institutional nature (extended participation, climate 
mainstreaming, climate protection legislation, climate 
impact assessment, extended legal remedies) stand for, 
and concretise, the national goal of climate protection. 
Legislative, executive and judiciary bodies are legally 
bound to act. 
National policies have reached their limits, both in 
terms of time and scope. We must therefore discuss 
how the (supposed) interests of future generations can 
be taken into account in contemporary elections and 
polls, and how people beyond national borders can be 
included, in accordance with transnational democracy. 
The WBGU proposes an extension to parliamentary leg­
islative procedure in the form of a deliberative ‘future 
chamber’ to provide an institutional anchor for future­
oriented interests. To avoid interest and party political 
interference, chamber membership could, for example, 
be decided by drawing lots.
Statehood transcends national borders and sover­
eignties, particularly as far as climate, energy and the 
environment are concerned; this aspect also requires 
new supra­ and transnational institutions. One prime 
example for such improvement, in the opinion of the 
WBGU, is the European Union’s network of insti­
tutions, as the EU, after all, will also benefit from 
impulses for a deepening of its integration through 
joint, citizen­friendly climate, environment and energy 
policies (bundle 3). Although it does not have a cen­
tral legal act on climate protection, it has set material 
targets as far as renewable energies, energy efficiency 
and climate protection are concerned. Further harmo­
nisation is required with respect to energy policy. The 
EU obliges its member states to give its citizens access 
to information on environmental issues, to give them 
the chance to participate, and to make legal remedies 
available to them. The recently established Directorate 
General for Energy could be a first step towards future 
climate mainstreaming, although so far, this directorate 
has not been sufficiently committed to a transforma­
tive energy policy. Constitutionally, climate protection 
is anchored in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union; it could, however, certainly be codi­
fied as an explicit goal. 
On an international level, central arenas for glo­
bal governance of energy, urbanisation and land­use 
would have to be established for the transformation 
(bundle 10). Exemplary for mobilisation of the global 
community is the Aarhus Convention, so far limited to 
Europe, which obliges its member states to advise their 
citizens of environment­relevant projects, and provides 
them with ways in which to participate, obtain informa­
tion, and legal recourse.
Bundle 2: Advance Carbon Pricing Globally
The WBGU believes that carbon pricing is the most 
important political measure for decarbonisation, and a 
necessary element of any regulatory framework for the 
transformation into a climate­friendly society. How­
ever, the price of carbon has to be at a level that is high 
enough to achieve the transformative impact called for, 
i. e. it must be substantially higher than the current 
European emissions trading price level. Price is a signal 
which can be given either through taxation, or through 
the introduction of a cap and trade system. Assum­
ing that the institutional capacities are given, and that 
stringency can be guaranteed, the WBGU considers cap 
and trade to be the more effective instrument.
The WBGU proposes the following steps, with 
 pro gressive ambition levels:
 > Refine the European Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS) and reach a G20 agreement on carbon pricing 
(low ambition level): The EU ETS should be contin­
ued, simplified in terms of administration, and sup­
ported by ambitious caps on emissions. The EU­wide 
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goal for emissions reduction should be increased to 
at least 30 % below 1990 levels by 2020, not least to 
regain EU credibility in international climate politics. 
A carbon price should also be introduced for sources 
of diffuse emissions, such as transport, which so far 
have not been included. At the same time, the EU 
should lobby for the introduction of carbon pricing 
policies in all G20 states. 
 > Pursue the linking of emissions trading systems 
(medium ambition level): Parallel to this, linking of 
current emissions trading systems should be encour­
aged. The more countries join a linked system, the 
higher the chances that other countries will follow 
their example. For countries that have not intro­
duced national emissions restrictions, sectoral 
approaches should be considered. In countries that 
are currently unable to introduce emissions trading 
systems due to a lack of institutional capacity, the 
introduction of a CO2 tax would be a reasonable 
measure.
 > Establish an emissions trading scheme that is as global 
as possible, with joint emissions restrictions (high 
ambition level): The speedy and comprehensive inte­
gration of the major high­emission countries in a 
global emissions trading scheme would ensure that 
significant global emissions reductions can be 
achieved. To send a price signal both for investments 
and consumption, emissions trading should take 
place at corporate level. Such an emissions trading 
scheme requires a high level of international coop­
eration and must therefore be based on principles of 
fair distribution, as, for example, suggested in the 
WBGU’s budget approach (2009). 
Bundle 3: Promote a Common European Energy 
Policy
Goal of a common European energy policy should be 
the decarbonisation of the energy systems by the mid­
dle of the century. To achieve this, the WBGU recom­
mends consistent and strong support for renewable 
energies, a coordinated, speedy extension of grid infra­
structures, grid access, as well as storage facilities, and 
strong foreign and development EU policies on energy 
to promote the integration of neighbouring states, 
such as Norway or the North African countries. Such 
a common European energy policy would have a great 
symbolic effect, and would underscore Europe’s com­
mitment to joint action in key future­oriented fields, 
strengthen the Union’s competitiveness, and serve as 
an inspiration to the global economy. The WBGU pro­
poses the following three steps, with progressive ambi­
tion levels:
 > Strengthening of the objective ‘climate protection’, 
and elaborating existing energy political measures 
(low ambition level): To guarantee all­encompassing 
consideration of decarbonisation in all areas influ­
enced by EU policies, climate protection should be 
given symbolic and constitutional support by 
being  explicitly defined as an EU goal. Ambitious 
goals that go further than the EU renewable energy 
directive, which defines the targets to be reached by 
2020, should be set, to be reached by 2050: climate 
protection objectives must be elaborated, and bind­
ing energy efficiency targets must be agreed. The 
financial support given to renewable energy carriers 
should be better coordinated on an EU­wide level, 
and, in the long­term, harmonised (bundle 4). These 
material provisions should be procedurally accompa­
nied by extending monitoring scope, such as, for 
example, the introduction of collective European 
legal action. 
 > Realisation of a single European energy market 
(medium ambition level): To ensure a continent­wide 
sustainable energy supply, the WBGU strongly rec­
ommends pushing ahead with the realisation of a 
single European energy market to provide better 
support for renewable energies. Independent net­
work operators would guarantee unrestricted grid 
access. Unrestricted grid access and cross­border 
networks are indispensable for the efficient integra­
tion of renewable energies into the existing grid, and 
for a guaranteed reliable supply. This is the only way 
that allows the development of a single European 
market for energy and gas with uniform prices. 
 > Europe-wide energy strategy on union basis (high 
ambition level): The EU should pool its continent­
wide renewable energy potentials and, taking the 
differing geographical and economic conditions for 
the production and storage of renewable energies 
into account, drive ahead their cost­efficient exten­
sion. Apart from the harmonisation of existing pro­
motion schemes, this requires joint planning of grid 
expansion, including the securing of the requisite 
funds. The WBGU advises the German federal gov­
ernment to support augmentation of EU legislative 
authority to allow for the definition and implemen­
tation of a European energy strategy, including the 
determination of the respective energy carriers, and 
the extension and rebuilding of cross­border infra­
structures, to achieve a decarbonised, EU­wide 
energy system by 2050 based on the largest possible 
share of renewables. 
Procedurally, we recommend a division of labour 
between the EU and its member states: the EU provides 
the legal framework for the energy mix and the exten­
sion and rebuilding of infrastructural projects. The 
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actual legal form and the implementation of planning 
and application procedures for infrastructure­related 
projects should be the member states’ tasks.
Bundle 4: Accelerate Promotion of Renewable  
Energies on a Global Level through Feed-In Tariffs
The transformation speed that needs to be reached to 
protect the climate and avoid the imminent risk of path 
dependencies on fossil energy technologies can only 
be achieved by accelerating and increasing the use of 
renewable energies. The WBGU therefore advises the 
German federal government to strongly support, both at 
EU and global level, the widespread use of feed­in tar­
iffs as a useful instrument. The most important accom­
panying measure, as it creates the one vital precondi­
tion an accelerated expansion of renewable energies 
depends on, is extension of the infrastructure, above 
all the construction of high­capacity transmission grids 
and storage facilities. Simultaneously, subsidies for fos­
sil energy carriers should gradually be phased­out, as 
they are currently several times higher than the sub­
sidies for renewable energy carriers. This ratio must be 
reversed as soon as possible. 
 > Harmonise EU feed-in tariffs step by step: Initially, 
the EU should strive for a binding EU­internal agree­
ment for the introduction of feed­in tariffs in all 
member states, and for gradual harmonisation of the 
various national feed­in tariffs. However, complete 
harmonisation cannot be implemented immediately, 
as the transport capacities of Europe’s electric power 
grids are as yet far away from being capable of 
allowing a limiting of the extension of renewable 
energies to ideally suited locations only. A harmo­
nised, EU­wide feed­in tariff would be a sensible 
option once the grids are in place, and should already 
be prepared in advance. Renewable energies should 
also enjoy a Europe­wide feed­in priority status. The 
tariff should degress gradually to take into account 
changing market conditions, in line with the cumula­
tive performance of each technology used. At an 
early stage, the potential integration of North Africa 
into this Europe­wide feed­in tariff system should 
be explored.
 > Drive ahead worldwide acceptance of feed-in tariffs: 
Germany should, both as a pioneer of the feed­in 
tariff system and on the basis of having already 
gained practical experience, step up the knowledge 
transfer with regards to a system implementation. 
The International Feed­in Cooperation (IFIC) should 
receive more support, both financially and in terms 
of staffing, to allow further development into a cen­
tre of excellence that attracts international interest. 
In addition, the German federal government should 
suggest the founding of an initiative to encourage 
global adoption of the feed­in tariff system. The UN 
Conference for Sustainable Development (Rio+20 
Conference) in 2012 would be a suitable occasion for 
the launch. The UN General Assembly has declared 
2012 the ‘International Year for Sustainable Energy 
for All’. Within the scope of this initiative, bilateral 
partnerships between industrialised and developing 
countries could be proposed, including support in 
terms of capacity and financing. An international 
financing mechanism should also be established to 
provide the (co­)funding needed for financing feed­
in tariff systems in developing countries. The fund­
ing required for the extension of the necessary infra­
structure, like grids and storage facilities, should also 
be taken into consideration here. The International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) could function 
as a platform for initiative administration and coor­
dination. The initiatives and systems supporting 
feed­in tariffs should gradually be phased out 
towards the middle of the century, as in all probabil­
ity, renewable energy carriers will be competitive by 
then, even without subsidies. 
Bundle 5: Promote Sustainable Energy Supply 
Services in Developing and Newly Industrialising 
Countries
If the 2 °C guard rail is to be complied with, there is very 
little room for manoeuvre left for greenhouse gas emis­
sions intensive development paths in developing and 
newly industrialising countries. These countries need 
support with guaranteeing all of their people access 
to the basic essentials of a modern energy supply by 
2030. They need support that allows them to establish 
a sustainable energy infrastructure (AGECC, 2010). If 
they do not succeed, there is a risk of path dependen­
cies on high­carbon energy systems that would be very 
difficult and costly to overcome, and it would take dec­
ades to do so. The WBGU proposes the following steps, 
with progressive ambition levels:
 > Adapt concepts and strategies (low ambition level): 
The goal of overcoming energy poverty should be 
anchored more firmly in all developmental policy 
planning processes. The WBGU also proposes that 
the World Bank should develop a measurable, 
sophisticated strategy for low­carbon transforma­
tion, with the requirements of the 2 °C guard rail as 
the benchmark. During the implementation of a glo­
bal decarbonisation strategy, and in supporting the 
establishment of a low­carbon infrastructure, the 
regional development banks should also play a more 
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prominent role. Development cooperation should set 
concrete energy political targets on this basis.
 > Extend the use of modern energy in rural areas 
(medium ambition level): Stepping up the use of 
existing technologies is one way to quickly and inex­
pensively improve the quality of life for many hun­
dreds of millions of people. Efficiency optimisation 
in bioenergy use and switching to electricity and gas 
are crucial for overcoming energy poverty. Beyond 
poverty reduction, the European Development 
Cooperation should be guided systematically by the 
goal of low­carbon growth. Particularly in sub­Saha­
ran least developed countries and in southern Asia, 
it should contribute to the establishment of low­
carbon infrastructures, thereby supporting climate­
friendly growth in these countries, too.
 > Commence large-scale implementation soon, and 
accelerate it (high ambition level): The EU should 
offer strategic ‘decarbonisation partnerships’ to 
developing and newly industrialising countries for 
low­carbon energy system establishment that go far 
beyond the scope of current EU climate­related 
cooperative partnerships. The WBGU recommends 
rapid large­scale expansion of existing model 
projects, and improvement of the preconditions for 
expansion, acceleration and multiplication of further 
pilot projects. One concrete measure is the major 
extension of the Africa­Europe Energy Partnership, 
and the potential expansion of Desertec further 
south. The G20 should use the Rio+20 Conference to 
set a clear signal for this.
Bundle 6: Steering the World’s Rapid 
 Urbanisation towards Sustainability
Cities have a key function in the transformation pro­
cess, not least because around three­quarters of glo­
bal primary energy is used in urban areas – a rising 
trend. For currently rapidly growing urban structures, 
for example in Asia, high­carbon path dependencies 
must be prevented, as they would hinder low­carbon 
development for many decades. The issue of low­car­
bon urbanisation should therefore be as high up as pos­
sible on the international political agenda. The follow­
ing recommendations are important steps, but hardly 
enough to overcome this challenge. The WBGU pro­
poses the following measures, with progressive ambi­
tion levels:
 > Improve global communication and information (low 
ambition level): Initially, scientific and methodical 
foundations should be laid through the generation 
of regular progress reports on global urbanisation 
trends. Verifiable methods and standardised illustra­
tions of greenhouse gas intensity in cities, including 
all of the relevant protagonists and sectors, as well as 
direct and indirect emissions, should be developed. 
On the strength of these, UN Habitat should be 
upgraded, its current role with regard to the setting 
of standards should be expanded, and its staff sig­
nificantly increased, ultimately leading to further 
development into a central organisation for issues 
concerning sustainable urban development. 
 > Develop and implement technologies and planning for 
low-carbon cities (medium ambition level): Technolo­
gies and different ways of using renewable energies 
that are particularly suitable for use in urban areas 
should enjoy strong support in the form of special 
programmes (for example UN, World Bank or bilat­
eral governmental cooperation), within the scope of 
an ‘emergency plan for sustainable urbanisation’. 
Germany should become increasingly involved in 
international technology cooperation. In addition, 
the network of existing initiatives, cooperating cit­
ies, town twinning and protagonist associations 
should be improved. The adaptation to the unavoid­
able aspects of climate change should be one of the 
priorities here. Sustainable urban and regional plan­
ning are key issues that have so far been neglected 
in transformation management; they should play a 
bigger role in development cooperation and devel­
opment bank programmes (global training initiative, 
capacity increase). Moreover, the World Commission 
on Dams might be a role model for establishing a 
‘World Commission on Low­Carbon Urban Plan­
ning’. At this ambition level, the WBGU proposes the 
creation of a UN Specialised Agency for sustainable 
urbanisation, with a strong mandate, which UN 
Habitat would then become part of (bundle 10).
 > Large-scale launch of beacon projects and initiatives 
(high ambition level): The World Bank should sup­
port the implementation of particularly ambitious 
mitigation strategies that address the goal of ‘cli­
mate­neutral mega­cities’ to make investment sums 
in the region of two­digit billions possible. The 
WBGU also believes that Germany should call for a 
bundled European initiative for the development of 
actions with signal effect to promote low­carbon 
urbanisation in Asia. In Europe and in Germany, too, 
model regions and niches for change agents should 
be created to test ambitious concepts for low­carbon 
mobility and urban development. A model region 
could be the Berlin metropolitan area, in particular 
the area within the Berlin urban rail system (S­Bahn) 
circle line or within the scope of the International 
Building Exhibition 2020 (IBA). 
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Bundle 7: Advance Climate-Friendly Land-Use
Priority of any globally sustainable land­use policy 
must be securing the food supply for just under a billion 
mal­ and undernourished people. Furthermore, demand 
for agricultural produce is going to rise because of the 
growing share of animal products and the increase in 
biomass production for energy and industry. At the 
same time, competition for arable land, by now a rare 
commodity, will become even fiercer due to soil degra­
dation, water shortages and increasing climate impacts. 
The necessary mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions 
from land­use is an additional challenge. For these rea­
sons, the transformation of global land­use is one of the 
central tasks for the future.
 > Establish a ‘Global Commission for Sustainable Land-
Use’ (medium ambition level): Land­use must be 
given a significantly higher priority on the interna­
tional political agenda, and given a firmer institu­
tional footing. The WBGU reaffirms its previous rec­
ommendation of establishing a new ‘Global Commis­
sion for Sustainable Land­Use’ for this purpose, with 
extensive authority regarding integrated land­use, 
that would have to go far beyond issues concerning 
agriculture or food security (WBGU, 2010a). 
Amongst others, it should have the following 
responsibilities: determination of the current state 
of scientific knowledge regarding global land­use, 
setting objectives and launching initiatives to 
encourage climate­friendly eating habits, developing 
a minimum sustainability standard for all biomass 
products, and exploring options for global land man­
agement. 
Around a quarter of world­wide greenhouse gas emis­
sions can be attributed directly to agriculture and land­
use change. These emissions can be mitigated, but land­
use systems cannot become completely emissions­free, 
not least because of the nitrous oxide resulting from 
the use of nitrogen fertilisers. Without a significant 
contribution from land­use, climate stabilisation cannot 
succeed. Mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions should 
therefore become another core element of new strate­
gies for global, integrated land­use management. The 
most important starting points for this are forest man­
agement, agricultural production, and eating habits. In 
each of these three categories, the respective ambition 
level of the recommendations are noted: 
 > Stop deforestation and transition towards sustainable 
forest management: A central goal of climate­
friendly land­use is stopping deforestation and 
destructive forest­use. As an important platform for 
international dialogue, the REDD­plus Interim Part­
nership should be used for advancing the application 
of ecological and social minimum standards (low 
ambition level). In addition, the WBGU reaffirms its 
previous recommendation to extend the cooperation 
in the field of forest management with the major 
‘forest countries’ with a view to forming strategic 
alliances (WBGU, 2010b) for joint development and 
testing of the technical and administrative frame­
work conditions for sustainable forest management, 
and for REDD­plus­projects (medium ambition 
level). Particular attention should be paid to the pro­
tection and renaturation of (frequently forested) 
peatlands. The multilateral negotiations on a REDD­
plus regime within the scope of the UNFCCC should 
be intensified to create the global framework for a 
legally binding mechanism, and to provide the 
required long­term planning security (medium 
ambition level). 
 > Support climate-friendly agriculture: Global agricul­
ture must cover the expected rapid growth in demand 
for food, bioenergy and biomass as an industrial 
feedstock in a sustainable manner, and at the same 
time significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Development policy should address this challenge, 
and encourage investment and incentive structures 
aiming for a sustainable, climate­friendly intensifi­
cation of agriculture. One goal should also be the 
halving of agricultural post­harvest losses by the 
middle of the century. Equally, an international con­
sensus on a minimum standard for sustainable 
bioenergy production should soon be reached 
(medium ambition level; WBGU, 2010a). The WBGU 
again emphasises not least the major significance of 
a rapid and more extensive liberalisation of global 
agricultural trade under the World Trade Organisa­
tion (WTO). The agricultural subsidies in the EU and 
the other OECD countries should soon be reduced 
further, and market access for developing countries 
should be improved. Negative impacts of liberalisa­
tion on poorer developing countries should be offset 
by international financial support (high ambition 
level).
 > Promote climate-friendly eating habits: One priority 
that demands critical attention, apart from food 
wasted in households, are the changing eating habits 
in favour of animal products. In total, around three­
quarters of agricultural land is already dedicated to 
livestock production, seen as the most dynamic fac­
tor in land­use alongside population growth. Suc­
cessfully steering demand away from this would 
have a major transformative impact, and is therefore 
considered ‘high ambition level’. The WBGU recom­
mends stepping up education, together with food 
labelling identifying the environmental impact, as 
measures to be speedily implemented. Canteens run 
by public authorities should schedule one or two 
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meat­free days a week by way of setting an example. 
EU subsidies supporting livestock production should 
be phased out as quickly as possible. Due to the sub­
stantial leverage of these impacts, the option of 
including the emissions intensity of foodstuffs as a 
criterion in the taxation of agricultural products 
within the scope of a tax reform should be examined. 
Bundle 8: Encourage and Accelerate Investments 
into a Low-Carbon Future
The transformation into a climate­friendly society 
needs substantial additional investments in sustain­
able energy and land­use systems (several hundred bil­
lion US$ per year). State policies must therefore aim 
to make investment into low­carbon technologies more 
attractive, and to abolish current misguided incentives 
and investment barriers. The ambition levels of the rec­
ommendations in the following four areas depend on 
the level of development of the respective countries 
(industrialised, newly industrialising, or developing), 
and on the stringency of their political implementation, 
so ambition levels are not explicitly identified: 
 > Provide stable framework conditions for climate-
friendly investments: The most important precondi­
tion for investments into low­carbon technologies 
and infrastructures are long­term, stable climate and 
energy policy framework conditions with ambitious 
targets, for example within the scope of climate pro­
tection legislation or a decarbonisation strategy. 
Apart from carbon pricing and phasing out of subsi­
dies for fossil energy carriers (bundle 2), technol­
ogy­specific funding should be granted, and binding 
efficiency standards for buildings, vehicles and 
energy consuming products should be introduced, or 
become more stringent. In the interim, tax incen­
tives, for example for investments in sustainability 
and sustainable assets, should be an additional 
measure for a certain period of time. 
 > Open up new financing sources at state level: Ambi­
tious carbon pricing and the phasing out of subsidies 
are important financing sources for the transforma­
tion. Of further relevance for developing and newly 
industrialising countries are financial transfers 
within the scope of the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). To make these avail­
able, the Green Climate Fund should immediately be 
turned into a binding mechanism, which offers 
grants with out repayment. The fund should finance 
mitigation measures in developing and newly indus­
trialising countries which are strategically integrated 
into decarbonisation road maps. Grants for mitiga­
tion projects in developing countries funded by 
existing multilateral funds should also be increased. 
The funds for mitigation, adaptation, technology 
transfer and capacity­building that have already 
been agreed by the industrialised countries as avail­
able from 2020 onwards should be in addition to 
Official Development Assistance, and exceed US$ 
100 billion per year. Levies on international shipping 
and aviation and the introduction of a tax on inter­
national financial transactions could generate fur­
ther funds. Potentially, a global emissions trading 
system (bundle 2) could become an international 
financing instrument for the transformation.
 > Strengthen mechanisms to encourage private invest-
ment: A large part of the investments will have to 
come from non­governmental sources. For many 
countries, we can assume that, due to historically 
low net investments but high private profits, consid­
erable private capital exists; for Germany, empiri­
cally sound data is available to prove this. The release 
of these funds should be stimulated through suitable 
framework conditions and government measures to 
raise the rate of return for investments (for example 
low­interest loans), and to minimise the risks (for 
example credit guarantees). At national or EU level, 
the WBGU advocates the establishment of national 
Green Investment Banks to consolidate existing 
grants. For institutional investors with a long­term 
investment horizon (for example pension funds and 
insurance companies) the Green Investment Banks 
should offer attractive terms. To strengthen venture 
and equity capital markets, favourable taxation 
could be introduced, or the Green Investment Banks 
could establish new Venture Capital Funds. The 
development banks should extend their regular 
lending in the field of renewable energies and energy 
efficiency, and expand it through the jointly financed 
climate investment fund, not least in order to 
encourage additional, private investment through 
leverage. Existing microfinancing approaches in Ger­
man development cooperation to promote decen­
tralised energy generation from renewable sources 
should be increased. Concerning the Clean Develop­
ment Mechanism (CDM), the WBGU recommends 
the future limiting of this mechanism to the Least 
Developed Countries, enhancing the development 
aspect, and the inclusion of programme­based and 
sectoral measures. 
 > Encourage new business models: The high initial 
investment burden for individual investors could be 
shared if traditional seller­buyer business models 
were turned into business models with new financ­
ing and ownership structures. These would allow 
businesses to offer their customers combined pack­
ages in certain areas (for example mobility, housing, 
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production and consumption) that include services 
as well as real assets, instead of just tangible goods. 
Car sharing and energy contracting provided by 
energy service companies are examples of this. 
Cooperative societies are also suitable for financing 
larger investments. To have a major transformative 
impact, new business models such as these must 
become more widely accepted, and more widely 
established. 
Bundle 9: International Climate and Energy 
Policy
As infrastructures for energy generation, transport and 
production have a long lifetime, any current conversion 
and extension projects must already be geared towards 
climate protection. As most of the additional energy 
infrastructures are expected to be built in develop­
ing and newly industrialising countries, a climate pro­
tection scheme that is limited to the more prosperous 
countries cannot solve the problem. Global cooperation 
is therefore necessary to ensure that the requisite funds 
for climate­friendly development are also available to 
poorer countries, and that all countries have access 
to climate protection technologies and the respective 
expert knowledge. International climate and energy 
policy is the forum for achieving a global consensus 
on transformation targets and ambitions. There is also 
no better alternative for negotiations on balancing glo­
bal equity than the UN level. Although some opera­
tive goals like the sharing of climate protection related 
knowledge and technologies can be advanced on a sub­
global level, the strengthening and institutionalisation 
of the fragmented international energy policy, and a 
convergence of climate policies, should nevertheless be 
systematically pursued to accelerate the technological 
shift.
International Climate Policy
The gap between the claims and the reality of interna­
tional climate policy is widening. In the agreements of 
the Cancún Climate Conference, a restriction of global 
warming to less than 2 °C above the pre­industrial level 
is recognized as the long­term goal, the urgent need for 
action is identified, and a review process is initiated. 
An effective regime with internationally binding obli­
gations on emissions targets, on the other hand, seems 
to have been put on the back­burner. Currently, climate 
protection depends on the voluntary pledges for limit­
ing emissions on the part of the states. These pledges 
altogether are currently not enough to achieve compli­
ance with the 2 °C guard rail. The WBGU proposes the 
following steps for an international climate policy, each 
with progressive ambition levels: 
 > Ambitious unilateral targets within a pledge and 
review system (low ambition level): An absolute min­
imum should be higher mitigation target ambitions 
on the part of the states within the scope of a pledge 
and review system (voluntary, internationally veri­
fied climate protection measures and payments) to a 
level that is compatible with observing the 2 °C guard 
rail. The WBGU recommends that German and EU 
mitigation levels should be more or less in line with 
the budget approach proposed by the WBGU (2009). 
Compliance with the 2 °C guard rail requires global 
greenhouse gas emissions of no more than 44 Gt CO2 
eq per year by 2020. By 2020, in accordance with its 
share of the global population figures, Germany 
would have to reduce its emissions by 56 % com­
pared to 1990. It could meet this demand through a 
reduction of its own emissions, stocked up with 
transferred funds. For example, domestic emissions 
could be reduced by around 40 %, offsets or CDM 
could also play a small part in this, the remainder 
would be covered by finance and technology trans­
fers amounting to at least € 4–8 billion annually, 
which would allow an additional mitigation of 
0.2 Gt CO2eq annually in other countries. The level 
of reduction the whole of the EU is responsible for 
would be around 40 %, around 30 % of which could 
be realised within the region, plus annual financing 
and technology transfers worth around € 11–22 bil­
lion for mitigation measures in other countries. 
These amounts do not include finance and technol­
ogy transfers for adaptation to climate change or 
compensation for climate damages. On the other 
hand, to allow the global climate protection goal to 
be met, countries where emissions are still low, but 
which are currently on a dynamic growth path, 
would have to aim for development paths with emis­
sions levels significantly lower than they would be if 
the global budget were to be applied equally per­
capita, by as early as 2020. They should be sup­
ported in this in the form of the above mentioned 
finance and technology transfers from high emission 
countries. During this process, the physically 
achieved emission reductions should always be in 
line with the respective countries’ mitigation poten­
tials. The development of appropriate decarbonisa­
tion road maps should be a precondition for access to 
the Green Climate Fund. The technology mechanism 
agreed in Cancún offers a very good starting point 
for a global offensive to promote the spread of cli­
mate­friendly technologies, and should be put into 
operation as soon as possible. All of the described 
aspects of international technology transfers should 
be taken into account here. Parallel to this, Germany 
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and the EU should become actively involved in 
determining the vital long­term global emissions tar­
get. 
 > Pioneer coalitions for mandatory climate protection 
(medium ambition level): Many states are prepared 
to go beyond pledge and review. Through coalitions, 
both within the framework of the UN negotiation 
process and independent of it, the EU should con­
tribute to reaching ambitious partial agreements on 
climate protection. These kinds of sub­global alli­
ances could, for example, play an important role in 
forest protection, the establishment of climate­
friendly infrastructures, or help to establish accept­
ance of emissions trading systems. Beyond these 
alliances, however, the EU should also increasingly 
seek coalitions for a binding treaty within the scope 
of the UNFCCC. Apart from unconditionally and 
stringently raising its own mitigation targets, the EU 
should also show a clear commitment to continua­
tion and further development of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 > Comprehensive mandatory global climate protection 
regime (high ambition level): The ultimate goal of 
international climate policy should be a comprehen­
sive, binding agreement for global emissions restric­
tion. In its budget approach, the WBGU (2009) out­
lined the basic elements of such a treaty: a 2 °C guard 
rail compatible maximum global budget for CO2 
emissions from fossil sources would be allocated 
across all countries on an equal per­capita basis. All 
countries should agree to present internationally 
verifiable decarbonisation road maps that clearly 
state the planned national emissions path up to 
2050. In the WBGU’s view, CO2 from non­fossil 
sources and other greenhouse gases should be gov­
erned by separate regulations to achieve a more 
direct impact. The WBGU has repeatedly proposed 
an independent international agreement for the pro­
tection of terrestrial carbon stocks (WBGU, 2004). 
Priority should here be given to the stopping of 
deforestation in the developing countries (bundle 7). 
Mitigation of fluorinated greenhouse gases could be 
accelerated and simplified through a special agree­
ment along the lines of the Montreal Protocol 
(WBGU, 2009). As far as the as yet unregulated, 
short­lived radiative forcing substances such as soot 
particles and ozone­forming gases are concerned, 
there could be separate agreements directly related 
to national air pollution control. 
International Energy Policy
The most important objectives of the transformation of 
global energy use towards climate­friendliness are (1) 
limiting final energy demand whilst at the same time 
ensuring access to modern, sustainable energy services 
for all people, (2) the decarbonisation of the energy 
supply, and (3) the introduction of new, low­carbon 
technologies in the transport sector, in buildings tech­
nology, and in industry. One important starting point 
for the relevant international energy and technology 
policies is the agreement of norms and the setting of 
standards. Beyond this, international cooperation can 
also accelerate the development of key technologies for 
the transformation. Ultimately, cooperation plays an 
important role in breaking down the barriers obstruct­
ing a global diffusion of technologies for a low­car­
bon development. Currently, there is a lack of legal and 
institutional foundations for an effective international 
energy policy for the transformation. The WBGU rec­
ommends building upon existing organisations to grad­
ually establish global sustainable energy governance, 
and proposes the following steps, with progressive 
ambition levels:
 > Open up IEA, consolidate and strengthen IRENA (low 
ambition level): The International Energy Agency 
(IEA) is an influential, international energy institu­
tion. However, membership, role and energy politi­
cal objectives regarding a sustainable energy policy 
have so far been restricted. The IEA’s policies should 
focus more on sustainable energy use and sustain­
able energy systems, methods should be made more 
transparent, and access for non­OECD countries 
should be accelerated. The International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA), established in 2009, can 
take on the important task of acting as the global 
voice for the diffusion of renewable energies and the 
requisite industries in all country groups in future. 
The WBGU recommends continuing to actively sup­
port the establishment of IRENA. In future, IRENA 
should play a major role worldwide with regards to 
energy issues to advance the increased use of renew­
able energies, on par and in cooperation with exist­
ing organisations in the field and the civil society.
 > Upgrade UN-Energy and strengthen sustainable 
energy policies within the UN system (medium ambi-
tion level): The link between energy policies and 
development assistance policies on a global level has 
long been neglected. The WBGU therefore recom­
mends to upgrade UN­Energy to the level of official 
UN programme. The UN general assembly has 
declared 2012 the ‘International Year for Sustainable 
Energy for All’. This should be utilised to agree 
access to modern energy services by 2030 for all 
people as an additional Millennium Development 
Goal.
 > Make IRENA the central organisation for global sus-
tainable energy policies (high ambition level): IRENA’s 
mandate should be extended to encompass all 
energy systems and low­carbon energy options, 
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including issues regarding system integration and 
energy efficiency on the demand side. Step by step, 
IRENA could then be developed further into an 
International Sustainable Energy Agency (WBGU, 
2004). The federal government should actively sup­
port turning IRENA into one of the central organisa­
tions for energy policy in the long­term, that can 
effectively advance the global transformation of 
energy systems.
 > Use the G20 as the driving force for a sustainable glo-
bal energy and climate policy (high ambition level): 
Considering the urgency of the global energy shift, 
political willingness to act must significantly 
increase, and political leaders must be mobilised. As 
an alliance of the economically and politically lead­
ing industrialised and newly industrialising coun­
tries, which together cause approx. 80 % of global 
greenhouse gas emissions, the G20 occupies a prom­
inent position. The German federal government 
should encourage the G20 in their determined pur­
suit of a sustainable energy political agenda, and the 
creation of the institutional foundations required for 
effective global cooperation. 
Bundle 10: Pursue a Revolution in International 
Cooperation 
The world desperately needs a higher level of inter­
national cooperation if climate­ and environmentally­
friendly global development is to be achieved in the 
long­term. Considering this aspect, the WBGU recom­
mends:
1. Using the Rio+20 Conference as a chance for set­
ting the course of international environmental and 
developmental policy towards improved coopera­
tion and climate­friendliness. 
2. The conference should therefore pave the way for 
a comprehensive cooperative global governance 
architecture, without which a worldwide transfor­
mation to sustainability cannot succeed.
International Environmental and Developmental 
Policy in Context with the Rio+20 Conference
The UN Conference on Sustainable Development 
(Rio+20 Conference) scheduled for 2012 provides an 
excellent opportunity for elaborating international 
environmental and developmental policies. In view of 
the background provided by the two key issues defined 
for the conference, ‘Green Economy in the Context of 
Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication’, 
and ‘Institutional Framework for Sustainable Develop­
ment’, the least the WBGU would expect is the adop­
tion of a global ‘Green Economy Roadmap’, and pro­
found institutional reforms within the scope of the UN.
 > Green Economy Roadmap and institutional reforms 
(low ambition level): With the ‘Green Economy 
Report’ presented by UNEP in 2011, the interna­
tional community gathering in Rio has been pro­
vided with a suitable and timely basis for discussion 
and decision­making with regards to binding agree­
ments. The WBGU believes that a binding ‘UN Green 
Economy Roadmap’ with specific targets in terms of 
both content and timing should be decided in Rio, to 
be implemented within the framework of national 
Green Economy Strategies that include verifiable 
indicators by 2030. The focus should be on low­car­
bon oriented, quantifiable targets and secondary 
targets, as these have proven successful in the con­
text of the Millennium Development Goals for the 
conversion of energy systems, and on issues of 
urban development and sustainable land­use. Con­
currently, poverty eradication strategies and espe­
cially the further implementation of the MDGs 
should be integrated into the higher­ranking Green 
Economy Roadmap in a way that explicitly allows 
direct focusing on the demands of the transforma­
tion. Key starting points for this are the securing of 
access to modern forms of energy for all people, and 
an improved food supply through the sustainable 
intensification of agriculture. As of now, the multi­
lateral institutions involved in developmental pol­
icy­making should be coherently guided in their 
operative strategies by the target systems serving 
poverty reduction and low­carbon development.
 The implementation of the UN Green Economy 
Roadmap should also be supported by long over­
due institutional reforms. The WBGU reaffirms its 
recommendation that UNEP should be politically 
upgraded and expanded to a UN Specialised Agency 
under particular consideration of the developmen­
tal dimension of international environmental policy. 
The Rio+20 Conference is also an opportunity to lay 
the groundwork for more fundamental reforms of 
the UN’s development assistance political architec­
ture.
 > Fundamental reform of multilateral environmental 
and developmental policy (medium ambition level): 
An ambitious summit result would be a comprehen­
sive modification of the multilateral environmental 
and developmental architecture in line with the 
transformation. In the context of the Rio+20 Confer­
ence, both the German federal government and the 
EU should initiate a process aimed at prompt trans­
formation of the major operative international 
development agencies (such as the World Bank, 
regional banks, UNDP, UNIDO) into change agents 
for low­carbon transformation. The WBGU takes its 
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inspiration here from the 2006 reform proposals 
presented by the High­Level Panel on System­wide 
Coherence, and also recommends that these are 
geared explicitly towards an environment­ and cli­
mate­friendly developmental policy. 
 In addition, system­wide coherence, taking the 
transformation into account, demands closure of 
the huge governance gaps in the key transforma­
tion fields of energy, urbanisation and land­use on 
an international level (bundles 6, 7 and 9), and the 
gradual abolition of transformation impeding and 
expensive parallel structures. The Rio+20 Confer­
ence should task the standard multilateral organi­
sations with the drafting of concrete restructuring 
plans, to be presented to the member states by 2014 
for decision­making. The benchmark guiding all 
these actions should be compliance with the inter­
national climate policy’s 2 °C guard rail. New organi­
sations would only be established if the demand for 
global regulation in the three transformation fields 
could not be satisfied within the foreseeable future 
through the reorganisation of already existing struc­
tures.
 > United Nations 2.0 (high ambition level): Considering 
the scale of the described challenges of the transfor­
mation, the WBGU believes that there are plenty of 
arguments for an even more radical approach that 
would go beyond the existing UN architecture, a 
fundamental restructuring of the organisation. Cur­
rently, this does not seem feasible in political terms, 
as it would need a political leadership that is guided 
by a profound realisation of vital global necessities, 
for example, in the UN Security Council as well as 
other industrialised and newly industrialising coun­
tries. If this were the case, a reform should start with 
a review of the UN Charter, and aim for a completely 
restructured United Nations organisation. Its pur­
pose would be to take the planetary guard rails into 
account as a guiding principle that governs UN 
actions, and the pursuit of which would guarantee 
protection of climate and environment as much as 
peace, security and development.
 The Rio+20 Conference should at least admit to this 
kind of vision, and initiate an intergovernmental 
consultation process aimed at substantially extend­
ing the UN Charter. The drawing up of a ’Charter 
for Sustainable Development’ that codifies the joint 
responsibilities and duties of all states and their (glo­
bal) citizens regarding the protection of the Earth 
system would be a significant step towards a glo­
bal social contract. This could form the basis for a 
contemporary review of the UN – for example the 
establishment of a ‘Council for Sustainable Devel­
opment’, on par with the Security Council, reflect­
ing a 21st century world of states – which would be 
a formal expression of the normative need for a glo­
bal we­identity. 
Extensive Global Governance Architecture for the 
Transformation
A generally high level of international cooperation, glo­
bal coordination and political pro­activeness are cen­
tral conditions for the success of the transformation. 
The global development dynamics trend reversal that is 
needed will therefore not be achievable without com­
prehensive, long­term oriented international regula­
tory policies with an equitable world order as its goal. In 
the following, the WBGU outlines three steps with pro­
gressive ambition levels on the path towards the neces­
sary ‘revolution in global cooperation’.
 > Revitalised multilateralism (low ambition level): Inev­
itably, non­cooperation regarding central issues of 
global environmental and climate change leads to an 
escalation of conflicting interests and distributional 
conflicts. To prevent this, the key actors of world 
politics must find a new mode of international diplo­
macy as soon as possible. In the view of the WBGU, 
the G20 are generally suitable for handling this task, 
as they not only carry a high level of climate political 
responsibility, but also have correspondingly high 
potentials for transformation. The WBGU therefore 
recommends working towards the goal of a global 
transformation road map within the scope of the 
G20, or a comparable sub­global constellation. The 
benchmark for the practical decisions this kind of 
plan might include should at the very least be a G20 
crisis management in the context of the global finan­
cial crisis. The interests of smaller and poorer devel­
oping countries would have to be taken into account 
in a plausible way to allow for a gradual pro­trans­
formation mobilisation across the international com­
munity as a whole. The German federal government 
and the European Union should, through credible 
leadership, also aim for a high level of ambition as far 
as this joint cause is concerned, and meet the other 
states with a committed and mediating attitude. The 
G20 could then even become the driving force 
behind modernising the entire UN system.
 > Transformative global infrastructure development 
(medium ambition level): The transformation focuses 
on three fundamental national and global economy 
‘infrastructures’: the energy systems, urban areas, 
and land­use systems. Compliance with the 2 °C 
guard rail is only possible if we have changed our 
course towards low­carbon in all three of these 
transformation fields by 2020. However, all three 
fields lack problem­adequate global governance 
mechanisms to coordinate global and national trans­
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formation goals, develop the corresponding indica­
tors and routes for transformation, and define suit­
able incentive systems.
 Accordingly, the WBGU recommends that suitably 
capable international organisations are either author­
ised to act, or newly established and provided with 
adequate resources. One important point of refer­
ence is provided by the UNFCCC, particularly in view 
of the emissions restrictions that have been negoti­
ated there. The mechanisms that were additionally 
agreed upon, for example on the transfer of technol­
ogy or forest protection, should be developed and 
implemented quickly (bundles 7 and 9). In the trans­
formation field of energy, the German federal gov­
ernment should actively support a shift in the objec­
tives of the IEA towards sustainable energy policies, 
the improvement of organisation accessibility for 
developing countries, the strengthening of IRENA as 
the driving force behind the international diffusion 
of regenerative energies, and the upgrading of the 
status of UN­Energy (bundle 9). Regarding urbani­
sation (bundle 6) and global land­use (bundle 7), the 
WBGU initially recommends the establishment of a 
‘World Commission for Low­Carbon Urban Devel­
opment’ and a ‘Global Commission for Sustainable 
Land­Use’. On the strength of the findings of the 
latter commission, the FAO should then develop a 
suitable range of instruments to ensure the climate 
friendliness of national and global land­use paths. 
Due to the impact of the rapid urbanisation on cli­
mate protection, and the fact that the UN­Habitat 
programme is not adequately equipped to deal with 
this aspect, the WBGU also recommends the estab­
lishment of a UN Specialised Agency for sustainable 
urbanisation with a strong mandate (bundle 6).
 > Equitable new global system (high ambition level): In 
accordance with the global social contract for sus­
tainability, the ultimate goal of a revised global gov­
ernance architecture must be the creation of a new, 
equitable global system. Its institutions must put the 
international community in a position that leaves 
them capable of appreciating the complex interde­
pendencies of the global society within the scope 
determined by the limits imposed by our planet, as 
soon as within the first half of the 21st century, to 
allow for timely and adequate response. This 
demanding process is comparable with the embed­
ding of market dynamics in constitutional states, 
democracies and welfare states during the last great 
transformation into an industrialised society, which 
led to the stabilisation and acceptance of this new 
form of society in the first place.
 Politically, this requires a historically unprecedented 
transcending of established sovereignty concepts 
and purely power­driven global politics in favour of 
ensuring the long­term availability of global com­
mons. Sustainable strategies and concepts must be 
developed for this in order to embed sustainable glo­
bal development in transnational democratic struc­
tures, to formulate answers to the 21st century 
questions regarding global equity and distribution of 
resources, and, not least, to be able to claim world­
wide legitimacy. 
 This means concrete academic search processes, for 
example by global governance theoreticians, inter­
national law experts, cosmopolitans, transnational­
ists and philosophers of justice to formulate legit­
imate and realisable norms, rules and procedures 
which, all together, could form the basis of an ideal 
global social contract. This would be something of 
a quantum leap for civilisation, on par for example 
with the transition of the feudal systems to consti­
tutional states and democracy. Comparably to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, however, it 
should in principle also be possible to reach a univer­
sal consensus regarding human civilisation’s ability 
to survive within the natural boundaries imposed by 
planet Earth. This necessarily presupposes an exten­
sive ‘Global Enlightenment’, which must be aimed 
towards promoting cooperative behaviour and accel­
erating the formation of relevant global social stand­
ards and debate. The WBGU strongly advises the 
use of the coming Rio+20 Conference as a historic 
chance for such an enlightenment process. A corre­
sponding summit declaration could serve as a future 
reference framework and point of reference for glo­
bal enlightenment, and help to initiate an effective, 
long­term paradigm shift.
Synthesis of Measures 
In the face of the imminent challenge, policy­making 
should pave the way for several of the steps with a high 
level of ambition, even if these currently still appear to 
be of a rather visionary nature. For example, a climate 
policy that focuses primarily on measures with the low­
est level of ambition is hardly likely to comply with the 
2 °C guard rail. Ultimately, a great number of demand­
ing measures will be required to make it possible for the 
transformation to succeed. 
The bundles of measures must also be put together 
wisely. The combination possibilities describe a contin­
uum across different operating levels: at one end, there 
are polycentric transformation approaches at different 
levels of ambition, with an initially limited geographical 
or sectoral extent, that rely on a ‘concurrence of mul­
tiple change’ to create an irreversible general momen­
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tum. At the other end are strategies aimed at the highest 
level of ambition, and ultimately at the establishment 
of a comprehensive global architecture for the transi­
tion into a low­carbon society. In particular, the global 
approach is aimed at the enforcement of a legally bind­
ing world climate agreement to establish an upper limit 
for global emissions and instruments for global emis­
sions trading, and at multilateral mechanisms for the 
climate­friendly transformation of urbanisation, land­
use, and the energy systems. Along this continuum, 
there is a wide range of choices. Particularly ambitious, 
polycentric transformation policies can work in differ­
ent ways:
 > Geopolitics – forming sub-global alliances: To acceler­
ate the transformation, the forging of intergovern­
mental alliances between climate pioneers should be 
increased. For Germany and the EU, the major newly 
industrialising countries China, India and Brazil are 
particularly important in this respect. Suitable topics 
would be the promotion of renewable energies or 
emissions trading, areas in which pioneer partner­
ships could set standards and establish structures 
that should gradually be ‘globalised’. These alliances 
should also serve the discussion on a fair burden­
sharing of decarbonisation measures. 
 > Establish incentive systems for dynamic protagonists 
in the transformation fields: In the transformation 
fields, positive incentive systems for dynamic pro­
tagonists could speed up the low­carbon transforma­
tion. Thus, generously funded programmes for low­
carbon investment projects by the World Bank and 
by regional development banks could provide con­
siderable incentives for leaving the established fossil 
development path. Substantial loan programmes for 
a competition to identify and support the 10 or 20 
most visionary models for the building of low­car­
bon cities in developing or industrialising countries 
could initiate or accelerate search processes in that 
direction. This path could be followed independent 
of the progress of geopolitical alliances.
 > Focus on transformation barriers: One particularly 
difficult obstacle the transformation must overcome 
is presented by the global annual subsidies for fossil 
energy carriers in the region of three­digit billion 
figure amounts. A politically supported international 
alliance of change agents in economy, civil society 
and science could contribute to breaking down this 
barrier impeding progress towards sustainability.
This outline of polycentric transformation strategies 
clearly shows the extensive scope of options for inno­
vative paths. The ten bundles of measures presented by 
the WBGU are representative of the wide spectrum of 
strategies available to us. The 2 °C guard rail is the most 
important benchmark any measures have to consider. 
To stay credible, the European Union should, as far as 
emissions reductions are concerned, agree on the rais­
ing of its own reduction target to at least 30 % for the 
year 2020, complemented by substantial, legally bind­
ing international climate protection financing commit­
ments. 
The Role of the Knowledge Society in the 
 Transformation Process: Recommendations for 
Research and Education
Social Renewal by Comprehension
Research and education are going to play a central 
role during the requisite transformation process, as 
the realisation of the necessity for restructuring the 
world economy has been triggered mainly by scientific 
knowledge. Society should therefore decide on actions 
that are not a direct response to recently experienced 
events, but motivated by foresight and precaution. For 
this purpose, the debate between science, politics and 
society should be far more structured, more obligatory, 
and livelier, to ensure a constructive discourse about 
the best ways to achieve sustainability. Research and 
education that assume participation can make a deci­
sive contribution to this.
The transformation is a societal search process that 
should be supported by experts. In collaboration with 
politics, the economy, and society, research and educa­
tion are tasked with developing visions for a low­car­
bon society, exploring different development paths, and 
developing sustainable technological and social innova­
tions. Concurrently, the social framework for a culture 
of participation should be strengthened. To this end, 
education should enable people to develop an aware­
ness of current problems, to learn systemic thinking, 
and to act responsibly. Promoting research and educa­
tion is therefore a key task for the modern, proactive 
state, which should provide targeted support for the 
integration of the scientific expert community into the 
social contract.
The Four Transformative Pillars of the Knowledge 
Society
To clarify the different roles research and education 
play in the transformation process, the WBGU sug­
gests differentiation between ‘transformation research’ 
and ‘transformation education’ on the one hand, and 
‘transformative research’ and ‘transformative educa­
tion’ on the other hand. The subject of transformation 
research or transformation education is the transforma­
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tion as such, and the conditions needed for realising it. 
Transformative research or transformative education is 
tasked with advancing the transformation process with 
the aid of specific information, methods and technolo­
gies (fig. 3). 
Transformation Research 
The WBGU proposes the establishment of a new sci­
entific discipline, ‘transformation research’ (Tr), which 
specifically addresses the future challenge of transfor­
mation realisation. This discipline explores transitory 
processes in order to come to conclusions on the factors 
and causal relations of transformation processes. Exam­
ples from history could provide the basis for analys­
ing observed transformative moments. One such exam­
ple would be the integration of the steam engine into 
the mechanisation of cotton processing around 1785. 
This one, seemingly innocuous step led to a rapid rise 
in textile production efficiency, which in turn led to a 
rise in the demand for raw materials, thus (co­)trigger­
ing the Industrial Revolution. It was, though, embed­
ded in a complex causal network of further factors and 
historically evolved framework conditions. This equally 
applies to transformations at another level, for example 
the normatively motivated abolition of slavery. Trans­
formation research should draw conclusions for the 
transformation to sustainability based on an under­
standing of the decisive dynamics of such processes, 
their conditions and interdependencies. It is important 
here to learn how to anticipate acceleration moments 
in order to create the relevant favourable framework 
conditions. One particular challenge for transforma­
tion research is the creation of a network of social, nat­
ural and engineering sciences in order to understand 
the interaction between society, the Earth system, and 
technological development. 
Transformative Research 
The WBGU uses the expression transformative research 
(tR) to describe research that actively advances the 
transformation. Transformative research supports 
transformation processes with specific innovations 
in the relevant sectors. It encompasses, for example, 
consumer research, which is needed for the develop­
ment of new business models such as the shared use 
of resource­intensive infrastructures, and research for 
technological innovations like efficiency technolo­
gies. Transformative research can have a wider trans­
formative impact if, as of a certain development stage, 
development activities for low­carbon innovations are 
embedded into a systemic context, their impact on cli­
mate and sustainability is verified, and they reflect 
the conditions required for transformative impact. 
So  although achieving higher degrees of efficiency in 
photovoltaics – for example through development of 
new, different material combinations – is necessary, 
the aspect of global usability should also be taken 
into account at the earliest possible stage. This also 
applies to the development of new investment mod­
els for energy efficient technologies. Their intercultural 
transferability should also be considered at an early 
stage, yet equally, attention should be paid to measures 
against rebound effects and potential path dependen­
cies. Transformative research therefore encompasses 
a spectrum that reaches from purely discipline­based 
to system­based research. This means that the appli­
cation­oriented exploration of highly­efficient stor­
age technologies can have as much of a transformative 
impact as an interdisciplinary project for the develop­
ment and implementation of SuperSmart Grids. 
The ongoing exchange of information between both 
types of research leads to ‘cross­fertilisation’, and in 
turn with society, the economy, and politics, thus offer­
ing the best possible support to the transformation. 
Absolutely crucial for this is a higher level of science 
communication, including the targeted utilisation of 
the new media. This provides a wide range of opportu­
nities for interactive, participative shaping of the social 
dialogue. 
In this context, the education sector must also take 
on more responsibility. As an important channel of 
knowledge communication, education provides the 
foundations for each individual’s knowledge­based 
self­concept, thereby creating the social preconditions 
needed for the transformation. Transformation research 
should be linked closely to transformation education. 
Categories and interaction are described in the follow­
ing.
transformative
education (tE)
transformation
education (Te)
transformative
research (tR)
transformation
research (Tr)
Figure 3
Typification of transformation research and education.
Source: WBGU
23
Transformation Education
Transformation education (Te) makes the scientific 
findings of transformation research available to soci­
ety. As ‘education for participation’, it critically reflects 
on the requisite basic requirements – like a thorough 
understanding of the pressure to act, and a global sense 
of responsibility – and generates a systemic awareness 
of the different action paths. It is especially about com­
munication of knowledge at the interface of engineer­
ing, social and Earth system sciences. Suitable narra­
tives of change should be developed, so that these 
can be fed into everyday discourse through creative 
forms of knowledge communication, and develop fur­
ther scope there. Through a focus on change agents, an 
awareness of the preconditions for the transformation 
can be firmly ensconced in education. Change can only 
be imagined through a dynamic view of the world. In 
view of this, educational institutes should increasingly 
teach sustainability­oriented knowledge, and the skills 
necessary for lifelong learning and systemic thinking. 
This also includes a better understanding of the scien­
tific research process, its possibilities, and its limits.
Transformative Education
Transformative education (tE) generates an under­
standing of action paths and possible solutions. Related 
educational content would, for example, be innovations 
that are likely to have transformative impact, or that 
have already had a transformative impact. The cur­
rent stage of research should be made understandable, 
and should be actively shared with society. To facilitate 
this, education should, if possible, attempt to establish 
a relation to the key factors of the transformation. For 
example, renewable energies could be a topic in phys­
ics lessons, whilst concurrently, international energy 
partnerships are discussed in the social science sub­
jects. Geography lessons might be about, for exam­
ple, low­carbon cities. Transformative education should 
also be responsible for creating a basic general prob­
lem awareness, which is also reflected in theme­spe­
cific educational opportunities. In accordance with this, 
the boundaries between the different disciplines should 
be less strict, and comprehension of the broader, inter­
disciplinary and global contexts should be strived for. 
In economics, for example, global material flows, from 
resources to waste products such as CO2, could be ana­
lysed. So the lesson would be about embedding the 
economy into the planetary boundaries. 
Both types of education should regard society as a 
stakeholder in the transformation process, with the aim 
of also allowing participation in the education process 
itself in the future. People can only comprehend the 
transformative power of their actions if they see them­
selves as an active factor. Respective educational struc­
tures are an essential precondition for this.
Current Research Programmes
Currently, a number of programmes with implicit trans­
formation relevance are running both at German fed­
eral republic and EU level. The WBGU analyses relevant 
programmes in its report. Certain criteria are applied, 
such as, for example, ‘international scope’ and ‘inter­
disciplinarity’, to show the positive trends apparent in 
the different research programmes, but also to iden­
tify their weaknesses. On the basis of this analysis, the 
WBGU concludes that research policy in the individ­
ual areas, like urbanisation and land­use, is already 
addressing the challenges posed by the transforma­
tion through innovative research agendas and pro­
grammes, frequently in a low­carbon context, even 
though funding is inadequate. In many cases, interdis­
ciplinarity, too, has already been admitted into research 
programmes, although overall, incentive structures to 
encourage interdisciplinarity are as yet insufficient. As 
far as the factors that are needed for transformation 
acceleration are concerned, many research grants are 
already focusing on innovation, which is a very wel­
come sign. Nevertheless, the emphasis is too much on 
the purely technical side, in comparison with social 
conditions and the corresponding systemic approaches, 
which is also why too much attention is paid to supply 
rather than demand. 
Recommendations
Considering the identified challenges for research and 
education and the analyses carried out, the WBGU has 
reached the following conclusions in terms of recom­
mendations. 
Research
 > Science and research should dedicate themselves 
even more to the low­carbon transformation within 
the context of sustainability. Research should focus 
more on transformation­relevant issues and subjects 
and the new field of transformation research. At the 
same time, it should increasingly meet a number of 
structural demands, such as, for example, a systemic, 
long­term, cross­ and transdisciplinary direction. It 
should develop technological and social low­carbon 
innovations, evaluate these, and assess the required 
conditions for their global diffusion. This also 
includes the development, evaluation, and public 
discussion of strategies and policy options. Accord­
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ingly, research programmes should reflect these 
demands.
 > The WBGU calls for the establishment of a new field 
of studies, ‘transformation research’, which exam­
ines transformation processes and the social precon­
ditions within the scope of planetary boundaries. To 
develop this new field of inquiry, the WBGU pro­
poses a joint societal search and discussion process. 
This process could be overseen by The Alliance of 
Scientific Organizations in Germany.
 > Overall, in order to face the current challenges suc­
cessfully and accelerate the transformation, sub­
stantial additional research and development fund­
ing is required. Concurrently, research should be 
consolidated both at EU and international level, as 
no country can develop all the solutions required on 
its own. 
 > Funding for the central transformation field energy 
should be substantially increased. The WBGU 
emphasises its 2003 recommendation to increase 
direct public spending in the industrialised countries 
on research and development in the energy field 
tenfold, largely through reallocation. Grants for 
energy generation through nuclear fusion could be 
stretched across a longer term to release funds for 
higher priority tasks.
 > The current funds for the German Federal Ministry 
of Education and Research (BMBF) sustainability 
research, particularly the framework programme 
‘Research for Sustainable Development’, and ‘Socio­
Ecological Research’ (SÖF) should be significantly 
increased, and SÖF’s global perspectives should be 
considerably extended. 
 > Interdisciplinary research should be supported by 
concrete measures. This requires changing the exist­
ing incentive systems, and introducing new ones. 
The WBGU proposes that the German Rectors’ Con­
ference, the Joint Science Conference, the German 
Research Foundation and the Academies of Sciences 
meet to consult on recommendations and directives 
for the implementation and rating of interdiscipli­
nary transformation research. 
 > In the course of drawing up the 8th EU Framework 
Programme for Research, the German federal gov­
ernment should lobby for a stronger focus on the 
transformation; environment and energy research 
should be given particular weight. 
 > Internationally, Germany and the EU should forge 
stronger research alliances with research centres in 
emerging economies. In the scope of its development 
cooperation, Germany should step up the promotion 
and support of education, science and research 
capacities in the less developed countries.
 > The WBGU suggests that a coming Initiative for 
Excellence should focus thematically wholly on the 
subject of research in the context of the transforma­
tion for a resource friendly, sustainable and liveable 
society. 
 > The current evaluation of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is an 
opportunity to direct their activities towards climate 
friendliness and sustainability.
Education
 > Transformation education should be given a higher 
priority in the German sustainability strategy. It 
should also be integrated into school and university 
curricula, vocational qualification, and further stud­
ies. This encompasses exchange programmes, new 
combinations of bachelor and masters courses, 
teacher training modules for transformation­rele­
vant systemic education, and degree programmes for 
transformation sciences. 
 > Through coherent policies, subject­relevant educa­
tion and vocational qualification systems should be 
redesigned in such a way that they can dedicate 
themselves to the demands of sustainable develop­
ment. At the same time, opportunities for life­long 
on­the­job learning should be extended through 
publicly funded further education courses and post­
graduate qualifications, for example in the form of a 
‘sabbatical’ with regard to transformation for 
employees.
 > The WBGU also suggests the establishment of low­
carbon business schools and interdisciplinary facul­
ties for low­carbon land­use, energy science, urban­
isation and transformation­specific management in 
order to support the transformation process. 
 > During the UN ‘Decade of Education for Sustainable 
Development’, institutional mechanisms should be 
developed to ensure that sustainable development 
education continues once the decade has passed. 
The UNESCO could initiate a process that could be 
designed similar to the continuation of the Interna­
tional Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 
(IDNDR). That way, successful activities could be 
continued through local and national institutions.
Field of Interaction Education–Research
 > In view of the overriding importance of the issue, 
the WBGU further suggests the establishment of a 
German federal university with a research and edu­
cation profile that focuses on the transformation 
towards sustainability. Research and teaching should 
be inter­ and transdisciplinary.
25
 > The WBGU proposes an extensive education and 
research programme ‘Participation in the Science for 
Transformation’, aimed at education and knowledge 
for the benefit of the environment and sustainabil­
ity, achieved through participation of non­scientists.
 > Science policy and science should initiate interdisci­
plinary and society­wide dialogues on subjects such 
as visions for a ‘decarbonised society’, requirements 
for transformation research, stepping up inter­ and 
transdisciplinary research, or priority research 
issues. The dialogue could also be stimulated in a cul­
tural and artistic form, for example in museums, at 
future exhibitions or music and film festivals.
 > To increase the involvement of social actors, the 
establishment of participative formats should be 
promoted. Appropriate would be, for example, net­
worked biodiversity, environmental and climate 
‘stations’, or participation in model participation 
projects on subjects such as electromobility, alterna­
tive agriculture, or new forms of housing.
 > The WBGU suggests the introduction of a voluntary 
social year in ‘education and research’.
A reform of research and education towards sustain­
ability not only paves the way to a knowledge­based 
social contract for this ‘Great Transformation’, but also 
opens up specific future opportunities for those who 
participate. In accordance with the social contract, edu­
cative opportunities that encompass the communica­
tion of a sense of responsibility, a sense of justice and 
the skills needed for proactiveness should be encour­
aged. School education should also not just endeavour 
to instigate cross­ and transdisciplinary approaches, 
but also an understanding of the scientific process as 
a whole. 
Science and research policy can serve as a role model 
on an international level if it continues to expand in the 
direction it is in part already heading, towards systemic, 
transformation­relevant research.
Therefore, the social contract addresses future gen­
erations in two ways, as it is they who will participate 
in bringing about the change in future. Above all, how­
ever, it is also in our young citizens’ interest to rapidly 
accelerate the transformation and to stop impeding it 
– now. 
Conclusion
The ‘fossil­nuclear metabolism’ of the industrialised 
society has no future. The longer we cling to it, the 
higher the price will be for future generations. How­
ever, there are alternatives which would at least give 
all people access to the chance of a good life within the 
boundaries of the natural environment. Without a glo­
bal agreement to actually dare to experiment with these 
alternatives, we will not manage to find our way out 
of the crisis of late modernity. So nothing less than a 
new social contract must be agreed to. Science will play 
a decisive, although subservient, role here. Ultimately, 
sustainability is a question of imagination.
‘Imagination is everything. It is the preview of life’s 
coming attractions.’ (Albert Einstein) 
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It’s not because things are difficult that we 
dare not venture. It’s because we dare not 
venture that they are difficult. 
Seneca (1 BC–AD 65) 
Action for a Low-Carbon and Equitable Future
In 2009, sixty Nobel Laureates published a memo­
randum appealing to the global public to take ‘Action 
for a Low Carbon and Equitable Future’, highlighting 
the fierce urgency with which we must transform our 
high­carbon economies into sustainable and equitable 
 systems (The St. James’s Palace Memorandum, 2009). 
This states that ‘decarbonising our economy offers a 
multitude of benefits, from addressing energy secur­
ity to stimulating unprecedented technological inno­
vation. A zero carbon economy is an ultimate neces­
sity and must be seriously explored now.’ In view of 
every thing we know, the Nobel Laureates are abso­
lutely right, and what they are describing is a challenge 
of a dimension never before experienced by humanity. 
In order to avoid dangerous climate change, the great 
transformation into a low­carbon society must start – 
or rather, must be accelerated – as soon as  possible. 
This means: in the coming decade, we must trigger 
serious production process, infrastructure and life­
style changes to be able to reduce global greenhouse 
gas emissions to a minimum by 2050. In addition, the 
disconcerting events in Fukushima make it absolutely 
clear that the path towards a low­carbon future must 
be nuclear energy free. The avoidance of dangerous 
climate change is a key element in the transformation 
towards sustainability: climate protection alone cannot 
guarantee the conservation of humanity’s natural life­
support  systems; however, without climate protection, 
the essential development opportunities that mankind 
needs will soon be erased.
There have been plenty of ‘great transformations’ in 
the history of mankind. The two most significant, and 
also the two best­known, are the Neolithic Revolution, 
i. e. the transition from hunter­gatherer society to agri­
cultural society, and the Industrial Revolution. Whilst 
the historical transformations were on the whole evo­
lutionary and occurred gradually, developing in stages, 
humanity must now, for the first time ever, actively 
bring about and accelerate a great transformation, as 
otherwise the 2 °C guard rail will soon be broken.
The WBGU has taken this as its starting point, and 
examines what form a societal search process for the 
transformation could take, and how the transforma­
tive development ‘corridor’ may be widened. On the 
one hand, it must be shown how existing measures can 
have a transformative effect through intensification 
and bundling. On the other hand, the WBGU also iden­
tifies innovative instruments with immediate trans­
formative effect. Overall, conclusions are reached as to 
what the German federal government, as an important 
player on the international stage, can do. Equally, the 
public and society as a whole are also addressed – on 
a national, European, and even global level; all citizens 
can make important contributions to the achievement 
of this Herculean task.
Contribution to the 2012 UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro 
The WBGU examines the options for a low­carbon 
transformation from a global perspective, differenti­
ating between developing, newly industrialising, and 
industrialised countries, and considers the challenges 
in terms of international cooperation. The forthcoming 
2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in 
Rio de Janeiro offers the next opportunity of focusing 
appropriately, at a UN level, on this issue of the chal­
lenges humankind faces. This report is intended as a 
contribution to this: policy­makers and society shall be 
supported in the debate on the transformation, and in 
its accomplishment. The report aims to reassure eco­
nomic, political and social decision­makers and (future) 
change agents that the transformation can be success­
fully realised.
Core Questions
In the following report, the arguments and viewpoints 
held by the WBGU are laid out on the basis of the 
core questions cited below. Attempts are made to find 
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answers to these core questions, and to highlight paths 
for overcoming conflicting aims.
 > Is the transformation technologically feasible?
 > Are the costs of the transformation financially feasi­
ble?
 > What are the measures, processes and instruments 
that are necessary for the transformation into a low­
carbon society? 
 > Which concrete political measures should be intro­
duced immediately?
 > What are the roles played by nation state and EU in 
shaping the searching and transformation process? 
Do nation states, particularly the democracies, have 
the strength for huge fundamental changes? Are we 
seeing the beginnings of cross­border governance 
and trans­ or supranational democracy?
 > What is the significance of the social actors in the 
transformation process?
 > What are the opportunities that should be used for 
bi­ and multilateral cooperation?
 > What should be achieved at the 2012 UN Confer­
ence on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro?
 > What are the current knowledge gaps? How can sci­
ence accompany this process of searching; how 
would the scientific community have to adapt to the 
existing challenges?
The recommendations developed by the WBGU, with 
their different levels of ambition, are intended to be 
options for policy­makers. The recommended measures 
are designed to indicate a fundamental pattern for the 
reversal, in full awareness of the fact that long­running 
processes such as these are hardly predictable and are 
therefore inherently searching processes. These search­
ing processes should be initiated and shaped by the 
state, and accompanied by research. Some of the rec­
ommended measures are of a very high level of ambi­
tion, so that, from a current point of view, they may 
still seem unrealistic in political terms; they could, how­
ever, become realisable only a few years from now. One 
example for the ‘unthinkable’ is the moratorium on 
Germany’s seven oldest nuclear power plants as a con­
sequence of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima in 
March 2011. The temporary shutdown of these nuclear 
reactors for three months, ordered by the CDU/FDP 
coalition government, and their vote for an accelerated 
nuclear phase­out in Germany would have been unim­
aginable prior to Fukushima. And who would have been 
able to predict the success of Eastern Europe’s ‘Vel­
vet Revolution’ in 1984; who could have foreseen the 
2010/11 revolutions in the Arab world? 
Increasing Knowledge
In the past few years, there have been numerous pub­
lications on ‘low­carbon transformation’ or the ‘green 
economy’; however, these studies have frequently 
focused only on specific elements of the issue (for 
example technical measures, financial, or governance 
aspects), and many examined them primarily from a 
national point of view. In several respects, this report 
has followed a completely new approach:
1. The transformation into a low­carbon society is 
examined in its entirety. The technical, social, eco­
nomical, and legal feasibility is investigated, includ­
ing currently existing obstacles and barriers. 
2. The transformation into a low­carbon society is 
examined from a global point of view, differen ti­
ating between developing, newly industrialising 
and industrialised countries.
3. Apart from the lessons to be learnt from historical 
experiences, the findings of transition research are 
also taken into account.
4. The role of social actors in transformation processes 
is examined to reveal that they can fulfil a whole 
range of important functions, for example as cata­
lysts, and that ultimately, the transformation is sup­
ported by them.
5. Apart from energy systems, a field which has 
already enjoyed frequent examination, further 
central transformation fields such as land use and 
urbanisation are investigated.
6. All of these recommendations have been developed 
under consideration of the fact that there is enor­
mous pressure in terms of time: global greenhouse 
gas emissions must exceed their maximum within 
the next decade if the avoidance of dangerous cli­
mate change is to stand a chance. 
7. These elements are the inspiration for the WBGU’s 
guiding principle, and its understanding of the 
transformation when considering the design of the 
requisite searching process. This guiding principle 
is also intended as a foundation for further social 
debate.
The transformation is feasible!
In terms of dimension, the transformation into a low­
carbon society is on par with a new Industrial Revolution 
in fast motion. Particularly in view of this, it re presents 
an unprecedented challenge in the history of human­
kind, as it must be based on scientific research and 
knowledge, and must be accomplished under great time 
pressure. It should be mentioned here that the WBGU, 
in the face of this epochal task, faced a dilemma: on 
the one hand, concrete and implementable, managea­
ble, science­based recommendations for policy­ makers 
and society to facilitate urgently required changes were 
to be developed; on the other hand, the issue seemed 
far too complex at times, difficult to grasp, hardly 
 limitable, and teeming with social obstacles and path 
 29
dependencies that are difficult to overcome. In short: 
the problem seemed almost unsolvable. Subsequent 
to some very difficult and controversial – particularly 
with regard to numerous conflicting aims – as well as 
constructive debates and (also) interdisciplinary learn­
ing processes, the WBGU has reached the ultimate con­
viction that the great transformation into a low­ carbon 
society is not just necessary, but really feasible. Not 
least because the required transformation already con­
forms to the population’s predominant value systems 
in many countries, and can therefore justly, and posi­
tively, be regarded as an addition to the subjective life 
satisfaction of large parts of the population. It is desired 
by opinion leaders and large parts of the population – 
and not just in rich countries, either. Because the great 
transformation offers the chance, as many governments 
have already recognised, to transform the energy and 
economic  systems whilst at the same time accelerating 
the catch­up development of the developing and newly 
industrialising countries, thus advancing global equal­
ity. Concurrently, because of the shared responsibility 
of states and societies, and the responsible interaction 
of all social actors in this process, the transformation 
can contribute not only to overcoming the legitimation 
crisis in democracies, but even also to a strengthening 
and a revitalisation of democracy. 
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A New Age – The Anthropocene
The extent of environmental changes caused by 
humankind has altogether reached another dimension 
since the industrialisation. The population has grown 
from just under 1 billion then to almost 7 billion today. 
Energy use, around 600 W per person in agricultural 
societies, rose to 4,750 W per person in the highly 
industrialised nations of the north. One important driv­
ing factor of this expansion has been the use of fossil 
energy carriers, which has made possible both inten­
sive agriculture and the huge increase in material flow, 
amounting to around 10–30 t per person per year in 
industrial societies (Box 1­2). 
Humankind has also reengineered around half of 
the world’s land surface. Humans already use almost a 
quarter of the biomass produced globally each year on 
all land (IPCC, 2007a), and over 40 % of the renewable, 
accessible water resources (MA, 2005b).  Collectively, 
various anthropogenic global material and energy 
fluxes by now far exceed any natural flows. As a con­
sequence, developments in many of the vital environ­
mental dimensions are reaching a crisis stage: water 
resources, soils, forests and oceans have been overex­
ploited or are being destroyed, biodiversity is undergo­
ing a drastic reduction, and important biochemical flow 
patterns have been radically changed by humankind, 
for example the carbon and nitrogen cycles. The Board 
of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment has reached 
the following conclusion: ‘Human activity is putting 
such strain on the natural functions of the Earth that 
the ability of the planet’s ecosystems to sustain future 
generations can no longer be taken for granted.’ (MA, 
2005d). Without a doubt, humankind has become the 
Earth ecosystem’s dominating force (Vitousek et al., 
1997b). 
A great number of scientists therefore support 
Nobel prize winner Paul Crutzen’s proposal of view­
ing the current industrial age as a new geological epoch 
(Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000; Crutzen, 2002; Steffen 
et al., 2007). This geological epoch, called the ‘anthro­
pocene’ (also ‘Menschenzeit’ or ‘The Age of Man’, 
Schwägerl, 2010), not only refers to the effects human­
kind has had on the Earth system, but also to the cogni­
tive changes undergone by a global civilisation with an 
increasing awareness of itself as a driving force. Inter­
national research therefore initiated relevant, globally 
coordinated programmes as early as the 1950s (for 
example the International Geosphere­Biosphere Pro­
gramme, Man and the Biosphere Programme, etc.) in 
order to better understand the interdependencies in the 
Earth system. 
Sustainable Development 
The beginning of the anthropocene also marks the 
beginning of a new era of responsibility, as in terms 
of technology, humankind has by now advanced so far 
that it could unbalance the Earth system to an extent 
that would have dire consequences for human socie­
ties and ecosystems. The megatrends of a dynamic, glo­
balised economy, together with a population which will 
in all probability continue to increase up to the mid­
dle of the century, are on a collision course headed for 
the planetary guard rails (Box 1­1). We are currently 
risking the Earth system’s capability of continuing to 
provide human civilisation with the stable life­sup­
port system which made its development over the last 
10,000 years possible in the first place. 
For the past few decades, international environmen­
tal policy has addressed these issues. The Rio de Janeiro 
Earth Summit in 1992 hailed an important turning point 
on this relatively new political stage. The concept of 
sustainable development, debated and further defined 
since then at environmental conventions and by civil 
society organisations, has been, at least rhetorically, 
recognised as the guiding principle that should govern 
all actions, even if not consistently implemented. Poli­
cies for combating global environmental problems are 
gaining in importance; nevertheless, apart from a few 
exceptions (for example with regard to stratospheric 
ozone; Section 1.1.5.3) they have so far failed: nega­
tive trends have not abated, on the contrary, in many 
cases, they have even intensified (Section 1.1.6). 
This chapter relates to the agenda of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Develop­
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ment (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) and attempts to deter­
mine the current status quo of a ‘world in transition’, 
not only with reference to global environmental prob­
lems  (Section 1.1), but also with regard to the dynamic 
global economic and social megatrends defining an 
increasingly globalised civilisation (Section 1.2). In this 
report, the WBGU focuses on the dynamics of the glo­
balisation, reflected in the various megatrends, or the 
way these dynamics act as drivers. Contemporary crises 
such as, for example, food and crude oil price spikes, 
and, not least, the financial and economic crisis (Box 
1.2­1) can be regarded as symptoms of an overtaxation 
Box 1-1
The WBGU’s Concept of Planetary Guard Rails in 
the Context of Sustainable Development
Certain Earth system conditions must be avoided at all costs. 
The concept of the Earth system’s planetary guard rails has 
been developed by the WBGU since 1994, with regard to 
climate change and other areas of global change (soils, bio­
diversity, etc.; WBGU, 1995a, 2005, 2006). Rockström et al. 
(2009a,  b) adopted the concept, using the term ‘planetary 
boundaries’. International environmental policy even accept­
ed the ‘2°C climate protection guard rail’ as a political target. 
The WBGU describes planetary guard rails as quantitatively 
definable damage thresholds, whose transgression either 
today or in future would have such intolerable consequences 
that even large­scale benefits in other areas could not com­
pensate these (WBGU, 2006). Once the guard rails have been 
transgressed, global environmental change becomes a socially 
intolerable risk for human civilisation. 
However, keeping within the limits of all guard rails by 
no means implies that all socio­economic deficits or ecologi­
cal damages can be averted, as global guard rails can under 
no circumstances take all of the widely differing regional and 
sectoral impacts of global change into account. Furthermore, 
knowledge about global environmental change is limited and 
bears the potential for misjudgements. From this perspective, 
observance of the guard rails is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
premise for the sustainability of future development.
Guard rails do not demarcate exactly defined system lim­
its, within which there is hardly any risk at all, and beyond 
which we can immediately expect serious damages or even 
disasters. The changes which occur are frequently creeping 
changes, which cumulatively, over decades or generations, 
will ultimately have extremely negative effects, but which 
are difficult to perceive and comprehend (the ‘shifting base­
line’ phenomenon; Pauly, 1995). Particularly in view of this 
gradual systemic change, guard rails can serve as an orienta­
tion aid. Nevertheless, especially with regard to the 2°C guard 
rail, it should be emphasised that the avoidance of Earth sys­
tem tipping points – for example the irreversible melting of 
Greenland’s ice sheet, the collapse of tropical coral reefs due 
to global warming, and other non­linear processes – plays a 
central role in defining the scope. Against this background, 
scientists are advising policy­makers to establish certain 
guard rails on the basis of scientific reasoning. Determining 
the point at which these burdens become intolerable must 
then take place on the part of the politicians in the form of a 
democratic decision­making process.
Compliance with the guard rails ensures that the Earth 
system’s resources and services, the precondition for secur­
ing humankind’s natural life­support systems and sustain­
able development, can be preserved. In analytical terms, the 
term ‘sustainable development’ can be defined as a vector 
of the respective welfare dimensions (for example, meeting 
basic needs like food and medical care, criteria for individual 
qualifications such as education and collective qualifications 
like institutional legitimacy or benchmarks for a ‘good life’, 
such as access to experiencing nature), whose norm increas­
es with time. Temporary increases in some dimensions, for 
example caused by the consumption of finite resources, must 
not hinder long­term development opportunities. Guard 
rails delimit the scope in which development can take place 
sustainably; transgression of these limits must therefore be 
avoided.
A timely gradual course adjustment avoids the drastic 
measures that would be necessary if we were to suddenly 
‘slam on the brakes’ once we reach the guard rail, or rather, 
once a sudden severe change of course would be the only 
remaining option. An abrupt change such as this is usually 
not only associated with tremendous costs, it can also trigger 
social shifts and crises.
It is therefore paramount to pre­empt and avoid any trans­
gression of the guard rails. Any path on collision course with 
a guard rail should be changed through suitable policies in 
such a way as to prevent transgression. The use of appropriate 
policy instruments, but also self­propelling social processes 
are major factors for gradually exerting influence over the 
development path. Anticipatory sustainability policies should 
aim at a timely achieving of changes, so that the social adap­
tation to the course change can be managed without exces­
sive breaks and costs. Forward­looking implementation of a 
policy to prevent climate change is a sensible measure, and 
also makes far more economic sense than later costly, drastic 
emissions reductions and adaptation measures.
The setting of guard rails and the subsequent skilful 
implementation of suitable steering instruments can serve to 
accelerate a positive pace of development, rather than imped­
ing it. Awareness of planetary guard rails and the appropriate 
action to be taken can drive humankind’s progress. A major 
‘co­benefit’ of the decarbonisation of the energy systems, 
for instance, is an energy supply that is clean and does not 
depend on finite fossil resources. Moreover, a fair burden­
sharing in terms of decarbonisation efforts also opens up 
new development prospects, particularly for many poorer 
countries. Reduced conflict potential, and better conditions, 
for example with regard to education, diet, medical care, but 
also more scope for cultural and artistic development, could 
emerge to give human development a new impetus. 
Guard rails and social progress are therefore by no means 
a contradiction in terms; on the contrary, they are mutually 
supportive. This certainly applies in the long run, as guard rail 
transgression endangers the basic requirements for sustain­
able development. However, even in the short­term, inevita­
ble transformation processes bear the potential for impacting 
catalytically for advancing human development.
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of the world’s institutional structures in a globalised 
world, in which cross­linking and critical interde­
pendencies have dramatically increased. Viewed as an 
entity, these megatrends are a perfect illustration of the 
necessity of sustainable development, and the required 
framework conditions. They pose a considerable hin­
drance to reaching the development goals: not only is 
a large part of the global population still excluded from 
the dynamic wealth increase, but in fact, almost 1 bil­
lion people actually continue to live in life­threatening 
 poverty (Section 1.2.1). 
Some of the major environmental issues, for exam­
ple climate change (Section 1.1.1), have by now 
become so urgent that they are generally referred to as 
a ‘task for humankind’. Even if not all of the causes and 
consequences of the different global environmental 
change issues or development problems can be elabo­
rated individually here, the final balance sheet not only 
clearly shows that despite some major successes, the 
actual challenge of sustainable development remains 
unsolved, but moreover, that the remaining timeframe 
for action is fast becoming shorter. 
One single WBGU report can hardly provide the 
extensive analysis and solution search that compre­
hensive global sustainable development requires. The 
following chapters focus on climate and energy issues, 
as climate change mitigation is a central element of 
sustainability. Anthropogenic climate change is closely 
interlinked with other environmental issues, frequently 
creating feedback dynamics (Section 1.1.6). The more 
extensive the impacts of climate change become, the 
more difficult it will be to solve other global environ­
mental changes, and to master the challenge of achiev­
ing sustainable development in the newly industrialis­
ing and developing countries. Moreover, climate change 
has a ‘long braking distance’, and must be restricted 
very quickly indeed if significant negative impacts are 
to be avoided. For these reasons, this report focuses 
primarily on the question of how to achieve the change 
into a low carbon society without undermining sustain­
ability efforts in other essential areas, such as sustain­
able land use or the conservation of biodiversity. 
To bear the context of a more comprehensive sus­
tainability agenda in mind, this chapter briefly summa­
rises the extensive correlation of the various issues. The 
message is clear: economy and society must urgently 
undergo a fundamental change to ensure the preserva­
tion of humankind’s natural life­support systems and 
the future prospects of humankind. Climate change 
mitigation is a necessary element; however, alone, it is 
not sufficient.
1.1
Earth System Megatrends 
1.1.1 
Climate Change, Climate Impact 
By now, there is a scientific consensus on the elemental 
issues in connection with anthropogenic climate change 
which has also found acceptance at all political levels. 
Both IPCC reports (most recently IPCC, 2007a, b, c), 
and the WBGU’s policy advice reports (2003, 2008, 
2009a) extensively illustrate and elaborate the scien­
tific basis for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, 
the consequences for the global mean temperature, the 
changes in the Earth system, and the effects on ecosys­
tems and human societies. 
Rapidly progressing, unabated climate change will 
constitute a crisis for humankind, as it means that the 
relatively stable climatic era since the last Ice Age in 
which human civilisations have developed will come to 
an end (Figure 1.1­1a). In the past 2,000 years, fluc­
tuations in mean global temperature amounted to less 
than 1 °C. Neither our agriculture and forestry nor our 
culture, society, infrastructures, etc. are prepared for a 
rapid and significant climate change of several degrees 
Celsius. 
Some aspects of climate change are impacting faster 
than anticipated by science. The deglaciation rate of sea 
ice, ice sheets and glaciers has been underestimated, for 
instance (Figure 1.1­1c). Current estimates (Allison et 
al., 2009) have revised the sea­level rise rate to at least 
double the rate stated by the IPCC (2007a). The 1m sea­
level rise guard rail recommended by the WBGU (2006) 
could therefore already be broken before the end of the 
century (Figure 1.1­1b; Rahmstorf, 2007; Vermeer and 
Rahmstorf, 2009). CO2 emissions are also responsible 
for another global environmental problem: ocean acidi­
fication (Box 1.1­2).
By now, avoiding global warming of more than 
2 °C has not only become the generally declared aim 
of scientists, but also that of politicians. Global warm­
ing of more than 2 °C would probably have dangerous, 
irreversible and hardly controllable consequences for 
nature and human society (WBGU, 1995b, 2007a). As 
yet, it is still possible to comply with this limit, but the 
technical, economic and political challenges are consid­
erable (UNEP, 2010a).
The 16th Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in Cancún not only made it perfectly clear 
that climate change is one of the greatest challenges 
of our time, but also that the climate change mitiga­
1 World in Transition
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Box 1-2
The Concept of Industrial Metabolism
For consumers, household waste is an obvious result of mod­
ern life. Each inhabitant of an industrialised country with 
a typical lifestyle generates around 400–600 kg per year, 
largely due to consumer goods packaging, for example around 
food. The environmentally friendly disposal of this waste 
continues to inspire heated social debates. Less obvious for 
the consumer, on the other hand, is the prior environmental 
impact ‘upstream’ in a product’s lifecycle (Figure 1­1). 
In total, these often by far exceed the resource invest­
ment ultimately evident to consumers in the form of house­
hold waste. To manufacture an aluminium can containing fruit 
juice, for instance, bauxite must first be extracted, the elec­
tricity for the melting process must be generated, crude­oil 
based coatings and packaging also have to be produced, etc. 
Moreover, all upstream input and processes are connected by 
transport networks which themselves are resource­intensive. 
Fruit production, drinks manufacture, cold chains and distri­
bution to retailer and, ultimately, consumer also contribute 
to the environmental impact. Process chain analysis meth­
ods (‘lifecycle assessment’) have been developed to illustrate 
the environmental impact of the entire lifecycle of a product 
‘cradle to grave’. This strategic approach to environmental 
reporting allows, for example, comparisons between a circu­
lar economy, which continues to recycle the same material 
resources, from ‘cradle to cradle’, and conventional ‘linear’ 
resource use. It also allows the linking of consumption pat­
terns, production processes and resource consumption, and 
highlights alternative action choices (UNEP, 2010c).
At a higher aggregation level, it also serves to describe 
the cumulative social­industrial metabolism for individual 
industrial sectors, region and countries, and at global level 
(Ayres and Simonis, 1994; Figure 1­2). In this account, the 
social activity based anthroposphere is viewed as an integral 
element of the global biosphere. This perspective serves to 
describe environmental impact not only on the output side (as 
an overload of the sink capacities of environmental systems, 
for example through nutrient­rich waste waters, greenhouse 
gases, etc.), but also on the input side as resource scarcity or 
overuse of renewable or non­renewable sources.
From this perspective, a typical inhabitant of an industr­
ialised country directly consumes around 10–20 t of mate­
rial every year (excluding water and air, and indirect material 
consumption, for instance through induced soil erosion) to 
sustain themselves and their livestock, and support the tech­
nical infrastructure (assets, commodities, buildings, trans­
port networks, etc.). In the industrialised countries, these 
material flows consist of around a third each of fossil energy 
carriers, biomass (food, feed, wood and fibres) and mineral 
resources (construction and industrial minerals). This entire 
process, just like the biological metabolism concept, can be 
represented as an energetic process, and also in the form of 
a material balance (input = output + net stock changes). Out­
put can be differentiated according to target medium: into the 
atmosphere (such as greenhouse gases, dust or aerosols), into 
soils, or rather, the geosphere (for example landfills), or into 
the hydrosphere (as waste water). In industrialised countries, 
emissions are usually dominated by CO2. 
Figure 1­3 illustrates current material consumption trends 
and global freight traffic volume in the 20th century. Direct 
material extraction rose from around 7 to around 59 billion t 
annually (or from 4.5 to 9 t per person per year). At the same 
time, the transport of goods has increased since 1850 to about 
10,000 t km per person per year. The global market integra­
tion is leading to ever longer distances between raw material 
extraction, production and consumption. Integrated methods 
for the analysis and illustration of the environmental impacts 
Figure 1-2
Socio­economic metabolism 
as a component part of the 
global environment. 
Source: based on  
Odum, 1971
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Figure 1-1
Industrial metabolism: schematic illustration of material use, 
production, consumption and emissions.
Source: based on EEA, 2010a
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tion guard rail must not be transgressed, and that deep 
cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required 
(UNFCCC, 2010). In fact, there is some debate on 
whether this maximum damage threshold should be 
lowered only 1.5 °C.
CO2 accumulates in the atmosphere due to its long 
life­span, so further global warming can only be pre­
vented if the CO2 emissions from fossil sources are 
stopped almost completely. The extent of anthropo­
genic climate change depends largely on how quickly 
global CO2 emissions can be successfully reduced. Anal­
yses of plausible emissions pathways show that a maxi­
mum of around 750 Gt CO2 from fossil sources may be 
released into the atmosphere up to the middle of the 
century to allow a two­thirds probability of compliance 
with the 2 °C guard rail (Box 1.1­1). Post­2050, only a 
small, remaining amount of CO2 may be emitted. The 
era of the fossil energy driven economy must therefore 
end as soon as in the first half of this century (WBGU, 
2009). Global emissions should peak as soon as possi­
ble; at the latest, however, by 2020, as otherwise, the 
reduction rates that would be necessary by 2050 would 
be so drastic as to overburden the technical, economi­
cal and social capacities of our societies (Figure 1.1­2). 
The world is still a long way away from this vital 
trend reversal. Despite 2008’s financial and economic 
crisis, global CO2 emissions from the use of fossil fuels 
only fell by 1.3 % in consequence; 2009 was still the 
year with the second­highest emissions in the history 
of humankind, with 2008 in the lead. The preliminary 
results for 2010 show that this emissions decline has 
probably already been overcompensated and emis­
sions are continuing on their pre­crisis growth path 
 (Friedlingstein et al., 2010). The 2010 average con­
centration of CO2 in the atmosphere already amounted 
to 389 ppm (Tans, 2011), compared to approx. 280 
ppm before the Industrial Revolution (IPCC, 2007a). 
 Limiting climate change requires the immediate decou­
pling of economic growth from greenhouse gas emis­
sions. These do not only include CO2, which is prima­
rily released through the combustion of fossil energy 
 carriers (Section 1.2.3), but also other climate­impact­
ing gases (CH4, N2O, and industrial gases). Other sec­
tors in which emissions must also fall drastically include 
land use and industry (WBGU, 2007a). 
of consumption are therefore called for. Such balances make 
it possible to connect environmental impact with the driving 
forces of social activity (OECD, 2008). They not only serve to 
illustrate how the environment is changing, but why, making 
strategic and preventative policy decisions easier.
Numerous industrialised countries and international 
organisations such as the OECD and the EU now record the 
national direct material consumption, and the resource inten­
sity of their economic activities, as part of national environ­
mental statistics. The Statistical Office of the European Com­
munities has developed basic methodical principles for the 
generation of such an accounting system as part of the overall 
economic balance (Eurostat, 2001). Achieving sustainable 
consumption patterns through green growth strategies 
requires an increased decoupling of resource consumption 
and economic growth and, in the long term, a circular econo­
my for material resources. Relevant programmes to encourage 
environmentally friendly production strategies with slogans 
such as the ‘3 R Principle: Reduce, Reuse, Recycle’ are being 
supported by a number of UN organisations, for example 
UNIDO and UNEP, within the scope of the Marrakech Process. 
To improve the knowledge base and scientific policy consulta­
tion in this field, UNEP has established an International Panel 
for Sustainable Resource Management (for example UNEP, 
2010d). 
Figure 1-3
Direct resource extraction 1900–2005 (a) and development of global freight volume 1850–1990 (b).
Sources: Gilbert, 2001; Krausmann et al., 2009
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The negotiations for a global climate treaty com­
menced in 1990, and led to the UNFCCC in 1992. Today, 
with 192 signatories, it enjoys almost universal mem­
bership. Its most important achievement is the formu­
lation of a common climate change mitigation goal, to 
succeed in stabilising the greenhouse gas concentra­
tions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system (UN, 1992). Its framework convention charac­
ter, however, means that complementing decisions for 
implementation are needed. Since 1995, many such 
decisions have been agreed in 16 Conferences of the 
Parties (COP) to date, including the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997. It contains binding emissions targets for indus­
trialised countries for the period 2008–2012, and was 
designed to allow for subsequent commitment periods. 
However, the protocol was never ratified by the indus­
trialised countries’ largest emitter, the USA, and the 
negotiations on further commitment periods in Cancún 
in 2010 were also fraught with difficulties. Although 
only moderately ambitious (the industrialised countries 
committed to reducing their emissions by 5 %, com­
pared to 1990 levels, for the period 2008–2012), the 
Kyoto Protocol has frequently been viewed as a trial 
run for climate change mitigation instruments (such as 
the trading of allowed emissions between parties, and 
the Clean Development Mechanism), and has certainly 
contributed much to testing these. Negotiations on 
long­term international cooperation have been ongo­
ing since COP 13 in 2007 on Bali. So far, however, the 
hope that these will ultimately lead to a comprehensive 
and legally binding agreement that can be operational­
ised has not been fulfilled. The negotiations do not only 
concern climate change mitigation, but also increas­
ingly adaptation to climate change. Central unresolved 
issues are aspects of equity, particularly with regard 
to the industrialised countries’ responsibility to sup­
port the developing countries’ climate change mitiga­
tion and adaptation efforts both financially and with 
technology transfers. Progress has been made, how­
ever, with regard to a consensus on the overall ambition 
level of climate protection efforts; the view that the rise 
in temperature must be limited to 2 °C or even 1.5 °C 
has become prevalent in the debate (UNFCCC, 2010). 
However, the resultant consequences with regard to 
the required measures have so far been ignored. The 
‘Cancún Agreements’ that have been passed at COP 16 
could make the further negotiation process somewhat 
easier as some aspects have been preliminarily agreed; 
however, the important question of future emissions 
reductions is by and large excluded. 
To summarise, it can be stated that although the 
UNFCCC and its decisions currently provide adequate 
goals in terms of the general aspiration level, these are 
not acted upon and remain abstract, nor are they sup­
ported by appropriate concrete measures. Currently, 
nothing would support the expectation that the sum 
total of the climate change mitigation measures and tar­
gets planned by the states themselves, and reported to 
the convention, will be enough to avoid global warming 
of more than 2 °C. A binding agreement which would 
oblige the states to develop and keep to adequate plans 
does not appear to be on the horizon.
1.1.2 
Loss of Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity
Humankind has also had a dramatic impact on the bio­
sphere. At a rapidly increasing speed, forests, savan­
nahs and grasslands are being cleared to make way for 
agriculture. Globally, more than three­quarters of the 
ice­free landmass is showing signs of anthropogenic 
change, and around a third of this area is used for agri­
culture, this looks likely to increase (Ellis and Ram­
ankutty, 2008; Ramankutty et al., 2008). A growing 
Figure 1.1-1
Development over time of temperature, sea­level and Arctic sea ice extent.
a) Past (Mann et al., 2008) and future (IPCC, 2007a) global temperature curve. Three different emission scenarios are shown 
(B1, A2 and A1FI); the coloured areas are the associated climatological uncertainty spans. Without successful climate change 
mitigation measures, the 2°C guard rail would be transgressed even in the most optimistic scenario (B1; green). Inset: 
recorded temperatures to 2010 (NASA, 2011). The measured data shows annual values for global temperature relative to the 
1880–1920 average, and an adjusted climate trend line. 
b) Current projections of global sea­level rise up to 2300 (relative to 1990). Red: WBGU guard rail of 1m above the pre­
industrial level (WBGU, 2006). As the sea level has risen by around 15 centimetres between the beginning of industrialisation 
and 1990, the line is here shown at less than 1 m. Data: Sea­level data based on Church and White (2006). Projections: grey 
area and dotted lines based on Rahmstorf (2007); orange bar based on Delta Committee (2008); light blue bar based on 
WBGU (2006). The differing assumptions underlying these projections are explained in the sources cited. Inset: orange: sea­
level data based on Church and White (2006); blue: satellite data up to 2010, updated based on Cazenave et al. (2008); grey 
area and dotted lines: projections from the IPCC Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001).
c) Extent of Arctic sea ice at the summer minimum (September), according to observed data, reconstruction (Walsh and 
Chapman, 2001) and a series of model calculations by the Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, Hamburg (based on 
Jungclaus et al., 2010).
Source: based on WBGU, 2009, amended
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global population, which also becomes more demand­
ing (for example concerning the consumption of animal 
products), increased bioenergy production and biomass 
use, and an expanding infrastructure are major reasons 
for growing land­use pressures (WBGU, 2010a; van 
Vuuren, 2009; PBL, 2010; Section 1.2.5). Moreover, 
coral reefs and mangrove forests are being destroyed, 
lakes over­fertilised, rivers dammed, and fish resources 
overexploited (WBGU, 2001b, 2006; MA, 2005b; 
CBD, 2010b). All this leads to a massive loss of biodi­
versity: compared to the natural background rate, the 
current rate of extinction of floral and faunal species 
has already increased by a factor of between a hun­
dred and a thousand (MA, 2005b). In the extensively 
studied species groups, a large proportion is considered 
endangered or already extinct (22 % of mammals, 14 % 
of birds, 31 % of amphibians, 28 % of conifers and 52 % 
of cycads; Vié et al., 2008), current conservation meas­
ures appear to be inadequate (for example Hoffmann 
et al., 2010).
Box 1.1-1
The Global CO2 Emissions Budget
Recent studies have shown that in the long run, CO2’s already 
major impact in terms of climate change, compared to more 
short­lived greenhouse gases and aerosols, will become even 
more dominant due to its long life­time in the atmosphere 
(Allen et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009). The WBGU 
focused on this fact in its special report ‘Solving the climate 
dilemma: The budget approach’ (WBGU, 2009). As more 
recent emissions data has now become available, the fol­
lowing reviews the still permissible CO2 budget. According 
to Meinshausen et al. (2009), the emission of 1,160 Gt CO2 
from anthropogenic sources between 2000 and 2050 leads 
to 2 °C guard rail transgression with a probability of 33%. 
Based on data from CDIAC (2011), Le Quére et al. (2009) and 
GCP (2011), the WBGU estimates that for the period 2000–
2010, CO2 emissions from fossil sources and cement produc­
tion amounted to 314 Gt CO2, and emissions from land­use 
changes to 45 Gt CO2; i. e. according to this estimate, anthro­
pogenic CO2 emissions for the period 2000–2010 amounted 
to approx. 360 Gt CO2 in total. This would leave a permissible 
budget of approx. 800 Gt CO2 for emissions from anthropo­
genic sources between 2011 and 2050 if compliance with the 
2 °C guard rail is to carry a probability of two­thirds. What 
does this mean in terms of emissions from fossil sources? 
Friedlingstein et al. (2010) cite an average 4.0 Gt annual CO2 
emissions from land­use changes for the period 2000–2009. 
The Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity have 
set themselves the target of at least halving the natural eco­
system loss rate, including forests, by 2020 (CBD, 2010b). If 
therefore the respective emissions were successfully halved 
by 2020, and would subsequently continue to sink at the 
same rate down to zero, CO2 emissions from land­use change 
between now and 2050 could be limited to 40 Gt. However, if 
these emissions were not halved until 2030, and not reduced 
to zero until 2050, it would mean emissions of 80 Gt CO2. 
Therefore, depending on how successfully CO2 emissions 
from land­use change are contained, i. e. above all by reduc­
ing deforestation in the tropics (Section 4.1.7), 720–760 Gt 
CO2 from fossil sources could still be emitted by 2050. Rais­
ing the probability of limiting anthropogenic global warming 
to 2 °C to 75 % would reduce the permissible budget for CO2 
from fossil sources to 560–600 Gt CO2. If deforestation is not 
successfully contained, this budget will shrink even further.
Particularly due to new, significantly lower estimates of 
land­use emissions since 2000 (Friedlingstein et al., 2010), 
the 750 Gt CO2 estimate cited in the WBGU budget for 2010–
2050 therefore still applies as a rough guideline for the per­
missible 2011–2050 budget. Figure 1.1­2 depicts three sche­
matic pathways of global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels that 
would be compatible with such a budget. It becomes clear 
that the evident consequence of a temporal shift in the global 
emissions peak is that the required reduction rates in order to 
comply with the budget are substantially higher in later years.
Although the dominant warming effect originates from 
CO2 emissions, these calculations also include the impact of 
the other greenhouse gases regulated by the Kyoto Protocol. 
It is assumed that the cumulated emissions of these other 
greenhouse gases for the period 2010–2049 will amount to 
approx. 500 Gt CO2eq (Meinshausen et al., 2009).
Figure 1.1-2
Examples of global emission 
pathways with emissions of 
750 Gt CO2 between 2010 
and 2050.
Source: WBGU, 2009
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Human societies need resources which nature deliv­
ers: food, fibres, building materials and industrial raw 
materials are just some examples. We also depend on 
ecosystem services: coastal protection, freshwater sup­
ply, pollination, soil fertility, unpolluted air, etc. (MA, 
2005c). Not least, we need floral and faunal species 
because their genetic and physiological blueprints are 
vital for the further development of useful crops to 
safeguard global food security, or for medical and tech­
nical research (WBGU, 2001a; Chivian and Bernstein, 
2008).
As biodiversity and ecosystem services have the 
character of public goods which are not traded on mar­
kets, and which do not carry a specific price tag, the 
economic system hugely underestimates their impor­
tance (Sukhdev, 2008; TEEB, 2010). In consequence, 
the degradation and destruction of natural ecosys­
tems and the diversity of their species and gene pools 
continues, so that considerable loss of biodiversity 
can be expected in this century (Pereira et al., 2010). 
The 6th extinction crisis of species in geological his­
tory is an imminent danger, irreversible and, this time 
round, caused by humankind (Leakey and Lewin, 1996; 
Chapin III et al., 2000). This new mass extinction can 
only be avoided through strict protection of the endan­
gered species (Barnosky et al., 2011).
The disappearance of species and genes renders the 
remaining ecosystems more vulnerable to disturbances 
(Suding et al., 2008). In addition to the large­scale 
land­use changes mentioned above, climate change 
(Section 1.1.1), the considerable intensification of 
nutrient cycles (Section 1.1.5), and the global disper­
sal of invasive alien species through increasing inter­
continental traffic (Figure 1­3b) constitute further glo­
bal disturbances which have greatly increased since the 
industrialisation, straining the ecosystems even further. 
Unabated climate change alone means risking the irre­
trievable loss of 20–30 % of floral and faunal species 
(IPCC, 2007b). This increases the risk of sudden, non­
linear and unforeseeable changes in ecosystems (Schef­
fer et al., 2001; Hastings and Wysham, 2010), which 
can even affect ecosystem structures of continental 
dimensions and extensive oceanic regions (Scheffer, 
2009; for example collapse of cod stocks off the shore 
of Newfoundland, Hutchings and Myers, 1994; Ama­
zonas region: WBGU, 2008). The ability of the planet’s 
ecosystems to provide the natural life­support systems 
needed to sustain future generations can therefore no 
longer be taken for granted (MA, 2005d). 
In economic terms, as with climate change, the 
timely avoidance, or at least limiting, of the problem is 
considerably more viable than a later repair of the dam­
ages (TEEB, 2010; Table 1.1­1).
A planetary guard rail for the loss of biodiversity 
is particularly difficult to define, due to the diversity 
of species, their extremely varied importance for the 
functioning of the ecosystems, and the huge knowledge 
gaps. As nature reserves are one of the most important 
instruments for the conservation of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services, they are suitable as a rough indica­
tor for biosphere protection. The WBGU proposed the 
following guard rail for biosphere conservation (2006): 
Box 1.1-2
Ocean Acidification
CO2 emissions not only lead to climate change, but also direct­
ly impact ocean chemistry. So far, around a third of anthropo­
genic CO2 emissions have been absorbed by the oceans, and 
turned into carbonic acid in the ocean water, thus leading to 
a measurable acidification (The Royal Society, 2005). This has 
already led to an approx. 30 % rise in the concentration of 
hydrogen ions, equalling a reduction of around 0.11 units of 
pH value compared to pre­industrial levels (WBGU, 2006). 
Acidification is progressing at least 100 times faster than 
ever before in the past 20 million years (Rockström et al., 
2009b). The fact that the atmospheric CO2 concentration has 
already been higher in earlier ages is not a counterargument, 
as the acidification is particularly caused by the pace of the 
CO2 increase, which decouples it from natural chemical buffer 
processes (WBGU, 2006).
Unabated continuation of this trend would lead to acidifi­
cation of the oceans that is unparalleled over the past millions 
of years, and irreversible for thousands of years. Acidifica­
tion impedes the growth of calcifying organisms (for exam­
ple corals, mussels, snails and certain groups of plankton), 
leads to biodiversity loss, can create anoxic death zones in 
oceans (Hofmann and Schellnhuber, 2009), changes the 
biogeochemical dynamics in sea water (for example of cal­
cium carbonate, organic carbon, nitrogen and phosphorus; 
Doney et al., 2009), and generally endangers the existence of 
marine ecosystems (for example coral reefs; Hoegh­Guldberg 
et al., 2009). These fundamental changes can have far reach­
ing consequences for the millions of people who, directly or 
indirectly, depend on the ocean (Doney et al., 2009).
The WBGU has proposed the following guard rail: the pH 
level of the near­surface ocean layer should not fall in any 
major ocean region by more than 0.2 units against pre­ 
industrial levels (WBGU, 2006). Rockström et al. (2009a, b) 
have chosen a different indicator and suggest that the calcium 
carbonate saturation (of aragonite) should amount to at least 
80 % of the pre­industrial value Ω = 3.44, so that the near­
surface layers are not undersaturated, enabling most coral 
systems to survive. The acidification issue alone is reason 
enough to restrict CO2 emissions. Climate policies should 
therefore ensure that anthropogenic CO2 emissions are 
restricted independently of the reduction of other green­
house gas emissions. So far, the special role of CO2 has not 
been adequately taken into account in UNFCCC negotiations.
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10–20 % of the global area of terrestrial ecosystems, 
and 20–30 % of the area of marine ecosystems should 
be designated as parts of a global, ecologically repre­
sentative and effectively managed system of protected 
areas. At the 10th Conference of the Parties in Nagoya, 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) defined 
its targets by 2020 as increasing protected areas on 
land to 17 %, and marine areas to 10 % (CBD, 2010a). 
Although officially, around 12 % of global land areas 
are already under protection (BIP, 2010), the existing 
protected area systems are neither adequately repre­
sentative, nor sufficiently well planned, financed or 
managed (CBD, 2004). Moreover, even a perfectly 
functioning system of protected areas cannot halt the 
loss of biological diversity alone. This needs sustainable 
land use of cultivated areas, the linking of protected 
areas with the surrounding countryside, and the restric­
tion of climate change and ocean acidification. Rock­
ström et al. (2009a, b) base their planetary boundary 
on the species extinction rate, and believe that a rate 
ten times that of the natural background rate of species 
extinction is a limit beyond which adverse large­scale 
system changes cannot be excluded. However, the cur­
rent extinction rate of floral and faunal species is today 
already 100–1,000 times higher than the natural back­
ground rate, and this rate is set to increase further (MA, 
2005b), so in essence, using this parameter, humankind 
has already broken this boundary and is deep within 
the danger zone (Rockström et al., 2009b). 
The CBD is viewed as the most important interna­
tional agreement on biodiversity. There are also fur­
ther intergovernmental agreements, focusing on cer­
tain aspects of biodiversity. The CBD has endeavoured 
to improve implementation of the agreed targets in the 
Parties to the Convention since 1993, with the aid of 
work programmes, standard setting and finance trans­
fers for developing countries. The international commu­
nity’s target of significantly reducing the biodiversity 
loss rate by 2010 has not been reached: since then, the 
loss rate has even gained momentum. Not one of the 
21 sub­targets agreed has been achieved, and signifi­
cant progress has been made in only four of these sub­
targets. Of the 15 indicators included, two are pointing 
upwards, three show no clear trend, and eleven indi­
cate a worsening of the situation (CBD, 2010b). Models 
show that without a fresh political approach, the loss of 
biodiversity will continue (PBL, 2010). A new strategic 
plan was drafted at the Conference of the Parties in 
Nagoya. It intends to stop the loss of biodiversity and 
to establish the basis for this by 2020 (CBD, 2010a). 
However, despite some ambitious target setting on the 
part of the existing global institutions, a trend reversal 
in the area of biodiversity has not yet been achieved. 
1.1.3 
Land Degradation and Desertification
Land degradation is caused primarily by deforestation, 
overgrazing, the expansion of non­sustainable agri­
cultural production, soil salinisation, soil sealing, and 
urban growth (IAASTD, 2009; UNEP, 2002, 2007). 
According to UNEP, around 20,000–50,000 km2 of pro­
ductive land are lost annually, mainly through soil ero­
sion (UNEP, 2007). Assessments regarding the extent 
of land degradation vary, depending on the methodical 
Table 1.1-1
Estimates of cost and benefits of restoration projects in different biomes.
Source: Sukhdev, 2008
Biomes or ecosystems Typical cost 
of restoration 
(high  scenario)
[US$/ha]
Estimated
annual benefits 
from restoration 
(average scenario)
[US$/ha]
Net present 
value of 
 benefit over
40 years
[US$/ha]
Internal 
rate of 
return
[%]
Benefit/
cost ratio
Coral reefs 542,500 129,200 1,166,000  7  2.8
Coastal ecosystems 232,700 73,900 935,400 11  4.4
Mangroves 2,880 4,290 86,900 40 26.4
Inland wetlands 33,000 14,200 171,300 12  5.4
Lakes and rivers 4,000 3,800 69,700 27 15.5
Tropical forests 3,450 7,000 148,700 50 37.3
Other forests 2,390 1,620 26,300 20 10.3
Woodland and shrubland 990 1,571 32,180 42 28.4
Grasslands 260 1,010 22,600 79 75.1
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approach used. However, the consensus in the scientific 
community is that unabatedly progressing land degra­
dation and desertification represent global problems 
which will considerably limit the scope for action with 
regard to agricultural production, nature conservation, 
water catchment areas and forests, and not least cli­
mate change mitigation in the coming decades (Eswaran 
et al., 2001; MA, 2005e). 
The first global assessment of land area degradation, 
based on expert opinions, was the Global Assessment 
of Human Induced Soil Degradation (GLASOD) pre­
sented by the International Soil Reference and Infor­
mation Centre in 1990, which included changes over 
the past centuries (WBGU, 1995a). GLASOD estimates 
that globally, between 1940 and 1990, slightly less than 
2 billion hectares of land (the equivalent of 15 % of glo­
bal land area) were subjected to anthropogenic degra­
dation, with all countries being affected (Oldeman et 
al., 1990, 1991). Subsequently, 65 % of agriculturally 
used land showed signs of degradation, of which 25 % 
were moderate, and 40 % strong, or very strong. Recent 
research also including satellite data concludes that glo­
bally, degradation has affected around a third of the 
arable land (IAASTD, 2009). Drylands are seen as par­
ticularly prone to soil degradation, especially desertifi­
cation (MA, 2005e; Hutchinson and Herrmann, 2008). 
Unlike GLASOD, the latest interim findings report by 
the Land Degradation Assessment in Drylands (LADA; 
Bai et al., 2008) shows that over a fifth of global arable 
land is affected by degradation. This report is based on 
satellite data on net primary production, and empirical 
in situ analyses between 1981 and 2003. According to 
LADA, improved soil canopy can also be observed in 
almost 16 % of global terrestrial land areas: 18 % on 
arable land, 23 % in forests, and 43 % on pastures. Two 
factors which have led to a partial improvement of the 
vegetation canopy, or biomass production, are addi­
tional irrigation, and large­scale reforestation projects.
However, from a global perspective, in comparison 
with soil improvement, land degradation is the domi­
nating trend: in many developing countries, land deg­
radation threatens food security and the development 
potential of rural areas (WBGU, 2010a). 
A sensible measure to support the avoidance of fur­
ther land degradation would be the agreement of a 
planetary guard rail for global soil protection. Rock­
ström et al. (2009a) propose that a maximum of 15 % 
of the total global terrestrial area should be used for 
agriculture. To date, slightly less than 12 % has already 
been converted. The WBGU has suggested the stabilisa­
tion of the natural yield potential in 300–500 years as a 
planetary guard rail for anthropogenic soil degradation 
(WBGU, 2010a). Soil loss should not exceed soil refor­
mation. Depending on soil properties, a tolerance limit 
could be set to achieve this. In the temperate zone, the 
WBGU envisages a tolerance limit of 1–10 t soil loss per 
hectare per year. 
The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertifi­
cation (UNCCD) addresses land degradation and deser­
tification, important areas for development cooperation 
for many decades now. Effective climate change miti­
gation can hardly be achieved without sustainable land 
use. To date, desertification has caused the release of 
an estimated 18–28 Gt C (the equivalent of 66–103 Gt 
CO2) of soil carbon (FAO, 2009d). Grasslands and pas­
ture are major potential carbon sinks: through the sus­
tainable management of grassland areas and the resto­
ration of degraded grassland, 100–800 Mt CO2 could be 
stored globally each year (FAO, 2009d). 
Considering the importance of soil protection and 
sustainable land use, the global institutions dealing 
with these areas do not have a very high profile. Of the 
three ‘Rio conventions’, the desertification convention 
has always been somewhat neglected in international 
environmental policy­making. Whilst there is at least 
an international agreement on combating land degrada­
tion in drylands, there is still no sign of any comprehen­
sive, global, legally binding regulation addressing this 
issue beyond drylands or forest protection. 
1.1.4 
Water Shortage and Water Pollution
Overall freshwater use has increased almost eight­fold 
over the last century (Shiklomanov, 2000), and is con­
tinuing to grow by about 10 % each decade. A grow­
ing global population with rising demands will also lead 
to a considerably increased future water demand, par­
ticularly because of the continued growth in irrigation 
agriculture. 
Humankind’s impact on the global water balance 
increases every year (Shiklomanov and Rodda, 2003); 
currently, over 40 % of renewable, accessible water 
resources are subject to anthropogenic use or control 
(MA, 2005b). Increasingly, the problem is not simply 
overuse, but also water pollution. Agriculture (salini­
sation, nutrient and sediment contamination), indus­
try and households (nutrients and pollutants) pollute 
lakes, rivers and coastal waters, causing considerable 
ecological, health and development problems (IWMI, 
2007). Groundwater tables are falling in many water 
catchment areas, many large rivers are overused, badly 
polluted and biologically depleted, a quarter of these do 
not reach the sea any more due to massive water use 
(for example the Yellow River in China; the Colorado in 
North America). 
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In some regions, water crises have already exacer­
bated serious social conflicts (WBGU, 2008). A third 
of the world population is affected by water scarcity; 
approximately 1.1 billion people do not have access 
to clean drinking water. Water pollution is an equally 
critical problem: 2.6 billion people do not have access 
to basic sanitation facilities, posing a serious threat to 
human health (UNDP, 2006). A lack of clean water 
causes diseases and is one of the most common causes 
of child mortality in developing countries. At 17 %, gas­
trointestinal infections were the most common cause of 
death of children under 5 in developing countries, kill­
ing 1.8 million globally in 2000 (UNESCO, 2009). Cli­
mate change exacerbates these problems. It will nega­
tively impact the water balance in many regions, affect­
ing the amount of water available, or impair its seasonal 
distribution (IPCC, 2007b; WBGU, 2008).
This inspired the agreement of one of the Millen­
nium Development Goals, to halve the number of peo­
ple without access to water by 2015, compared to 1990 
levels (Millennium Development Goal 7, Target 10; UN, 
2010). This goal is achievable if the appropriate efforts 
are made, even though it is unlikely that the  situation 
will improve in some regions, for instance in sub­
Saharan Africa or Oceania (UNICEF and WHO, 2004; 
WBGU, 2005). 
Rockström et al. (2009a) propose a planetary 
boundary for global freshwater use. Removing more 
than a total of around 4,000 km3 of water from all riv­
ers, lakes and ground water (‘blue water’) per year har­
bours a significant risk of non­linear system responses 
(major shifts in water balance, collapse of ecosystems), 
both on a regional and continental scale. Although cur­
rent usage of around 2,600 km3 per year, with a rap­
idly rising tendency, leaves some room to manoeuvre, 
this will in all probability not be the case anymore by 
2050 due to the necessary agricultural expansion and 
intensification. 
A globally agreed framework for a sustainable fresh­
water policy along the lines of the three Rio conven­
tions has so far not been set by the international com­
munity. Other than climate, freshwater is an environ­
mental good whose protection and sustainable use can 
often be achieved most efficiently locally, in the respec­
tive water catchment areas. In view of this, regional or 
national solutions appear more sensible. However, as 
water scarcity and pollution of freshwater resources are 
also a trend that can be observed on a global level, there 
is also a need for a global regulation or agreement. Con­
trary to the three Rio conventions, global water policy 
is a dialogue process, organised by a non­governmen­
tal organisation, the World Water Council. Every three 
years, a World Water Forum is held in which all stake­
holders participate (UN, states, NGOs, private sector, 
science, etc.) to advance the dialogue on sustainable 
freshwater use. 
1.1.5 
Raw Materials, Nutrients, Pollutants
For around the past 150 years, mineral material flows 
have increased drastically. Coal and ores, crude oil, and 
natural gas are the best­known examples of the extrac­
tion of finite raw materials fuelling the global economy 
since the Industrial Revolution. Some of these resources 
are now becoming scarce (Section 4.1.2; Figure 1­3a).
However, artificially manufactured nitrogen ferti­
lisers and the extraction of mineral phosphor depos­
its (Box 1.1­3) are also vital for providing the grow­
ing global population with food, and for agriculture in 
general. Effective climate change mitigation requires 
the conversion of large parts of the economic system, 
not least in terms of energy supply and mobility (Sec­
tion 4). In this context, the focus is now on other min­
eral resources, which will be required in considerably 
large volumes in future, and which are relatively rare, 
or whose deposits are distributed extremely dispropor­
tionately; Section 1.1.5.1 cites some examples of these. 
Anthropogenic pollutant emissions have led to 
numerous global environmental problems and adverse 
effects on people’s health: greenhouse gases change the 
Earth atmosphere’s radiation balance (Section 1.1.1); 
nutrients enter the biosphere and provoke changes in 
ecosystems on a large scale; stratospheric ozone layer 
depleting substances are still being released into the 
atmosphere (Section 1.1.5.3); regionally, aerosol par­
ticles sometimes have an extremely adverse effect on 
both people and ecosystems; toxic chemicals which 
are hazardous to health are released into the environ­
ment. Not least, in consequence, water pollution is 
becoming an increasingly critical development problem 
 (Section 1.1.4). 
The following is limited to outlining only a few of 
these problems by way of examples. 
1.1.5.1 
Increasing Scarcity of Strategic Mineral Resources: 
Examples
Lithium
Almost a third of the globally extracted lithium is used 
in modern batteries, found in, for example, mobile tel­
ephones and notebook computers. Even today, lith­
ium batteries already exhibit an annual growth rate of 
around 20 %. The massive expansion of electromobil­
ity would increase lithium battery demand even fur­
ther (USGS, 2010a). There has been some controversy 
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on whether lithium scarcity could actually prevent 
the large­scale use of electric cars (for example Tahil, 
2007; Meridian International Research, 2008; Evans, 
2008). According to US Geological Survey calcula­
tions (USGS, 2010b), current economically exploitable 
reserves amount to 9.9 million t, identified resources 
total around 25.5 million t, and global production in 
2009 is estimated at 18,000 t; therefore, scarcity does 
not appear to be an issue in the medium­term, partic­
ularly if effective recycling measures are implemented 
(Angerer et al., 2009b). The latest research by the 
US Ministry of Defence has shown significant, as yet 
uncharted lithium reserves in Afghanistan. 
Rare Earths, Rare Metals and Semimetals
Gallium and indium are used in the photovoltaic indus­
try, neodymium is an important element used in the 
manufacture of permanent magnets, for example for 
electric engines and wind power stations, germanium is 
used in optoelectronics, scandium in fuel cells, tantalum 
in micro capacitors (for instance for mobile telephones), 
and platinum for fuel cells and various catalytic con­
verters. These elements are at the top of a list of those 
relevant for future technologies, where in some cases, 
the expected demand in 2030 will considerably out­
strip current production levels (Angerer et al., 2009a). 
Demand for all of these raw materials is expected to 
rise, for some significantly; the use of rare earths could 
triple between 2000 and 2014  (Service, 2010). Accord­
ingly, rare earth prices have already shown significant 
increases. There is therefore some concern that raw 
material shortages could limit large­scale solar energy 
expansion, or the expected strong demand for elec­
tric engines and generators. Not least for reasons of 
cost­efficiency, over 90 % of the currently available 
rare earths are extracted in China; however, in 2010, 
 China’s export volume fell by 29 %, compared to 2008 
levels (Schüler et al., 2011). Higher export duties for 
these strategic raw materials were introduced, so scar­
city could become exacerbated (Service, 2010). In 
response, there are plans to open, or reopen, alterna­
tive extraction sites (for example Mountain Pass mine 
in California, Mount Weld mine in Australia; Schüler 
et al., 2011). 
Conclusions
The EU has presented a raw material initiative (EU COM, 
2008c), and also developed a list of the 14 raw mate­
rials critical for the EU (EU COM, 2010h). The German 
federal government introduced its raw material strategy 
in October 2010 (BMWi, 2010d), which focuses prima­
rily on raw material supply security from the German 
perspective. The WBGU believes that this strategy is a 
step in the right direction. However, it is mainly con­
cerned with securing the supply of strategic mineral 
raw materials in the short to medium term. There is not 
enough emphasis on the fact that in the long term, the 
course should be set towards a circular economy, par­
ticularly towards recycling and usage efficiency. The 
international long­range and secondary effects with 
regard to sustainable development in export countries 
play only a marginal role in the raw material strategy. 
Although environmental and development political 
aims are mentioned, it seems that these are superseded 
by the primary aim of securing the raw material supply. 
A raw material strategy should integrate the avoid­
ance of negative impacts on environment and develop­
ment from the start, and should also be more expansive 
by combining the following elements for each respec­
tive raw material and application: securing and expand­
ing the supply, usage efficiency, recycling, and substi­
tution. Particularly the significant potential for effi­
ciency optimisation and recycling of the listed strategic 
Box 1.1-3
Peak phosphorus
Besides nitrogen and potassium, phosphorus is one of the 
three main components of artificial fertilisers. Whilst nitrogen 
can be obtained from the air in practically unlimited quanti­
ties using the energy­intensive Haber­Bosch process, phos­
phorus is a scarce finite resource which, unlike for example 
crude oil, is irreplaceable by other energy carriers or sub­
stances. Phosphorus is indispensable as a crop nutrient to 
ensure the required increase in productivity per crop area to 
maintain the food security of a growing world population, 
and to meet the rising demand for bioenergy and bio­based 
products from land use (Section 1.2.5). Almost 60 % of phos­
phorus reserves of approx. 16 billion t are in Morocco and 
China (although China does not export); South Africa and the 
USA are next on the list (USGS, 2010c). Cordell et al. (2009) 
estimate that the extraction maximum (peak phosphorus) 
could already be reached in 2030; according to Déry and 
Anderson (2007), the peak has even already been exceeded 
in 1989. As with crude oil (peak oil), the quality of the 
remaining phosphate minerals subsequently declines, leading 
to rising production costs. Unlike oil, however, phosphates 
cannot be substituted, but they can be recycled. Important 
coping strategies are the more efficient use of phosphate fer­
tiliser, the completion of nutrient cycles in agricultural pro­
duction, particularly through the use of organic fertilisers, 
and the reclamation of nutrients from waste water. Despite 
the future major importance of this problem in terms of food 
security, it is still not on the international political agenda 
(Vaccari, 2009; Cordell, 2010; Craswell et al., 2010).
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minerals has been examined only marginally (Schüler 
et al., 2011). 
In the case of imminent, permanent price increases 
for certain raw materials, substitution seems the obvi­
ous choice. For example, neodymium scarcity, about 
which concerns are frequently voiced, could lead to an 
increase in the price of permanent magnets, which are 
also used in the construction of modern wind power sta­
tions. However, electric generators, such as those used 
in wind power stations or engines for electric vehicles, 
could also be realised without the use of permanent 
magnets. There are also sufficient alternatives available 
which could be used in photovoltaic technology to gen­
erate solar energy, rather than relying on materials with 
limited availability. Comparable alternatives also exist 
for the catalytic converters used in hydrogen electroly­
sis or fuel cells. In principle, the WBGU therefore does 
not consider the limited availability of rare materials 
to be a risk endangering the rapid conversion towards 
low­carbon energy systems. 
1.1.5.2 
Nutrient Cycles
Nitrogen (N) and phosphor (P) are – besides CO2 and 
water – the two vital plant nutrients whose global 
cycles are relevant for the Earth system. Anthropo­
genic change and acceleration of both cycles has been 
significant in order to increase agricultural production 
through the use of mineral fertilisers (Vitousek et al., 
1997a; Mackenzie et al., 2002; Section 1.2.5). Over­
supply with these nutrients can change ecosystems to 
such an extent that threshold values are exceeded, trig­
gering fundamental structural changes or collapse. This 
pattern can be observed at all dimensional scales, from 
small local ecosystems (meadows, lakes) to large­scale 
anoxic marine environments (for example dead zones 
in the Gulf of Mexico or the Baltic Sea; Diaz, 2001).
The anthropogenic production of reactive nitrogen 
(fertilisers, combustion processes and the cultivation 
of nitrogen­fixing legumes) has increased tenfold since 
industrialisation (from approx. 15 to approx. 156 Mt N 
per year), today exceeding natural flows. Over half of 
all synthetic nitrogen fertiliser ever produced has been 
applied post­1985 (MA, 2005a). Its use is expected to 
increase even further to approx. 267 Mt per year by 
2050 (Galloway et al., 2004; Bouwman et al., 2009). 
As a planetary boundary, Rockström et al. (2009b) rec­
ommend limiting nitrogen input to around 35 Mt N 
per year, roughly the equivalent of a quarter of cur­
rent amounts, to prevent the slow erosion of ecosys­
tem resilience through eutrophication and acidification. 
The use of phosphor as a fertiliser has tripled 
between 1960 and 1990 (MA, 2005a). Today, around 
20 Mt P per year are extracted for use as mineral ferti­
liser; however, the easily accessible resources will soon 
become scarce (Box 1.1­3; Rockström et al., 2009a). 
Ultimately, around half of this ends up in the oceans 
(8.5–9.5 Mt P per year). For comparison: prehistorical 
input into the oceans amounted to merely approx. 0.2 
Mt P per year (Mackenzie et al., 2002). Such a huge 
input increase of phosphor into the oceans could, in 
the long term, lead to expansive anoxic zones, or dead 
zones, in the oceanic deep seas, as has been the case 
before in the history of the Earth (Handoh and Len­
ton, 2003). Despite the massively increased anthropo­
genic phosphor flow, Rockström et al. (2009a) believe 
that a planetary boundary of 11 Mt P per year should 
be sufficient to prevent critical load limits from being 
reached. In view of the increasing demand for agricul­
tural products (Section 1.2.5), this boundary has almost 
been reached. 
1.1.5.3 
Depletion of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer
Over the past few years, the annual seasonal strat­
ospheric ozone hole over Antarctica has continued to 
reach record dimensions, fluctuating slightly from year 
to year. Recovery can not be expected as yet, despite 
the successes of the Montreal Protocol that led to the 
reduction of emissions of ozone­depleting substances, 
as the processes are still in saturation. This also applies 
more or less to the Arctic stratospheric ozone deple­
tion in the spring; again there has been no measura­
ble trend reversal. In the global mean, the ozone layer 
has also not yet recovered to pre­1980 levels, however, 
over the past few years, total column ozone has stabi­
lised at around 3.5 % (northern hemisphere), and 6 % 
(southern hemisphere) below pre­1980 levels. Accord­
ingly, clear­sky UV radiation levels in mid­ and higher 
latitudes are still higher than they were pre­1980. 
The atmospheric concentration of the ozone­
depleting substances regulated by the Montreal Pro­
tocol (measured in terms of their stratospheric ozone 
depletion potential) is expected to fall to 1980 levels 
by the middle of the 21st century. Nevertheless, the 
ozone layer is not expected to fully return to its pre­
1980 condition but to remain permanently altered due 
to the impact climate change has on atmospheric circu­
lations. Total ozone columns in the tropics are expected 
to remain lower than they were in 1980, whilst out­
side the tropics, they are expected to increase (Li et 
al., 2009). Without the regulation of ozone­depleting 
substance emissions as stipulated by the Montreal Pro­
tocol, the globally­averaged column ozone could have 
been expected to decrease by 17 % by 2020, and by 
67 % by 2065, which by then would have led to a dou­
bling of skin damaging UV radiation levels during the 
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summer months in the northern mid­latitudes (New­
man et al., 2009).
The Montreal Protocol, in force since 1989 and con­
tinuously reviewed and tightened over the years, can 
therefore be seen as successful. Beyond protecting the 
ozone layer, it has also contributed to climate change 
mitigation, as many of the ozone­depleting substances 
regulated in the Montreal Protocol are also strong 
greenhouse gases. Velders et  al. (2007) estimate that 
the global climate change mitigation effect of the Mon­
treal Protocol through avoided emissions in the period 
1990 to 2010 considerably exceeds that of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
However, particularly in Antarctica, an effect in the 
opposite direction is to be expected: the annual forma­
tion of the ozone hole influences the local climate via 
lower atmospheric flows. In the past decades, the warm­
ing in Antarctic summer which otherwise would have 
been expected due to anthropogenic climate change 
has been reduced in this way. In a future where the 
ozone hole does not develop anymore, a corresponding 
increase in warming can be expected in Antarctica (for 
example Son et al., 2009).
1.1.5.4 
Pollutants: Examples
This report would like to mention only two groups of 
globally significant pollutants by way of example:
 > Persistent organic pollutants: One group of toxins 
presenting a particular health hazard for people and 
the environment are the synthetically produced per­
sistent organic pollutants (POPs), characterised by 
their great toxicity, strong mobility, and persistence 
(long life). Their number and volume has signifi­
cantly increased, they are spreading globally, and, 
not least, they are particularly dangerous because 
they can accumulate in the food chain (UNEP, 2007). 
In her 1962 book ‘Silent Spring’, considered an 
important trigger for the environmental movement 
by many, Rachel Carson highlighted this issue (Car­
son, 1962; Kroll, 2006). Ten years later, the pesticide 
DDT was banned in the US, and as of 2004, the 
Stockholm Convention is effective, aimed at initially 
banning ‘the dirty dozen’ (nine pesticides, PCBs, 
dioxins, and furans). Some of these substances are 
intentionally produced synthesised products for a 
particular use, for example as a pesticide; others are 
unintentionally created pollutants, such as, for 
example, dioxins, which are the result of combustion 
processes. These are a major source of POPs in devel­
oping countries (UNEP, 2003). 
 > Heavy metals: Another important example is pro­
vided by toxic heavy metals that are released into 
the environment, such as lead and mercury. These 
substances also have a long life­span, disperse glo­
bally and accumulate: in the Arctic, for example, 
high concentrations of mercury and POPs can now 
be found in both people, and animals living in the 
wild (Hansen, 2000). Whilst the conversion to lead­
free petrol has mitigated lead contamination, mer­
cury continues to increase, and still remains inade­
quately regulated (UNEP, 2007).
1.1.6 
Interaction of Global Environmental Changes
Global environmental changes are complexly inter­
linked (Table 1.1­2). In some instances, for example 
with regard to the avoidance of summer smog, goals 
run parallel, leading to win­win measures: mitigating 
toxic tropospheric ozone also mitigates the greenhouse 
effect (Section 1.1.5.3). Most of these interrelations, 
however, are intensifying effects; the overall impact 
of global environmental change is therefore likely to 
exceed the sum of the individual effects. 
An example of this kind of pronounced positive 
feedback loop is the conversion of natural ecosystems 
(forest, grasslands, peatlands) for agricultural or for­
estry use. Deforestation and drainage release the major 
carbon reserves stored in biomass and soils into the 
atmosphere as CO2 emissions (partly with a delayed 
effect). Moreover, sink efficiency also often decreases, 
if the secondary ecosystems have a lower CO2 absorp­
tion capacity than the original vegetation. As cli­
mate change also contributes to biodiversity loss, and 
impedes ecosystems function, these two major envi­
ronmental changes lead to mutual intensification (Sec­
tion 1.1­2). 
On the other hand, these interrelated impacts can be 
used for synergistic environmental policies. An effec­
tive policy for the protection of forests and peatlands 
would not only have a positive effect on climate change, 
but would also slow down biodiversity loss. Current 
forest protection efforts within the scope of the climate 
convention (Sections 4.1.7.1, 7.3.7.2) are therefore of 
outstanding strategic importance (WBGU, 2010b). 
Climate change is characterised not only by the great 
number of intensifying feedback loops leading to other 
environmental problems, but also by the dimensions 
of these intensifying effects. The WBGU has analysed 
these links, and concluded that people and society may 
expect considerable effects (WBGU, 2008). Unabated 
climate change would, for instance, cause vegetation 
zones to shift, meaning not only that forestry and agri­
culture have to be expansively adapted, but also that 
20–30 % of floral and faunal species might become 
extinct (IPCC, 2007b). The global water balance would 
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also be severely affected. A tendency towards less pre­
cipitation in drylands, and increased rainfall in the wet 
 areas of the upper latitudes, can already be observed. 
At the same time, more extended dry periods and 
heavy rainfalls can be expected, increasing the risk of 
droughts and flooding, respectively. Without decisive 
climate change mitigation, these interrelated environ­
mental impacts could overload many societies’ ability 
to adapt over the next few decades, ultimately even 
leading to national and international security threats 
(WBGU, 2008). 
One implication of this analysis is that international 
environmental policies should increasingly focus on 
integrative approaches which address several envi­
ronmental problems concurrently, or concentrate on 
interactions and points where environmental prob­
lems meet. However, so far, these are the exception, 
and must be accorded a far higher degree of attention 
(Section 1.3). 
1.2
Global Economic and Social Megatrends
In view of the Earth system megatrends, and the eco­
nomic and social megatrends, it becomes clear that a 
transformation into a low­carbon, sustainable society 
is essential (Section 3). Without a change in direction, 
the natural life­support systems of humankind are in 
danger, drastically limiting future social development. 
The transformation is accompanied by the dynamic 
megatrends of a globalised economy and society, as 
evidenced by the global financial and economic crisis 
(Box 1.2­1). 
The transformation is of key relevance particularly 
for the dynamics of the socio­economic development 
of the developing and newly industrialising countries 
(Section 1.2.1). If the required development advances 
are to be made in a sustainable way, they must be 
achieved without collision with the planetary guard 
rails. This is a major challenge, especially in view of the 
Table 1.1-2
Interaction of Global Environmental Changes. Red: cumulative intensifying effect; green: cumulative alleviating effect; black: 
neutral or unknown effect, or impact to be analysed individually.
Source: WBGU
Impact of
on
Climate change Biodiversity loss Freshwater 
scarcity and 
pollution
Soil degradation, 
desertification
Pollutants and 
nutrients
Climate change CO2 emissions 
through the loss of 
natural ecosystems 
(stocks and sinks); 
albedo change
Loss of CO2 stock 
and sink function: 
albedo increase
Impact of 
aerosols: 
CFCs; ground-
level ozone; 
 stratospheric 
ozone
Biodiversity 
loss
Overtaxation of 
ecosystems’ and 
species’  ability to 
adapt (e. g. coral 
bleaching)
 Degradation 
of limnic 
 ecosystems; 
species loss
Ecosystem 
 degradation; 
 species loss
Accumula-
tion of pollut-
ants in  natural 
 ecosystems; 
eutrophication; 
species loss
Freshwater 
scarcity and 
pollution
Altered precipi-
tation volumes 
and patterns
Altered local hy-
drological balances, 
e. g. through defor-
estation, increased 
sediment load in 
rivers
Increased 
 pollutant and 
sediment burden
Contamination of 
water resources 
(e. g. through 
mercury, pesti-
cides);  sediment 
burden
Soil 
 degradation, 
desertification
Desertification 
as a consequence 
of less precipita-
tion in arid areas
Increased erosion 
through loss of 
plant cover
Salinisation Soil burden-
ing through 
heavy metals 
and  organic 
 substances
Pollutants and 
nutrients
Less air filtration; 
 decelerated pollut-
ant degradation
 Decelerated 
pollutant 
 degradation
More dust 
through wind 
erosion
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Box 1.2-1
Impacts of the Global Financial and Economic 
Crisis 
The 2007 to 2009 financial and economic crisis, which ini­
tially affected US finance markets, then spread on to Euro­
pean and, ultimately, global markets, directly impacted the 
real economy and led to the biggest global recession since the 
late 1920s. Unlike the 1997/98 Asia crisis, which was region­
ally restricted, it threatened the stability of the entire global 
financial system. An immediate breakdown was only averted 
through massive liquidity extension on the part of the cen­
tral banks, coupled with coordinated key interest rate reduc­
tions and expansive state guarantees for defaulted loans. In 
addition, debt­financed economic stimulus packages helped 
to stabilise demand in the large national economies, and to 
prevent a negative spiral of diminishing economic perform­
ance and growing unemployment.
The immediate and determined response of the interna­
tional community proves that under severe pressure to act, 
transformative turnarounds are possible. Despite the fact 
that the crisis has been temporarily contained, however, the 
world is faced with considerable structural challenges to set 
the course towards a sustainable and stable economic system.
The crisis should also be used as an opportunity to accel­
erate sustainable development. National economic stimulus 
packages provide an opportunity for a targeted redirecting 
of investment flow in the sense of a ‘Green New Deal’, to 
promote sustainable growth – or ‘green growth’ (Edenhofer 
and Stern, 2009). Key areas for investments into the future 
are, for example, the switch to energy systems based on low­
carbon technologies, and the increase of energy efficiency 
on the demand side (Chapter 4). Nevertheless, active policy 
measures to support the business agenda cannot be main­
tained indefinitely. The spiralling national debt, particularly 
the USA’s, but also of other OECD countries, limits the room 
for manoeuvre in terms of further public investments.There­
fore, consumers and companies must become more involved 
in global climate financing. China, on the other hand, appears 
to have emerged from the crisis stronger, and has the financial 
resources to redirect growth specifically towards sustainabil­
ity, and to leapfrog a large part of the established high­car­
bon development path. This opens up huge opportunities for 
a managed transformation; however, as yet, a fundamental 
change of course still remains to be set.
At a global level, the crisis­related slump in economic per­
formance in 2009 merely meant a breather in terms of emis­
sions growth: at 1.3 %, global CO2 emissions decreased less 
drastically than originally anticipated, and they are expected 
to rise again by 3 % in 2010 (Friedlingstein  et  al., 2010). 
The room for manoeuvre gained by global climate protec­
tion through the temporary emissions decline is threatening 
to be lost again through two effects: on the one hand, the 
large newly industrialising countries are undergoing a rapid 
catch­up process, which currently still relies largely on fossil­
based energy systems. CO2 emissions attributed to China and 
India rose in 2009 despite the global economic crisis by about 
8 % and 6.2 % respectively (Friedlingstein et al., 2010), and 
a trend reversal is not in sight. On the other hand, the cur­
rent economical dynamics in many developing countries is 
based primarily on expanded resource extraction for export, 
particularly also to the emergent newly industrialising coun­
tries, increasing the pressure on the ecosystems even further. 
Therefore, in the sense of acceleration of sustainable develop­
ment, the economic crisis was by no means a catalyst.
From a forward­thinking perspective, far reaching con­
clusions regarding the future structuring of global govern­
ance mechanisms can be drawn from the crisis. Globalisation 
consequences and dynamics at an economic level are clearly 
disproportionate to the current opportunities for institutional 
monitoring – and control – of the process at global level. Not 
least, the outbreak of the global financial and economic crisis 
has served to prove that the existing structures of national 
regulations constitute an inadequate global regulation frame­
work for coping with systemic risks. The development of effi­
cient global institutions is therefore of major importance to 
manage the globalisation process, and to reduces the vulner­
ability of the system to further crises (UN, 2009a).
Apart from the blatant failure of existing warning and 
control mechanisms to avoid global crises, the financial and 
economic crisis has above all revealed the degree of global 
integration and interdependencies. These have meant that a 
problem originally limited to the US real estate market was 
able to trigger sudden consternation on international finance 
markets through the global trade with inadequately collater­
alised, certificated mortgages, with the resultant shockwaves 
subsequently affecting the real economy. Newly industrialis­
ing and developing countries are also affected by the crisis, as 
it led to less demand for export goods, for instance, negative­
ly impacting development and employment opportunities. 
Potential financing problems are also a consequence of the 
crisis; developed countries are blocking capital seekers from 
other regions through new issues of government securities 
(World Bank, 2009a). These added difficulties with regard 
to the financing situation, in conjunction with, at least tem­
porarily, lower growth rates, hold huge challenges for devel­
oping countries and impede achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals (World Bank, 2010a). Particularly for the 
poorest countries, which do not benefit from the economi­
cal dynamics in the newly industrialising countries, there 
are now fewer development opportunities. OECD countries’ 
cutbacks of official development assistance could also have a 
particularly drastic effect in this regard. The risk remains that 
the global financial crisis means a setback for some parts of 
the world, particularly in terms of socio­economic develop­
ment. The negation of recent economic progress is a serious 
threat, especially in Africa (Debiel et al., 2010).
The far­reaching feedback effects, which have merely 
been outlined here, illustrate that systemic thinking and act­
ing under adoption of a long­term perspective are the funda­
mental premises for avoiding future economic, social and 
ecological crises.
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dynamic growth of greenhouse gas emissions in these 
countries. 
One positive factor is the apparent trend towards 
democratisation, which allows broad and liberal dis­
course, thereby promoting the establishment of a 
social consensus for the necessary transformation 
 (Section 1.2.2). 
Ultimately, the imminent radical changes to the 
industrial metabolism focus particularly on three main 
pillars of today’s global society:
1. The energy systems, also including the transport 
sector, which the entire economy depends on. These 
are currently faced with a new surge of growth, due 
to the accelerated development dynamics in the 
newly industrialising countries (Section 1.2.3). The 
energy sector causes around two­thirds of today’s 
long­lived greenhouse gas emissions. 
2. The urban areas, currently responsible for three­
quarters of global final energy demand. Their popu­
lation will double to 6 billion by 2050  (Section 
1.2.4). 
3. The land­use systems (agriculture and forestry, 
including deforestation). They are currently respon­
sible for almost a quarter of global greenhouse gas 
emissions (Section 1.2.5). Land use does not only 
have to provide enough food for a world popula­
tion that continues to grow, and to become more 
demanding, but also has to deal with a growth in 
demand due to the increasing use of bioenergy and 
bio­based raw materials.
1.2.1 
Development
Substantial Progress
Over the past 20 years, there has been substantial 
progress in many areas of human development. Today, 
most people live healthier and longer, are better edu­
cated, and have improved chances of covering their 
basic needs (UNDP, 2010). One indicator for this is the 
Human Development Index, which illustrates the three 
dimensions of health, education and standard of liv­
ing through life expectation at birth, literacy and school 
entry rates, and a weighted per capita income. Coun­
tries with the most significant development progress 
not only include emerging economies such as China, 
Indonesia and South Korea, but also poor countries 
such as Nepal, Oman and Tunisia, where great progress 
has been achieved in the non­income related areas 
of human development (UNDP,  2010). However, the 
development progress made by these countries var­
ies greatly. Whilst a quarter of the developing coun­
tries has achieved only moderate improvements over 
the past 40 years, a further quarter has managed great 
development progress (UNDP,  2010). The effects of 
improved health care, however, are currently counter­
acted mainly by the fact that in 19 countries (nine of 
these sub­Saharan African countries), the general state 
of health has again changed for the worse, and life 
expectation gone down, particularly due to HIV infec­
tions and a higher adult mortality in countries in tran­
sition. Simultaneously, the socio­economic disparities 
within and between states have frequently increased. 
New Geography of Global Growth
The majority of people living below the poverty line 
no longer live in the poor developing countries. This 
initially surprising fact stands for the growing heter­
ogeneity in the development dynamics of countries, 
such that the classical categorisation into industrial­
ised, newly industrialising and developing countries 
cannot reflect this adequately. The OECD report on the 
‘shifting of wealth’ reveals the global structural changes 
that have occurred in the past decade (OECD, 2010c). 
This new ‘4­speed world’ (James Wolfensohn) there­
fore includes affluent, converging, struggling and poor 
countries (Figure 1.2­1; measure: income and per cap­
ita growth in comparison to the industrialised coun­
tries). Between the 1990s, still viewed as a lost decade 
in terms of development, and the 2000s, there has been 
significant global development progress, and shifts in 
geographical diffusion patterns. A ‘new geography of 
global growth’ (OECD,  2010c) has become apparent: 
whilst some countries continue to suffer from absolute 
poverty, and no development progress at all is on the 
horizon, there are developing countries which are on 
the path to the middle­income group of countries; this 
also includes some sub­Saharan states in Africa. Finally, 
there are countries that are catching up economically, 
coming close to the prosperity level of wealthy coun­
tries. Between the 1990s and the 2000s, the number of 
countries where per capita growth has doubled, com­
pared to the OECD countries, has increased from 12 to 
65 (‘converging’). Over the same period, the number 
of poor countries has fallen from 55 to 25. However, 
a number of countries have not benefited from these 
growth dynamics (‘poor’). 
Regional Shifts of Absolute Poverty 
An analysis by the Institute for Development Studies, 
distinguishing between low­ and middle­income coun­
tries and fragile or conflict­affected states, showed sim­
ilar results (Sumner, 2010). Thus, the number of low­
income countries (based on World Bank classifica­
tion), following a rise in the 1990s, fell from 60 to 39 
between 2000 and 2009. Correspondingly, the number 
of middle­income countries has greatly increased (Sum­
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Figure 1.2-1
Dynamics of national wealth development: the ‘4­speed world’; a) 1990s; b) 2000s. Between the 1990s and the last decade, 
there has been considerable wealth progress, causing shifts in geographical patterns of countries with differing rates of growth 
and GDP per capita. Today, four distinct country groups can be differentiated according to their growth dynamics: poor, 
struggling, converging and affluent countries. Whilst some countries continue to suffer from absolute poverty (red), and no 
wealth progress at all is in sight, there are developing countries which are on the path to the middle­income and high­income 
group of countries, albeit struggling to keep up sustained growth rates (orange, this also includes some sub­Saharan states in 
Africa). And finally, there are countries that are catching up quickly due to sustaining high rates of growth; coming close to 
middle­income and high­income countries (light blue). 
Source: OECD, 2010c
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ner, 2010). Whilst 1.81 billion people were still living 
below the poverty line of US$ 1.25 a day in 1990, this 
went down to only 1.38 billion people in 2005 (Chen 
and Ravallion, 2008). These dynamics have led to the 
following new global distribution of absolute poverty 
structure (Sumner, 2010):
 > Almost three­quarters of the people suffering from 
absolute poverty, i. e. almost 1 billion people, or the 
‘bottom billion’, today live in middle­income coun­
tries (mainly India, China, Nigeria, Indonesia, Paki­
stan, South Africa). 
 > Only around a quarter of people suffering from 
absolute poverty, i. e. around 370 million people, are 
living in low­income countries. 
Around 300 million of these live in fragile and con­
flict­affected states, including low­ and middle­income 
countries. Even if, in the wake of the global financial 
and economic crisis (2009–2010), the number of people 
globally living in absolute poverty has again increased 
by 65 million people (Ravallion and Chen,  2010), it 
can be assumed that the observed structural and geo­
graphical shifts will largely remain unaffected by this. 
Although the global financial and economic crisis con­
tinues, many countries are back on a growth path (for 
example middle­income countries in Latin America).
Consequences of these Dynamics for Climate 
Change Mitigation
At first glance, the fact that in future, around three­
quarters of people living in absolute poverty will be 
doing so in middle­income countries, and that many 
developing countries are enjoying economic growth, 
and therefore also progress in terms of welfare, are very 
positive trends. However, the problem, from a climate 
change mitigation perspective, is that fact that these 
countries are on a growth path that is based on fos­
sil fuels. This particularly applies to the fastest growing 
countries (China, India, Brazil, etc.). 
Many low­income countries (for example sub­Saha­
ran African countries), and middle­income countries 
(for example in Latin America) are also pursuing a 
resource­based export model (mainly agricultural com­
modities), which usually exacerbates the degradation 
of the natural environment (for example deforestation, 
soil degradation, water scarcity). 
These growth trends are not only unsustainable from 
an environmental and climate perspective, they are 
also going to impede or prevent the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Both Human 
Development Report 2010 and Global Development 
Report 2010 conclude that non­sustainable production 
and consumption patterns represent the biggest threat 
to development progress, and that a transition towards 
low­carbon development paths is therefore necessary 
(UNDP, 2010; World Bank, 2010b). 
For climate change mitigation to succeed, it is of cen­
tral importance that emissions are reduced not only in 
industrialised countries, but also in low­ and middle­
income countries, which may already be on a devel­
opment path today, or will soon be. They must change 
course, from fossil energy use to climate and environ­
mentally friendly development paths. Above all, this 
applies to China and India.
1.2.2 
Democratisation
Particularly since the 20th century, fundamental 
changes to political systems and social orders can be 
observed at a global level; this is characterised by the 
transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system 
(Merkel, 2010). Samuel  P.  Huntington described this 
transition, which has continually also inspired coun­
ter movements, as three major waves of democratisa­
tion (Huntington, 1991). The first wave from 1828 to 
1926 was triggered by the American and French rev­
olutions. By the early 1920s, general, equal and free 
elections, the minimum requirement for democratic 
systems, had become established in around 30 coun­
tries. The second wave lasted from 1943 to 1962, and 
brought the democratisation of the political post­war 
systems in West Germany, Italy and Japan, and some 
Latin American countries. The third democratisation 
wave, as of the mid­1970s, started with the Portuguese 
‘Carnation Revolution’, and continued during the early 
1980s across Latin America, where a number of military 
regimes were toppled by a democratic regime change. 
Further African and East Asian countries followed suit. 
A ‘fourth wave’ between 1989 and 1991 led to the col­
lapse of the Eastern European socialist systems and the 
former dominions of the Soviet Union. Since then, glo­
bal democratisation has progressed further, seemingly 
also gaining a foothold in the Arabic­Islamic world with 
the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in Tunisia in 2011 (Freedom 
House, 2010; Leggewie, 2011). The global democratisa­
tion trend has been confirmed by the quantitative Pol­
ity study, started by political scientist Ted Robert Gurr 
(Gurr and Eckstein, 1975; Figure 1.2­2). If it were to 
transpire that only the granting of liberties allows per­
manently stable societies, the current wave of democ­
ratisation (always with distinct politico­cultural differ­
ences) could also engulf further autocratic regimes such 
as that of the People’s Republic of China. In that case, 
democracy would have established itself as a model for 
political order worldwide.
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Principles of Democracy
Even if globally and historically, varying forms have 
emerged, the core element of democracy remains the 
congruence of rulers and ruled. Democracy, to quote 
Abraham Lincoln, is ‘government of the people, by the 
people, for the people’. Its most important achievement 
is therefore the requirement of legitimation for all acts 
of governance, which in democratic systems is guaran­
teed by the political equality of all. Democracies put 
their trust in the (political) ‘wisdom of crowds’; that 
is why it works with different variants of the major­
ity rule, which, however, also allows minorities to have 
their say, effectively and fairly, and protects them. 
Democratic political systems are also embedded in legal 
orders and the rule of law, and are subject to a sys­
tem of checks and balances. Effective decision­making 
advantages such as the reversibility of decisions and 
effective stakeholder participation on the part of the 
citizens, instigated through direct and indirect involve­
ment in the decision­making process and through pub­
lic multi­level communication, go hand in hand with 
these principles. Improved consolidation of preferences 
and interests, best­possible use of widespread knowl­
edge, and the highest input legitimation of any politi­
cal system therefore represent the rationality and com­
parative advantage of democracies. No democratic sys­
tem has ever achieved the absolute optimum (Schmidt, 
2006). There are also many ‘defective democracies’ 
(Merkel et al., 2003), that continue to show elements 
of autocratic forms of governance. Moreover, over the 
past few years, the established liberal democracies are 
exhibiting signs of a crisis, as described in the ‘post­
democracy’ thesis, for example, which assumes an 
internal hollowing out of formal democratic institutions 
which continue to exist, through a decline in (elec­
tion) participation and the increasing importance of 
democratically non­legitimised groups (Crouch, 2004; 
 Section 5.3.2). Despite these by all means serious prob­
lems and developments, the outlined general democra­
tisation trend continues worldwide, beyond the west­
ern core countries. 
Democracy as an Important Premise for 
Transformation
In recent years, the climate change has given rise to 
the question of whether democratic political systems 
can actually overcome this and other planetary chal­
lenges, or whether autocratic systems are not bet­
ter equipped to deal with the great transformation 
 (Chapter 3) by simply ordering it. The WBGU is con­
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Changing global government types 1946–2009. Within the scope of the Polity IV project, a combined democracy­autocracy 
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democratisation wave during the early 1990s, when the number of democracies rose by more than 50 %, from 48 in 1989 to 77 
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vinced  (Sections  5.3.2,  6; Box  5.3­1) that the great 
transformation is about the finding of legitimate, fair, 
creative and permanent problem solutions for a sus­
tainable life. In doing so, the citizens’ inherent right to 
actively participate in shaping and working towards the 
vision of a climate­friendly society cannot be ceded. 
Increasingly, demands for the right to get involved in 
decision­making are also being made, as recent cit­
izens’ protest campaigns, for example with regard to 
the ‘Stuttgart 21’ railway station or nuclear power have 
shown (Sections 5.3.1.4, 5.4.1.3). The aims of a ‘good 
life’ must be discussed globally by citizens, in line with 
the changing values across all social environments, and 
with the inclusion of the scientific community (Sec­
tions 2, 8). In the WBGU’s view, only a democratic pub­
lic allows this kind of debate, to make the required self­
restrictions and the chances of a better life for all peo­
ple plausible, and to form the basis for the necessary 
political decisions. Transformation is a societal search 
process, and therefore requires more, rather than less, 
democracy (Sections 5.3.2 5.4.2). 
Against the background of the current debate on 
democratic systems’ ability to perform, this conclusion 
may not be the obvious one. It is certainly true that 
as yet, democracy has not proven its future capacity 
to deal with the described challenges and the immi­
nent great transformation (Section  5.3.2). However, 
this does not imply that democracy as such should be 
questioned, but that further development in terms of 
its content, and its modernisation, should be pursued, 
including at a global governance level (Section 5.3.5.2). 
Not least, the great transformation is therefore a test 
of the future viability of democratic systems (Leggewie 
and Welzer, 2009).
1.2.3 
Global Energy Trends: Demand and Production
Energy Demand
Energy is a basic premise for human development. It is 
essential for the socio­economic activities of all soci­
eties, in the form of light, heat, mechanical power or 
electricity. At the same time, energy use is responsible 
for the largest share of anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions (Section 1.1.1). The distribution of energy 
use is currently distinctly uneven. Around half of glo­
bal primary energy demand originates in OECD coun­
tries, which make up merely 20 % of the population, 
but generate around three­quarters of global GDP (Fig­
ure 1.2­3). Concurrently, 2.8 billion people still prima­
rily rely on traditional biomass as their primary energy 
source for cooking, and 1.4 billion people do not have 
access to electricity. In non­OECD countries, where the 
current per capita consumption is still low, the demand 
for energy is rising particularly fast. This is due to the 
rapid development progress since the 1990s described 
in Section 1.2.1, and their increasing market integra­
tion as a consequence of globalisation. OECD country 
demand, on the other hand, is satisfied. In 2009, China 
superseded the USA as the country with the highest 
energy demand, for example (IEA, 2009b). 
If only existing and already planned government 
policies related to the energy sector were implemented 
(New Policies Scenario), the IEA estimates that the glo­
bal primary energy demand would rise by 1.2 % annu­
ally, so that by 2035, the energy demand would already 
exceed 2008 levels by 36 %. 93 % of this expected 
increase can be attributed to non­OECD countries, 
driven by the faster growth of the economy, industrial 
production, the population and urbanisation in these 
countries (IEA, 2010c). China alone is responsible for 
36 % of this expected increase in global energy demand 
by 2035, India for 18 %. The OECD countries’ energy 
demand increases only slowly in this scenario; however, 
in 2035, the USA is still the second­largest energy con­
sumer after China (IEA, 2010c). A generally expected 
trend is the relative increase of electricity in the final 
energy demand mix.
In the Global Energy Assessment’s baseline scenario 
(GEA, 2011), it is assumed that the global primary 
energy demand will more than double by 2050, from 
approx. 470 EJ in 2010 to around 1,100 EJ per year 
(Figure 1.2­4).
The global economy’s energy intensity, i. e. the 
amount of energy used in relation to the gross domes­
tic product, has steadily decreased over the past few 
decades. As responsible factors, the IEA cites improved 
energy efficiency, change of energy carriers, and struc­
tural changes in the global economy away from energy­
intensive industries. Again there are marked differ­
ences between the OECD and non­OECD countries 
(Figure 1.2­3). Without the energy intensity improve­
ments achieved between 1980 and 2008, today’s glo­
bal energy demand would be 32 % higher (IEA, 2010c). 
Energy Production
Today’s global energy supply relies overwhelmingly 
on the use of fossil fuels (Figure 1.2­4). They stead­
ily gained in importance, from the beginning of indus­
trialisation up to the 1970s, when their share in the 
global primary energy supply peaked at 87 % (Grü­
bler, 2008a). Since then, it has varied between 84 % 
and 86 %. However, the relative significance of the 
respective individual fossil fuels has clearly changed. In 
1925, coal dominated the fossil energy supply, contrib­
uting 45 % to the global energy supply. Subsequently, 
its share dropped to around 25 % by the 1970s. At the 
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same time, crude oil, the fossil fuel dominant since the 
mid­1960s, peaked at over 46 % of primary energy. As 
a consequence of oil price fluctuations in the 1970s, the 
energy supply resource basis was intentionally diver­
sified further; the proportion of natural gas in the pri­
mary energy mix, for example, has risen from less than 
16 % to over 22 % since then. Since the early 2000s, the 
relative significance of coal has increased again, partic­
ularly through the rapid economic growth in China and 
India. Overall, this has led to a rise in the global signif­
icance of coal as primary energy, from around 24 % in 
2000 to 28 % in 2008. 
Nuclear energy has been commercially produced 
and expanded since the 1950s, although it did not start 
to make major contributions to the electricity supply 
until the 1970s. Most nuclear power plants were built 
between 1970 and 1990, a period during which the glo­
bal capacity expanded from around 50 to around 350 
GWe. In 2008, 2,731 TWh electricity, or 13 % of glo­
bal electric power, were generated by nuclear power 
plants. In the early 1990s, nuclear power already 
contributed 19 % to global electricity generation, it is 
therefore declining. As yet unpredictable is the extent 
to which the dispute regarding the risks of nuclear 
energy, reignited in many countries in the aftermath 
of the reactor accidents in Fukushima, will impact on 
its global use.
Renewable energy carriers have been used for a 
number of purposes since the beginning of civilisation, 
and were indeed the only source of energy until the 
advent of the Industrial Revolution. These included, 
for example, firewood for cooking, heating and light­
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Trends in major drivers of anthropogenic climate change. Stated are the CO2 emissions from the use of fossil fuels per capita (a) 
and in relation to economic output (b), the primary energy use per capita (c) and in relation to economic output (d), and the 
economic output per capita (e), respectively divided according to OECD and non­OECD countries, plus global values. In addition, 
the share OECD or non­OECD countries contribute to the global population, global GDP, global primary energy demand and 
global CO2 emissions from the use of fossil fuels is shown (f). 
Sources: WBGU, based on IEA (2010e, f) and World Bank (2011b) data)
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ing, solar energy for heating and drying, hydro­energy 
or wind power for pumping or irrigation. The traditional 
bioenergy carriers are still the primary energy source 
for a great number of people in many developing coun­
tries; however, their use can be associated with adverse 
effects on health and environment, and is by no means 
always sustainable (WBGU, 2010a). It is often predom­
inantly the task of women and children to collect fire­
wood, limiting their chances of taking part in educa­
tion measures or other productive activities. They also 
frequently suffer disproportionately from respiratory 
problems through particle pollution from inefficient 
hearths.
Modern renewable energies today deliver 19 % of 
the global electricity supply, and meet 10 % of the heat­
ing needs of industry and buildings (IEA, 2010c). The 
expansion of renewable energies enjoys worldwide 
political support, leading the IEA to expect that their 
share in the energy mix will increase. In the IEA’s ‘New 
Policies’ Scenario, they achieve a global share of a third 
of the electricity supply by 2035, and 16 % of heat gen­
eration. Although this anticipated increase in the use of 
renewable energies leads to the relative decarbonisa­
tion of energy generation, it is by no means sufficient 
to reduce energy­related greenhouse gas emissions. On 
the contrary, in this scenario, emissions continue to rise 
up to 2035. 
Energy-Related Emissions
95 % of anthropogenic CO2 emissions (excluding land­
use emissions) can currently be attributed to the energy 
sector; the remaining 5 % originate from industrial pro­
cesses. Electricity and heat generation cause 45 % of 
these emissions, 20 % can be attributed to transport 
systems. A further 20 % are generated through the use 
of fossil fuels in industry and construction (WRI­CAIT, 
2011). Energy­related emissions are currently funda­
mentally developing in the wrong direction: between 
1990 and 2000, global CO2 emissions rose by 1.1 % 
per year; in the subsequent seven years, this figure 
has already risen to 3 % annually (IEA, 2010a). As 
the most important factors for this, the IEA cites the 
increasing energy demand in coal­based economies, as 
well as an increasing use of coal in response to rising oil 
and gas prices. Whilst emissions from the use of coal 
grew by 0.6 % yearly between 1990 and 2000, this rate 
increased to 4.8 % per year in the period between 2000 
and 2007 (IEA, 2010a). Coal, whose deposits are far 
more evenly distributed around the world than those 
of crude oil, for example, is promoted in most coun­
tries (including Germany) for reasons of strategic sup­
ply security, and globally attracts subsidies amounting 
to billions.
Energy Infrastructure and Path Dependencies
A particular cause for concern is the fact that the long 
life­span of energy generation infrastructures means 
that current energy sector investments will impact 
upon the energy mix, and thereby one of the decisive 
factors in terms of emissions, for decades to come. The 
energy sector therefore relies on timely and future­
oriented political course changes, as otherwise there 
is a risk of path dependencies that would make ade­
quate climate change mitigation impossible. Even if the 
Figure 1.2-4
Development of global primary energy demand (business as usual) between 1800 and 2050. For the period 1800–2008, 
actual primary energy demand is shown, and from 2010, demand according to the GEA baseline scenario is presented. With 
a probability of around 99 %, the emissions that would be associated with a scenario like this would lead to transgression of 
the 2 °C guard rail. Temperatures would rise by approx. 5 °C. The development illustrated here should therefore be avoided at 
all cost. Contrary to this scenario, the primary energy demand must be significantly restricted, and the energy mix must be 
changed in order to protect the climate (Section 4.6). 
Source: WBGU, on the basis of GEA 2011 data
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growth in final energy demand will primarily take place 
in non­OECD countries, and the overall energy demand 
in the OECD countries is not going to rise significantly, 
the OECD countries must still make considerable invest­
ments in the energy generation infrastructure, as the 
old infrastructure must be replaced. The IEA New 
 Policies’ Scenario assumes that 35 % of the cumulative 
global energy investments between 2010 and 2035 
will have to be made in OECD countries, even though 
their energy demand will only grow by 3 % over this 
period in this scenario (IEA, 2010c). So in terms of cli­
mate change mitigation, the important aspect is steer­
ing investments all over the world in the right direction: 
the OECD countries’ existing high­carbon energy infra­
structure must be replaced by low­carbon energy gen­
eration capacities, whilst at the same time, the increas­
ing energy demand from non­OECD countries must be 
met through the expansion of the capacities of climate­
friendly energy forms. 
1.2.4 
Urbanisation
Trends
Even though urban settlements have existed for thou­
sands of years, limited agricultural yields meant that for 
a very long time, the proportion of people living in cit­
ies was less than 5 % of the total population. Historically, 
societies in China, India and the Middle East were at the 
top of the urbanisation charts; even in 1800, Peking 
was probably still the most populous city in the world 
(Chandler, 1987; McNeill, 2002). In just a few gener­
ations, since the early 20th century, the global urban 
population has grown from around 165 million people, 
or approx. 10–15 % of the total population, by a factor 
of 20 to currently 3.5 billion. Around half of the glo­
bal population now lives in urban areas, although these 
are not always distinctly separate from rural regions, 
with various local statistics applying different defini­
tions. This dynamic urbanisation process continues at 
great speed, leading to a population growth in urban 
areas of more than 1 million people a week. The average 
global population growth in rural areas, on the other 
hand, is expected to stagnate even before 2020, and 
the remaining net population growth will mainly occur 
in cities. Migration is one major factor for this. By 2050, 
the urban population will almost double to approx. 6.4 
billion people, or an expected 69 % of the global popu­
lation, which will by then exceed 9 billion (Box 1.2­2; 
UN DESA, 2009b). 
Today, the majority of the overall global urban popu­
lation lives in Asia. Their number will double over the 
next two decades; Asian cities therefore have a key 
role to play in the transformation. The highest relevant 
urban growth rates, however, can currently be observed 
in African countries, also due to the comparatively low 
initial basis. Africa is the least urbanised continent, 
not least because of the colonial past and its economic 
structures, which focus on the extraction sector (UN­
Habitat, 2010a; Figures 1.2­6, 1.2­7). 
Over the past few years, many regions of the world 
have rapidly become wealthier: in the past decade, the 
number of countries with a per capita income growth 
rate that is, in comparison, double the rate of growth 
in OECD countries has increased considerably. Over the 
same period, the number of poor countries has consid­
erably fallen (Section 1.2.1).
Currently, five of the worldwide 21 megacities with 
more than 10 million inhabitants are located in ‘devel­
oped’ global regions. In 15 years’ time, due to economic 
development progress, there will be 29 megacities with 
approx. 470 million inhabitants in total, of which 23 
will be located in ‘less developed’ global regions. How­
ever, the highest proportion (>50 %) of urban inhabit­
ants, currently 1.8 billion people, in 2025 2.4 billion, 
lives in settlements with less than 500,000 inhabitants. 
The exact number of these settlements and their names 
or geographical locations are currently not included in 
official UN statistics; further research is needed in this 
respect. As these settlements are as yet less restricted 
in terms of infrastructure than the megacities, they 
could potentially play an important role in cost effec­
tive climate stabilisation. 
The challenge in terms of climate change mitigation 
is that without a redirection into climate­friendly chan­
nels, this combination of rapid urbanisation and increas­
ing wealth can have an extremely negative impact on 
climate change. The positive trend of increased wealth 
also means increased energy and resource consump­
tion. For this reason it is vital that the urban densifica­
tion process, particularly in the up­and­coming newly 
industrialising and developing countries, is made cli­
mate­friendly.
This rapid urbanisation is primarily taking place in 
countries with only insufficient capacities for orderly 
urban planning (UN­Habitat, 2009; Figure 1.2­6). One 
visible result takes the form of the rapidly expanding 
slums found particularly in the townships of devel­
oping countries. 62 % of Africa’s urban residents live 
in slums, 43 % in southern Asia (UN­Habitat,  2009). 
Overall, almost 1 billion people, or almost a third of 
city dwellers, live in slums. These informal settlements 
frequently lack basic urban development standards, 
and their inhabitants enjoy no legal protection what­
soever. They often have no access to either electricity 
or clean water that is safe to drink, or hygienic waste 
and wastewater disposal facilities. Slums tend to be 
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located in areas that are prone to flooding, or on unse­
cured slopes, exposed to the risk of mudslides. In the 
event of a disaster, the lack of access roads in many 
places means no effective access for the fire brigade or 
emergency services. Nevertheless, these kinds of set­
tlements remain attractive for their inhabitants, as they 
are often located in relative proximity to the markets 
and economic hubs of major cities, thereby allowing 
access to income generation. 
In the least developed countries, sustainable urban 
development must therefore make considerable efforts 
to improve the urban residents’ living conditions; how­
ever, it should also integrate the consideration of adap­
tation and mitigation targets with a view to climate 
change (for example, water supply, access to clean, 
environmentally friendly and safe energy sources for 
lighting and cooking, high­capacity public transport 
system connections, alternatives to corrugated iron 
roofs for better protection against the heat, flood pro­
tection). 
Drivers and Victims of Climate Change
Cities are demand centres, and commercial production 
sites. Through the emissions this generates, they are 
Box 1.2-2
Global Population Growth up to 2050
The global population will grow from 6.8 billion (2009) to 
9 billion people by the middle of the century (medium UN 
DESA scenario, 2009b; Figure 1.2­5). The increase will mainly 
occur in developing countries. The population will grow most 
in the 49 least developed countries (LDC). Half of the glo­
bal population growth by 2050 takes place in nine countries: 
India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, USA, DR of the Congo, Tan­
zania, China and Bangladesh. In contrast, population growth 
will stagnate in the wealthier countries (in part also decline). 
The global population is aging, as the birth rate will 
decrease by 2050, also in the developing countries, and life 
expectancy will increase. This process will be particularly 
rapid in the 49 LDC. There, the average number of children 
per woman is expected to fall from the current 4.39 to 2.42; 
globally, this will go down from 2.56 to 2.02. At the same 
time, according to UN projections, the proportion of over­60s 
will rise fastest globally (initially particularly in the industr­
ialised countries; delayed, but subsequently also particularly 
rapidly, in the developing countries). 
Present economic socio­economic disparities will remain 
the major driving force for international migration: UN pro­
jections for the period 2010–2050 predict net immigration 
into the following countries: USA (1.1 million), Canada 
(214,000), Great Britain (174,000), Spain (170,000), Italy 
(159,000), Germany (110,000), Australia (100,000) and 
France (100,000). The largest emigration movements are 
expected in Mexico (­334,000), China (­309,000), India 
(­253,000), the Philippines (­175,000), Pakistan (­161,000), 
Indonesia (­156,000) and Bangladesh (­148,000). 
Figure 1.2-5
Global population 1950–2050. Various projections and variants. 
Source: UN DESA, 2009b 
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important accelerators of climate change. Cities already 
consume around three­quarters of global final energy 
(GEA, 2011), and possibly cause an even higher share 
of energy­related anthropogenic greenhouse gas emis­
sions. Cities therefore play a key role in the transfor­
mation process, and are laboratories for innovative, cli­
mate­friendly development paths (OECD, 2010c). 
Cities are not only climate change drivers, but are 
also victims of climate change: settlements tend to 
be concentrated particularly in coastal areas, and are 
therefore increasingly affected by the consequences of 
sea­level rise (Table 1.2­1; Figure 1.2­8; Corfee­Mor­
lot et al., 2009). Although cities in developing coun­
tries suffer particularly from exposure to the risks of 
unabated climate change, the New Orleans flood dis­
aster in 2005 shows that these risks are by no means 
restricted to developing countries. One OECD scenario 
reaches the conclusion that a 50 centimetre sea­level 
rise by 2070 would triple the coastal populations at risk 
from floods, whilst the volume of direct losses would 
rise tenfold. Some of this increased risk exposure (from 
5 % of GDP in 2008 to 9 % of GDP in 2070), however, 
can actually also be attributed to the dynamics of rapid 
urbanisation. Increased flood risk through changes in 
glacial and precipitation patterns means that riverside 
cities frequently face similar challenges. At the same 
time, many cities also have to deal with pronounced 
water shortages during the dry season. 
In the summer, heat islands form in many densely 
populated areas, exacerbating heat wave impacts. In 
Figure 1.2-6
Number of city dwellers per continent: development up to 2050. 
Source: UN DESA, 2010
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Figure 1.2-7
Population figure broken down according to urban settlement size and rural population. The number of settlements in 2009 is 
shown in brackets. The number of settlements with less than 500,000 inhabitants remains unknown.
Source: UN DESA, 2010
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Europe, for instance, such a summer anomaly led to 
over 40,000 additional deaths, mainly among the sick 
and the elderly, in 2003 (Robine et al., 2008). The grow-
ing demand for energy-hungry air conditioning units is 
a prime example of a self-reinforcing, potentially fatal 
adaptive action loop. Because of this, peak electric-
ity demand has now shifted to the summer months in 
many southern European countries.
Use Synergy Potentials and Economies of Scale
A rapid urbanisation that takes place under the pri-
macy of climate-friendliness could be associated with 
a considerable development potential that should be 
used: improved access to education, health care, and 
income generation can be achieved far more efficiently 
in urban areas (World Bank, 2009b). The large number 
of urban households and their proximity to each other 
brings down the cost per unit of water and electricity 
supply. In terms of resource management, cities also 
provide unique opportunities for creating efficient 
and integrated urban systems. Systematic cross-sector 
urban and regional planning should therefore exploit 
the synergies between low-carbon urban development 
and other urban development goals (Corfee-Morlot et 
al., 2009). 
Key Role in the Transformation Process
Cities have a key role to play in the low-carbon trans-
formation, as they are major CO2 emitters. At the 
same time, cities can function as laboratories for cli-
mate-friendly development. In view of the low-carbon 
transformation, the challenge is fourfold: firstly, exist-
ing inefficient urban infrastructures must be trans-
formed (industrialised countries, South America, exist-
ing urban structures in Asia), secondly, the currently 
rapidly evolving new urban areas (in newly industrial-
ising countries, particularly in Asia) must be made cli-
mate-friendly, thirdly, poverty in the densely populated 
urban areas in poor developing countries (particularly 
in Africa and southern Asia) must be overcome (slum 
rehabilitation, capacity building, etc.), and fourthly, the 
ability to adapt to the inevitable climate change must 
be improved. Particular attention should be paid to 
exploiting the synergies between climate-political aims 
and established urban development goals. 
1.2.5	
Increasing	Land-Use	Competition:	Food	
	Production,	Bioenergy,	Forests
Humankind already uses almost a quarter of global 
plant-based biomass net production, mainly for agri-
cultural and forestry related products (Haberl et al., 
2007; Figure 1.2-10). This proportion is expected to 
increase, as natural ecosystems continue to be con-
verted into croplands or plantations (albeit at a declin-
ing speed), and production intensity will have to con-
tinue to increase. A brief analysis of current land-use 
trends shows that land-use related conflicts (including 
those about water; Section 1.1.2) will probably inten-
sify significantly (Steinfeld et al., 2006; WBGU, 2010a; 
IAASTD, 2009). 
Over the past few decades, increased agricultural 
production has overcompensated population growth 
(IAASTD, 2009). The area of agriculturally used land 
has hardly increased (from 1,400 to 1,500 million 
hectares, 1950–2005); rather, drastic productivity 
Table	1.2-1
Concentration of cities in coastal zones. For various population figures, the proportion of cities along the coast is shown. 
Major cities are particularly often located in coastal regions.
Source: OECD, 2010d
	 Population	figure
Region <100,000
[%]		
100,000–500,000
[%]
500,000–1	million
[%]
1–5	million
[%]
>5	million	
[%]
Africa  9 23  39  50 40
Asia 12 24  37  45 70
Europe 17 22  37  41 58
Latin America 11 25  43  38 50
Australia and 
New Zealand
44 77 100 100 –
North America  9 19  29  25 80
Small island 
states
51 61  67 100 –
World 13 24  38  44 65
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increases have been achieved, so that today, on aver-
age, considerably more is harvested per hectare of cro-
pland. The intensification of agriculture through the 
use of artificial fertilisers, pesticides, new plant varie-
ties, mechanisation and not least irrigation has made 
this productivity increase possible (Green Revolution; 
Section  3.5.2). Current food shortages are therefore 
above all a distribution problem. On average, suffi-
cient food to feed the global population can be pro-
duced (WBGU, 2005; FAO and IFAD, 2008). This could 
change, for not only will there be another approx. 2.6 
billion people by 2050 (FAO, 2009a; Box 1.2-2), but 
the growth of high-income urban social environments 
in newly industrialising and developing countries is 
Figure	1.2-8
The 20 most important port cities: assets (a) and people (b) exposed to climate change risks.
Source: Nicholls et al., 2008
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accompanied by a preference for diets which contain 
more animal products and are therefore far more land 
and emissions intensive (Section  4.3.4). The antici-
pated shortages have already affected prices. After 
food prices peaked in 2008, leading to critical situa-
tions in developing countries not least due to the speed 
of the increase (WBGU, 2010a), a new all-time high 
was reached in early 2011 (FAO, 2011; Figure 1.2-10).
At the same time, the only alternative food resource 
is facing a desperate crisis: the fishing industry regu-
larly overexploits fish populations, catch volumes have 
stagnated for over ten years, and climate change, acid-
ification and oceanic pollution are new environmen-
tal impacts adding to the strain (WBGU, 2006; FAO, 
2009b; UNEP, 2010b). In future, the fishing indus-
try will find it increasingly difficult to achieve current 
catch volumes, as there are hardly any unused marine 
regions left (Swartz et al., 2010). 
Global food demand will rise considerably (IAASTD, 
2009). Even more so than in the past, this rising 
demand will have to be met with production intensi-
fication on already cultivated land. For reasons of cli-
mate and biodiversity protection, the continued con-
version of yet more natural ecosystems (particularly 
primary forests, wetlands, savannahs, etc.) is not a 
sustainable option (Section 4.1.7.1; van Vuuren, 2009; 
Godfrey et al., 2010; CBD, 2010b). More extensive and 
better linked protected areas are necessary for the con-
servation of biodiversity, not least to aid better adapta-
tion to climate change (MA, 2005a; Turner et al., 2010). 
Although global deforestation, driven mainly by the 
conversion of tropical forests into agricultural land, has 
declined slightly over the past decade to now 13 mil-
lion hectares per year, compared to 16 million per year 
in the previous decade (1990–1999), the level remains 
extremely high. 40 % of the current 540 million hec-
tares of Amazonian rain forest alone could be lost by 
2050, releasing an estimated 117 Gt CO2 (Soares-Filho 
et al., 2006; IPCC, 2007b). 
Not least, the necessity of climate change mitigation 
and energy system decarbonisation exacerbates land-
use competition. Bioenergy use plays a major role here, 
as production has tripled over the past 10 years, and 
is set to increase further (FAO, 2009a). The resultant 
new link between energy and food markets means that 
in future, political crises will affect food prices even 
more (WBGU, 2010a; Figure 1.2-10; Box 4.1-4). Rap-
idly increasing prices for agricultural products could be 
tolerated far more easily by those demanding bioen-
ergy or bio-based raw materials than by the almost 1 
billion people suffering from a lack of food security 
(FAO, 2008). Even a moderate bioenergy production 
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Figure	1.2-9
Map showing net primary production (NPP), used or influenced by humans (human appropriation of net primary production, 
HANPP), disregarding anthropogenic fires. 
Source: Haberl et al., 2007
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expansion to 100 EJ per year as recommended by the 
WBGU (2009a) would imply that agricultural produc-
tivity would have to rise by 1.2–1.4 % each year until 
2055, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and in the 
Middle East (Lotze-Campen et al., 2009). In addition, 
the demand for biomass for material use will grow to 
increasingly replace the crude oil based materials used 
in the chemical industry with biologically produced 
materials (BMBF, 2010b). 
The competition for limited arable land is exacer-
bated by increasing production risks. Advancing soil 
degradation (Section 1.1.3) and increasing water short-
ages (Section 1.1.4; Rockström and Karlberg, 2010) can 
be observed at a global level. Moreover, depending on 
the characteristics of climate change, negative effects 
on agriculture and food security are expected in many 
regions, particularly those already frequently suffering 
from droughts, floods and poverty today, for example 
sub-Saharan Africa (Gregory et al., 2005; IPCC, 2007b). 
It seems that between 2000 and 2009, net primary pro-
duction of land ecosystems already shows a slight cli-
mate-related decline (Zhao and Running, 2010). Cli-
mate change is expected to impact severely on glo-
bal harvest yields in the second half of the century 
(Fischer, 2009). Taken together, these trends indicate 
that the transformation of global land use constitutes a 
key challenge (Godfrey et al., 2010). 
Agricultural production will be required to increase 
considerably. Global agricultural production increase 
estimates anticipate the required increase to range from 
50 % to as much as 70 % by 2050 (IAASTD, 2009; FAO, 
2009a; Bruinsma, 2009). To achieve this, the current 
trend must first be reversed, as the global agricultural 
production growth rate has been in decline for roughly 
the past three decades (FAO, 2003). Accordingly, prices 
for agricultural goods are expected to continue to rise 
in the coming decades (IAASTD, 2009). One can only 
hope that this will serve as an incentive to  channel 
more investments into this sector; currently, they 
are close to a historical low (Halweil and Nierenberg, 
2011). Increased production must be augmented with 
improvements in the usage of agricultural products 
(Godfrey et al., 2010). Conversion to a healthier diet 
in the industrialised countries and the rapidly grow-
ing middle-income social environments in the newly 
industrialising and developing countries would equal 
a conversion to less consumption of animal products. 
The reduction in the associated land requirement would 
considerably reduce land-use pressure (Section 4.3.4; 
WBGU, 2010a). 
Land-use competition is increasingly becoming a 
central sustainability issue, and is a potential future 
conflict area (GO Science, 2011; WBGU, 2009, 2010a). 
There is a consensus on the dimensions of the challenge 
and the considerable need for reform and development. 
In contrast, there is no broad scientific or political con-
sensus on which strategies are best suited to ensure 
sustainable global land use. Primarily, this concerns the 
question of appropriate intensification techniques (for 
example the pros and cons of green genetic engineer-
ing, and of intensive use of agrochemicals), the issue 
of definition and importance of sustainability in agri-
cultural production (for example consideration of soil 
protection or biodiversity, links to rural poverty, and 
equity), and suitable framework conditions and pro-
duction structures that take the extremely different 
regional conditions into account (role of subsidies, 
industrial farming versus smallholdings). 
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Figure	1.2-10
Food price development 1990–2011 (FAO Food Price Index, adjusted for inflation). 
Source: FAO, 2011
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In recent years, moneyed investors (for example from 
Saudi Arabia or China) have increasingly attempted to 
secure themselves access to sizeable areas of arable 
agricultural land (several million hectares in total), par-
ticularly in Africa, in order to cover their own national 
biomass production deficits, or to generate profit, from 
large-scale industrial food or bioenergy production and 
subsequent export. This can be classified as a symptom 
of increasing land-use competition (FAO et al., 2009; 
von Braun, 2010). In principle, any additional direct 
investments in agriculture in developing countries are 
to be welcomed; however, these large-scale projects, 
often tellingly referred to as ‘land grabbing’, could fuel 
land-use conflicts if they are carried out non-transpar-
ently and without participation of the local population, 
and do not take local conditions and rights into account. 
This could intensify the already precarious situation of 
many African smallholders (von Braun and Meinzen-
Dick, 2009; BMZ, 2010). 
1.3
Conclusions:	The	Transformation	Towards	
	Sustainability
Humankind currently lives in the Anthropocene, i. e. 
the geological age in which the detrimental effects 
of human actions on the environment have reached 
a dimension that is comparable to natural influences 
(Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000). The Earth system’s 
mega trends (Section 1.1) are so dangerous because 
they significantly impact on humankind and soci-
ety. If the planetary guard rails are not complied with 
(Box 1-1), resources or Earth system services that are 
extremely important for humankind are in danger. An 
unabated continuation of these trends could for exam-
ple have serious consequences for global food security 
(Section 1.2.5). The guard rails define the limits within 
which development and progress can take place sus-
tainably. Some of these megatrends have set human-
kind on a collision course with the planetary guard 
rails (for example climate change: Section 1.1.1), oth-
ers have already led to transgression (e. g. biodiversity: 
Section 1.1.2; Rockström et al., 2009b). 
At the same time, the positive development progress 
in many developing and newly industrialising countries 
is associated with an increase in resource-intensive life-
styles (Section 1.2). The idea that all people should be 
able to enjoy a lifestyle that equals today’s predomi-
nant lifestyle in the industrialised countries, character-
ised by the use of fossil energy carriers, cannot be real-
ised. To avoid non-sustainable development paths, the 
developing and newly industrialising countries would 
have to leapfrog technological development stages. 
The industrial countries should therefore lead the way 
off current development paths to demonstrate that it 
is also possible to follow sustainable paths. A lifestyle 
must be found that is consistent with the guiding prin-
ciple of global sustainable development. It must also 
allow the catch-up development of poorer countries, 
equally guided by the criteria of global sustainability, 
and allow for inclusion of the so far excluded ‘bottom 
billion’. 
A change of course is therefore an urgent impera-
tive. A transformation towards sustainability must take 
place, as otherwise, the natural life-support systems of 
a continuously growing global population are in dan-
ger, considerably restricting the development chances 
of future societies (Section 3; Raskin et al., 2010). In 
view of the dimensions, the dynamics and the close 
interaction of the Earth system’s megatrends and global 
economic and social megatrends, it becomes clear that 
the transformation towards sustainability must be a 
Great Transformation. In terms of profound impact, it is 
comparable to the two fundamental trans formations in 
world history: the Neolithic Revolution, i. e. the inven-
tion and diffusion of agriculture and animal husbandry, 
and the Industrial Revolution, a term used to describe 
the transition from agricultural to industrial ised society. 
Furthermore, it must take place within the planetary 
guard rails, advance rapidly within a very tight time-
frame, and given a high rank on the political agenda.
High Priority for Climate Change Mitigation as a 
Precondition for Sustainable Development
Analysis of megatrends shows that climate change 
plays a particularly important role. It exacerbates con-
temporary environmental crises; concurrently, some 
environmental problems affect climate change retro-
actively, triggering feedback dynamics (Section 1.1.6). 
Anthropogenic climate change is only just starting to 
become apparent, and its effects on economy and soci-
ety will increase over the coming decades. The bot-
tom line is that unabated climate change could have 
a disastrous negative impact on economy and society 
 (Section 1.1.1; IPCC, 2007b). The global rise in mean 
temperature can endanger the livelihood of many peo-
ple, particularly those in developing regions, increase 
the susceptibility to poverty and social immiseration, 
thereby not least threatening human security. Particu-
larly in weak and fragile states with inefficient institu-
tions and government systems, climate change would 
overtax the ability to adapt to changing environmental 
conditions, for instance dealing with the consequences 
of extreme events such as droughts, flooding or har-
vest loss. New security risks might evolve, triggering 
additional environmental migration (WBGU, 2008). For 
the following reasons, the WBGU has decided to focus 
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on the transformation into a low-carbon society, albeit 
embedded into the context of sustainable development, 
in this flagship report.
	> Compliance with the 2 °C guard rail is a conditio sine 
qua non for sustainable development. Once this 
guard rail is broken, it will become extremely diffi-
cult, or even impossible, to keep within the other 
planetary guard rails (Section 1.1.6). Unabated cli-
mate change will also prevent the achievement of 
other development goals, particularly combating 
poverty (WBGU, 2005; Section 1.2.1). Climate 
change mitigation therefore has a particularly impor-
tant part to play in the transformation towards sus-
tainability: although climate protection alone cannot 
guarantee the conservation of the natural life-sup-
port systems on which humankind depends, it is 
nevertheless foreseeable that without effective cli-
mate protection, mankind will soon lose essential 
development opportunities.
	> Time is particularly of the essence where climate 
protection is concerned. The greenhouse gas emis-
sions trend must be turned around within the next 
10 years as otherwise, compliance with the 2 °C 
guard rail will be unachievable (Section  1.1.1; 
Box 1.1-1). First steps towards energy system decar-
bonisation, i. e. the avoidance of CO2 emissions from 
fossil sources, have already been taken and must be 
significantly accelerated (Section 4). 
	> The extent of the required reorganisation is a par-
ticularly major challenge. Regarding the transforma-
tion towards a low-carbon society within the scope 
of sustainable development, policies should prima-
rily address the following three main pillars of con-
temporary global society: Firstly, the energy sys-
tems, including the transport sector, which the whole 
economy depends on and which currently, due to 
the rapid development dynamics in the newly indus-
trialising countries, are facing yet another wave of 
growth. The energy sector causes around two-thirds 
of today’s long-lived greenhouse gas emissions (Sec-
tion  1.2.3). Secondly, the urban areas, currently 
responsible for three-quarters of global final energy 
demand. Their population will double to 6 billion by 
2050 (Section 1.2.4). Thirdly, the land-use systems 
(agriculture and forestry, including deforestation). 
They are currently responsible for almost a quarter 
of global greenhouse gas emissions (Section 1.2.5). 
Land use not only has to provide enough food for a 
world population that continues to grow, and to 
become more demanding, but also has to deal with a 
growth in demand due to the increasing use of 
bioenergy and bio-based raw materials. These sec-
tors must be fundamentally restructured worldwide 
to avoid breaking the 2 °C guard rail, without endan-
gering efficiency in the three transformation fields 
energy systems, urban areas and land-use systems. 
Over the past few years, anthropogenic climate change 
has reached the centre stage in societal discourse. 
There is now a global political consensus that rapid 
global warming by more than 2 °C would overtax our 
 societies’ ability to adapt (Section  1.1.1; UNFCCC, 
2010). Although the low-carbon transformation con-
tinues to be recognised as a huge challenge for human-
kind, it is approached with little ambition. It is not only 
absolute greenhouse gas emissions that have continued 
to rise in recent years. Contrary to the long-term trend, 
the CO2 intensity of energy generation has also again 
increased. Without redirection, the remaining glo-
bal carbon budget will soon be exhausted (Box 1.1-1). 
 Climate change mitigation and the inferential neces-
sity for energy system decarbonisation has therefore 
become an essential element for sustainable develop-
ment. The ‘transformation into a low-carbon society’ is 
therefore the main focus of this flagship report. 
Although climate protection is the most urgent step 
on the path towards sustainability, other environmental 
and developmental issues also require solution strat-
egies, some of which have already been outlined and 
are now the subject of international discussion, or are 
seeing implementation. However, the measures of the 
various strategies must be consolidated and aligned, 
as they overlap extensively with other sustainability 
dimensions, and can have secondary effects on these 
(Section 1.1.6). In part, synergies emerge: the protec-
tion of primary forests from deforestation for climate 
change mitigation also favours the conservation of bio-
diversity, and impacts positively on the quality of life 
of local or indigenous communities (WBGU, 2001a). 
Other measures are accompanied by negative second-
ary effects, for example the use of bioenergy; although 
it can substitute fossil energy carriers, it can also, if not 
used carefully, have an extremely negative impact on 
food security, biodiversity conservation and even cli-
mate change mitigation (Box 4.1-4; WBGU, 2010a). 
The associated risks and undesired secondary effects 
of climate protection strategies and measures on other 
sustainability dimensions and future tolerance should 
therefore be carefully examined prior to large-scale 
implementation. The pronounced interconnectedness 
of problematic issues and solution approaches requires 
this ‘sustainability check’. The debate on the certifica-
tion of bioenergy and timber products has correspond-
ing solutions to offer. The sustainability check should 
be taken into account at the earliest possible stage 
of strategic solution approaches, and carried out ini-
tially in small-scale pilot projects. The WBGU plane-
tary guard rails (Box 1-1) could serve as a first rough 
screener with regard to the environmental dimensions, 
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and the Millennium Development Goals with regard to 
developmental dimensions. Apart from sustainability 
compatibility checks, long-term monitoring in the form 
of an early warning system should also be implemented 
to highlight critical environmental changes in time. Civil 
society participation should also play a role in the pro-
cess at the earliest possible stage, to obtain a better 
assessment of specific local issues, which, ultimately, 
serves legitimation and acceptance. An obligatory sus-
tainability check is certainly not unrealistic, but rather 
a requirement to avoid expensive and time-consuming 
technological dead ends. 
Key Factors for the Transformation
The key factors impeding or promoting the low-carbon 
transformation process are identified during the course 
of this report. This chapter has already illustrated some 
of the factors listed below; others are elaborated in sub-
sequent chapters. Impediments are:
	> Tight timeframes: The analysis in Section 1 shows 
that the transformation must take place within a 
very tight timeframe if the planetary guard rails are 
to be upheld. This equals a major challenge for com-
plex societies, particularly in the context of interna-
tional negotiation systems (Chapter 5). 
	> Rapid urbanisation: The urbanisation waves in the 
developing regions, a significant proportion of which 
are founded on high- carbon based economic growth, 
are a further huge challenge for the transformation 
process, but also a great opportunity (Sections 1.2.4, 
5.4.5.2).
	> Path dependencies: The dimensions of global energy 
systems, coupled with the long life-span of the 
related infrastructure, account for the inertia with 
regard to adjustment processes (Sections 1.2.3, 4.2). 
Political, institutional and economic path dependen-
cies, interest structures and veto players impede the 
transition into a sustainable society (Chapter 5). The 
worldwide subsidies in the three-digit billion range 
for fossil energy carriers are one example of this. 
	> Availability of cheap coal: The fact that the fuel coal 
is cheaply available in many currently dynamically 
growing newly industrialising countries reinforces 
path dependencies and impedes the transformation 
(Section 4.1.2). 
	> Global cooperation blockades: The analysis also 
shows that existing global governance instruments 
and the implementation of the strategies and recom-
mendations thus developed do not suffice to solve 
complex global environmental problems 
 (Sections  1.1,  5.4.4). Sample deficits include the 
partial fragmentation or lack of coherence between 
the various treaties and institutions; the main draw-
back, however, is the inadequate enforceability of 
the agreements. The global community is not well 
prepared for the transformation; this also applies to 
the three key transformation fields energy, urbani-
sation and land use. Developing international envi-
ronmental law and global institutions further 
towards an integrated strategy for dealing with glo-
bal environmental and development issues therefore 
remains an important future challenge (Sections 
5.4.4, 7.3.9, 7.3.10).
During its course, this report elaborates how 
these impeding factors can be overcome, and how trans-
formation-relevant promoting factors can be identified 
and reinforced. The following factors are of essential 
importance in terms of achievability of the transforma-
tion into a low-carbon society:
	> Value change towards sustainability: The initial ques-
tion is whether the population is actually willing to 
share the burden of such a fundamental reorganisa-
tion of the infrastructure. Do people’s values accord 
a high enough priority to the protection of the natu-
ral environment? Is there a global cross-cultural 
consensus for the transformation of the current way 
of life towards sustainability and climate change 
mitigation? These questions are of paramount 
importance for policy-makers in order to be able to 
assess the level of legitimation and acceptance in 
terms of the transformation process. Chapter 2 poses 
these questions and shows that values are already 
changing at a global level. Chapter 6 focuses on the 
transformation’s societal actors and examines how 
innovations can spread faster, aided by these 
changed values.
	> Technology: The most important starting point for 
climate protection is the energy system. The cru-
cial question is therefore whether the technical and 
sustainable potentials of climate-friendly energy 
carriers will be sufficient. However, the energy sys-
tem decarbonisation strategy must not impede the 
overcoming of energy poverty. Moreover, it must be 
ascertained whether the technologies for setting the 
course towards climate protection are available in 
the area of land use, which is another major green-
house gas emitter. The question of technical feasibil-
ity is analysed and answered in Chapter 4. 
	> Financing: Another issue in terms of implementing 
the transformation is whether it is economically 
achievable, and how substantial the transformation-
relevant financial challenges are. This calculation 
should not only take the additional investment 
requirements into account, but also consider the 
long-term savings achieved through the use of 
renewable energies in terms of fuel cost avoidance, 
and the avoidance of the huge costs that would be 
the consequence of dangerous climate change. These 
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issues are examined in Section 4.5, ‘Financing the 
Transformation into a Low-Carbon Society’. 
	> Steering instruments: Besides the technical and eco-
nomical achievability, there is also the issue of 
 societal implementation of the transformation to be 
considered. Are the political, economic and legal 
steering instruments available to structure the 
framework conditions in such a way as to promote 
the energy system decarbonisation? Could these 
instruments be used to also establish a central guide-
line in the other two transformation fields of urban-
isation and land use? These issues are dealt with in 
Chapter 5,  ‘Structuring the Transformation’. 
Based on the overall analysis, the WBGU’s key conclu-
sion is that the transformation into a low-carbon global 
society is not only vital, but also achievable. In some 
sectors, regions and countries, it has already begun.
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2.1
Values and Value Change
Transforming economy and society fundamentally, 
rapidly, and on a global scale ­ against people’s wishes 
and prevalent values ­ is neither possible nor desira­
ble. The reason for the latter: if you view dangerous 
climate change, for example, or the extinction of spe­
cies, not just as adverse changes to the natural life­sup­
port systems, but above all as a possible huge curtail­
ment of individual scope and global social development 
options, you cannot pursue solutions that authorita­
tively curtail precisely this scope and those options 
(Leggewie, 2010). Firstly, therefore, the adequate prop­
agation of the appropriate attitudes and preferences is 
an indispensable premise for a successful transforma­
tion towards sustainability (Raskin et al., 2002; Leise­
rowitz et al., 2006). An environmental and climate 
policy that is both effective and democratically legit­
imate must ’make people go with the flow’, i. e. it must 
make the intended transition agreeable to large majori­
ties (acceptance), obtain general consent (legitimation), 
and invite their cooperation (participation). Secondly, 
the indispensable social and political mobilisation can­
not (solely) rely on minimisation and relinquishment 
targets, which usually trigger anxiety about the future 
and loss aversion. It must match perceptions of what 
a good and successful life is, and these again must be 
widely shared and attractive. Transformation strategies 
for averting Earth system crises should (and can) put 
the realisation of goals on the daily agenda, goals which 
a great number of people all over the world strive for 
anyway, and support decisions which, after balancing 
all the pros and cons, can be made ‘without regret’ (no­
regret strategies). 
In the following, the WBGU brings forward a two­
fold argument. Firstly, that the necessary transforma­
tion into a low­carbon society already corresponds to 
some of the prevalent attitudes and value systems in 
many of the world’s countries (Box 2.1­1). Secondly, 
that the transformation can therefore be viewed as a 
positive factor in the sense of increasing subjective life 
satisfaction for large parts of the population.
Value systems are always linked to cultural and social 
context. In pluralistic societies, they are ‘negotiated’, 
i. e. hotly debated, against the background of practi­
cal problems and dilemmas. Value conflicts are just as 
normal as distribution conflicts, and – always assum­
ing that they are carried out peacefully and solved 
amicably – promote social change and cultural inno­
vation (Dahrendorf, 1957). Any kind of reflexion on 
the development progress and transformation chances 
of today’s societies must start with empirically proven 
values and attitudes. This highlights many issues, such 
as: what are the value systems in the poor and in the 
wealthy regions of the world, and how do they dif­
fer? And, again region­specific, how is the relationship 
between the goal of (increasing) material wealth on the 
one hand, and postmaterialist ideals of self­expression 
and consideration of the natural environment on the 
other, developing? What rank is accorded to the growth 
of both national economies and the global economy in 
relation to environmental and climate protection?
Since the beginning of the modern era, attitudes and 
considerations inspired by personal benefit maximisa­
tion have established themselves. With the advent of 
industrial mass production, the ‘good life’ has increas­
ingly become synonymous with material wealth. In the 
course of the ‘Great Transformation’ (Polanyi, 1944), 
the economy has been extensively disembedded from 
its relation to society and life worlds. This functional 
differentiation of the economic system has lent it an 
autonomy that has made possible a previously unim­
agined extent of productivity growth. However, it has 
also led to the whole social order being subjected to 
economic principles (Schimank, 2009). This is (only) 
the case once market principles affect all other sub­
systems (such as politics, culture, family, etc.) thereby 
turning rational cost­benefit analysis into the interpre­
tation pattern that determines the actions of society as 
a whole. This focusing of individual and collective atti­
tudes and preferences has had as much of a determin­
ing impact on the self­definition and self­observation 
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of developed industrialised societies as it has on the 
implementation of socio­economic modernisation in 
most of the developing societies in the south. This gen­
eralisation (or tunnel vision) means that the aspects of 
a ‘good life’ and sustainable development have become 
secondary. 
Nevertheless, a rethinking process seems to be cur­
rently taking place in many parts of society in a great 
number of countries; just one example from Germany 
to highlight this, and prove the point: according to a 
survey published in the autumn of 2010, carried out 
by the Emnid Institute and commissioned by the Ber­
telsmann Foundation, a significant part of the German 
population views growth and capitalism with scepti­
cism: a mere third of Germany’s citizens believes that 
growth will automatically impact positively on their 
own personal quality of life. Immaterial values such as 
social justice or environmental protection are accorded 
so much importance that they influence the attitude 
Germans have towards the economic system; for exam­
ple, 88 percent of respondents think that the current 
system is not suitable for taking environmental pro­
tection, resource conservation, and social redistribu­
tion, adequately into account. The majority would like 
a ‘new economic system’, and does not really believe 
in the resilience and crisis resistance of purely market­
driven economic systems. Particularly younger Ger­
mans do not trust the market’s self­restorative powers, 
and call for improved compatibility between economic 
growth and environmental protection. The survey sub­
stantiates that in Germany, postmaterialist thinking is 
by no means limited to the well­off and educated. For 
the majority of respondents, health, social relation­
ships and environmental status were deemed to be far 
more important sources of personal quality of life than 
‘increasing money and wealth’ (Figure 2.1­1). 75 % of 
respondents with higher education entrance qualifica­
tions, and 69 % of respondents with a mere school leav­
ing certificate, agreed with the statement ‘I  consider 
wealth to be less important than environmental pro­
tection and debt reduction’ (Bertelsmann Foundation, 
2010).
The increasingly sceptical view of the current eco­
nomic system’s performance and its externalities rests 
not least on the realisation of the system’s social costs 
that result from economic activities relying on short­
term benefits and gains  (Section 1.1), but also on the 
improvements of material wealth in low­income house­
hold settings, leaving space for alternative, postma­
terialist value­orientations and lifestyles. These have 
emerged from the eco (or green) niche, and – as will be 
shown in the following – are now increasingly deter­
mining general perspectives; this also applies in eco­
nomically less developed regions. 
2.2
Changing Values and Environmental 
 Consciousness
2.2.1 
The Theory of Value Change: An Explanation 
of the Increasing Prevalence of Postmaterialist 
 Values since the Second World War
This ‘silent revolution’ (Inglehart, 1977) – the gradual 
advance of values mindful of, amongst other aspects, 
the environment and sustainability – can be explained 
with a Theory of Value Change (Inglehart, 1977, 1998), 
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Box 2.1-1
Values, Attitudes and Opinions
The terms ‘values’, ‘attitudes’ and ‘opinions’ have different 
meanings in psychology, sociology and political sciences (see 
Häcker and Stapf, 1994). For the most part, it is assumed 
that attitudes are based on values, and that these attitudes 
influence people's behaviour, even if research (Eckes and Six, 
1994) assumes that there is no particularly close connection 
between attitudes and behaviour. In this report, the WBGU 
uses these terms as follows:
1. Personal and cultural values: According to Kluckhohn 
(1951), values are a shared perception of something 
worth having or striving for. Cultural values therefore 
refer to something that has evolved socio­culturally, 
something that exists independent of individuals. Per­
sonal values, on the other hand, refer to the subjective 
concepts of desire and specific value orientation. Per­
sonal values or value orientation therefore describe the 
individuals' relatively stable preferences with regard to 
different values (Häcker and Stapf, 1994).
2. Attitudes: Contrary to the rather abstract ‘values’ and 
‘value systems’, attitudes relate to certain objects, peo­
ple (groups), ideas and ideologies, or specific situations 
(Häcker and Stapf, 1994). Attitudes represent evaluation 
and action tendencies with regard to attitude objects, and 
are usually stable in the medium­term. They are therefore 
neither long­term value systems, nor short­term inten­
tions. 
3. Opinions: Are generally considered to be the verbalisa­
tion of attitudes and values (Rokeach, 1968). Attitudes 
are usually measured by several items, i. e. asking care­
fully selected questions and statements which are indica­
tors for certain attitudes to evaluate one attitude object, 
thereby ensuring that the results are reliable.
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which, if applied, reveals the intergenerational advance 
of postmaterialist values and attitudes, particularly 
since the Second World War. In the dichotomy assumed 
by Inglehart, material needs gratification also includes 
the pursuit of economic stability and growth, such as 
price stability, and both national and social ‘peace and 
order’, as well as physical needs – all in all, therefore, 
the striving for physical security (Inglehart, 1998). 
Postmaterialist needs, on the other hand, include ele­
ments such as self­expression, which are to be found 
in the gratification of spiritual, creative and aesthetic 
needs, and furthermore the desire to participate in state 
and society, as well as the valuing of freedom of opin­
ions, and tolerance. These two value spheres are by no 
means mutually exclusive as the international debate 
on value change has shown (Klages, 2001). It is much 
rather a case of their being positioned on a continuum 
in the direction of a value synthesis as changing values 
actually do not develop independently. The change cor­
relates to the postmaterialists’ rising income and edu­
cation level; due to the gratification of their material 
needs and their time budgets, they are able to spend 
leisure time with partners, family and friends, to dedi­
cate themselves to a leisurely enjoyment of art and cul­
ture, and to feel personally accepted and appreciated 
in these contexts. Initially, this post­Second World War 
postmaterialist value change in the industrialised socie­
ties could only be expressed hypothetically. Inglehart et 
al., however, managed to prove the value change theory 
empirically, supported by World Values Survey (WVS) 
data (Inglehart, 2008; Box 2.2­1).
Inglehart et al. argue that, over the past 25 years, 
‘constraints’ – i. e. the existence of, and emphasis on, 
normative axioms and/or practical constraints – have 
shifted on a global level, and particularly in affluent 
and ‘secure’ societies, to the extent of an effective wid­
ening of choices that promote the individual’s auton­
omy to act, linked with the respective (postmaterialist) 
value systems (Inglehart, 2008; Inglehart et al., 2008). 
Interesting with regard to the global transformation 
process is the fact that, on the basis of the WVS data, 
this trend can not just be observed in the ‘rich west’ 
(of Europe and North America), but also – although 
at a different level – in five different cultural spheres 
 (Confucian cultural sphere, Protestant and Catholic 
Europe, the Anglo­Saxon, and the Hispanic worlds; 
Inglehart et al., 2003; Welzel, 2006). This does not 
necessarily mean that certain material values are disap­
pearing completely from people’s value­consciousness, 
or that they have indeed already disappeared. Neither 
does it mean that they do not continue to determine the 
actual behaviour of individuals and groups; it simply 
shows that the shift moves on a continuum.
2.2.2 
Attitudes to Environment and Sustainability in 
various Countries and World Religions
Inglehart views the emergence and increasing power of 
new social movements – like the conservation, peace or 
homosexual movements – as the expression of a wider 
cultural value change (Inglehart, 2008). Concern about 
the natural environment is, just like the valuing of tol­
erance, an element of a postmaterialist attitude pattern 
that corresponds to the diffusion of self­expression 
values. The history of the conservation movement in 
the western industrialised states has shown that above 
all, apart from a value change towards postmaterialist 
attitudes, being directly and perceptibly affected by 
environmental pollution and damage creates environ­
mental consciousness (Hünenmörder, 2004). 
Regardless of the exact reasons responsible for the 
relevant developments, the results of the WVS emphat­
ically document the level of importance that public 
Figure 2.1-1
What citizens consider important in terms of quality of life; statements on quality of life (in %, multiple answers permitted) 
from the Emnid Institute’s representative telephone survey (N=1001), conducted in Germany, commissioned by the Bertelsmann 
Foundation.
Source: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2010
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Box 2.2-1
Ronald Inglehart and the World Values Survey
In terms of number of publications and citations, the US 
American political scientist Ronald Inglehart is seen as the 
most influential researcher in the field of value change (Rös­
sel, 2006). Apart from his theoretical works, Inglehart has 
also had a major influence of value change research through 
the World Values Survey (WVS) in his capacity as WVS 
executive committee chairman. The WVS is one of the most 
comprehensive and empirically most valid set of data which 
makes it possible to draw conclusions on the attitudes and 
value orientations of people from all over the world. The 
WVS is an ongoing empirical study that is conducted by an 
international network of research institutions and research­
ers. In five waves of data collection since 1981, more than 
330,000 people worldwide have been interviewed; the 6th 
wave is currently being carried out. The study started in 1981 
in 20 mainly western European states. All in all, over the past 
almost 30 years, data from 97 countries, all cultural spheres, 
and all world regions has been collected. More than 88 % of 
the world's population live in these countries (Figure 2.2­1). 
The spectrum of countries covered by the survey is corre­
spondingly comprehensive: people living in long­established 
democracies were interviewed, but also people in the former 
Eastern Bloc, countries with more of an authoritarian tradi­
tion. The survey was run in some of the richest nations on 
earth, but also in countries where the average annual income 
per capita is less than US$ 300 (Inglehart, 2003). The WVS is 
therefore one of the few sets of data that covers the majority 
of the world population in the long­term, and permits the for­
mulation of concrete statements regarding the world society’s 
attitude and value system trends. 
During the WVS, a sample, as representative as pos­
sible, of between 1,000 and 3,500 people aged 18 to 85 is 
interviewed face­to­face, using a standard questionnaire. In 
each of the respective countries, local leading social scien­
tists are recruited on a cooperative partner basis to collect 
the data. It is hoped that this way, the national and cultural 
specifics of each of the countries surveyed are taken into 
account, and that the questionnaires are accordingly modi­
fied. The question naires are always translated into each of 
the respective country’s languages, providing that it is spoken 
by at least 15 % of the population. The WVS is one of the 
few studies that collects data multi­nationally, and over long 
time­spans. With the WVS, an empirical database that is gen­
erally considered to be unique has been created for the field 
of value change research (Rössel, 2006).
Apart from socio­demographic data, the WVS also collects 
information regarding attitudes and positions on a wide spec­
trum of issues. This includes, amongst other items, the areas 
of work, family, politics and society, or religion and ethics. For 
the most part, the WBGU analysis focuses on illustrating the 
results from the group of questions headed ‘environment’.
Figure 2.2-1
Countries covered by the World Values Survey, and sample sizes. 
Red: 97 countries where people have been interviewed for the 
WVS up to 2007.
Source: WVS, 2010
Wave Years Countries Population Sample
1 1981–1984 20 4.7 billion  25,000
2 1989–1993 42 5.3 billion  61,000
3 1994–1998 52 5.7 billion  75,000
4 1999–2004 67 6.1 billion  96,000
5 2005–2008 57 6.7 billion > 77,000
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opinion in many of the world’s countries today accords 
to aspects of sustainability. Nowadays, the popula­
tion views environmental problems, in particular cli­
mate change, as one of the important political issues 
– and this not just in the comparatively rich north­
ern countries, but also in many of the developing and 
newly industrialising countries. The results of the 5th 
WVS wave (2005–2008) show that despite the con­
tinuing high­profile trivialisation through so­called cli­
mate sceptics, a total of 89.3 % of respondents in 49 
countries (n = 62,684) consider global warming to be 
a serious or very serious problem. This result and all 
of the following results quoted are based on WVS data 
(2009). Even in countries where the climate­sceptical 
public element is comparatively large – like the USA, 
South Africa or China – the vast majority of respond­
ents views climate change as a serious or very serious 
problem (Figure 2.2­2).
Not only climate change, but also the loss of plant or 
animal species or biodiversity is considered as a serious, 
or very serious, issue by a similar number of respond­
ents (90.9 %; n = 64,573). Materialist value systems, i. e. 
the preference of physical and socio­economical secur­
ity, continue to be important in a great number of coun­
tries and tend to dominate in the materially less pros­
perous and crisis­ridden societies, in accordance with 
the value change theory (Inglehart, 2008). However, 
different survey items designed to give insights into 
the ranking of environmental conservation resulted in 
high agreement levels in almost all of the countries that 
were included in the survey. For example, the majority 
of respondents (54.6 %;  n = 73,461) state that protect­
ing the environment should be given priority, even if it 
causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. 
Breaking down the data according to country reveals 
that although environmental protection is ranked 
above economic interests, particularly in the rich OECD 
states (like Norway, Canada, Australia, or Switzerland), 
this preference is, however, also marked in the popula­
tion of a whole range of developing and newly indus­
trialising countries in South America (such as Colombia, 
Argentina, or Chile) and Asia (such as China or Vietnam; 
 Figure 2.2­3). Although the environmental conscious­
ness of societies is partly subject to strong fluctuations, 
and must not be viewed outside the respective social 
and economic contexts (Hünenmörder, 2004), the 
approval rating over the entire period of the 3rd (1995–
1998), 4th (1999–2002) and 5th (2005–2008) WVS 
waves show that the preference of environmental pro­
tection over economic growth and job creation is, over­
all, relatively stable in the surveyed countries. Further­
more, the results of the 5th wave (2005–2008) show 
that a majority of respondents (57.3 %; n = 68,123) 
would be prepared to pay more taxes if the income thus 
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Figure 2.2-2
How serious an issue is global warming, or the greenhouse 
effect? Results of the 5th wave of the World Value Survey 
for 49 countries (N = 62,684). Respondents could choose to 
answer ‘very serious’, ‘somewhat serious’, ‘not very serious’, 
or ‘not serious at all’.
Source: WVS, 2009 (own calculations)
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generated were to be used to prevent environmental 
pollution, and that a majority of respondents is funda­
mentally prepared to accept financial losses as well in 
order to protect the natural environment: for example, 
65.8 % of respondents (n = 68,123) stated that they 
would be prepared to give part of their income if they 
were certain that the money would be used to prevent 
environmental pollution.
Other studies have resulted in figures similar to the 
WVS results. One example is the so­called Greendex 
Survey, which is carried out by opinion research insti­
tute GlobeScan, and is commissioned by National Geo­
graphic (National Geographic Society, 2009a). Method­
ically, the Greendex Study is less sophisticated than the 
WVS. It does not claim representativeness, so far cov­
ering only 17 countries, with not a single African state 
amongst those, and the respondents are interviewed by 
telephone. Nevertheless the results show that, on aver­
age, a more sustainable lifestyle is not only prevalent 
in the newly industrialising countries surveyed, which 
is also explainable by a comparatively lower prosper­
ity level and lower resource consumption, but also that 
in countries like South Korea, Mexico and Brazil, or 
equally in India or China, the sensitivity towards envi­
ronmental issues is more pronounced than in some of 
the early­industrialised OECD states (National Geo­
graphic Society, 2009b). With reference to climate 
change, the results of the Danish Board of Technology’s 
‘World Wide Views on Global Warming’ (2009) study, 
based on a sample of 4,000 respondents from a total 
of 38 countries, were analogous to WVS results: in all 
countries and all of the world’s regions, a large major­
ity of respondents views global warming as an urgent 
problem, and supports ambitious climate protection 
measures (Danish Board of Technology, 2009). 
In the past few years, however, a range of studies 
measuring people’s reservations against climate and 
environmental policy measures has also been pub­
lished. Opinion poll findings are fundamentally subject 
to media reporting trends. Experiences gained in the 
field of empirical social research have also shown that 
the answering behaviour of respondents depends heav­
ily on the exact phrasing used in the questions, which 
strongly limits the validity of a comparison of studies 
that operate with different items. In recent years, pub­
lic debates refer to opinion polls in the USA and Europe 
which supposedly prove a rising scepticism towards cli­
mate research results with regard to the anthropogenic 
causes of global warming, and a gradual withdrawal of 
the support for climate protection measures on the side 
of the population (Eurobarometer, 2009; Pew Research 
Center, 2009; BBC, 2010; Gallup, 2010). 
In terms of method, it should be noted, particularly 
with reference to the BBC and Gallup polls, that the 
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Figure 2.2-3
What is more important: protecting the environment, or 
economic growth and creating jobs? Results of the 5th wave 
of the World Value Survey for 56 countries (N = 73.461). For 
method see Box 2.2­1.
Source: WVS, 2009 (own calculations)
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wording of the research questions is ambiguous, and 
tends to focus on respondents’ perception of the pub­
lic debates on the causes of climate change, rather than 
the survey participants’ personal opinion (Krosnick, 
2010). Furthermore, the reporting and public discus­
sion of the surveys pays hardly any or no attention to 
the fact that despite a decline in the agreement lev­
els regarding individual question items, a large major­
ity of respondents to these polls also continues to view 
climate change as a serious or very serious problem, 
and/or supports political climate protection measures 
(Eurobarometer, 2009; Pew Research Center, 2009; 
BBC, 2010). Current  representative surveys with ques­
tion items that are unambiguously worded conclude 
that even in the USA, sample majorities of more than 
70 % believe global warming to be caused by human­
kind, and support political climate protection measures 
(Stanford University, 2010). There is hardly any other 
political field (such as migration, or economic and social 
policies) that shows these kind of approval ratings and 
trends (Krosnick, 2010). Even if the population of a 
great number of countries agrees with sustainability­
oriented policies, there are still misgivings and conflict­
ing aims to which environmental and climate policy 
must do justice (Section 2.4).
2.2.3 
Openness for Innovations and Attitudes towards 
New Technologies, Science and Renewable 
E nergies
Any kind of successful transformation into low­car­
bon and sustainable societies requires the develop­
ment of new technologies, and the prompt and wide­
spread diffusion of technical and social innovations. It 
is to be expected that extensive agreement with post­
materialist values will be subject to pressure at the pre­
cise moment in time when climate and environmental 
protection are not just abstractly postulated views, but 
concrete political endeavours, such as the implementa­
tion of infrastructure projects. The widespread intro­
duction of renewable energies, and the improvement 
of energy efficiency (Section 4.6), impacts on the eve­
ryday practices of a great number of people in key life 
areas, such as how and where they live, or their mobil­
ity (Sections 4.3.2, 4.3.3). A certain openness towards 
technological inventions and their application is there­
fore a precondition for the successful decarbonisation 
of the economy, and our society. The WVS contains a 
series of items designed to evaluate people’s attitudes 
to technology and science. The results of the study sug­
gest that in many countries, technological development 
and scientific progress are mainly seen as a good thing. 
During the 5th wave (2005–2008), for example, 69 % 
of respondents (n = 77,460) stated that they would 
welcome the development of new technologies being 
accorded more importance in the near future. A total of 
77.5 % of respondents (n = 62,718) hope that science 
and technology will create more opportunities for the 
next generation. 
Other studies furthermore show that large parts of 
the population in various countries and world religions 
particularly support the extension and more wide­
spread use of renewable energies (comparable items 
have so far not been included in the WVS question­
naire). Renewable energies (in particular solar power 
and wind technology) are far more socially accepted 
than fossil and nuclear energy carriers. This is made 
exemplarily clear for the EU by the Eurobarometer data 
shown in Figure 2.2­4.
The studies for the EU region also show that ‘only’ 
or ‘at least’ – depending on the observer’s perspective – 
40 % of Europeans would be prepared to pay more for 
energy from renewable sources, whilst 54 % reject this 
(Eurobarometer, 2006). In principle, renewable ener­
gies also appeal greatly to the US population (Environ­
ics, 2007; Leiserowitz et al., 2010). Equally, a wide­
spread social acceptance of renewable energy sources 
is documented in developing and newly industrialising 
countries like India (Iniyan et al., 2001). 
Despite the high levels of support that renewable 
energies enjoy in general surveys, practical experiences 
have shown that at a local level, protest is also some­
times voiced – for example with regard to the installa­
tion of wind power plants (Woods, 2003; Wüstenha­
gen et al., 2007). Such objections are partially rooted in 
residents being bothered or stressed by the noises that 
wind energy plants make, or their signal lights (BMU, 
2010a). Other surveys also report rejection tenden­
cies within the population for aesthetic reasons (Faiers 
and Neame, 2006; Sidiras and Koukios, 2004), or refer 
to the so­called NIMBY (‘Not In My Backyard’) phe­
nomenon, describing a social phenomenon that can be 
observed across a range of areas. It stands for a rejec­
tion of something that is generally supported, as soon 
as it encroaches on the own living environment and 
personal space. 
Some studies (Jobert et al., 2007; Schweizer­Ries, 
2010), however, also show that under consideration 
of various institutional and territorial factors, as well 
as the participation of local residents in planning pro­
cesses, a high social acceptance level can be reached for 
wind energy projects, or for the construction of power 
lines. Denmark for example, where acceptance of wind 
technology (and generally all renewable energies) is 
particularly widespread, is exemplary, because its citi­
zens, or citizen cooperatives own many of the installed 
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wind energy plants, and therefore benefit financially 
directly from wind power generation (Tranaes, 2006). 
Case studies from England also prove that financial 
participation or cooperative ownership significantly 
increase the acceptance of renewable energy projects 
(Ison, 2010). 
As a first conclusion, it should be kept in mind that 
there is considerable evidence that the protection of 
the natural environment and sustainability aspects 
ranks highly in the value systems of large parts of the 
population in different world regions. Despite its abso­
lute strength and persistence, independent of chang­
ing trends, this value change in many of the OECD and 
newly industrialising countries went hand in hand with 
the formation of ‘green’ social movements and political 
parties. In many countries, departments for the envi­
ronment have been introduced at state and suprana­
tional level, and sustainability issues have a firm place 
in the cross­functional activities of policy­making and 
administration. Politicians and civil society actors have 
been given a broader legitimation basis for ecological 
policies. Policies that are purely based on economic 
performance, on the other hand, clearly appear to have 
lost their attractiveness and plausibility.
2.3
The GDP Debate as an Expression of Changing 
Values
The debate on alternatives to gross domestic product 
(GDP) as a welfare indicator that has currently flared up 
again can also be seen as an expression of the described 
value change. A discussion which, initially, was led in 
society’s ‘ecological niches’ has become a matter of con­
cern for governments and the EU Commission: since 
2007, various initiatives for measuring national welfare 
and social progress have been pioneered by the United 
Nations, the OECD (Istanbul World Forum ‘Measuring 
and Fostering the Progress of Societies’), the European 
Community (Beyond GDP) and Eurostat, and, most 
recently, by the French President Sarkozy (Stiglitz­Sen­
Fitoussi­Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress). In November 2010, 
backed by joint application of all major German par­
ties (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and Green Party), the Ger­
man Bundestag also established an inquiry commis­
sion, ‘Growth, Prosperity, Quality of Life – options for 
a sustainable economy and social progress in the social 
market economy’, whose initiators voiced the opinion 
that the assessment of human development and subjec­
tive life satisfaction ought to be decoupled from growth 
indicators. 
Both parliamentary and government initiatives 
agree that they consider the indicator GDP, or GDP per 
capita, as unsuitable for adequately reflecting national 
welfare, social progress and aspects of sustainable 
development (Box 2.3­1). The debate on alternatives 
to GDP as an indicator is hardly a recent one, however. 
Since the 1970s, and the Club of Rome’s study on ‘The 
Limits to Growth’ (Meadows et al., 1972), there have 
been scientific and political discussions on how to ade­
quately measure welfare, human development, social 
progress and natural environmental changes. These 
have been based on, amongst other aspects, the mani­
fold debates on quality of life, humanisation of working 
Figure 2.2-4
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environments, and social indicators as a basis for wel­
fare­state related planning and development coopera­
tion. Those who use GDP per capita as a welfare indi­
cator were and are mostly aware of the fact that this 
indicator can only give, at best, a very rough estimate 
of the welfare situation in countries. GDP, or GDP per 
capita, after all exclusively measure economic market 
activities and monetary values. The calculation of GDP 
takes only flow values into account, and excludes the 
existing stocks, meaning that any conclusions regard­
ing the sustainability aspect of these business transac­
tions cannot be drawn. The cost of, for example, rem­
edying environmental damages leads to a higher GDP 
per capita, even though it only serves the restoration 
of the status quo. Goods and services that do not have 
a market price, or are not actually traded, such as eco­
system services, housework, voluntary work or sub­
sistence economic activities, are not included in the 
GDP. Equally, GDP per capita does not reflect education 
and health system quality; only the respective input 
costs are included. The GDP per capita also makes no 
statement regarding an economy’s income distribution 
(Stiglitz et al., 2009b), although the equality or ine­
quality of income distribution is considered to be wel­
fare­relevant (Wilkinson and Willet, 2009). 
So therefore, the GDP per capita is neither intended 
nor suitable for the measuring of welfare or sustainabil­
ity (Nordhaus and Tobin, 1973; Stiglitz et al., 2009b). 
This applies to an even greater extent to the measuring 
of people’s subjective wellbeing: an increase in an econ­
omy’s performance ability does not necessarily auto­
matically lead to an increase in subjective wellbeing. A 
rising GDP per capita does not inevitably lead to rises 
in individual income, and rising individual incomes – at 
least once a certain level of material gratification has 
been achieved – do not increase the subjective well­
being further (Easterlin, 1974; Layard, 2005; Leise­
rowitz et al., 2006; Inglehart et al., 2008; Frey and 
 Stutzer, 2009; Stiglitz et al., 2009a). In the long­term, 
too, there is apparently no clear correlation between 
rising incomes and subjective happiness (Stiglitz et al., 
2009a). Individual studies, though, have shown that 
a significant positive correlation between real income 
and subjective wellbeing can exist, and that this equally 
applies to poorer and richer countries (Stevenson and 
 Wolfers, 2008; Deaton, 2008; Eckersley, 2009). By 
trend, a higher GDP is also particularly promotive 
for areas that usually impact positively on individual 
wellbeing, such as education, health and security. An 
increasing GDP also tends to help to reduce unemploy­
ment levels. Not to be unemployed appears to have a 
strong positive impact on subjective wellbeing (Clark 
and Oswald, 1994; Oswald, 1997).
The current indicator debate shows the need for 
measurable welfare and sustainability dimensions that 
go beyond GDP per capita. These would be welcomed 
by many politicians and large parts of the civil society. A 
growing number of politicians and citizens question the 
dominance of economic growth (measured as GDP) as 
a basis for political decisions. In the face of urgent eco­
logical, economic and social problems, a reorientation 
towards ‘qualitative’ growth (based on a more compre­
hensive welfare and/or sustainability concept) is long 
overdue, also as a political target value (Box 2.3­1).
Which indicators and indices should be used to 
replace or complement the GDP is ultimately a political 
issue. Because apart from aspects like data availability 
and quality, the question of which welfare indicators 
should be used as the measure for successful policies 
depends above all on which economic, ecological and 
social goals the respective policies should pursue. Only 
then can be decided which type of indicator (monetary 
or non­monetary, objective or subjective, i. e. personal 
assessment by individuals, individual indicator, com­
pound indicators, or set of indicators) are best suited 
to collect this data to measure the respective target 
achievement. The Stiglitz­Sen­Fitoussi Commission 
used by President Sarkozy made a few suggestions for 
developing statistical reporting further (Box 2.3­2).
2.4
The Gap between Attitudes and Behaviour 
What conclusions can be drawn from the ‘GDP­scepti­
cism’, the approval ratings measured in surveys regard­
ing the position of environment and sustainability, and 
the presently existing global value orientations? Firstly, 
it becomes clear that a transformation into a more sus­
tainable society would evidently be welcomed by a 
significant part of the world society. There appears to 
be a relatively wide, cross­cultural consensus that the 
prevalent way of doing business should be embedded 
in higher­ranking goals of sustainability, environmen­
tal conservation, and climate protection, or generally in 
aspects of a more caring and careful resource manage­
ment. To put it another way: anyone supporting sustain­
ability is not, or no longer, swimming against the tide. 
This conclusion is not a marginal note in a report that 
deals with the preconditions and possibilities of a glo­
bal transformation. On the contrary, it shows that a part 
of the population welcomes the goal of such a trans­
formation. Political options that pick up on postma­
terialist value orientations and sustainability­oriented 
attitudes are not complete antitheses to the majority 
view in rich and industrialising societies. They are also 
widespread amongst the opinion leading groups in the 
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newly industrialising countries, which are even more 
reliant on catching up, i. e. on the increase and diffu­
sion of material prosperity.
The conclusion that many people all over the world 
show a marked sensitivity towards environmental 
issues, and have shown in surveys that they would 
be prepared to support a more sustainable economy 
and way of living, and accept technological innova­
tions, however, does not mean that a widespread actual 
rejection of non­sustainable practices has already taken 
place, and that concrete environmental policy reforms 
such as, for example, the introduction or increase of 
eco­taxation, or the introduction of environmental 
standards, enjoy the unequivocal approval of all citi­
zens. In the course of such reforms, significant political 
objections must regularly be overcome (OECD, 2001; 
Thalmann, 2004), and it is certainly not a rare phenom­
enon that on the one hand, people profess support for 
Box 2.3-1
Alternative Concepts for Measuring Welfare and 
Sustainability
A number of alternative indicators for measuring welfare and 
sustainability have been developed and evaluated since the 
1970s (Table 2.3­1). Some concepts, such as the Genuine 
Progress Indicator (GPI), still use the GDP as a basis, modify­
ing it by monetising ecological and social factors that impact 
welfare (for example environmental degradation, voluntary 
work), then adding or subtracting these values. 
Other approaches no longer use the GDP as a starting 
point, but instead add various monetary and non­monetary 
factors together to give one index (compound indices). Exam­
ples for this method are, amongst others, the United Nations 
Development Programme's Human Development Index (HDI), 
and the Index of Economic Wellbeing (IEWB). The HDI, for 
example, is made up of part­indicators for the areas of health, 
education, and material living standard. Beyond these, there 
are different approaches that explicitly not only measure the 
current level of welfare, but also the sustainability aspect of 
business activities. Of these, some focus only on ecological 
sustainability, whereas others also include additional sustain­
ability dimensions. 
Another approach is the ‘Gross National Happiness’ index 
conceived by the Himalayan state of Bhutan. This takes more 
than just the GDP­relevant values into account to measure 
the performance capability of a society. On the contrary, a 
range of other values, such as ‘spiritual wellbeing’, ‘health’, 
‘good government’ or ‘biodiversity’ are included (Adler, 
2009). In terms of sustainability measurement, there are also 
approaches like overall eco­balance, which could be consid­
ered a modification of the GDP approach. The various sus­
tainability aspects are shown separately from the GDP here. 
The KfW Sustainability Indicator or the German federal gov­
ernment's sustainability indicators are also in this category. 
Their counterparts at European level are Eurostat’s Sustain­
able Development Indicators. 
The following table summarises some of the concepts that 
have been suggested, and categorises them according to sus­
tainability dimensions included. 
Table 2.3-1
Overview of concepts for measuring welfare and sustainability (*index includes subjective indicators).
Source: WBGU
Type of measuring concept Name of index/indicator Economic 
Dimension
Social  
Dimension
Ecological 
Dimension
Beyond GDP: 
monetised indicators/indices
Measure of Economic Welfare x x x
Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) x x x
Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) x x x
Full Cost of Goods and Services (FCGS) x x
National Welfare Index (NWI) x x x
Beyond GDP: overall eco-balance/
satellite systems
Overall eco-balance/UN System of Environ-
mental and Economic  Accounting (SEEA)
x x
Non-monetised 
indicators/indices
Ecological Footprint x
Living Planet Index x
Compound indicators/indices 
(integration of monetised and 
 non-monetised values)
Human Development Index (HDI) x x
Index of Economic Wellbeing x x x
Happy Planet Index* x x
KfW Sustainability Indicator x x x
Sustainable Development Indicators (Eurostat) x x x
Index of Economic Freedom x x
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI)/
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)
x x
Gross National Happiness* (Bhutan) x x x
Canadian Index of Wellbeing* (CIW)
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) x
National Accounts of Well-being* x
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ambitious climate protection in surveys, yet at the same 
time, they also object to paying higher prices for elec­
tricity and fuel from fossil energy carriers (Leiserowitz 
et al., 2006). What leads to this gap between attitudes 
and actions?
One of the key reasons for why people don’t (always) 
do that which – by their own admission – is important 
to them is that value systems are often abstract con­
cepts that are perceived as a hypothetical area of life. 
The corresponding surveys are therefore not perceived 
under inclusion of all of the actually expectable con­
sequences, and accordingly, questions are answered 
hypothetically. In general, sociological and socio­ 
psychological research has shown that the perception 
of problems does not necessarily trigger ‘right’, i. e. for 
example environmentally friendly, actions (Diekmann 
and Preisendörfer, 1991; Kuckartz, 2010), or that there 
is little correlation between attitudes and behaviour 
(Eckes and Six, 1994).
There are ‘barriers’ (Leiserowitz et al., 2006) pre­
venting value systems from impacting behaviour, at 
both individual and social or structural level. An actual 
change of behaviour requires a material and cognitive 
basis. The suitable socio­economic and legal framework 
must also be given. Frequently, for example, the inten­
tion to use environmentally friendly public transport 
for private journeys and commuting is hampered by a 
status quo bias, but also by a lack of basic information, 
(supposed) disadvantages in terms of cost (both mon­
etary and non­monetary), and wrong fiscal incentives, 
and a lack of infrastructure. The relatively stable trends 
towards a rather high level of sensitivity towards envi­
ronmental issues presented in Section 2.2 must there­
fore not hide the fact that other, sometimes completely 
contrasting values and framework conditions also par­
tially influence actual decisions. 
Election research proves that, apart from personal­
ity factors – which, for example, include the attitudes 
acquired in socialisation processes – structure­related 
determinants (like social hierarchy, social class, or the 
political system) and short­term situation­related influ­
ences (such as candidate sympathies, practical issues, 
or election campaign development) also significantly 
influence voting decisions (Schultze, 2003; Broschek 
and Schultze, 2006). Areas as diverse as diffusion 
research, ethnological studies and relevant develop­
ment cooperation experiences show that – beyond any 
kind of rational benefit calculation – it is people’s cul­
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Box 2.3-2
Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission 
Recommendations for Measuring Economic 
Performance and Social Progress
The Stiglitz­Sen­Fitoussi Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress identified eight 
dimensions that impact quality of life in its report: material 
wealth, health, education, personal activities/paid employ­
ment, political participation and governance, social rela­
tionships, environmental conditions and existential (physi­
cal and economic) insecurity. According to the Commission, 
these should be taken into account when measuring social 
progress. The most important of the Commission’s other rec­
ommendations made in their September 2009 final report are 
 (Braakmann, 2009; Michaelis, 2009; Stiglitz et al., 2009b):
 > Net domestic product, net national income or dispos­
able income should form the basis of longer­term and 
international comparisons instead of gross domestic pro­
duct, as gross domestic product or gross national income 
still includes write­offs (value losses) and does not reflect 
householders' real incomes and actual consumption.
 > In addition, the measurement should generally be expanded 
from aggregated to household level, as there can be consid­
erable gaps between the aggregated national income and 
the average real income of households.
 > Disposable income and consumption should be stated 
according to the so­called consumption concept, which 
includes individually attributable state services (education 
and healthcare provision, amongst others) that increase 
individual consumption.
 > The assessment of economic activity should not only con­
sider quantitative changes in economic performance, 
but also qualitative changes (amongst others improved 
 services, better­quality products). 
 > Social groups’ share in economic growth should be made 
visible by publishing data on income and wealth distribu­
tion according to household groups, and explicitly record­
ing inequalities between different social groups, sexes and 
generations.
 > Non­paid services like homemaking, subsistence economy 
and voluntary work should be included when measuring 
welfare, as should the value of leisure time.
 > Sustainability should be measured separately from the 
current welfare level, as it is an independent concept; a 
multi­dimensional set of indicators (dashboard) should be 
defined for this.
 > To evaluate sustainability, assets and liabilities should be 
compared, and natural, human, and social capital should be 
accounted for to reveal changes in the portfolio.
 > Equally, (non­monetised) physical indicators should be 
included to illustrate ecological sustainability.
 > Indicators of the subjective wellbeing of a country’s citizens 
should also be surveyed, including indicators for material 
wealth, as well as immaterial aspects impacting quality of 
life. 
 > In this context, subjective indicators like happiness and life 
satisfaction should be included in the official statistics.
 > The statistics agencies should allow the further develop­
ment of compound indices by making the relevant data and 
methods available.
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tural practices that are particularly important when 
new ideas and technologies or behaviour patterns are 
actually introduced (Rogers, 2003). The introduction, 
for example, of simple, seemingly plausible practices 
can fail if these collide with existing cultural values or 
norms (Rogers, 2003). The applicable system of cultural 
norms does not just determine whether new every­
day practices in society are adopted by a certain social 
group, but also how the adoption is carried out. 
Differing norms and dispositions are not just found 
in different societies and cultural zones; they also differ 
according to social class within societies. Studies based 
on the Sinus Institute’s (now called Sinus Sociovision) 
representative life world research show that people 
with certain lifestyles have (so far) shown hardly or no 
interest in sustainability issues. Conversely, however, 
the studies also clearly show that there is a significant 
potential for sustainable behaviour in social groups with 
an ecological affinity, a potential which, moreover, is 
still a long way from having been fully realised (Klein­
hückelkotten, 2006). It is also remarkable in this con­
text that the citizen segment with an ecological affin­
ity has become much more extensive over the past few 
years (Wippermann, 2009). In addition, the main barri­
ers which make it more difficult for certain individuals 
or social environments to make sustainable decisions 
are considered to be the lack of long­term orientation, 
loss aversion, and path dependencies in general.
2.4.1 
Lack of Long-Term Orientation and Loss Aversion
The transformation of societies towards low­car­
bon economic activity can only succeed if the actors 
involved, particularly the consumers and voters, take 
their decisions in such a way that future generations’ 
costs and benefits are also adequately taken into 
account. Frequently, such long­term oriented decisions 
are accompanied by higher costs in the short­term than 
exclusively short­term oriented decisions. For example, 
there is still relatively little demand for energy efficient 
household appliances as these tend to be quite expen­
sive at the point of purchase. In the medium­ and long­
term, however, the higher purchasing price is offset by 
lower running costs. This equally applies to investments 
in buildings insulation and the conversion of heating 
systems, car purchases, and so on. With all of these 
decisions, the exact, tangible value of the future bene­
fit is uncertain, and therefore difficult to grasp, unlike 
the relatively high cost at the point in time when the 
purchase is made. The fact that many individuals are 
characterised by loss aversion, particularly in uncer­
tain decision situations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Paech, 2005), contributes even more to this effect of 
an overriding awareness of the short­term effects. So in 
view of the described time architecture of cost and ben­
efits, options which are more expensive in the short­
term but cheaper in the long run often tend to be ‘left 
by the wayside’. 
There are many causes for the lack of long­term ori­
entation and/or the loss aversion of individual deci­
sion­makers. A particularly important role is played by 
subjective factors like lack of knowledge and uncer­
tainty regarding the pressure to act. The higher the 
uncertainty is, the more likely it becomes that those 
deciding will discount future gains, which is why 
long­term projects are more difficult to realise. Since 
losses typically have an extremely high level of nega­
tive influence on benefit perception, as opposed to the 
far smaller positive influence of the perceived benefit 
in the case of gains, consumers will attempt to refrain 
from actions that they perceive might lead to (substan­
tial) losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The later 
the benefits of an action become apparent, and the ear­
lier the costs – the typical distribution of cost and bene­
fit of transformative actions over a period of time – the 
higher the loss risk is estimated to be, thereby reducing 
the likelihood that individual actors will welcome and 
support such action options. In any case, the lower the 
disposable income or the living standard of those decid­
ing, the more widespread short­term oriented acting 
and the avoidance of losses are (Lorenzoni et al., 2007).
One method of overcoming those barriers to behav­
iour changes that are the result of a lack of long­term 
orientation and loss aversion is the employment of so­
called ‘nudges’. Nudges, i. e. triggers for desired behav­
iour changes, are currently the focus of an international 
discussion on so­called ‘libertarian paternalism’ strate­
gies (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). One of the prominent 
examples of such nudges are default options, which, 
from a paternalistic perspective, stipulate ‘good’ solu­
tions as the standard, but always include the option of 
choosing an alternative (opt out). When there is a diver­
gence in terms of time between the costs and  benefits 
of an action, nudges can help individuals to make their 
decisions in such a way that the benefit is optimised in 
the long­term (for examples see Box 5.2­5).
2.4.2 
Path Dependencies
For the transformation of economy and society towards 
sustainability, the political, economical and tech­
nological path dependency is also a significant bar­
rier  (Liebowitz and Marjolis, 1995; Pierson, 2004). 
An existing system of institutions (norms, contracts, 
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negotiating and decision­making modi, etc.), but also 
of technologies and infrastructures, can hinder far­
reaching social changes. Already existing technologies, 
infrastructures and socio­cultural patterns can produce 
these kind of lock­in effects, restricting the behaviour 
and the development potential over several investment 
cycles (Freeman, 1992). 
In the 20th century, an extensive high­carbon infra­
structure that rests on the massive and self­propagat­
ing application of fossil energy carriers was established 
in the OECD states. Various economic and social insti­
tutions have stipulated specific development paths, 
thereby excluding others (Urry, 2010). In politics and 
the economy, path dependent processes and devel­
opments frequently result in mistakes becoming the 
established norm, and the continued absence of learn­
ing effects. Individual and political decision­makers, as 
well as the public, are led by crisis management rou­
tines that were developed for past problem cases. Cling­
ing to past thought and action patterns can lead to an 
‘objective’ pressure to change, which merely results in 
modification, rather than transformation of the sta­
tus quo, delaying the replacement of the fossil­nuclear 
energy system with a sustainable energy system even 
further.
2.5
On the Way to a Shared Global Transformation 
Vision? 
The transformation outlined in this report depends on 
being widely acceptable (and this also in societies with 
a so far low material development level). On the basis 
of the global values surveys, the WBGU has been able 
to make clear that postmaterialist value systems have 
found a wide, and, in the past decades, growing con­
sensus, not just in richer countries, although there is no 
discernible automatism for the realisation of such value 
preferences and the disposition to act accordingly. Usu­
ally, there is a wide gap between awareness and action. 
However, when people do not just, or do not primarily, 
base their agreement with political norms and goals on 
actual actions, but also on mind­sets and projections, 
then the presence of a potentially high approval rat­
ing with a stronger position on environmental con­
servation and climate protection is by no means triv­
ial. The transformative measures and regulations out­
lined in this report, which could potentially have a far­
reaching effect on habits and things taken for granted, 
are easier for political and economic decision­makers to 
justify if they are presented not only as a relinquish­
ment, but also as agreeing at least in part with prefer­
ences and desires that are prevalent in the world popu­
lation in any case.
The diffusion of environmental consciousness and 
postmaterialist values in numerous countries and 
world regions represents an important precondition 
for a transformation towards sustainability. Persons 
and institutions which act by and large in agreement 
with the prevalent values carry great strategic weight 
as so­called change agents, or pioneers of change 
 (Section 6.2). They bear witness to the fact that a trans­
formation towards sustainability is possible, and that 
the room to manoeuvre for reflecting the correspond­
ing values and positions in concrete actions exists in 
society. In this way, people who share a predisposition 
towards sustainability, but for whom, with regard to 
their concrete behaviour, other, contrary criteria tend 
to be more significant, could be motivated to support 
sustainable economic activity, and change their own 
behaviour and consumption patterns in this direction.
Then the transformation would not only be down to 
‘planetary boundaries’, but also backed by the ‘open 
frontiers’ of humankind’s existence. New, alternative 
ways of living and entrepreneurial visions are con­
stantly being developed and, for example, held up as 
role models for a ‘good life’. These kinds of role models 
appear to have a solid basis in people’s everyday prefer­
ences (Graham, 2010). 
All cultures used to, and in fact still do, feature con­
vincing aspects and dimensions of ‘good life’ and hap­
piness designed for universalisation, and not as aver­
age values of subjective human preferences and con­
ditions, but as evaluation criteria for certain life world 
contexts and choice situations. In the practical philoso­
phy inspired by Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ‘good 
living’ as such (eu zén, ‘to live well’) is worth pursuing 
for its own sake – all other commodities or virtues are 
only worth striving for in relation to this ‘goodness’. 
In today’s practical philosophy, which refers only par­
tially to the ethical theories of ancient Greece, a ‘good 
life’ is also not a condition, but an action, an acting that 
is guided by reason and emotion. It is not only, or not 
primarily, based on a great number of material posses­
sions, pleasant experiences or plentiful enjoyment, but 
rather on humaneness in a comprehensive sense that 
benefits fellow men and women and the environment. 
This includes personal development, i. e. development 
of the opportunities a person has available to them, 
just as much as a sense of community, a taking over 
of responsibility for the general well­being, and vari­
ous justness principles. A ‘good life’ is usually depend­
ent on the fulfilment of certain basic requirements, also 
on the existence of scope for individual actions and 
options that must be secured by material standards. 
Beyond that, immaterial factors play a role in the ‘pur­
suit of happiness’ in all cultures, such as the recogni­
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tion received from others, being embedded in different 
kinds of communities and networks, yet also the fulfil­
ment of aesthetic and hedonistic pleasures. Any trans­
formation strategy which can make it plausible that the 
suggested or stipulated changes are compatible with 
these immaterial goals, i. e. that they do not necessarily 
represent a negative impact on subjective life satisfac­
tion, but that they can in fact improve it, promises far 
more success than a strategy which, by external force 
alone, stipulates mitigations, thereby triggering prob­
lem repression and loss aversion.
From a liberal point of view, any attempt to norma­
tively pitch ‘good living’ (in Aristotle’s sense) against 
respective individual needs bears the risk of authori­
tarian paternalism. Modern societies view themselves 
as ‘multi­optional’ (Gross, 2005), i. e. the gratification 
of individuals’ needs takes the empirical and norma­
tive precedence. The individual pursuit of happiness 
is therefore hampered only by the avoidance of caus­
ally attributable damages to others. This argumentation 
allows the discounting of past environmental damages, 
as these are compensated by future welfare increases. 
However, against the background of the risks revealed 
in Chapter 1 – global climate change, the loss of biodi­
versity, and the multiple crises faced by the world soci­
ety – it becomes increasingly doubtful whether such a 
focus actually still protects today’s individual freedoms 
and those of coming generations. Subsequent to the 
emergence of liberal basic human rights (18th century), 
political participation rights (19th century) and social 
rights (20th century), there are many who feel that 
the progressive development of rights has reached the 
point where a new kind of right must be strived for: an 
ecological basic right (Marshall, 1992; Menke and Poll­
mann, 2007). A closer look at the awareness of the lim­
its to growth should therefore not just focus on the nat­
ural restrictions imposed by limited resources, stresses, 
emissions and so on, but also on the possible conse­
quences of unlimited growth for the individual freedom 
of future generations. Self­imposing restrictions today, 
for example with regard to the quantity and origin of 
consumer goods and services, guarantee future options 
for action which in all probability will, if we wait any 
longer, disappear. Taking a closer look, we must there­
fore conclude that restrictions which today are initially 
perceived as a relinquishment could actually result in 
taking some of the burden off the people and societies 
of the future without subjecting today’s generation to 
unbearable restrictions and immeasurable costs.
Self­imposing restrictions to avoid dangerous cli­
mate change and other damages to the Earth system 
is not a new, revolutionary idea. People are, as cur­
rently proved by the smoking ban and balanced budget 
amendments, quite capable of reducing the degree of 
their own spontaneous first­tier desires (short­term 
preferences) in favour of second­tier desires, i. e. wish­
related desires (Frankfurt, 2001; Schaal and Ritzi, 
2008), and to commit to cooperation to achieve these 
(Tomasello, 2009). They thereby prove a precaution­
ary attitude towards possible preference, or the future 
development of these preferences. This problematic 
issue is highlighted by historic transformations, whose 
structural patterns will be determined in the following 
chapter. 
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The WBGU understands imminent change in politics, 
economy and society that is required in order to mas­
ter the challenges described in Chapter 1 as a ‘Great 
Transformation’. The key requirements this compre­
hensive transformation must fulfil stem from the plane­
tary boundaries, which make the conversion of national 
economies and the global economy under consideration 
of these boundaries compulsory, in order to avoid irre­
versible damages to global ecosystems and their conse­
quences for humankind.
Production, consumption patterns and lifestyles 
must be altered in such a way as to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions to a minimum in the coming decades 
(decarbonisation of the energy systems and establish­
ment of low­carbon societies), to minimise the scarcity 
of essential resources (above all land, water, strategic 
mineral resources) through major resource efficiency 
increases, and to avoid abrupt changes within the Earth 
system (tipping points), through economic and devel­
opment strategies which take the guard rails of the 
Earth system (planetary boundaries) into account. 
Such a transformation cannot succeed without a 
hitherto unparalleled level of global cooperation, the 
further development of normative infrastructures in 
the international system, new welfare concepts, tech­
nology leaps, multifaceted institutional innovations 
and flexible reform alliances. The WBGU considers only 
two great transformations, waves of change or civilisa­
tion phases in the history of humankind to be compa­
rable to the Great Transformation faced now: the Neo­
lithic Revolution, i. e. the transition from hunter­gath­
erer to agricultural society (Winkler, 2009; Box 3­1), 
and the Industrial Revolution, already referred to as 
a ‘Great Transformation’ by the Hungarian economist 
Karl Polanyi (1944) (Box 3.2­1).
To date, no comprehensive theory adequately ren­
dering the complexity of great transformations exist. 
However, a transformation concept is necessary in 
order for this profound change to be suitably elabo­
rated and analysed in depth, and for the development 
of a systematic approach that facilitates the illustration 
of the Great Transformation’s processes and dynamics, 
levels of action, change agents and actor constellations. 
Sustainable political, economic and social transforma­
tion strategies for the transition to a decarbonised and 
resource efficient (global) economy and society can be 
only developed this way. 
How to describe a great transformation, and how to 
influence it? The first important aspect is that the Great 
Transformation goes beyond changes in the medium 
term (Section 3.5), which are analysed by various the­
ories:
The theory on the ‘long waves of economic change’ 
describes Kondratiev waves, or economic cycles driven 
by basic innovations (Kondratiev, 1926; Mensch, 1975; 
Freeman and Louca, 2001; Perez, 2002). In this con­
text, it is has been observed that key innovations lead­
ing to profound economic change and transformative 
investment waves occur every 40–60 years (1780–
1850 steam engine, mechanical loom, coal, iron; 1840–
1890 railway, steel production, agricultural methods; 
1890–1940 electricity, chemistry, automobile, mass 
production; 1940–1990 electrical engineering, petro­
chemistry, computer, plane/rockets; 1990 to present, 
information and communication technologies). The 
Great Transformation leading to a global economy and 
society able to provide wealth, stability and democracy 
within the planetary boundaries evidently also depends 
on basic innovations to make low­carbon and resource 
efficient economic activities possible. However, it goes 
far beyond even the time frame of Kondratiev´s cycles, 
as its objective is bringing the current industrial age to 
a close. It also includes social, cultural and political pro­
cesses of change that are not only of a technological 
nature, or determined by technology. 
Evolutionary economics draws on the concept of 
fundamental innovations, differentiating between 
incremental and radical innovations and a change in 
techno­economic paradigms (Freeman, 1996). We can 
learn a great deal from these approaches for the Great 
Transformation, as the transition towards a low­car­
bon and resource­efficient economy must obviously go 
hand in hand with radical innovations that affect large 
parts of the economy, and of society, and will lead to 
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a change of the ‘high­carbon paradigm’. However, just 
as in Kondratiev’s long wave theory, innovation theo­
ries tend to look at changes in terms of medium­term 
time span. 
Moreover, the complexity of the Great Transforma­
tion goes well beyond changes which are, at their core, 
technological, something that is addressed by parts of 
evolutionary economics also deals with. The most dif­
ficult changes which must be brought about in order to 
achieve the Great Transformation transcend technolo­
gies – changing lifestyles, for instance, or revolutionis­
ing global cooperation, overcoming policy­related bar­
riers, and dealing responsibly with permanent, cross­
generational changes (Chapters 5, 6). Technologies can 
help to simplify these challenges of comprehensive 
economic and social change. However, they are not the 
ultimate key, or even the only key, to the Great Trans­
formation.
Along with the innovation theories and the theory 
of long waves, transformation theories dealing with the 
Box 3-1
The Neolithic Revolution
The Neolithic Revolution describes the emergence and 
expansion of sedentary societies during the New Stone Age. 
Between 10,000 and 5,000 BC, after previously living exclu­
sively in nomadic hunter­gatherer communities, humankind 
developed agriculture, animal husbandry and how to store 
food in different regions around the globe at the same time, 
thus creating the preconditions for sedentariness (Sieferle, 
2010; Figures 3.2­1, 3.2­2).
The fundamental characteristics of agricultural civilisa­
tions are very similar all over the world. This suggests con­
vergent evolutionary processes in which goal­oriented steer­
ing cannot have played a major role. Rather, the systemic 
conditions of agricultural production methods, despite the 
socio­technical advances achieved since then, provide agri­
cultural societies with only very limited scope for unique 
developments and differentiating characteristics (Sieferle, 
2010). Once a society had assimilated the first steps on the 
path towards agriculture, for example the regular harvesting 
of wild plants, the next logical step, i. e. the intentional sow­
ing of seed, was inevitable.
Although the Neolithic Revolution is an evolution­
ary change between one age and the next, it permanently 
changed humankind’s basis for civilisation, and the world as 
a whole. From an economic perspective, sedentariness and 
agriculture brought previously unimagined material wealth 
and economic growth. This became particularly apparent in 
the evolution of advanced agricultural civilisations (Weisdorf, 
2005).
Compared to the status quo ante, sedentariness, coupled 
with agriculture and food storage, allowed the evolution of 
considerably more complex and differentiated societies. Eco­
nomic historians emphasise that an early adoption of agricul­
tural production methods and the farming lifestyle led to such 
fundamental differences with regard to technological devel­
opment and social organisation. These were so profound that, 
to a certain degree, they still determine the various countries’ 
economic output today. Moreover, there are indications, for 
example in India, that it is less the historical length of time 
of agricultural production that is decisive in this regard, but 
rather the respective development stage of the agrarian tradi­
tion, and the technological and social skills adopted thereof 
(Putterman, 2008).
With the economic growth of agricultural societies, their 
energy demand and the degree of interference in natural 
environments also increases, as agricultural societies reen­
gineer their environments far more intensively and system­
atically than hunters and gatherers (Haberl, 2006). Agrarian 
societies’ main energy source is biomass, which is used more 
controlled and more intensive than previously (Figure 3.2­1). 
Furthermore, a substantially larger share of biomass net pri­
mary production is used as food and feedstock, firewood, 
and construction material. Although hunters and gatherers 
also withdraw biomass from their environment, they use this 
comparatively unsystematically, unmodified and in lower vol­
umes. 
There is some controversy as to why hunting and gath­
ering was replaced by sedentariness and agriculture, as our 
knowledge about prehistory is incomplete and largely specu­
lative. All attempts at explanation assume that the climatic 
changes towards the end of the Ice Age played a decisive role. 
However, it is unclear whether this impacted negatively on 
environmental conditions, leading to resource scarcity, or, 
precisely the opposite, whether this actually improved envi­
ronmental conditions, leading to an overabundance of food.
To put it simply, in the first case, a lack of prey would 
have been the key driver for developing agriculture. In the 
second case, it would have been the overabundance of prey 
that would have made sedentariness, the domestication of 
animals and a more complex degree of organisation, such as 
the systematic cultivation of wild barley, possible in the first 
place. A third theory supposes that initially, global warming 
allowed hunting sedentariness, and a sudden climatic cold 
snap forced the sedentary hunters to turn to agriculture. A 
fourth approach looks for an explanation not in the relative 
improvement or deterioration of environmental conditions 
through climatic changes, but in the increasing constancy of 
environmental conditions after the climatically volatile Pleis­
tocene. Whilst hunters and gatherers were flexible and able 
to adapt to climate fluctuations, the continued constancy of 
climatic conditions also allowed relatively inflexible, but in 
the long term more productive lifestyles such as agriculture.
Regardless of the specific causes, sedentariness and agri­
culture allowed a historically unprecedented acceleration of 
cultural, social, technological and economic development. The 
end of the imperative of always adapting to fluctuating cli­
matic conditions brought other compulsory needs to adapt, 
and co­evolutionary processes in agriculture (for example the 
emergence of parasites) and settlement communities (for 
example competitive pressure through foes, and social dis­
parities). The solution of a problem usually led to an unfore­
seen set of new problems, which again called for responsive 
action, thereby promoting innovation and development 
(Sieferle, 2010).
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transition of socialist countries towards market econ­
omy and democracy also encompass some of the Great 
Transformation’s important dimensions (Merkel, 2010). 
This is not surprising, as these approaches examine 
the profound remodelling of economies and society, 
attempting to develop transformation­relevant strate­
gies. The essential difference between these transfor­
mations and the transition to a global economy within 
planetary boundaries is the fact that during their tran­
sition towards a market economy, the formerly socialist 
countries could refer to existing guiding principles and 
models in western countries for guidance. 
In contrast, there are no established role models 
for the Great Transformation to sustainability. Achiev­
ing wealth, decarbonisation, radical resource efficiency 
and democracy at around the same time is a historic 
challenge all countries will have to face in equal meas­
ure. It is particularly the wealthy nations – in view of 
their greenhouse gas emissions and resource consump­
tion – that are failing to do so. Currently, there is not 
a single low­carbon model country to serve as an ori­
entation guide for reform processes in other countries. 
Moreover, the transformation theories dealing with the 
transition from socialist to westernised societies focus 
on national systems, whilst the 21st century’s Great 
Transformation must encompass both national societal 
changes and, above all, processes of global change. 
The present transformation theories can certainly 
contribute elements and structural characteristics to 
a heuristic concept for analysis of the Great Transfor­
mation; however, they are not construed to describe 
the epochal change that is required, in the view of the 
WBGU, to secure the stability of the planetary system, 
widespread prosperity and democracy in the long term.
3.1
Key Characteristics of the Great Transformation
With their works on long term transformative change to 
sustainability, Grin et al. (2010) are making important 
contributions to a better understanding of the transi­
tional processes referred to by the WBGU as the Great 
Transformation. Grin et al.’s approach (2010) refers 
to the transformation concepts and theories outlined 
above, particularly from the areas of evolutionary eco­
nomics and innovation research, but also from the his­
torical sciences, and elaborates these in terms of a more 
comprehensive change towards sustainable develop­
ment. Grin et al. (2010) refer to ‘transition’ when ana­
lysing comprehensive change processes, and to ‘trans­
formations’ as phases within a transition. This distinc­
tion is not necessarily made in the German­speaking 
social scientific community to describe far reaching pro­
cesses of social, economic, cultural and political change. 
In this report, the WBGU uses the term ‘transforma­
tion’, not least with reference to Karl Polanyi’s ‘Great 
Transformation’ (1944) to describe an all­encompass­
ing transition.
Historical phases of comprehensive economic, tech­
nological, cultural and political change affecting not 
only individual niches and sectors, but transforming 
whole societies, can, with reference to Giddens (1984), 
Bourdieu (1977) and Braudel (1958), be understood 
as processes during the course of which ‘changing 
practices, structural change, and exogenous tenden­
cies occur in parallel to each other and may sometimes 
interact so as to produce non­incremental changes in 
practices and structures’ (Grin et al., 2010). The authors 
here adopt the view of economic historian Braudel 
(1958) that profound change is based on change pro­
cesses which vary in pace and follow differing histori­
cal time scales. Geographical, geological, but also social 
and mental structures, change very slowly and grad­
ually (structural history); economic structures, actor 
and power constellations and the availability of natu­
ral resources can change within a few years or decades 
(conjunctural history); certain moments and events in 
history (11 September 2001, beginning and end of the 
Second World War; global economic crises 1929/30 
and 2007–2009) can lead to course changes, shocks, 
lasting crises or windows of opportunity for changes 
(eventful history). Great transformations are therefore 
not linear processes or the result of intentional actions 
by powerful actors, but the consequence of interlinked 
dynamics occurring at different time scales, which 
then, in their compounded form, create a certain direc­
tion of the transition (for example during the course of 
the fundamental change from agricultural to industrial 
societies, Box 3.2­1, Figures 3.2­1, 3.2­2). 
Grin et al. (2010) refer to the concept of co­evo­
lution for the analysis of interactions between differ­
ent subsystems. ‘Economic, cultural, technological, 
ecological, and institutional subsystems co­evolve in 
many ways and can reinforce each other to co­deter­
mine a transition (...) we speak of co­evolution if the 
interaction between societal subsystems influences the 
dynamics of the individual societal subsystem, leading 
to irreversible patterns of change’. On this basis, the 
authors develop a bundle of the general characteristics 
of major transformation processes to concentrate their 
complexity:
 > Major change processes occur in a co­evolutionary 
manner, rely on a great number of changes in differ­
ent socio­technical (sub)systems, and take place at 
local, national and global action levels.
 > They include both the development of (niche) inno­
vations as well as their selection on the part of the 
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users, and their social embedding through markets, 
regulations, infrastructures and new social guiding 
principles.
 > They are influenced by a large number of political, 
scientific, economic and civil social actors and con­
sumers.
 > Ultimately, they are radical processes with regard to 
their impact and range; they may, however, some­
times take place very slowly over several decades.
If these characteristics are applied, then great transfor­
mations have no clearly defined epicentre from which 
they emanate, and are hardly manageable. It is true that 
neither of the historical civilisation leaps of humankind 
(Neolithic and Industrial Revolution, Boxes 3­1, 3.2­1) 
categorised by the WBGU as Great Transformations 
were steered processes; rather, they were the conse­
quence of evolutionary transition. A central challenge, 
and historically without precedent, in the transforma­
tion towards a low­carbon, resource efficient global 
economy within the planetary boundaries is therefore 
the shaping of this complex process (Messner, 1997). 
The imminent transition must gain momentum on the 
basis of the scientific findings and knowledge regarding 
the risks of continuation along the resource intensive 
development path based on fossil fuels, and shaped by 
policy­making to avoid the historical norm of a change 
in direction in response to crises and shocks. In the 
event of a climate crisis, following the ‘historical norm’ 
could have irreversible and unpredictable consequences 
for humanity (WBGU, 2009). Climatologists and natu­
ral scientists have the knowledge and skills to project 
the future impact of global warming on water availa­
bility, land degradation or sea­level rise with the aid 
of projection models. Contemporary societies therefore 
not only have recourse to a ‘past laboratory’ (history), 
but also a ‘future laboratory’ to make their decisions. 
Society must learn to ‘learn from the future’ (Chap­
ter 8). 
Grin et al.’s transformation concept (2010), but 
also other social­science theories on social change 
( Braudel, 1958; Messner, 1997; Mayntz, 2009; Fischer, 
2010; Ostrom,  2010), however, point out that even 
complex transformations do not occur simply as a 
uncontrolled self­propelling process on the strength of 
the complex internal dynamics of processes and struc­
tures in the sense of co­evolution; they can also be 
influenced by identifiable actor constellations. Actor 
constellations with sufficient power, resources and cre­
ativity, prepared to welcome innovations and reforms 
in order to overcome established barriers, can be effec­
tive drivers of change, or they can channel, consolidate 
and shape processes of change which develop their own 
dynamics. How much room for manoeuvre these actors 
have depends on the overall constellation in which they 
act. The following shows that the current imminent 
profound change towards a sustainable global society 
certainly offers ample openings for political shaping. 
To achieve success, change agents must in any case 
(beyond their powers and willingness to reform) be able 
to plausibly call attention to the limits of the estab­
lished social concept (in this case an economic structure 
that depends largely on the use of fossil energy carriers, 
i. e. a high­carbon economy, and have appealing guid­
ing principles at their disposal (narratives) to serve as 
guidelines the social change. This study intends to con­
tribute to such a narrative for the Great Transformation 
towards sustainability. 
Recent research in the fields of behavioural econom­
ics (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009), evolutionary anthro­
pology (Dunbar, 2010), political economy (Ostrom and 
Walker, 2003), or on ‘Actor­oriented Institutionalism’ 
(Mayntz, 2002) concur with regard to the importance 
of widely accepted narratives to guide the activities of 
actors. Narratives reduce complexity, create a basis for 
current and future­oriented action plans, are a foun­
dation for the co­operation between actors, and sup­
port reliability of expectations. Over the past two hun­
dred years, the prevailing narrative shared by all eco­
nomic systems has been a model of prosperity based 
on the unlimited availability of fossil fuels and other 
resources. What is needed now is a new ‘storyline’ to 
further develop human civilisation as well as the terms 
‘modernisation’ and ‘development’. That is easier said 
than done. Because John Maynard Keynes (1883–
1946) was probably quite correct when he surmised: 
‘The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas 
as in escaping from old ones.’
Without changed narratives, guiding principles or 
meta­narrations which will redefine the future of econ­
omy and society, there can be no shaping of the Great 
Transformation. In essence, this identifies two impor­
tant elements for shaping the transition towards a low­
carbon global economy (change agents and narratives) 
referred to in more detail later (Chapters 4, 5, 6). 
3.2
The ‘Global Metamorphoses in the 19th and  
21st Century’: Four Central Arenas for the 
Transformation
In his 1,500 page treatise ‘Verwandlung der Welt – 
Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts’ (‘Global Met­
amorphosis – a History of the 19th Century’, 2009), 
the historian Osterhammel describes the great transfor­
mation which led to the industrial society. He analyses 
the period from 1770 to the 20th century. Instead of a 
transformation, he refers to the phase of intense change 
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from agricultural to industrial societies he observes in 
‘the five or six decades around 1800’, which he vari­
ously refers to as the ‘Schwellenjahrzehnte’ ­ the dec­
ades of emergence, the ‘Epochenwandel’ ­ a time of 
epochal transition, ‘Sattelzeit’ ­ a time of historical dis­
continuity ­ or ‘Wendezeit’, the turning point (Oster­
hammel, 2009). It is interesting that he describes the 
characteristics of epochal change much like Grin et al. 
(2010) do. Osterhammel also concludes that great 
epochal transitions leading to a ‘global metamorpho­
sis’ last several decades. In these phases of ‘Übergänge’ 
and ‘Zäsuren’ (transitory and incisive change), eco­
nomic, cultural and social, but also ecological processes 
progressing at different speeds (Braudel, 1958) become 
more concentrated to gel into transformative dynam­
ics, influenced by a great number of actor groups which 
ultimately, albeit with potentially differing intentions, 
advance the change into a specific direction (Osterham­
mel, 2009).
History therefore knows no clearly definable tem­
poral evolutionary tipping points heralding an epochal 
change. Historical waves and comprehensive transfor­
mations are actually the result of ‘Häufigkeitsverdich­
tungen von Veränderungen’, ‘a concurrence of multi­
ple changes, which can either be an ongoing progress, 
or take place with interruptions; they can occur either 
additively or cumulatively, either reversibly or irrevers­
ibly, either at a steady, or an unsteady pace’ (Oster­
hammel, 2009, ad hoc translation by the WBGU). Only 
ex­post analysis reveals whether an epochal change, as 
in this event from the era of agricultural to the era of 
industrial societies (Box 3.2­1) has taken place. 
The non­linearity of far reaching social transfor­
mations becomes particularly apparent in the non­
parallelism between the history of ideas and the real 
political changes. A look at history shows that consid­
erable time passes before radical ideas and new guid­
ing principles permeate societies to ultimately lead to 
great changes. John Locke (1632–1704) argued for 
Enlightenment and Reason for the entire second half of 
the 17th century. French philosopher René Descartes 
(1596–1650) established French rationalism expanded 
later by Voltaire (1694–1778) and Rousseau (1712–
1778). Kant’s famous essay ‘An Answer to the Ques­
tion: What is Enlightenment?’, in which he demanded 
‘man’s emergence from his self­imposed immaturity’, 
was published in 1784. Whilst the philosophers of the 
Age of Enlightenment advocated liberty, reason and the 
‘welfare of humanity’, and ‘preconceived’ democratic 
societies, their own were still dominated by the coun­
ter­enlightenment philosophies propagated by either 
the Catholic or the Protestant Church, depending on 
locality. In either case, they were living a life still far 
removed from the new ideals of the Enlightenment. For 
a remarkably long time, the advocates of Enlighten­
ment themselves adhered to some established concepts 
of restriction of liberties. Only a minority of the great 
European philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment, 
including Adam Smith and Rousseau, protested against 
the slavery practised primarily by the colonial powers, 
and the transatlantic slave trade which peaked in the 
second half of the 18th century. Initially, this ‘human­
ity’, whose liberty the Enlightenment philosophers 
advocated, did certainly not include all of humankind 
(Winkler, 2009; Section 3.5.1).
Moreover, Osterhammel’s reconstruction of the glo­
bal ‘metamorphosis’ during the 19th century under­
lines that there were four transformation arenas of 
paramount importance for the epochal change into an 
industrialised society. These transformation arenas of 
the most recent major epochal shifts also have a cen­
tral bearing on the 21st century’s Great Transformation. 
Civilisation’s last great leap, into an industrial society, 
was based on an overlapping and the concentration of 
far reaching change processes with regard to
 > the energy basis for economy and society,
 > the significance of time for the economy, and in soci­
ety,
 > communication, knowledge and logistics infrastruc­
tures,
 > power transformation and social change. 
An outline illustrating Osterhammel’s findings on the 
global transition in the 19th century aids better under­
standing of current transformation processes.
The Energy Transformation in the 19th Century – 
Basis for the Industrial Revolution
Any form of economic activity requires an energy sup­
ply. A lack of access to affordable energy is one of the 
most dangerous straits societies can experience. The 
process of industrialisation was above all an energy 
regime change (Sieferle et al., 2006; Figure  3.2­1). 
Until the late 18th century, pre­industrial societies 
were based on a limited range of energy sources other 
than manpower. Water, wind, firewood, peat and beasts 
of burden limited the economies’ productive capacity 
and ability to expand (Figure 3.2­1). The worry that 
energy availability might not keep pace with popu­
lation growth was ever­present. The ‘Malthus Con­
troversy’, instigated by his ‘Essay on the Principle of 
Population’ (Malthus, 1798), testified to these wor­
ries, and became embedded in the historical memory of 
many generations (Figure 3.2­2). 
Around 1780, all global societies depended on the 
use of energy from biomass. A good century later, at the 
beginning of the 20th century, the world was divided 
into a small group of industrialised countries, where the 
expansion of infrastructures for the use of fossil energy 
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carriers had succeeded, and a majority of nations which 
were forced to continue to rely on traditional energy 
sources. The energy regime changeover in these indus­
trialised countries was by no means sudden. The ‘era of 
fossil fuels’ (Osterhammel, 2009) commenced around 
1820. During this phase, the per capita income, previ­
ously stagnant over a long period, also grew. The sub­
stitution of animal and human muscle power and wood 
and peat with energy stored in a fossil fuel (coal) revo­
lutionised the economy (Box 3.2­1). 
Coal drove steam engines, ships and railways, and 
catapulted the industrialising societies into an era of 
interconnectedness, acceleration and national integra­
tion. As late as the middle of the 19th century, coal 
provided only a small, but steadily rising amount of 
the energy used, even in Europe. The history of crude 
oil began in Pennsylvania in 1859, when it was first 
extracted commercially. It took around seven decades 
for mineral fuels (coal and oil) to overtake biomass in 
global economic importance, even though the majority 
of the global population remained reliant on traditional 
energy carriers by the end of the 19th century. Japan 
represents an interesting case of catch­up, learning, 
copying and accelerated fossil development. In 1860, 
Japan still lagged many decades behind Great Britain in 
terms of energy technology. By 1900, however, it had 
completely caught up.
The predominance of a fossil energy regime (partic­
ularly in Great Britain, Germany and the USA) since the 
1880s led to a second generation of industrial innova­
Figure 3.2-2
Global population growth in 
the wake of the transitions 
from hunter and gatherer 
to agricultural society, 
and from agricultural to 
industrialised society, from 
approx. 1 million people to 
several billion.
Source: Kates, 1996
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Growing energy input in 
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Box 3.2-1
The Industrial Revolution
The Industrial Revolution is a complex process of economic 
and social remodelling of pre­industrial societies which ini­
tially took place on the British mainland (Osterhammel, 
2009). From England, the process of industrialisation spread 
to the European continent during the course of the 19th cen­
tury (Belgium, Switzerland, France, Germany, Russia, Italy), 
and to North America and Japan. In China and India, and 
Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Mexico, the required precondi­
tions for industrialisation were not developed for political 
reasons (Osterhammel, 2009). According to Sieferle’s inter­
pretation (2010), the Industrial Revolution started in Great 
Britain because, in comparison with Asia, Europe was not 
such an established agrarian society, and political competi­
tiveness between the individual countries was high. In the 
wake of the Industrial Revolution and industrialisation, ener­
gy system and source were chosen according to the resources 
available in each respective country.
Energy became the central leitmotif of the 19th century. 
In all of the newly industrialising countries, biomass, man­
power and animal power were gradually replaced by fossil 
energy carriers in combination with new technologies (steam 
engine, railway, car, tractor). Initially, coal was the primary 
source, later joined by oil and gas, hydropower and electricity 
(Osterhammel, 2009; Sieferle, 2010). Agricultural capacities 
were released through the increased cultivation of food, rath­
er than feedstock, and the reduction in forestry. The conver­
sion of the economy and the energy system was a long­term 
evolutionary process, accompanied by modifications to exist­
ing institutions and labour structures. Communication, tech­
nology transfer – including non­licensed imitation, industrial 
espionage and international trade all played a major role in 
diffusing industrialisation.
In contrast to the latecomers in the second half of the 18th 
century, conditions in Britain were particularly favourable for 
the Industrial Revolution: a unified country and coherent, 
centralised government, civil peace, short and cheap trans­
port routes and, thanks to the colonies, an abundance of nat­
ural resources at its disposal, and an extended economic area. 
Precision engineering and tool making skills, an avid interest 
in innovations, a general spirit of free enterprise and a liberal 
economic structure were also conducive factors advancing the 
Industrial Revolution (Meyerhoff and Petschow, 1996; Berg, 
2008; Holst and Fischer, 2008; Otto, 2008; Osterhammel, 
2009; Sieferle, 2010).
Moreover, in the run up to the Industrial Revolution, there 
had been some changes in Britain which strengthened the 
concept of private property – for example the introduction 
of patent law – and lent support to innovative agricultural 
production methods, releasing manpower (Otto, 2008). Even 
in the 18th century, Britain’s economic growth outstripped 
population growth, which contributed as much to the emer­
gence of a middle class as to domestic demand for superior 
quality goods. Mass production – later automated – allowed 
these products to be cheaply manufactured and sold (Oster­
hammel, 2009; Sieferle, 2010). Furthermore, an intellectual 
elite started to emerge, and there was a high degree of will­
ingness on the part of the wealthy to invest in new ideas and 
technologies (Sieferle, 2010). With the industrialisation, cit­
ies grew and developed, aiding the diffusion of socio­techni­
cal innovations and innovation processes. At the same time, 
there was a general awareness of living in a new epoch, pro­
moting open­mindedness for innovations and experiments.
Continental Europe (particularly Belgium, Switzerland, 
France, Germany, Russia), North America and Japan did not 
enjoy Britain’s favourable conditions, or only to a limited 
extent; however, these were gradually created during the 
course of the 19th century through a high level of interven­
tion on the part of the emerging nation states. Each of these 
countries therefore followed its own development path. There 
were also individual actors in these nations, such as business­
men, scientists, advisors or politicians who, inspired by the 
developments in England, strived for a comparable indus­
trialisation and economic system (Meyerhoff and Petschow, 
1996; Bischoff, 2008; Osterhammel, 2009).
In Germany, for example, a government­steered, fast 
catch­up industrialisation process took place soon after the 
founding of the German Reich in 1871 (Box 3.2­2). This 
included the creation of new institutions, for example tech­
nical universities, and the abolition of others, for example 
the guild system. This allowed Germany to soon outperform 
England in the heavy industry, mechanical engineering and 
chemicals production sectors. At the dawn of the 20th cen­
tury, countries such as the USA and Germany contributed 
significantly to the global diffusion of industrialisation with 
their inventions, the labour organisation structures they had 
devised, and their international trade activities (Osterham­
mel, 2009).
Not least, the Industrial Revolution and widespread indus­
trialisation are also so significant because for the first time 
they allowed humankind emancipation from the energy basis 
and resource ‘land’, and to increase productivity (Sieferle, 
2010). Necessary preconditions were a functioning system of 
law and order, land reforms, investment in human resources, 
skilled labour, access to natural resources, sufficient capital 
and a willingness to embrace progress, as reflected by the 
new intellectual elite’s common world vision and the emerg­
ing spirit of enterprise (Osterhammel, 2009; Sieferle, 2010). 
For the first time ever, humankind succeeded in maintaining 
the momentum of a sudden wave of innovation.
The Industrial Revolution shows that pioneering processes 
require political framework conditions. Pioneering processes 
include investments, innovative actors and a common guiding 
principle or world view. Suitable framework conditions 
include a liberal economic structure and the institutionalised 
collaboration of government, commercial enterprise, and sci­
ence. However, industrialisation is by no means the only path 
to economic growth. Countries such as, for example, the 
Netherlands, Canada, Australia or Argentina adopted new 
technologies and labour organisation structures and turned 
from agricultural societies into modern commercial and serv­
ice economies without any particular industrialisation efforts 
(Osterhammel, 2009).
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tions that were based on the new energy carriers: elec­
tricity (light bulb, electric engines, power plant tech­
nologies), chemicals and the automobile. The energy 
revolution therefore triggered a complex, self­con­
tained innovation cycle. This was accompanied by other 
innovations, such as radio transmission (1895) and cin­
ematography (1895). 
The transition into the ‘fossil energy century’ was 
not only a process of economic­technical transfor­
mation. Energy became a ‘cultural Leitmotiv’ (Oster­
hammel, 2009). The links between science and indus­
try became closer, and the age of large­scale indus­
trial research began (Boxes 3.2­1,  3.6­1). The scien­
tific organisations ‘invented the method of invention’ 
(Alfred North Whitehead, from Osterhammel, 2009). 
Commercially successful inventors such as Werner Sie­
mens, who discovered the electrodynamic principle in 
1866, and Thomas Alva Edison, who investigated elec­
tricity generation and distribution, helped to shape the 
founding years in Germany’s Wilhelminian era. Fossil 
energy carriers completely altered the way human­
kind saw the world, as people were no longer forced to 
depend on elemental natural forces, particularly in the 
form of fire. By way of the steam engine, fossil fuels 
released previously unimaginable forces and applica­
tion possibilities, increased the productivity of man­
power in the emerging industry and in agriculture, and, 
thanks to the railway, allowed acceleration and geo­
graphical interconnectedness. 
These changes also affected business sciences and 
economics. In the middle of the 19th century, Karl 
Marx referred to industrialism and capitalism as new 
social structures; in 1848, John Stuart Mill outlined 
the various approaches of traditional political economy 
in his comprehensive synthesis ‘Principles of Political 
Economy’, which became the analytical foundation for 
an economy in which industry was replacing agricul­
ture as the leading sector. These changes also resonated 
in art and philosophy. Around 1830, the heyday of 
philosophical idealism and romanticism in European, in 
particular French, German and English literature, came 
to an end. European painting underwent a transition 
towards realism. 
Over the first decades of the 19th century, the fos­
sil transformation led to the epoch of industrialism, 
which dramatically changed the global power balance. 
Until well into the 17th century, various empires had 
co­existed and competed with each other without the 
emergence of any clear superiority structures. The 
European colonial powers (such as Spain, England, the 
Netherlands), China, the Ottoman Empire and India 
were all on a par in terms of society, economy and sci­
ence. The fossil revolution defined the West as the cen­
tre of this newly emerging industrial global economy.
Industrialism’s New Time Regime 
Industrialism was accompanied by, and based on, a rev­
olution of the meaning of ‘time’, and its uniformity. At 
the beginning of the 19th century, no country in the 
world knew the synchronisation of time signals beyond 
city limits. Towards the end of the century, at the Inter­
national Meridian Conference in Washington in 1884, 
25 nations agreed to adopt a standard world time. This 
‘time reform’ (Osterhammel, 2009) made the alignment 
of railway and shipping, and later also air traffic, time­
tables possible, and served as the foundation for inter­
national commercial transactions and business. The 
fossil age therefore fundamentally changed people’s 
rhythm of life, and the way time was perceived. Elec­
trification meant that a day was no longer defined by 
sunrise and sunset. Technology allowed the synchroni­
sation of clocks, heralding the age of timetables, timed 
intervals and the acceleration of operating procedures. 
It may sound trivial to highlight the acceleration of pro­
cesses and mobility as one of the characteristics of the 
great industrial transformation; however, ‘the impact 
this experience had on historical development cannot 
be overestimated, as it meant that, for the first time in 
human history, it was possible to move from place to 
place faster and more reliably than on horseback, and 
independently of favourable winds on sea.’ (Osterham­
mel, 2009, ad hoc translation by the WBGU). Together 
with advancing enlightenment and the improvement of 
hygienic conditions, and the subsequent increase in life 
expectation, both present and future took on another 
meaning altogether for people – industrialism therefore 
opened up completely new horizons of time. Industrial 
modernity also hailed a departure into the future. 
Creation of Networked Infrastructures
The linking of geographical spaces and the creation 
of the basic infrastructures of the industrial age took 
place during the first half of the 19th century. In 1883, 
Friedrich List drew up a railway network, a rather dar­
ing vision of the future at the time, as no country in 
the world had anything like a railway network before 
1850. Since the 1870s, it has become possible to cir­
cumnavigate the world north of the equator solely with 
steam­powered modes of transport, without resort­
ing to horses, camels, bearers or own muscle power – 
even though only very few people were in a position to 
explore these new possibilities, so vividly described by 
Jules Verne in his ‘Around the World In Eighty Days’ 
(1872). 
The third quarter of the 19th century also marked 
the beginning of a world linked by cables, allowing 
communication over long distances for the first time in 
history. For a number of decades, the telegram was the 
cheapest ‘long distance communication medium’. The 
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telephone’s triumphant progress began in 1877/1879 
with the establishment of communal exchanges in New 
York and Paris. However, for several decades, the tel­
ephone initially allowed only local communication. 
Gradually, private households and companies were con­
nected to the new networked infrastructures for water, 
gas and electricity – the birth of utility grids. It was 
only these infrastructures which allowed the gradual 
emergence of the modern forms of economy through 
interconnected cities, trade routes and knowledge sys­
tems. As comparatively recently as the early 20th cen­
tury, only a small minority of the global population had 
access to these technical systems.
During the course of the development of technical 
infrastructures and the linking of people, companies, 
cities and economic regions which, alongside the new 
perception of time, also led to an altered perception of 
geographical distances, there also emerged regulatory 
systems, legal dimensions and bureaucracies to stabilise 
these interactions. The epoch of nation states is closely 
bound to the transformations in the course of the tran­
sition to industrialism. 
Power Shifts and Social Change
The upheaval of industrialisation also altered the social 
and political structures of societies. These dimensions of 
the transformation have been described by authors as 
varied as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Karl Polanyi and Max 
Weber. The downfall of the centuries­old institution of 
aristocracy, still the mainstay of all societies in the 18th 
century, coincided with the rise of industrial societies. 
These social minorities in whose hands the means of all 
economic and social power lay, who viewed their priv­
ileges as a god­given right, who owned all economic 
resources of the pre­industrial societies (manpower and 
land) whilst despising any kind of physical and menial 
work themselves, were not capable of stopping the 
technical, institutional and normative innovations (for 
Box 3.2-2
Drivers accelerating the Transformation Example: 
Germany's Wilhelminian Period
The four major transformation arenas outlined in Section 3.2 
– energy basis, temporal perception, infrastructures and 
social change – allow the systematic analysis of great trans­
formations, as elaborated with regard to the Industrial Revo­
lution. Fundamental change processes must be initiated in 
these areas to achieve sufficient acceleration and appropriate 
extent of the transformation process. Important transforma­
tion­accelerating drivers can be identified using the example 
of Germany’s Wilhelminian period at the end of the 19th cen­
tury; their interaction made the country’s economy the most 
dynamic in the world at that point in time.
Key to this comprehensive transformation process were 
not least the close links between invention, innovation and 
diffusion processes to allow positive feedback loops and 
accelerate the dynamics of the transition process. Three inter­
connected factors were of major significance; together, they 
formed a ‘golden triangle’ for innovation processes: firstly, 
the building up of scientific­technical capacities in universi­
ties and scientific research institutions in conjunction with 
the qualification of skilled professionals; secondly, the emer­
gence of the ‘industries of tomorrow’ (or an even longer­term 
perspective), for example first uses for the then new energy 
carrier electricity, or a rapidly growing traffic and transport 
sector, and their commercial exploitation by companies such 
as, for instance, AEG and Borsig; thirdly, high net invest­
ment quotas, allowing a rapid diffusion of innovations. The 
net investment quota in Germany rose from almost 10% in 
1850 to over 15 % at the peak of the Wilhelminian  period 
(Hoffmann, 1965), i. e. three times greater than today’s 
( Section 4.5). The state played a central role (Figure 3.2­3), 
above all by supporting capacity building efforts through 
the establishment of scientific research institutions; it also 
created favourable framework conditions for private entre­
preneurs, which allowed rapid expansion into new business 
sectors (Box 3.2­1).
However, the transformation process progressed not just 
exclusively in the area of new technical solutions, but in line 
with the four transformation arenas also in social terms. 
 Particularly the emergence and increased prosperity of the 
middle classes had a great impact, as it advanced the transfor­
mation process and also inspired new cultural ideas. To under­
stand the demands of the transformation today, the elements 
of this ‘golden triangle’ of favourable conditions for innova­
tion processes continue to provide important points of refer­
ence for government action. However, the changed frame­
work conditions, and some additional factors, must be taken 
into account – above all the international dimension and the 
legitimisation of decision­making. Chapter 7 gathers these 
elements and extends the ‘golden triangle’ for innovation 
processes to the ‘transformation rhombus’ (Figure 7.1­3).
Figure 3.2-3
Elements of the transformative surge of innovations during 
the Wilhelminian period in Germany.
Source: WBGU
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example the French Revolution’s basic concept of the 
equality of all men) that took place during the tran­
sition into an industrialised society, neither were they 
capable of slowing them down, or even exploiting them 
for their own purposes. The Industrial Revolution also 
changed global power structures, as it led to the tri­
umphing of Western societies. Until that time, the var­
ious ‘superpowers’ (China, India, the Ottoman Empire, 
Spain, England, the Netherlands) had been at a more or 
less equal stage of socio­economic development. 
Lessons for the Great Transformation at the  
Beginning of the 21st Century
The outlined blurring of boundaries and profound inci­
sions in and between the four fields of action during the 
course of the global ‘metamorphosis’ in the 19th cen­
tury represents an interesting backdrop for the descrip­
tion of the dynamics of the current transformation. The 
four action fields described are again central to the 
upheaval. They differ fundamentally only in terms of 
direction and quality of the transition:
1. Energy basis: a central element of the low­carbon 
transformation is the expansion of a largely renew­
able energy infrastructure, and a leaving behind of 
the ‘fossil age’ (Chapter 4). Like the transition into 
an industrial society, this process will lead to a rad­
ically changed economic structure. 
2. Changed ‘time regime’: on the one hand, economic, 
political and institutional change processes must be 
vastly accelerated during the transition into a cli­
mate­friendly society, in order to still manage to 
avoid irreversible damages to the Earth system, and 
dangerous climate change (Chapters 1, 4, 5). How­
ever, accelerated change in complex societies, which 
are interconnected to a high degree and distin­
guished by the division of powers and control, with 
difficult to grasp, interlinked interests (‘checks and 
balances’) is no mere triviality. The same applies to 
the international negotiation system. On the other 
hand, people, companies and political organisations 
will have to learn to apply a long­term perspective 
to their actions, to take on responsibilities and prac­
tise preventative instead of reactive problem solv­
ing, because the decisions which are taken today 
(for example continuing along a fossil development 
path) will show their effects for many decades (for 
instance sub­regional water shortages), centuries 
(for example the melting of large­scale ice sheets) or 
even thousands of years to come (such as the sea­
level rise). Our societies’ social, economic and polit­
ical institutions, and possibly also people’s cognitive 
and normative capabilities, have as yet not adapted 
to these challenges. Just as during the transition to 
the industrial society, profound cultural changes are 
also imminent today (Chapters 2, 6).
3. New basic infrastructures as a foundation for the 
low-carbon society: just as central to the low­carbon 
transformation as it was to the Industrial Revolution 
is the energy supply. However, analysis of the cen­
tral action fields for the transformation into a low­
carbon society makes it clear that the three main 
infrastructures of national economies and societies, 
and the global economy as such, must be redirected 
towards the goal of decarbonisation (Chapter  4). 
Apart from the energy system, this also applies to 
urban spaces on a global level, as these contrib­
ute significantly to greenhouse gas emissions, and 
will continue to grow over the coming decades, as 
the number of city dwellers will roughly double by 
2050, from 3 to 6 billion (Chapter 1). On the other 
hand, the Great Transformation can only succeed 
if concurrently, emissions from traditional forms 
of land use (deforestation; agricultural greenhouse 
gas emissions) are also radically reduced. Whether 
we can successfully create a climate­friendly soci­
ety therefore stands and falls within three trans­
formation fields: energy systems trend reversal; cli­
mate­friendly shaping of the currently accelerat­
ing urbanisation, and climate­compatible land use 
(Chapters 4, 5, 6, 8). 
4. Social change and power shifts: just as during the 
transition into an industrial society, the break 
with the old­established required by the low­car­
bon transformation is blocked by impeding actors 
defending their traditional privileges and roles; 
there are those with something to lose from the 
transformation, and those with something to gain. 
Industries based on the use of fossil energy carri­
ers will lose their competitive advantages, low­car­
bon and resource compatible innovations will create 
new industries, the established hierarchies between 
universities and research institutions will change, 
new social guiding principles and narratives will 
gain the upper hand. The transformation is accom­
panied by a comprehensive social change marked 
by conflicts between the old and the new devel­
opment paradigm, and their respective diverging 
interests (Chapters 2, 6). Furthermore, global power 
constellations will change. China, India, Brazil and 
other rising economies will be the new global eco­
nomic centres. The western industrialised societies 
cannot manage the transformation towards a low­
carbon global economy by themselves, even if they 
attempted to do so with all their might. The crea­
tion of a low­carbon global economy is conceiva­
ble only if the new powers share this development 
path, or, even better, if they turn into forces driving 
the transformation. After all, global social changes 
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will affect the normative armamentarium of all soci­
eties. Just as the Enlightenment paved the way for, 
and had a huge influence on, industrialisation and 
democracy, this contemporary issue is about reach­
ing an unparalleled level of global cooperation, and 
international fairness, because the transformation 
must take place within such a tight timeframe. Ulti­
mately, it is also about reviewing the relationship 
between humankind and nature. The low­carbon 
transformation is therefore not only an economic 
and technological process; on the contrary, it also 
necessitates a normative reorientation and cultural 
learning processes. 
In comparison with the ‘global metamorphosis’ in the 
19th century, the Great Transformation is distinguished 
by three additional peculiarities:
Firstly, the fact that the industrial society achieved 
predominance as the norm was an evolutionary pro­
cess, for which there was no ‘master plan’. The trans­
formation into a sustainable society, on the other hand, 
must occur intentionally and under time pressure, to 
achieve a trend reversal towards a climate­friendly and 
resource efficient society. There will be no sustainabil­
ity turnaround without major, strategically targeted 
efforts by policy­makers, social actors and economy. 
This is the first great transformation in the history of 
humankind that has to be consciously effected on the 
strength of politics and policies. 
Secondly, the Great Transformation must take place 
at a global level, and be embraced by industrialised, 
newly industrialising and even poor developing coun­
tries as otherwise, dangerous climate change cannot be 
avoided. The Industrial Revolution initially took place 
in only a few countries, it also took more than a cen­
tury for it to become an (almost) global phenomenon. 
Now, the course towards a sustainable global economy 
must be set within a very short time in order to pro­
vide prosperity, stability and security within the plan­
etary boundaries for as many people as possible. This 
requires an unprecedented level of global cooperation.
Thirdly, the narrative, the guiding principles of social 
development, must undergo some radical changes. 
Although the core ideas of the Enlightenment can, on 
the one hand, serve as inspiration, for example that rea­
son, a sense of responsibility and consideration of other 
people’s interests guide all our actions, it must also be 
generally accepted that now, the planetary bounda­
ries must serve as the starting point of all social devel­
opment and prosperity increase (re­embedding). The 
primary motive of the era of industrialisation, on the 
other hand, was the overcoming of the boundaries set 
by nature (dis­embedding). This is not a petition for a 
romantic return to nature, and not an outright rejection 
of technological solutions for humankind’s future chal­
lenges. However, whichever development path is cho­
sen, it must take the boundaries of the global ecosys­
tems into account – as otherwise, the Earth could well 
become a barren and unsafe place in the course of the 
21st century. 
Crutzen and Schwägerl (2010) have succinctly 
made this paradigm change quite clear: ‘For millennia, 
humans have behaved as rebels against a superpower 
we call ‘Nature.’ In the 20th century, however, new 
technologies, fossil fuels, and a fast­growing popula­
tion resulted in a ‘Great Acceleration’ of our own pow­
ers. Albeit clumsily, we are taking control of Nature’s 
realm, from climate to DNA (...) We now live in ‘human 
systems with natural ecosystems embedded within 
them.’ Long­held barriers between nature and cul­
ture are breaking down... (...) It’s no longer ‘us against 
Nature’. Instead, it’s we who decide what nature is and 
what it will be. (...) Living in the anthropocene stresses 
the enormity of humanity’s responsibility as stewards 
of the Earth. (...) Imagine our descendants in the year 
2200 or 2500. They might liken us to aliens who have 
treated the Earth as if it were a mere stopover for refu­
elling, or even worse, characterize us as barbarians who 
would ransack their own home. (...) Remember, in this 
new era, nature is us.’
Following this core thought of the emergence of an 
entirely new epoch, the anthropocene, not only pro­
duction and consumption patterns, but also incentive 
schemes, institutions, normative maxims, and scientific 
disciplines will have to change (above all the economic 
sciences).
These three specific characteristics of the Great 
Transformation indicate that humankind  is facing an 
evolutionary leap for civilisation (as it did during the 
transition into industrial societies) if the radical change 
into a low­carbon society is to succeed: it must prove 
that it is capable of shaping and directing this major 
upheaval, and this can only be achieved on the basis 
of thinking and acting with an extremely long­term 
perspective in mind; it must leave the epoch of nation 
states behind and foster an unprecedented culture of 
global cooperation; it must also forge a sustainable and 
legitimised narrative which will serve prosperity, secur­
ity, liberty and fairness in a global society of soon­to­be 
9 billion people, and which will accept the limitations of 
the Earth’s ecosystems. 
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3.3
Stages of the Great Transformation –  
Where are We? 
Grin et al. (2010) illustrate the various stages of a trans­
formation by means of a simple S­curve (Figure 3.3­1). 
Their multi­stage concept helps to describe the basic pat­
tern of transformative change. Transformation progress 
is determined through the pace of the changes, the 
scale of transformation, and the stages of the transfor­
mation process. Applied to the transition towards a cli­
mate­friendly economy (from high­carbon to low­car­
bon economy), the following picture emerges: the tran­
sition from industrial to low­carbon society is, just like 
the change into an industrial society at the beginning of 
the 19th century, not a rapid process, as the established 
economic and social model is initially stable, legitimised 
through successes in terms of prosperity, and therefore 
resistant to change. However, since the 1970s critical, at 
first marginalised, voices have been raised, questioning 
the sustainability of the established model ( Meadows 
et al., 1972). So, before the accelerated transitional 
stage commenced (roughly since the beginning of the 
21st century), within the scope of the previous model, 
the dynamics of change already became apparent (pre­
liminaries include the establishment of ministries for 
the environment in many countries, environmentally­
oriented movements emerge, Brundtland Report 1987; 
Chapter 2). Taking this perspective, the transformation 
towards sustainability already started around four dec­
ades ago, with changes that were initially incremental. 
The change from the acceleration of the transitional 
stage (start phase) to a new social and economic bal­
ance and a low­carbon and resource efficient economy 
will probably take another two decades. This phase is 
not marked by linear change processes, but by difficult 
restructuring processes, by the necessity of more rapid 
and widespread reforms to overcome path dependen­
cies, by chaotic and uncertain changes, and dynamics in 
different action fields which can trigger positive, as well 
as negative, feedback loops. The steep progress of the 
curve (Figure 3.3­1) symbolises that this major break 
must be achieved in spite of a great number of block­
ade mechanisms and forces doggedly clinging onto the 
status quo. 
Today, the European economies are in the thrall of 
this difficult acceleration process. Now, the right course 
towards sustainability must be set within the next 10 
years. This situation can be compared to the 1830s to 
1840s of the industrialisation, during which period the 
new energy system slowly spread, its progress accom­
panied by innovations, although these dynamics had 
only spread to some part of economy and society 
(Box 3.2­1). Box 3.3­1 also shows that the transition to 
a new balance can also lead to failure. During the accel­
eration process, the risk of lock­in patterns is high. The 
energy efficiency of vehicles is improved, however, it is 
concurrently overcompensated by the even faster grow­
ing number of cars (rebound effect, Box 4.3­1); states 
agree the reduction of greenhouse gases and other 
‘green reforms’, however, far below the level required 
to avoid dangerous climate change (Section  7.3.9.1); 
renewable energies become more important, however, 
they only serve to complement the still dominant fossil 
energy carriers, not to replace them, This lock­in path 
leads to a ‘3–4 °C world’ (Figure 7.1­2).
Europe and the global economy are currently at 
this critical point. Things have already started to move 
towards low­carbon development; nevertheless, the 
danger that the current dynamics between the forces of 
change and the forces of dogged insistence on the sta­
tus quo will ultimately end in lock­in paths is very high. 
It is even conceivable that despite the fact that tenden­
cies towards a transformation in favour of sustainabil­
ity have already progressed for some time, there could 
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be some serious setbacks. The USA, for example, might 
reject the low­carbon change on principle, or the major­
ity of the most populous, and currently rapidly grow­
ing, newly industrialising countries (China, India, South 
Africa, Indonesia) that have their own coal reserves 
might decide to continue to use these, thus seriously 
impeding the transition towards a low­carbon society. 
Chapters 4 and 6 empirically examine the elaborated 
transformation progress in more detail, before the sub­
sequent introduction of recommendations for a suc­
cessful transformation process in Chapter 7.
3.4
The Great Transformation’s Action Levels – Why 
this Epochal Change can be Shaped
Grin et al. (2010) propose a multi­level analysis 
approach, as this helps to take the complexities, multi­
tiered nature and non­concurrency of the transforma­
tion process (co­evolution) into account whilst also 
making them considerably simpler. The authors dif­
ferentiate between three initially independent action 
levels which nevertheless impact each other in turn 
(megatrends, socio­technical regime, niche level; 
 Figure  3.4­1). Changes and the dynamic movement 
between and within these action levels create scope for 
transformation. This can at any given time be extremely 
minor or major in a country (region, sector).
At the centre is the established socio­technical 
regime; in our case a global economy based on the use 
of fossil energy carriers. It creates a system consist­
ing of technologies, policies and institutions, economic 
sectors, culture and science. As long as this established 
system is stable, legitimised and economically as well 
as politically attractive, any change towards low­carbon 
seems unlikely. At grassroots level, niches and change 
agents appear: climate­protection oriented entrepre­
neurs, scientists, architects, NGO members, journalists 
or change agents in ministries and international organ­
isations (Chapter 6). The more marginal and smaller 
these pioneering groups, the less likely a low­carbon 
transformation. Transformative change is not possible 
without change agents. In Europe, the group of ‘climate 
pioneers’ has steadily grown over the past four dec­
ades; it has already had an impact outside of its niche, 
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thereby starting to change established regimes. They 
are no longer merely actors at the margins of the estab­
lished climate­damaging system, but have also perme­
ated the established economic structures, although the 
tipping point of system transformation has not been 
reached as yet: environmentally­oriented industry sec­
tors have already emerged, as have, for example, the 
European emissions trading scheme, and feed­in tariffs 
for renewable energies. The discourse on low­carbon 
development has ceased to be limited to outsiders; it is 
now almost as accepted as the established growth path, 
and has possibly already been accorded a higher degree 
of normative legitimation than the established growth 
paradigm. The dynamics at change agent level are there­
fore lively, which also implies that the old development 
model is no longer stable and hermetic, but that it is 
gradually being confronted with the pressure to adapt 
(Chapter 6). This opens a window of opportunity to 
truly alter the development path, by promoting these 
‘pioneers of change’. This process is analysed in Chap­
ters 2 (normative reorientation), 4 (core innovations for 
low­carbon development), 5 (political and institutional 
change processes), and 6 (change agents).
Besides the two levels for action outlined, mega­
trends exist, which are difficult to influence but may 
either impede or promote the transformation process: 
self­contained technological dynamics and inventions, 
global power shifts, wars or major disasters (Cherno­
byl, Fukushima, global financial crisis). The multipo­
lar power blockades could be interpreted as one of 
these megatrends, considerably hindering international 
cooperation (for example with regard to the enforce­
ment of an effective international climate regime). The 
internet and other communication technologies, on the 
other hand, allow the spreading of knowledge and the 
organisation of international learning processes at a 
pace that is unprecedented in the history of human­
kind. This could make the low­carbon transformation 
less difficult. 
Central global trends impeding a low­carbon rans­
formation (dynamic urbanisation processes; easy avail­
ability of fossil energy carriers in rapidly growing and 
populous newly industrialising countries; multipolar 
power blockades hindering international cooperation) 
were identified in Chapter 1; Chapter 2 elaborates the 
fundamental normative change processes that tend 
to favour a transformation; Chapter 4 illustrates that 
the technological developments make the clean break 
towards sustainability possible. 
In addition, ‘shocks’ can also be generated at macro­
level, significantly influencing the direction and pace 
of the transformation process. The Fukushima reactor 
accident in March 2011 and the subsequent, in part 
radical reassessment of the risks of nuclear energy is 
a drastic example of such a shock. However, even less 
dramatic shocks can have a far reaching impact on the 
transformation. For instance, if any of the rapidly grow­
ing newly industrialising countries were to discover fur­
ther crude oil deposits in the next few years (as has 
recently happened in Brazil), this kind of ‘exogenous 
shock’ could seriously impede the low­carbon trans­
formation. On the other hand, if serious climatic crises 
(such as increased frequency of weather extremes with 
unusually high levels of destructiveness) were to occur 
in the coming years and not at some remote point in 
time in the future, this could accelerate the transfor­
mation. A substantial reduction in the cost of renew­
able energies through technological innovations would 
increase the likelihood of climate­compatible invest­
ments. 
The multilevel model is a helpful analysis grid as a 
basis for the structured discussion of transformation 
processes. It combines systemic perspectives (transi­
tion from high­carbon to low­carbon regime) allow­
ing the consideration of path dependencies along with 
processes with more or less self­contained dynamics, 
which can be influenced, but not ‘prevented’ (urban­
isation, population growth), with an actor’s perspec­
tive, allowing the exploration of the scope for action 
(change agents). Political transformation strategies can 
learn from this: change agents in economy, policy­mak­
ing and society should receive increased support; the 
review of economic, innovation and social policies with 
respect to climate­friendliness is vital, and approaches 
for redirecting difficult to influence megatrends must 
be developed (Chapter 7).
By way of a hypothesis, it should be stated here that 
against the background of the analysis so far, the low­
carbon transformation at least appears to be possible. 
Change agents have already become a relevant group 
in many societies, and also in the economy (Chapter 6). 
The established system, largely based on the use of fos­
sil energy carriers, has already been ‘unlocked’ for sus­
tainability through various reforms. Both positive and 
negative megatrends do not seem to make a low­carbon 
transformation impossible, at least in principle. These 
dynamics will be empirically examined in more detail in 
the following chapters. 
3.5
Lessons from Contemporary History: Medium-
Range Transformations
The Neolithic and Industrial Revolutions introduced 
so far have been the only transformation processes of 
truly global dimensions. They were also, for the most 
part, not steered. The following introduces and analyses 
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six historical transformation processes with a medium­
range impact, commonly accepted as steered. They are 
intended to serve the illustration of conditions, steering 
options, and actor constellations required for the Great 
Low­Carbon Transformation. 
For ease of differentiation, the WBGU divides these 
historical transformation processes into four types: the 
abolishment of slavery and the European integration are 
examples of the type ‘vision’. The primary driver was a 
vision of a better, fairer, and more peaceful future. The 
‘Green Revolution’ and the structural adaptation pro­
grammes of the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank have been allocated to the type ‘crisis’. In 
these cases, the transformation processes were moti­
vated by the experiencing of crises (hunger and devel­
opment crisis). The treaties on ozone layer protection 
fall into the ‘knowledge’ category. An unusual aspect 
here was that irrefutable scientific proof of the fact 
that fluorochlorinated hydrocarbons are destroying the 
ozone layer had not yet been offered whilst the Mon­
treal Protocol (1982–1987) was already being negoti­
ated. The international community acted on the basis 
of theoretical assumptions in the context of correlated 
impact according to the precautionary principle (Ben­
edick, 1999). Any finally, the IT Revolution exempli­
fies the type ‘technology’. The central aspect here is 
the vast and rapid proliferation of a technical innova­
tion which, as a key technology, affects far reaching 
areas of everyday life (multi purpose technology; Grin 
et al., 2010). 
3.5.1 
Abolitionism (18th/19th century):  
Type ‘Vision’
The term abolitionism describes the social movement 
against slavery which spread around the world from 
the 18th to the early 20th century in several waves. 
Carried by ethical and religious motives, the incremen­
tal change to economic systems and societies result­
ing from abolitionism was a transformation triggered 
by a ‘vision’. As the abolitionism movement actually 
achieved the global abolition of systematic slavery, it 
can also be characterised as a transformation of uni­
versal extent.
Abolitionism evolved over more than a century from 
its initial social organisation at the end of the 18th cen­
tury into worldwide condemnation and abolition of 
slavery in the 20th century. Although from a regional 
perspective, abolitionist transformations certainly also 
occurred much faster. In England, for instance, the 
abolition movement achieved an end to the slave trade 
within twenty years; another two­and­a­half decades 
finally saw slavery illegalised, and the freeing of all 
slaves in the royal British dominions. On the American 
continent, abolitionism spread gradually at first from 
the north­east to the south, starting in 1776; subse­
quent to several waves, it was finally successful in 1888 
with the abolition of slavery in Brazil.
The exemplary successes and the universal demand 
of Anglo­Saxon abolitionism led to its transcontinen­
tal diffusion from around the middle of the 19th cen­
tury. By the first third of the 20th century, it finally 
achieved the global abolition of slavery systems, or at 
least de jure. Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, dated 10 December 1948, therefore 
states that: ‘No one shall be held in slavery or servi­
tude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in 
all their forms.’ (UNGA, 1948). By way of example, the 
following elaboration focuses on the drivers, barriers 
and impacting factors of Anglo­Saxon abolitionism.
Geographical and Historical Categorisation
Organised abolitionist endeavours were initially made 
by only a few committed individuals in the United 
Kingdom, and by those of the United States of Amer­
ica fighting for independence from the British crown. 
They should be viewed in the historical context of the 
emancipatory spirit, and the closely related enthusiasm 
for the ideals of democracy and the rule of law, and 
against the background of 17th and 18th century colo­
nial expansion policies, and thus the resultant public 
presence of the slave trade and slavery, almost univer­
sally taken for granted.
In England, the Society for Effecting the Abolition of 
Slave Trade, founded in London in 1787, was one of the 
organisations that had a major influence on the official 
abolition of the slave trade in 1807. Subsequent to the 
Slavery Abolition Act of 1833, all slaves in the British 
Empire were ultimately set free in 1834. The first abo­
litionist organisations were also established in the now 
independent North American colonies, where slavery 
played a vital economic role particularly on cotton and 
tobacco plantations; these radicalised especially post­
1830, widening their sphere of influence. The North 
American abolitionists formally achieved their goals in 
1865 when the 13th amendment came into force.
Between 1776 and 1804, all of the northern states 
of the Union had at least taken the first steps towards 
liberating the slaves. The de jure abolition of slavery 
followed between 1789 and 1830. As early as 1783, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts inter­
preted the Massachusetts Constitution’s first Article on 
equality and freedom as an anti­slavery law, whereas 
the state of New York did not pass a general anti­slav­
ery law until 1827 (Adams, 2009). The dwindling hope 
that slavery might equally just gradually ‘die out’ in 
3 The Great Transformation:  A Heuristic Concept
96
the southern states of the USA meanwhile led to the 
polarisation and radicalisation of both pro­ and anti­
abolitionists (Raeithel, 1995).
In the 1830s, radical demands for the immediate 
manumission of all slaves increasingly found social res­
onance both in Great Britain and the northern states 
of the American (Finzsch et al., 1999; Drescher, 2009). 
Some members of the Society for the Mitigation and 
Gradual Abolition of Slavery Throughout the British 
Dominions, established in 1823, now lobbied for the 
universal abolition of slavery, emphasising this goal in 
1839 with the establishment of the British and For­
eign Anti­Slavery Society. One of the first genuinely 
transnational movements symbolically and tentatively 
culminated in the 1840 World Antislavery Convention 
in London, called by American abolitionists (Drescher, 
2009).
Drivers and Innovations
The primary drivers of this public attitude shift towards 
the rejection of slavery were ethical considerations and 
their transnational diffusion, especially within the 
sphere of influence of the British Empire and the Com­
monwealth. At first, abolitionism purely organised by a 
civil society organisation operated as the practical real­
isation of Christian­humanitarian morals which ‘very 
successfully utilised extensive extra­parliamentary 
campaigns as political means’ (Wende, 2001). In con­
temporary England, the abolition of slavery issue was 
mainly viewed as a moral imperative, and its successful 
realisation as an exceptional effort on behalf of society, 
and was celebrated as such (Drescher, 2009).
The abolitionists’ success also represented a partial 
change in the political structures of England, in which a 
small, but influential, elite of educated and propertied 
men repeatedly nudged far reaching reforms by means 
of targeted information campaigns and skilful organi­
sation (Wende, 2008). During their earliest efforts, the 
English abolitionists were also given support of the 
highest judicial kind: in 1772, the Lord Chief Justice 
ruled that English law did not support the legal status 
of ‘slave’. The thus established precedence case was a 
benchmark for Anglo­Saxon abolitionism for decades 
to come (Adams, 2009; Drescher, 2009).
In the USA, the social initiatives for the abolition 
of slavery progressed more or less synchronously in 
the northern states. American abolitionism was on par 
with the British movement not least because the pro­
tagonists on both sides of the Atlantic worked closely 
together. North American abolitionism was also initially 
advanced by an elite which reasoned on the basis of 
Christian ethics and emancipatory principles, paving 
the way for an organised abolitionism movement which 
gradually became more radical.
However, in what are now the southern states of 
the USA, which had a strong political­economic inter­
est in upholding slavery, the abolitionists’ ethics­based 
persuasive powers and socio­political methods that 
had proved so successful in England and the northern 
states found no resonance. At the close of the 18th cen­
tury, around 90 % of North American slaves lived in the 
southern states. Combined with new cotton processing 
methods and the expansion of large plantations, slave 
labour was the decisive economic factor here, and con­
cern about economic loss overrode any ethical aspects 
(Raeithel, 1995; Adams, 2009).
Key Actors and Factors
Quakers, Methodists and Baptists played a pioneering 
role in the large­scale promotion of abolitionism. They 
opposed slavery on religious and ethical grounds, and 
had considerable political influence both in England at 
the close of the 18th century, and in the Puritan colo­
nies of what would later become the USA. Their polit­
ical aims were also flanked by an open commitment to 
a capitalist market economy that emphasised the value 
of paid labour by free men and competitive individuals 
in the labour market (Adams, 2009).
The Society for Effecting the Abolition of Slave 
Trade knew how to utilise its members’ professional 
skills for the society’s management, the mobilising of 
financial resources, and in the publishing business, in 
order to address and inform a wide range of the popu­
lation’s social groups and to successfully mobilise not 
just the philanthropical elite, but also the English work­
ing class (Drescher, 2009). Articles in popular newspa­
pers and pamphlets, social networks, and in particu­
lar the presentation of petitions to parliament were the 
key instruments used to corner supporters of the sta­
tus quo, forcing them to commit. American abolitionists 
followed their example closely, and organised specific 
mutual transatlantic support (Drescher, 2009).
In the course of abolitionist expansion efforts, the 
American movement grew noticeably more radical dur­
ing the 1830s and 1840s. On the East Coast, in partic­
ular the New England Anti­Slavery Society (renamed 
the American Anti­Slavery Society in 1833) founded 
by the newspaper The Liberator’s editor William Lloyd 
Garrison, evolved into an important actor. By 1836, the 
number of comparable, decidedly abolitionist societies 
had risen to more than 500 (Raeithel, 1995). Thanks 
to their passionate propaganda and charismatic pub­
lic speakers, they managed to effectively advance an 
ethics­based issue without any form of parliamentary 
majority within the scope of the overall far more com­
plex constitutional­legal conflict between northern and 
southern states (Raeithel, 1995; Finzsch et al., 1999).
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At the same time, the violent reaction of the sla­
veholders, the romanticisation of abolitionist ‘mar­
tyrs’, and educational publications such as Garrison’s 
‘The Liberator’ and, above all, the 1852 popular novel 
‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin’ (Beecher Stowe, 2001) fed the 
shift in public opinion, which increasingly put pressure 
on the regime of those in favour of slavery (Raeithel, 
1995; Finzsch et al., 1999; Adams, 2009). Finally, by 
the 1850s, its effect on the shaping of political will and 
processes, and also on the relatively recently estab­
lished American party democracy could no longer be 
ignored: the fact that Abraham Lincoln was elected US 
president by Republicans was not least a consequence 
of the polarisation of slavery in the presidential elec­
tion campaign, leading to a schism within the up to this 
point dominating Democratic Party (Adams, 2009).
Impact and Barriers
Until well into the 19th century, slavery was deeply 
rooted in the legal, institutional and economic struc­
tures of numerous societies, and in part also sanctioned 
by religion. In traditional slaveholding societies, social 
status and the generation of wealth depended almost 
entirely on the possession of slaves and slave labour. 
Abolitionist efforts were met with correspondingly 
fierce opposition.
The censoring of abolitionist publications, draconic 
law enforcement against abolitionist activities, and 
the violent repression of individual slave revolts also 
contributed to delegitimising the slaveholder’s regime 
which ruled in the southern states of the USA. How­
ever as such, they initially did not manage to seriously 
destabilise the hegemony of the southern states’ aris­
tocrats. Moreover, the established power structures on 
the plantations and the resultant living conditions for 
the slaves also effectively precluded any systematic 
resistance ‘from below’ (Raeithel, 1995; Finzsch et al., 
1999; Adams, 2009).
The social discourse which sought to opportunis­
tically justify slavery against this political­economic 
background was fed by an amalgam of cultural­histor­
ical, religious, paternalistic and decidedly racist argu­
ments and, particularly in the case of the USA, by the 
ultimate constitutional­legal issue of whether the fed­
eration actually had the judiciary power to prohibit 
slavery in its individual states (Adams, 2009). The abo­
lition therefore became a decisive factor in the Amer­
ican War of Secession, ultimately violently enforcing 
the abolition of slavery by linking the issue of the right 
to possess slaves with the general constitutional con­
flict raging between ‘Unionists’ and ‘Confederates’: the 
ultimate prohibition of slavery in the territories legally 
recognising the US constitution was a federal political 
decision, only enforcable countrywide on the basis of a 
governmental monopoly on violence.
This example therefore also serves to illustrate the 
transformative potential of a ‘vision’ inspired by eth­
ics and morals, and the limits of social change based 
on normative discourse in the face of material inter­
ests and structures. If the abolitionists failed to enforce 
the abolition of slavery on a federal level by peaceful 
means, they were nevertheless successful in a trans­
formative sense, as they ‘heightened the majority’s 
conscience, thereby also possibly strengthening the 
readiness to make sacrifices in the war against the Con­
federate States’ (Adams, 2009). 
3.5.2 
Green Revolution (1960s): Type ‘Crisis’
According to the WBGU’s transformation concept, the 
Green Revolution is an example for the transforma­
tion type ‘crisis’. Subject of the transformation was 
the ‘socio­technical system’ of a traditional agricul­
ture with low yields dominant in most of the develop­
ing countries in the 1950s, under pressure particularly 
in southern Asia in the wake of recurring famines. The 
Green Revolution was a transformation process of agri­
cultural production systems, based on scientific find­
ings and technological advances, actively promoted by 
western governments and well­funded private founda­
tions since the early 1960s. Substantial research grants 
allowed the creation of experimental grounds for new 
agricultural production and productivity increase meth­
ods, and the successful breeding of new crop varieties 
in research institutes. Ultimately, these were able to 
establish themselves as a ‘niche regime’ by first practi­
cal trials in developing countries taking on a role model 
character. This transformation was distinguished by sci­
entific actors and a high degree of political steering.
Typical for the new production methods of the 
Green Revolution were the complementary and pre­
cisely timed use of newly developed high yielding 
cereal grain varieties (HYV), improved irrigation meth­
ods, synthetic nitrogen fertilisers, and pesticides and 
herbicides (complementary input). This was accompa­
nied by agricultural mechanisation (tractors, combine 
harvesters and threshing machines, irrigation with 
diesel engine powered pumps). The diffusion of these 
new production techniques was intensively supported 
by advisory services (Agricultural Extension Services), 
production material subsidies and the granting of loans, 
or the establishment of agricultural banks with numer­
ous branches.
In many countries, the Green Revolution’s ‘recipe’ 
for increasing agricultural yields became a core element 
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of national rural development programmes (diffusion). 
Within just a few years, agriculture in these countries 
was extensively revolutionised (from niche regime to 
established regime). It must also be taken into account 
that the Green Revolution took place against the back­
ground of the Cold War (megatrends, Figure  3.4­1): 
from the western industrial states’ perspective, it was 
also about counteracting the political hijacking of 
developing countries suffering from food shortages and 
hunger by the competing socialist ‘Eastern Bloc’.
Geographical and Historical Categorisation
In Asia (initially in India, the Philippines) and Latin 
America (initially Mexico), the Green Revolution had 
resulted in a substantial increase of maize, wheat 
and rice yields (Cleaver, 1972; Ruttan, 1977; Chap­
man, 2002). Mexico, for instance, still had to import 
half of the wheat it needed in 1946. As a result of the 
Green Revolution, it was completely independent from 
imports only 13 years later.
As of the 1960s, India became the Green Revolu­
tion’s prime example. In the past, the country suffered 
severely from recurring widespread famines, and again 
faced an imminent food crisis in 1961. The break­
through started in 1961, when Norman Borlaug, then 
researching in Mexico, was invited to India in a con­
sulting capacity. Over the next years, the Ford Foun­
dation and the Indian government funded the devel­
opment of a large­scale programme for increasing area 
yield for wheat and rice, particularly in the Punjab. In 
this respect, the programme was very successful: the 
Green Revolution significantly increased area yield for 
cereal grain crops. Today, India is one of the major rice 
exporting countries. However, since the 1980s, India’s 
Green Revolution has increasingly also attracted criti­
cism, because of the subsequent social and ecological 
consequences, such as salination of incorrectly irrigated 
soils, contamination due to inadvertent pesticide mis­
use, and reinforcement of social and geographical dis­
parities (Oasa, 1987; Bohle, 1989; Shiva, 1989, 1991; 
Conway and Barbier, 1990; Evenson and Gollin, 2003).
Drivers and Innovations
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the governments of many 
developing countries started to realise that the increas­
ing, population growth driven food demand would for­
seeably lead to devastating famines, or to extensive 
and expensive dependency on food imports. Drastic 
increases in agricultural production therefore appeared 
to be urgently needed. Chronic food shortages can thus 
be seen as the Green Revolution’s starting point and 
driving force.
In practical terms, the Green Revolution was ulti­
mately made possible by revolutionary achievements 
in the cultivation of new varieties of maize, wheat and 
rice. With the support of the Rockefeller Foundation, 
Mexico’s International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Center (CIMMYT), officially founded in 1963, although 
actually existent since the 1940s, became the world’s 
leading institute for the development of high­yield 
varieties of maize and wheat (Wright,  1984). At the 
same time, the development of high­yielding rice vari­
eties was pursued by the International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI), founded in 1960 in the Philippines. 
The institute was established with funds provided by 
the Ford and Rockefeller foundations (Cleaver, 1972). 
Norman Borlaug, generally viewed as the father of the 
Green Revolution, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 1970 in recognition of the groundbreaking impor­
tance of his achievements.
Key Actors and Factors
Key actors were the private US American foundations 
that funded the research efforts. However, in the Cold 
War context, this research funding was also a geopo­
litical strategy for the stabilisation of countries which, 
from a western perspective, could have become partic­
ularly ‘susceptible’ to establishing socialist regimes in 
the event of disastrous famines, or which might have 
had to depend on imports from the socialist ware­
houses (Dowie, 2001). In countries such as India, Mex­
ico and the Philippines, the technological solution was 
also viewed as a welcome alternative to the agricultural 
reform debate so often associated with socialist con­
cepts (Ross, 1998). The Green Revolution had there­
fore clear aspects of political power and vested inter­
ests, which certainly helped to significantly advance 
the transformation process. 
The actively steered transformation process of the 
Green Revolution, primarily controlled by the govern­
ments of industrialised and developing countries, was 
made possible through several converging factors, in 
particular the involvement of powerful actors with 
authority to act and a common goal and strategy:
 > Large­scale research funding through the establish­
ment of international research centres (Mexico and 
the Philippines), and the thus accomplished break­
throughs in cultivation research (innovation at ‘pre­
cisely the right point in time’).
 > Developing countries under urgent pressure to act 
due to chronic food shortages and the associated 
risks of recurring famines and political destabilisa­
tion.
 > US power political interests in the Cold War context, 
which helped with research and advice, but also with 
extensive technology transfer (including expansion 
of industrial capacities for fertiliser and seed produc­
tion, pest management, and agricultural machine 
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engineering), accompanied by substantial financial 
aid. Major transnational foundations and other gov­
ernments also helped with additional funding. 
 > Imposition of large­scale transformation pro­
grammes in rural areas, in which complementary 
measures were implemented at various levels (inter­
national, national, regional, local): research, financ­
ing, infrastructure, provision of equipment and tar­
geted knowledge diffusion through the setup of 
advisory networks (so­called Agricultural Extension 
Services).
Impact and Barriers
The Green Revolution model did not prove to be uni­
versally transferable in geographical terms, never gain­
ing a foothold, for example, in Africa. The lack of insti­
tutional and infrastructural capacities is cited as rea­
son for this. Moreover, breeding successes were limited 
to nutritional crops common in Asia and Latin Amer­
ica, and did not include African staples such as cassava 
or millet.
In addition, the Green Revolution has also tended 
to heighten already existing socio­economic disparities, 
rather than lessening them. Large agribusinesses tend 
to have benefited far more than small­scale produc­
ers, leading to intensified land­use competition in some 
instances, for example because irrigation with the aid 
of diesel powered pumps had lowered the groundwater 
level to such an extent that neighbouring farms without 
access to this technology subsequently suffered from 
water shortages.
In recent years, new efforts to increase agricul­
tural productivity have been undertaken by the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation (Gates Foundation, 2010). 
However, these are surrounded by controversy, partic­
ularly because of the heated debate regarding geneti­
cally modified plants.
3.5.3 
Structural Adjustment Policies (1980s): 
Type ‘Crisis’
In the mid­1980s, the World Bank and the Interna­
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced ‘Structural 
Adjustment Policies’ (SAP) in response to the so­called 
Third World Debt Crisis in developing countries, ini­
tially in Latin America. In practical terms, the interna­
tional financial institutions granted new loans to debt­
ridden developing countries within the scope of SAPs, 
conditionally tied to specific macroeconomic reforms. 
The reform policies  enforced in this manner where 
strictly guided by the free market principles of liber­
alisation, deregulation and privatisation, and included 
concrete economic and financial policy measures such 
as the privatisation of public companies, the ration­
alisation of public administration, the restriction of 
domestic cash flow and the liberalisation of foreign 
trade. Declared aim of the measures was to restabilise 
the economy as quickly as possible through a stronger 
integration of developing countries into the global mar­
ket. As an attempt of a transformation triggered by a 
crisis and externally initiated, the SAP can be allocated 
to the type ‘crisis’.
The transformation process is distinguished by the 
central role played by the two major international 
financial institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, as 
agents on behalf of the creditor nations. On the basis 
of their credit power, they intervened with detailed 
specifications in national economic and financial pol­
icy­making, thereby attempting a fundamental reo­
rientation of the economies of the indebted develop­
ing countries. These were to be steered away from the 
failed model of protectionist domestic market oriented 
industrialisation policies towards a liberal economic 
market model of global integration. The impact of SAP, 
however, was not limited to the economy, the conse­
quence of these enforced cost cutting measures also 
led to profound changes in social policy. In the short­
term, this led to massive increases in unemployment in 
many developing countries during the 1980s, and social 
disparities becoming even more pronounced following 
the decline of the medium­income group (Nolte, 2000; 
Brock, 2003).
In a global political context, SAPs are an expres­
sion of the North­South conflict as well as a result of 
the conflicting eastern and western systems during the 
Cold War. On the one hand, they served to reaffirm the 
western industrialised countries’ global economic dom­
inance in North­South relations after the developing 
countries had been in a position to lend unprecedented 
emphasis to their demands for a new global economic 
order through the formation of the G77 and OPEC in 
the 1970s. On the other hand, SAPs were instrumen­
tal in expanding the western industrialised countries’ 
sphere of influence, or rather, in consolidating it: the 
conditionality of the SAP loans also forced socialist­
oriented Third World governments to adjust their eco­
nomic policies to conform with the preferences of a lib­
eral market economy.
Geographical and Historical Categorisation
At the end of the 1970s, the looming Third World 
Debt Crisis prompted the leading industrial nations to 
react with structural adjustment policies in the 1980s. 
Over the course of this decade alone, Third World for­
eign debt had sextupled (Brock, 2003). In geographi­
cal terms, the SAPs initially targeted the fifteen biggest 
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Third World debtor nations, primarily in Latin Amer­
ica, the most crisis­stricken region at the time, but also 
in sub­Saharan Africa (Siebold, 1995; Nolte, 2000). 
SAPs were also soon expanded to include other debtor 
nations among the developing countries; at the close 
of the 1980s, around forty developing countries had 
taken on IMF or World Bank loans under the Struc­
tural Adjustment Policy programme. During the course 
of this, the SAP regional focus shifted to Africa (Sie­
bold, 1995).
The debt crisis was caused by the fact that many 
developing countries had pursued economic strategies 
that were protectionist and domestic market oriented, 
or import substituting industrialisation mainly financed 
by foreign loans. These were readily available on the 
international market at favourable conditions, thanks 
to the 1973 oil crisis and the oil exporting countries’ 
subsequent liquidity surplus. When, in the early 1980s, 
international loans suddenly became expensive as a 
result of US high interest policies, many Third World 
countries found it increasingly difficult to keep up their 
repayments to both private and public creditors. The 
situation was exacerbated by a concurrent decline in 
raw material prices, which meant a drastic fall in foreign 
currency income for the raw material exporting devel­
oping countries.
Finally, in August 1982, the Mexican government 
was the first to inform the US Treasury of its inabil­
ity to pay its debts. Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and 
the Philippines soon followed suit (Brock, 2003). World 
Bank and IMF thus became the central actors in the 
debt management of the concerned nations. The World 
Bank had already created the instrument of loans under 
the Structural Adjustment Policy scheme in 1980, the 
IMF added a structural adjustment facility in 1986, and 
an extended one in 1987. Macroeconomic structural 
adjustment quickly became the development political 
paradigm of the 1980s: by 1994, a total of 74 develop­
ing countries had been granted structural adjustment 
loans, more than half of these were African countries 
(52 %), and a good quarter went to Latin America and 
the Caribbean (26 %; Siebold, 1995). Regional Devel­
opment Banks and The European Community followed 
the Bretton Woods institutions’ example with similar 
loan programmes.
Drivers and Innovations
The radically market­oriented theories by the Chi­
cago School of Economics were the intellectual drivers 
behind the macroeconomic transformation processes 
in developing countries that the Structural Adjustment 
Policies had initiated. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
these theories became the predominant economics par­
adigm which later also marked Reaganism and Thatch­
erism. The incapacity of many developing countries as 
a result of the debt crisis finally offered the chance to 
put the theoretical teachings of the Chicago school into 
international practice.
With increasing saturation of domestic markets, the 
development model of protectionist industrialisation 
policies pursued by many African and Latin American 
countries had unavoidably led to an endogenous struc­
tural crisis (Messner, 1993). The external shocks which 
signified the slump in raw material prices and the sud­
den rise in interest rates on the international market 
in the early 1980s finally overtaxed the already debt­
stricken developing countries. Their inability to pay 
meant that no further loans were granted, thus start­
ing the downward spiral of unmanageable debts. Ulti­
mately, the SAP aiming for radical market reforms were 
forced on the overtaxed governments from the out­
side as a crisis management panacea. In hindsight, and 
regardless of the evaluation of the concrete results, this 
attempt to cure the economic systems of a group of by 
no means homogenous countries with a generic model 
prescribed from the outside can certainly be viewed as 
a rather ambitious political experiment.
Key Actors and Factors
The central actors in the implementation of the struc­
tural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s were 
– apart from the debtor nations themselves – the inter­
national financial institutions, the IMF and the World 
Bank. As agents acting for the international creditor 
community, they took on the role of ‘preceptors for pol­
icy­makers’ in the developing countries (Wolff, 2005).
As an initial response to the bankruptcy declarations 
by Mexico and other developing countries, the western 
creditor nations attempted to hold debt rescheduling 
negotiations with each individual debtor nation. How­
ever, as it became increasingly obvious that this was 
not just a case of individual developing countries bat­
tling temporary liquidity issues, but a (serious) struc­
tural crisis of their respective national economies, the 
World Bank and the IMF basically took over the cri­
sis management. They were mandated by their leading 
member states to enforce radical reforms in the debt­
stricken developing countries, i. e. liberal market­ori­
ented economic policies by means of SAP assistance, 
de facto fulfilling the role of liquidator in the countries 
concerned (Herr, 2001).
Due to its hegemonic position in the Bretton 
Woods institutions, the US Treasury played a key role, 
 supported by its European allies, as also reflected by 
the retrospective reference to the ‘Washington Consen­
sus’.
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Impact and Barriers
Because of their one­sided application of macroeco­
nomic criteria and their total disregard of the negative 
impact on poor and disadvantaged social groups, the 
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) attracted heavy 
criticism from their inception: whilst the fast successes 
in terms of economic recovery largely failed to materi­
alise, the extremely serious social consequences were 
highly visible in many of the countries concerned. The 
mostly drastic public spending cuts resulted in rising 
unemployment and the collapse of public health care 
and education systems. Real wage cuts, implemented 
to fight inflation, particularly hit employees and work­
ers, widening the income gap between rich and poor 
and often leading to social unrest.
Growing international criticism of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’, its negative social impact, and its failure 
to achieve the desired economic effects, as admitted by 
the World Bank, led to a SAP review in the context of 
the economic crises in Asia and Argentina in the 1990s. 
Under the motto ‘adjustment with a human face’, they 
are now supposed to show increased consideration of 
the needs of the socially disadvantaged (Siebold, 1995; 
Tetzlaff, 1996). With the emergence of a transnational 
anti­globalisation movement in the 1990s, and the Jubi­
lee 2000 ‘Drop the Debt’ campaign, the protest against 
structural adjustment policies increasingly also found 
resonance in the industrialised countries (public opin­
ion; Busby, 2010). In 1999, the IMF’s structural adjust­
ment facility was finally converted into the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), which explicitly 
links economic growth with the fight against poverty 
and offers the borrowing countries more involvement 
in developing the loan conditions (Thiele and Wiebelt, 
2000; Wolff, 2005).
A sustainable transformation of the global economy 
in the strictly macroeconomic sense in accordance with 
the original SAPs obviously failed. However, their fail­
ure is not universal. Particularly the example of Latin 
America makes it clear that the consistent implemen­
tation of SAPs certainly helped to create more stable 
economic framework conditions in the long run, as 
well as substantially and enduringly lowering the rate 
of inflation. The positive effects on economic growth 
and poverty reduction which were hoped for from a 
development policy point of view, however, did by 
and large not materialise, despite the powerful eco­
nomic leverage implemented by the World Bank and 
the IMF ( Tetzlaff, 1996; Thiele and Wiebelt, 2000). 
This becomes even more apparent when applied to the 
example of the ‘Asian Tigers’ which, although generally 
guided by the benchmark of macroeconomic stability, 
acted very cautiously when it came to issues of liber­
alisation and deregulation, and withdrawal of the state 
from the capital allocation (Wolff, 2005).
The central message to be gleaned from the Struc­
tural Adjustment Policies of the 1980s is therefore that 
political­institutional framework conditions and soft 
factors such as acceptance, legitimacy and participa­
tion are of much more significance than the advocates 
of radical macroeconomics initially thought. Even the 
economies of the most dependent developing countries 
could not be steered mechanically from the outside, as 
reforms under existential pressure could only be imple­
mented either incompletely or delayed. 
3.5.4
Protection of the Ozone Layer (from 1985): 
Type ‘Knowledge’
As a comprehensive reaction to a global environmen­
tal problem, the international regime for the protection 
of the ozone layer is the biggest success story in inter­
national environmental policy­making to date. With 
the effectively regulated production and use of certain 
ozone­harmful substances, the international ozone pol­
icy is therefore an example of a transformation brought 
about by a science­based suspicion. It concentrates pri­
marily on specific industries and represents the trans­
formation type ‘knowledge’. 
Geographical and Historical Categorisation
In 1974, the two American natural scientists Sherwood 
Rowland and Mario Molina warned against the damage 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were inflicting on the strat­
ospheric ozone layer. The only one year earlier (1973) 
established United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) responded by calling a meeting of scientists 
and government experts, who drew up a ‘World Plan of 
Action on the Ozone Layer’ in March 1977 for further 
research into the ozone problem.
 The ‘Coordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer’, 
supported by the UNEP, made up of both governmental 
and non­governmental actors, continued to intensify 
the scientific exchange on the impacts of various chem­
ical substances on the stratosphere. However, it was 
only the discovery of the so­called ‘ozone hole’ dur­
ing the course of the British Antarctic Survey in 1985 
that led to a widespread public discussion on the risks 
of increased UV insolation. This increased the pressure 
to act on the mainly responsible industrialised nations 
considerably. The speedy establishment of an interna­
tional legal framework by the Vienna Convention for 
the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985, and the 
follow­up Montreal Protocol on substances leading to 
ozone layer depletion (1987), achieved the almost com­
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plete discontinuation of production and use of ozone 
depleting substances at a global level up to the present 
day (Andersen and Sarma, 2002; Parson, 2003). Dur­
ing the entire negotiation period, there was no sound 
 scientific proof for a causal connection between the use 
of CFCs and the appearance of the ozone hole. Scien­
tific research merely confirmed the plausibility of this 
correlation, and produced computer simulations show­
ing the impacts of a damaged ozone layer. The global 
community acted – for the first time ever both globally 
and successfully – according to the precautionary prin­
ciple; the causality was not scientifically proven until 
later (Benedick, 1999). 
The Montreal Protocol, developed under the aegis of 
UNEP, was signed on 16 September 1987, and has been 
effective as of 1 January 1989. Initially, it was only 
ratified by 11 nations, these, however, represented 
two­thirds of the estimated global consumption of the 
substances concerned in 1986. Today, the Protocol is 
legally binding for 196 parties, including the European 
Union. Due to its extensive range and extreme effec­
tiveness (an almost global ban on all ozone­damaging 
substances in the meantime), the multilateral regime for 
the protection of the ozone layer is generally viewed as 
the biggest success story in multilateral environmental 
policy­making.
Drivers and Innovations
The initiators and driving force behind the international 
policy for the protection of the ozone layer were sci­
entists and knowledge communicators like UNEP. The 
institutional innovations with regard to the formula­
tion of the regime are also remarkable, as they allowed 
its dynamic further development in response to new 
scientific findings, and in addition ensured widespread 
inclusion of the developing countries.
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer, in force since 1988, mainly contains insti­
tutional and organisational regulations for the negotia­
tion of concrete political measures. In terms of content, 
the Convention restricts itself in rather general terms 
to the goal of appropriate protective measures and the 
overall commitment to global cooperation. 
Only the subsequently negotiated Montreal Proto­
col, in force since 1989, concretised matters further. 
Besides concrete reduction targets for the production 
and use of ozone depleting substances, it stipulates 
trade restrictions in the form of an import ban for the 
controlled substances from non­party states, and an 
export ban to such states. Moreover, it was designed 
as a dynamic instrument from the moment of its incep­
tion, and was revised at subsequent meetings of the 
Parties to the Protocol in London (1990), Copenha­
gen (1992), Montreal (1997) and Beijing (1999) with 
amendments.
Through their continued expansion of the list of 
substances identified as ‘ozone damaging’, and the 
one­by­one regulation of their production and use, the 
Parties to the Protocol acted in a previously unprec­
edented manner in accordance with the precautionary 
principle. Not least, this was made possible for the first 
time in international contracting practice: if a consen­
sus on amendments of this kind cannot be reached, a 
majority of two­thirds of the present and voting Par­
ties to the Protocol is sufficient under the framework of 
the Montreal Protocol, provided this majority is equally 
divided to represent the majority of both developing 
and industrialised countries. Decisions made in this way 
are immediately and internationally legally binding for 
all Parties to the Protocol, regardless of their own vote, 
without the usually required ratification by individual 
countries.
In terms of inclusion of the developing countries, 
who justifiably blamed the industrialised nations for 
the depletion of the ozone layer in accordance with 
the ‘polluter pays’ principle, well­founded exemption 
regulations regarding the production and use of ozone 
depleting substances which are difficult to substitute, 
and the long­term financing of the requisite technology 
transfers have proved to be effective.
Key Actors and Factors
Three main actor groups were primarily responsible 
for the successful creation of a global ozone policy, the 
comparatively speedy establishment of problem solv­
ing capable institutions, and the strict implementation 
of political specifications: scientific experts, committed 
international bureaucrats, and the powerful industrial­
ised countries which led the international negotiations. 
Scientific institutions, the World Meteorological Organ­
isation and NASA all played a decisive role, not only 
because of their research efforts, but also because of 
their endeavours to raise awareness of the problem in 
the public sphere and among political decision­makers 
(Haas, 1992; Parson, 2003).
UNEP’s international officials, above all its Execu­
tive Director Mostafa Tolba (1973–1992) and the first 
Montreal Protocol’s Secretary General, Madhava Sarma 
(1987–2000), were also central to the prioritisation of 
the ozone issue in international environmental policy­
making and the dynamic progression of international 
negotiations (Downie, 1995). 
At first reluctant, the governments of the USA and 
Great Britain subsequently played a decisive role both 
in international negotiations and in national implemen­
tation by demonstrating strong leadership qualities, 
ultimately leading the other industrialised countries to 
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follow suit and face their responsibilities in terms of 
ozone politics (Benedick, 1999; Grundmann, 1999). 
Another factor which not to be underestimated was 
also the availability of technical substitutes for CFCs 
and their manufacturers’ respective economic interests 
(Andersen and Sarma, 2002; Parson, 2003).
Impact and Barriers
To what extent the measures for saving the strat­
ospheric ozone layer agreed under the Vienna Con­
vention and the Montreal Protocol are adequate will 
be revealed only at some point in the future, due to 
the complexity and inertia of atmospheric physics and 
chemistry. The level of efficiency in their implementa­
tion and the global transformation in handling certain 
chemicals associated with it, however, is nothing short 
of radical. But, as this specific transformation only con­
cerns a small and highly specialised industrial branch, 
i. e. primarily aerosol and refrigeration equipment man­
ufacturers, its significance is limited.
Political barriers preventing unimpeded implemen­
tation and further revision of the Montreal Protocol 
mainly arise from the controversy regarding exemption 
regulations on production and use of ozone deplet­
ing substances which are difficult to substitute, typi­
cally following the geographical lines of the established 
North­South conflicts, as well as new findings and the 
potentially conflicting goals of ozone layer protection 
associated with them, and the greenhouse gas balance 
of various chemical compounds.
3.5.5 
IT Revolution and World Wide Web  
(1990s): Type ‘Technology’
The internet is a global network consisting of many 
smaller, interconnected computer networks. It provides 
the infrastructure for various communication serv­
ices such as hypertext, the world wide web, and elec­
tronic mail. All of these are capable of providing, man­
aging and transmitting data at a so far unprecedented 
speed. The development of the internet is a fundamen­
tal information and telecommunications technology 
(IT) transformation, sometimes also referred to as the 
Digital Revolution. In its wake, the previously domi­
nant communications regime, which was based on ana­
logue technologies, has largely been replaced by digital 
technologies within just a few decades, and by the com­
munication and action options these allow. The inter­
net is viewed as a key technology, having changed so 
many different areas of everyday life (a general pur­
pose technology) i. e. a technology that is used across 
a wide range of economic sectors, in this way contrib­
uting to economic growth by productivity increases 
(Chapter 3). This also helped to rapidly diffuse the basic 
technology beyond its niche status. The internet­driven 
IT Revolution therefore represents a transformation of 
the type ‘technology’. 
At the same time, the IT Revolution is an example 
of a transformation where the fundamental technologi­
cal developments were based on public research. The 
technology’s further diffusion and the associated incre­
mental improvements were driven ‘from below’ by var­
ious different actors, above all from the scientific and 
private sector, policy­making thereby also made some 
contributions to this process.
An outstanding characteristic of the IT Revolution 
is that it spread particularly fast among the younger 
generation, possibly also the reason why it was able to 
develop such an extremely high acceleration and pen­
etration potential.
Geographical and Historical Categorisation
Initially developed as a niche communications tool for 
military and scientific purposes, the internet is now used 
by almost a third of the global population. Since the 
mid­1990s, the number of internet users has increased 
rapidly. In 2009, there were more than 1.7 billion inter­
net users in the world (Internet World Stats, 2010). 
As its diffusion increased, the internet also became an 
interesting option for commercial use, and the devel­
opment of new information and communication tech­
nologies has impacted considerably on almost all areas 
of the global economy in the past years. The generally 
accepted view is that the global advance of the internet 
also drove globalisation. 
However, as yet, not everyone is in a position to 
enjoy the benefits of the IT Revolution. Although by 
now, even poor developing countries are connected to 
the global network, access is frequently restricted to 
the urban elites. The majority of people in poor devel­
oping countries has not yet joined the world wide web 
(digital divide; Wittmann, 2006).
As the internet technology was originally devel­
oped in a military context, it may well be that the end 
of the Cold War paved the way for its fast diffusion 
among civilians. However, what does seem certain is 
that the accelerated pace of globalisation since the close 
of the 20th century is directly and closely linked with 
the availability of new information and communica­
tion technologies. On the one hand, economic globali­
sation processes required and accelerated the diffusion 
of long­distance communication technologies; on the 
other hand, globalisation itself gained added momen­
tum through the establishment of these kinds of tech­
nologies.
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Drivers and Innovations
The requisite key technologies for establishing the 
internet, in the form of local networks linking univer­
sity and research institutions, were initially developed 
in a government niche, i. e. for use in military or scien­
tific research projects. The internet emerged from the 
so­called ARPANET, a project developed in the 1960s 
by the US Department of Defense Advanced Research 
Project Agency (ARPA) (Abbate, 1999). The Euro­
pean Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) played 
a major role in the development of a hypertext­based 
world wide web, making it possible for ‘ordinary peo­
ple’ to access the net since the early 1990s. 
The invention of the microprocessor and its steadily 
increasing capacities, the automation of operating pro­
cesses, the establishment of computers as an everyday 
household item, and the building of local communica­
tion and computer networks all contributed to creating 
the technological and social preconditions for internet 
expansion and World Wide Web general use.
However, it gained real momentum and a true global 
dimension only as a result of the progressive commer­
cial use, particularly among younger people at the start. 
Both the e­commerce sector and online trade have 
shown strong growth rates over the past few years, and 
internet service providers such as the online search 
engine market leader Google Inc. are now some of the 
most valuable global brands (Milward Brown Optimor, 
2009). The numerous public and private investments 
in the requisite infrastructure, like glass fibre cables 
and servers, were not least necessitated by increased 
demand. Both private and commercial users saw added 
value in the new internet technology compared to 
established technologies.
The development and diffusion of broadband inter­
net, allowing the transmission of huge volumes of data, 
has led to the increased provision of services other than 
the established digital communication technologies like 
e­mails, online discussion forums or chats, such as tele­
phone services, online radio and video via the internet. 
In conjunction with various software innovations, this 
has facilitated the increasing use of interactive applica­
tions, which spread rapidly in the past decade; giving 
rise to the catchphrase ‘Web 2.0’. The traditional media 
(TV, radio and printed media) are now facing consider­
able challenges, made even more pressing by the trend 
towards mobile devices.
Impact and Barriers
In all modern societies, technical information and com­
munication technology innovations have radically 
changed many aspects of working and living environ­
ments over the past few decades. They prove indisputa­
bly that a profound, global socio­economic transforma­
tion is indeed possible in a relatively short time span. 
Although the so­called digital divide between the early 
industrialised OECD nations and numerous developing 
and newly industrialising countries still exists at a glo­
bal level, the various information technologies (in par­
ticular mobile phone use) are still impressive examples 
for the leap­frogging of technological development 
stages (Mehra et al., 2004; Wittmann, 2006). 
Apart from the economic importance of information 
technologies, particularly where the commercial dif­
fusion of mobile devices is concerned, their potential 
significance as participation and mobilisation tools in 
political processes must not be underestimated (Perl­
mutter, 2008). Examples for this are the elections and 
subsequent protests in Iran in 2009, or the current 
democracy movements in the Arabic countries. The 
systematic use of ‘Twitter’ by Barack Obama during the 
2008 US presidential election campaign was viewed as 
an important factor in terms of mobilising young vot­
ers; authoritarian regimes are having considerable dif­
ficulties in controlling the diffusion and use of new 
media. They are also alternative information, participa­
tion, organisation and lobbying tools for citizens (Yang, 
2009).
Barriers impeding the diffusion of the internet are, 
on the one hand, development­related. Particularly in 
Africa, it is still not very widespread, although it must 
be said that there are still huge disparities in terms of 
access between rural regions and urban areas. A fur­
ther barrier, on the other hand, is also the prevention 
of free communication for political reasons, as practised 
in China, for example.
3.5.6 
European Integration (since the 1950s):  
Type ‘Vision’
The European Union is the concrete manifestation of 
the success of European integration. The driving force 
behind it was and is mainly the vision of a more peace­
ful, economically and politically stable Europe. It rep­
resents a comprehensive transformation of the type 
‘vision’.
Political endeavours for a united Europe were the 
consequence of experiencing two catastrophic World 
Wars, the rise and fall of fascist regimes in several 
European states, the integration and ‘taming’ of Ger­
many, and the emerging bipolar world order embod­
ied by the rise of the two superpowers USA and Soviet 
Union. European integration, and particularly the grad­
ual establishment and expansion of genuinely Euro­
pean institutions, has always been a process very much 
steered ‘from the top’, as established national state 
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governments pursued a common cause and decided 
upon the foundation of the European Communities. 
During its course, the vision of a peacefully united 
and prospering Europe led the transformation, even 
though, in the beginning, the concrete formation of 
supranational European institutions was by no means a 
given fact (Haas, 1958; Pollack, 2003). In the not even 
fifty years that have passed since then, a political, eco­
nomic and legal project has gained ground on the Euro­
pean continent. It now extends to 27 nation states. 
Geographical and Historical Categorisation
Initially, the governments of a handful of founding 
states – Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, 
and the Netherlands – played the role of integration 
pioneers. Based on the ‘Schuman Plan’, they agreed 
the joint management of their coal and steel indus­
tries, and to refrain from using either for non­peace­
ful purposes against one another. Inspired by the suc­
cess of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
the six member states extended their collaboration to 
other sectors of the economy. With the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome, they founded the European Economic Commu­
nity (EEC); its objective being the free movement of 
people, goods and services. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland 
and Great Britain were the first to join the Community, 
other nations gradually followed: Greece (1981), Portu­
gal and Spain (1986), Finland, Austria, Sweden (1995), 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus 
(2004), and Bulgaria and Rumania (2007). 
The fact that the transformation process of Euro­
pean integration is by no means concluded shows in the 
EU’s need to adapt, and also its ability to adapt in the 
face of new economic, political and social challenges, 
with regard to the gradual authority extension of its 
institutions, and its expansion to encompass new mem­
ber states (Weiler, 1991; Beach, 2005; Chalmers et al., 
2006).
Drivers and Innovations
The determined and purposeful actions of the polit­
ical elite were considerably influenced by the lasting 
shock of two World Wars. Against the background of 
the East­West system conflict, the will to achieve Euro­
pean unity was also driven by the desire to politically 
and economically counterbalance the Soviet­dominated 
Eastern Bloc. Post­1990, Europe soon gained major 
importance in a globalised world, as exemplified by the 
formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
the introduction of the euro as a common European 
currency, and not least by the geographical expansion 
of the community of states.
It had been the integration pioneers’ intention to 
gradually advance the integration process agreed in 
the ECSC contract economically. The development of 
today’s European Union was therefore based on an evo­
lutionary model of an incremental integration without a 
comprehensive overall concept. The creation of a com­
mon market, the introduction of a common currency 
and, above all, the conferring of certain rights of sov­
ereignty on the part of the member states onto supra­
national European institutions has led to the birth of 
globally unique organisation, unprecedented in inter­
national law. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the integration 
project also formally became the European Union on 1 
December 2009.
Key Actors and Factors
Governments of member states have always been the 
major actors in the European integration process. The 
former French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, and 
the Schuman Plan that bears his name, are exemplary. 
It provided the basis for the ECSC.
However, with increasing political integration, the 
European institutions themselves also evolved into 
integration­advancing factors (Beach, 2005). The Euro­
pean Court of Justice, for instance, on the grounds of its 
integration­friendly interpretation of Community Law, 
which enjoys application precedence above national 
laws as an independent legal system as well as contain­
ing contractually intended provisions for extended legal 
protection, has evolved into a groundbreaking actor in 
the course of ensuring the enforcement of Community 
Law in the member states (Alter, 2001). The European 
Commission has also turned into a ‘pro­integration 
engine’, as it frequently makes use of its right to initi­
ate legislation in European legislative procedures.
Impact and Barriers
The growing significance of the European institutions 
proves that the delegation of national sovereignty is an 
effective major factor in the transformation. The Euro­
pean Union’s member states have gradually ceded their 
traditional sovereign rights with regard to various areas 
to a superior, supranational institution, whose author­
ity they submit to voluntarily (Pollack, 2006). In this 
context, it is also a distinguishing characteristic of this 
specific transformation that the contractual basis regu­
lates not only the relationship between the EU and its 
member states, but also that of the EU and its individ­
ual citizens.
The failure of a number of projects to communitise 
certain areas of policy, the laboriousness of the Euro­
pean institutional architecture and its complex inter­
nal decision­making and voting procedures, and the 
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continuously growing number of member states can be 
identified as barriers impeding European integration.
Some of these impediments managed to consider­
ably slow down the transformation pace; however, they 
could not stop the transformation as such. The member 
states’ growing economic interweaving and the (joint) 
interests linked to a functioning common market pro­
mote European integration. Initially, this became partic­
ularly apparent where social policies are concerned, as 
the domestic market also demanded equal social stand­
ards. Gradually, European integration also extended 
to policy areas which, both from a constitutional and 
international legal perspective, have always been the 
preserve of national governments and their actions. 
This applies especially to the inclusion of foreign and 
security policies in Community Law, and police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal cases.
3.6
Conclusions from the Analysis of Historical  
Transformations
Analysis of these historical medium­range transforma­
tions led to the identification of four different types 
of drivers, developed as types. Transformations of the 
type ‘vision’ focused primarily on a better, fairer, or 
more peaceful, future (value changes). Transformation 
processes of the type ‘crisis’ were by and large moti­
vated by the experiencing of crises (hunger and devel­
opment crises). In the case of the type ‘knowledge’, 
the transformation process was advanced above all by 
knowledge­based considerations (precautionary prin­
ciple) and research findings. Central element in trans­
formation processes of the ‘technology’ type is the 
mass diffusion of a structure­changing technical inno­
vation. With respect to the approaching Great Low­Car­
bon Transformation towards a low­carbon society, the 
following six conclusions may be drawn from this his­
torical analysis:
1. The historical transformation processes examined 
here can be described as collective acts of antic­
ipatory change agents. They were transforma­
tions whose outcome could not actually be deter­
mined by the actions of individuals or small groups, 
although these frequently ‘get the ball rolling’. The 
change agents’ capabilities in terms of successfully 
communicating with politicians or the broad pub­
lic play a decisive role here. The activities of these 
pioneering change agents are at different times 
superseded by, or accompanied by, the intensifi­
cation of economic, cultural, social, and also eco­
logical processes, thereby gaining transformative 
momentum. An example for this is the creation of 
the European Union, initially founded in the 1950s 
by six countries as European Communities to secure 
peace by promoting intentional economic interde­
pendencies (coal and steel), and to accelerate eco­
nomic growth by extending the domestic market. 
With the Maastricht Treaty, the European Commu­
nity member states founded the European Union in 
1992. The EU was given responsibilities that went 
beyond economic issues. Gradually, the number of 
member states grew to the current 27 (2011). Most 
recently, the EU’s supranational authority has been 
extended with the Treaty of Lisbon. Within the EU, 
the European Economic and Monetary Union cur­
rently consists of 17 states. They have introduced 
a common currency, the euro, thereby transferring 
their authority with regard to monetary policy to 
the European Central Bank.
2. It can be said for most of the transformations ana­
lysed here that they would not have been possible 
without the acceptance and support of social actors. 
That is one of the major reasons, for example, why 
the Structural Adjustment Programmes were not 
particularly successful in Latin America, where they 
were perceived as having been ‘imposed’ by exter­
nal forces. With regard to the low­carbon transfor­
mation, this means that it is vital that all states and 
all its citizens join in the cause. 
3. The state plays a decisive role in shaping the pro­
cess. In the case of ozone layer protection, which was 
organised in a top­down process scientific warnings 
provided the decisive impulse. It was a knowledge­
based transformation, guided by the precautionary 
principle. The low­carbon transformation belongs to 
the same category: it is also about ‘learning from 
the future’, and acting in accordance with the pre­
cautionary principle. After all, based on scientific 
knowledge and models of future climate change 
impact, a ‘future laboratory’ is available to facili­
tate informed social decisions. Above all, though, 
the low­carbon transformation – and that is the 
crucial difference – requires measures of unprec­
edented dimensions and profundity. Their imple­
mentation requires a pro­active state, as the reg­
ulatory policies shaping an entire economic system 
and incentive schemes for investments and inno­
vations must be completely remodelled to change 
focus from a fossil­fuel based to a climate­friendly 
economy. Past crises are also a motivator for gov­
ernment actions (EU integration, structural adjust­
ment and Green Revolution). The structural adjust­
ment example shows how difficult it is to nudge a 
transformation process ‘from the outside’, despite a 
crisis and massive financial support, and the Bretton 
Woods organisations’ threat­potential. In relation to 
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the low­carbon transformation, this background of 
past experiences is important, as many developing 
and newly industrialising countries view the inter­
national climate protection negotiations and the 
discourse on low­carbon modernisation primarily 
as an ‘imposed’ mechanism which undermines their 
‘right to development’. The global low­carbon trans­
formation will therefore not be achievable with­
out confidence­building international cooperation. 
Transformations are usually open­ended processes, 
the results of a collective steering are never certain, 
and not clearly foreseeable, despite a defined goal. 
Transformations are not directly manageable; rather 
it is a case of allowing the transformation process 
to develop into a certain direction by creating the 
respective framework conditions. Exactly how a 
transformative world will look like at the end of 
this ‘possibility path of many possibilities’ cannot 
be predetermined. Today, the focus must above all 
be on providing the impetus for a change of course 
towards the right direction. 
4. The speed of transformation processes can vary 
greatly. Whilst the EU integration process, for 
instance, by now spans over sixty years, over the 
course of which it has gradually been institution­
ally anchored, the world wide web established itself 
at an almost frenzied speed, by comparison. Inde­
pendent of this it usually takes a decade for the 
requisite basic structures of a transformation to 
become strong enough to create long­term dynam­
ics. However, the establishment of the requisite 
basic structures relies on strategic political action. 
It can also be manifestly assumed that the level of 
intervention with existing established structures is 
a decisive factor in terms of pace. Whilst in the case 
of the EU, existing structures tend to be developed 
further gradually; the IT Revolution evolved inde­
pendent of existing institutional structures with­
out much resistance. With regard to the low­carbon 
transformation, it can be concluded that the change 
of firmly established energy generation and usage 
structures require a level of interference that will 
take a very long time.
5. The historical medium­range transformation pro­
cesses introduced here can only be understood fully 
if their respective contemporary historical embed­
ment (megatrends, Figure 3.4­1) and the corre­
sponding dynamics are also taken into account (for 
example Cold War, globalisation, post­war period). 
The historian Osterhammel describes transformative 
processes as ‘a concurrence of multiple changes’, 
which can progress either ongoing or intermittently; 
they can occur either additively or cumulatively, 
either reversibly or irreversibly, either at a steady, 
or at an unsteady pace (Osterhammel, 2009). These 
kinds of dynamics are manifestly apparent in the 
six cases analysed here. For example, the IT Revolu­
tion, the abolition of slavery and European integra­
tion were continuous, cumulative processes which, 
from today’s point of view, can be considered as 
irreversible. Typical for most of the processes ana­
lysed here is also that they were influenced by a 
number of actor groups (with by all means differ­
ent intentions), and occurred simultaneously at sev­
eral action levels (local, regional, global). One exam­
ple for this is the Green Revolution, which has been 
actively promoted by  western governments and 
well­funded private foundations since the early 
1960s. Individual countries implemented nation­
wide programmes to propagate the Green Revo­
lution, supported by international aid donors. The 
diffusion of these new production techniques was 
intensively and strategically supported at all levels 
by advisory services, production material subsidies 
and the granting of loans, or the establishment of 
agricultural banks with numerous branches. Change 
agents took on a key function at all levels.
6. The dynamics required for the low­carbon transfor­
mation can only be generated by a combination of 
measures at various different levels, as the analy­
sis of these historical examples shows. This trans­
formation process
 > must be a process based on knowledge and a 
common vision, guided by the precautionary 
principle (Chapters 1, 2, 8);
 > must rely heavily on change agents who help to 
inspire the requisite social acceptance, and 
whose concentrated joint activities generate 
transformative dynamics (Chapter 2, 6);
 > must be accelerated by a pro­active state which 
creates and actively promotes the appropriate 
room to manoeuvre, and overcomes the high­
carbon economy’s framework conditions to 
develop a climate­friendly system (Chapter. 5),
 > also relies on the cooperation of the interna­
tional community, and the establishment of sup­
porting global governance structures as an indis­
pensable driving force for gaining the envisaged 
transformation momentum (Chapter 5, 7).
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Only around half of humankind has benefited from 
the industrialisation that has allowed for great scien­
tific, technical and economic advances during the past 
200 years. A precondition for these advances was the 
unlocking of new energy sources and their diverging 
use, and substituting animal and human muscle power 
with mechanical energy (Landes, 1969). Over the past 
two centuries, fossil fuels have mainly been used for 
this, as well as for heating and lighting. This has led to 
more than 1,300 Gt CO2 being released into the atmos­
phere, and ecosystem boundaries being reached (Rock­
ström et al., 2009a). 
Apart from the energy sector, which is responsi­
ble for around two­thirds of current long­lived green­
house gas emissions, land use is responsible for around 
a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions through 
CO2 emissions from the ongoing deforestation as well 
as emissions of methane (CH4) and the far more per­
sistent nitrous oxide (N2O) contributed by agriculture. 
The land­use related emissions are widespread in terms 
of space, are subject to enormous fluctuations, and are 
closely linked to natural material cycles (for example 
soil biology). Improved land­use practices, for instance 
stopping deforestation, reducing the over­fertilisation 
of cropland, or better irrigation management would 
make it possible to significantly reduce these emissions. 
The respective sectors’ institutional complexity, the 
large number of actors and a still rising global demand 
for agricultural products, however, add to the difficul­
ties (Section 4.3.4.1).
Fundamental changes in the technological develop­
ment paths of all countries are necessary in order to 
provide the chance of achieving elemental develop­
ment goals like access to food, clean water, basic health 
care, or poverty reduction, to the 50 % of the popula­
tion so far denied this chance, whilst remaining within 
the planetary boundaries. The WBGU is convinced that 
with sufficient political willingness and determination, 
these objectives are compatible. Central elements of the 
transformation into a sustainable and climate­friendly 
society are the comprehensive decarbonisation of the 
energy system, as well as significant energy efficiency 
improvements, particularly in end­use efficiency.
The fundamental transformation of contemporary 
energy and land­use systems will by no means occur 
unaided. In the WBGU’s opinion, however, the deter­
mined realisation of a climate compatible development 
path is possible. This is accompanied by considerable 
co­benefits which, even taken on their own, justify the 
efforts required for the outlined transformation. These 
include, amongst others, facilitating economic devel­
opment through universal access to safe and modern 
energy, improving long­term supply security, and a 
de­escalation of international conflicts with regard to 
energy resources, positive effects on employment in 
structurally weak regions, and the reduction of many 
of the current systems’ negative effects on the envi­
ronment (Section 4.1). Building the transformation­rel­
evant technology and infrastructure requires substan­
tial investments, and the development of new financ­
ing concepts and business models for energy services. 
In the long run, however, these initial investments will 
be more than compensated by, amongst other things, 
reduced fuel and security costs, less damage to the 
environment, and avoidance of costs associated with 
adapting to climate change, and with the consequences 
of climate change (Section 4.5).
4.1
Resources, Energy Potentials and Emissions
The WBGU shall commence its analysis of the feasibil­
ity of the transformation with an overview of the ele­
ments that are of key importance for a transformed, cli­
mate­compatible energy, economic and land­use sys­
tem. Apart from potentials and resources of different 
energy sources, technological and other options for 
emissions reductions are analysed, as well as possibili­
ties for creating carbon sinks. 
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4.1.1 
Energy Carriers
The transformation into a sustainable and climate­
friendly society requires a far reaching restructur­
ing of the global energy system. The following sum­
mary of the available energy sources and carriers shows 
that a complete decarbonisation of the energy system 
is certainly possible. It cannot be expected, however, 
that such a transformation could be purely driven by 
resource scarcity. On the contrary, the as yet still avail­
able generous volumes of fossil fuels could prove to be 
an obstacle for the transformation, as, in the absence of 
a globally applicable price for carbon, they frequently 
appear nominally cheaper, and deposits are geographi­
cally widespread. The long useful lives of existing infra­
structures (for example coal­fired power plants, trans­
port infrastructures, buildings), behavioural norms, 
and established socio­economic interest groups lead 
to inertia towards rapid changes. Apart from resources 
and technical and sustainable potentials (Box 4.1­1), 
the following sections also discuss other transforma­
tion­relevant properties of the various energy carriers. 
The method used to determine primary energy demand 
is elaborated in Box 4.1­2.
4.1.2 
Fossil Energy Carriers
4.1.2.1 
Emissions and Properties
Coal is the most greenhouse gas emission intensive of 
all fossil energy carriers. A hard coal power plant emits 
around 750–1,100 g CO2eq per kWhe (kWhe = kWh of 
generated electricity), 850–1,200 g CO2 per kWhe is 
cited for brown coal (Wagner et al., 2007). In relation 
to energy content (lower heating value), the CO2 emis­
sions are 94.6 g CO2 per MJ for hard coal and 101 g CO2 
per MJ for brown coal (IPCC, 2006).
Coal deposits are geographically widespread and, in 
the absence of a carbon price, frequently the cheap­
est energy carrier. Potential rises in oil and gas prices 
increase coal’s relative price advantage. Coal is there­
fore preferred by many national states for reasons of 
strategic supply security, and frequently enjoys subsi­
dies. Germany and, also, the USA currently generate 
approx. 48  % of their electric power from coal. In India, 
the share is 68 %, and in China even 81 %. The potential 
greenhouse gas emissions alone from all coal resources 
and reserves are approx. 58 times the 750 Gt maximum 
amount of CO2 emissions from fossil sources that should 
not be exceeded to protect the climate (Box 1.1­1).
Mineral oil has, with regard to the stored energy, a 
lower carbon content than coal, its use therefore also 
causes lower specific CO2 emissions (around 657–866 g 
CO2 per kWhe for a heavy oil based electricity supply; 
Box 4.1-1
Reserves, Resources, Potentials
Examinations of fossil fuels usually differentiate between 
reserves and resources. Reserves are known deposits that 
have been determined exactly and, from a technical and 
economic perspective, can be extracted at any given time. 
Resources also include, in addition to reserves, known depos­
its or deposits that are believed to exist but which are not yet 
extractable with current technologies and in current econom­
ic conditions. However, they are considered as extractable at 
some point in the future. Above and beyond this, a distinc­
tion is often made between conventional and unconventional 
reserves: the latter refers to known deposits whose extrac­
tion is extremely elaborate, in terms of technology, so that 
extraction could only become economically viable at some 
point in the future. Reserves, resources, and other estimated 
or assumed deposits respectively describe a total volume of 
stored energy, i. e. they are only sensibly definable for non­
renewable energy carriers. 
In the case of renewable energies, it is not their overall 
volume but the potential availability over a certain period of 
time, their potential, that is limited. The theoretical potential 
refers to the physical maximum of energy available from a 
particular source – i. e. in the case of solar energy, the total 
solar irradiation on a particular area. Only some of this energy 
flow can be utilised, from a technical point of view. This is 
taken into account when considering the technical potential, 
which also includes any boundaries regarding the realisti­
cally available areas for energy recovery. The criteria apply­
ing to area selection have not been uniformly defined in the 
respective literature; sometimes further technical, structural 
and ecological restrictions, as well as legal requirements, are 
included. The level of the technical potential of the various 
energy sources is therefore not a clearly defined value, but 
depends on a number of boundary conditions and assump­
tions.
The economic potential refers to the economically utilis­
able proportion of the technical potential under the economic 
framework conditions (at a certain point in time). 
Particularly relevant for the WBGU is the sustainability 
potential. This covers all aspects of sustainability. To deter­
mine this, various ecological and socio­economic factors 
must be balanced off against each other, and evaluated. It 
is difficult to pinpoint the sustainability potential exactly, as 
individual aspects are evaluated differently, depending on the 
author. 
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Box 4.1-2
Definitions: Primary Energy Equivalents in 
Energy Statistics
Primary energy refers to the naturally occurring energy form, 
before the loss­incurring conversion into usable energy such 
as electricity. In the case of fossil fuels and biomass (together 
currently more than 90 % of the global energy supply), the 
primary energy content can be directly measured calori­
metrically through their combustion. The technical literature 
usually uses calorific value (lower heating value). For many 
renewable energy carriers (such as wind and photovoltaic 
energy, where electricity is generated directly), and for 
nuclear energy or geothermal power, there is no clear defini­
tion as to which stage of the conversion, and which energy 
form, should be regarded as primary energy. Different insti­
tutions use different calculation methods, limiting the direct 
comparability of statistics (Macknick, 2009). Three alterna­
tive methods of calculation are usually applied: the physical 
energy content method, the substitution method, and the direct 
energy equivalency method. 
1. The physical energy content method is used by the OECD, 
the International Energy Agency (IEA), and Eurostat, 
for example. It is based on the argument that primary 
energy should refer to the first energy form for which 
there are different possibilities of technical application. 
For one kilowatt hour of electricity generated by a coal­
powered power plant, for instance, more than double the 
amount of primary energy in the form of coal is counted, 
as the heat released through combustion might also be 
used differently (for example in heating systems). In the 
case of electricity generation through hydropower, wind, 
oceanic or tidal energy, and photovoltaic energy, on the 
other hand, the energy content of the electricity gen­
erated is counted as primary energy equivalent. In the 
case of nuclear energy, and geothermal or solar thermal 
electricity generation, the heat is counted as the primary 
energy form. 
2. The substitution method is used in various different forms 
by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), and 
BP. It is based on the convention of showing for all forms 
of secondary energy (for example electricity, or heat) the 
volume of fossil fuels that would be required alternatively 
to generate the same amount of secondary energy in con­
ventional power plants. The hypothetical efficiency fac­
tors applied can either be fixed (i. e. a uniform 38 %, for 
example), or they can reflect national variations of tech­
nologies (and the differences in the installed fossil power 
plant equipment), or also, in the case of projections, they 
can vary with time (for example, assume convergence in 
technical standards, or learning progress). 
3. The direct energy equivalency method is used by the UN 
Statistical Commission (UN, 2008a), in numerous IPCC 
reports, the Global Energy Assessment (GEA, 2011), 
and also frequently in research literature for long­term 
energy scenarios. It relies on the convention that all elec­
tricity which has not been generated through combustion 
processes is represented directly as primary energy. It is 
therefore a standardised variant of the physical energy 
content method. This choice of representation is partic­
ularly useful in scenarios which describe a fundamen­
tal conversion of the energy system, where non­fossil 
energy sources gain great significance (Nakicenovic et 
al., 2000). One of the main advantages is that all energy 
sources which do not rely on combustion processes are 
represented in a comparable way. In the physical energy 
content method, for example, one unit of electricity gen­
erated by geothermal energy or concentrated solar heat 
is shown up to five times higher than  photovoltaic energy 
(depending on thermal efficiency); in the direct energy 
equivalency method, in contrast, it is shown with the 
same value: in these cases, primary and secondary energy 
have the same value. 
Table 4.1­1 illustrates an example of the differences that 
result for various energy carriers through the application of 
the three different methods described above. In scenarios 
which accord particular significance to renewable energies, 
the volume of primary energy shown increases most over 
time when the substitution method is used, and least when 
the direct energy equivalent method is applied. 
Unless marked otherwise, this report used the direct ener-
gy equivalency method, and figures showing primary energy 
were adjusted accordingly. 
Table 4.1-1
Global primary energy consumption 2008 according to three different calculation methods. For each method, the absolute 
primary energy contributions of the individual energy carriers are shown, plus their share of the global primary energy 
supply in percent.
Source: WBGU, based on the data contained in IEA, 2010a
Physical Energy Content 
Method
Substitution Method Direct Energy Equivalency 
Method
Primary  energy 
demand 
 absolute value
[EJ]
Proportion 
of global 
demand 
[ %]
Primary  energy 
demand 
 absolute value
[EJ]
Proportion 
of global 
demand
[ %]
Primary  energy 
demand 
 absolute value
[EJ]
Proportion  
of global 
demand
[ %]
Fossil Energy 418  81 418  79 418  85
Nuclear Power  30  6  26  5  10  2
Renewables  66  13  84  16  64  13
Total 514 100 528 100 492 100
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WEC, 2004). In relation to energy content (lower heat­
ing value), the CO2 emissions are 73.3 g CO2 per MJ for 
crude oil (IPCC, 2006). Oil is the most important energy 
carrier for the transport sector. Its substitution through 
emissions­free alternatives is one of the most difficult 
elements of a comprehensive transformation. 
Methane (natural gas) causes, in relation to energy 
content, the least CO2 emissions of the fossil energy 
carriers. A gas powered combined cycle power plant 
emits approx. 425 g CO2eq per kWh of generated elec­
tricity (WBGU, 2010a), the bandwidth is around 400­
550 g CO2 per kWhe (Wagner et al., 2007). In relation 
to energy content (lower heating value), CO2 emissions 
are running at 56.1 g CO2 per MJ for natural gas (IPCC, 
2006). Gas power plants are more energy­efficient 
than coal power plants, and require lower investments. 
They can also be controlled quickly, and are therefore 
compatible with high shares of fluctuating renewable 
energy sources like wind and solar power. They cause 
relatively little air pollution, and can therefore also be 
used in densely populated areas, making a combined 
heat and power (CHP) use possible. Methane is also 
eminently suitable for powering small decentralised 
CHP plants in the form of communal combined heat 
and power plants. 
In the long­term evolution of the global energy sys­
tem, methane must be seen as a step towards energy 
system decarbonisation (Nakicenovic, 1996; Grü­
bler and Nakicenovic, 1996; Jepma and Nakicenovic, 
2006). Methane storage and distribution systems can 
potentially be adjusted to include mixed gases with 
higher shares of hydrogen (a greenhouse gas emission 
free energy carrier). There is also the option of power­
ing conventional combustion engines with methane, for 
example, thereby facilitating the technological conver­
sion to low­carbon transport systems that are mineral 
oil independent. 
4.1.2.2 
Potentials
Table 4.1­2 shows estimated deposits and current use 
of fossil energy carriers. Reducing global fossil fuel con­
sumption for reasons of resource scarcity alone is not 
mandatory, even though there may be substantial price 
fluctuations and regional or structural shortages as we 
have seen in the past. 
The presently known coal resources and reserves 
alone probably amount to around 3,000 times the 
amount currently mined in a year. In terms of resource 
potential, a current­level demand could therefore be 
met for many hundreds of years to come. Coal is also 
relatively evenly spread across the globe; each con­
tinent holds considerable deposits. The supply hori­
zon (reserve to production ratio), at 40–50 years, is 
clearly much lower for conventional mineral oil and 
gas reserves; the resource potentials, however, when 
including some resources or deposits which are cur­
rently still classified as ‘unconventional’, again exceed 
the current consumption rate by far more than one 
hundred years. However, serious ecological damage is 
frequently associated with fossil energy mining, par­
ticularly of unconventional deposits in oil sands and oil 
shale.
Over the past few years, new processes have been 
commercially developed in the natural gas extrac­
tion sector, facilitating the affordable unlocking of gas 
deposits previously considered ‘unconventional’. These 
processes allow the extraction of gas from smaller and 
more compact deposits with a low pore volume, and 
from flat coal seams; both are far more frequently 
found and evenly distributed on a global level than 
traditional gas fields. Tight gas and shale gas extrac­
tion, however, can potentially be accompanied by 
seismic activities and the pollution of groundwater 
basins and inshore waters, for example through drill­
ing muds, rinsing agents or the application of hydraulic 
methods to increase the permeability of the reservoir 
rocks (hydraulic fracturing). Just like boring into as yet 
hardly explored depths, it therefore needs special regu­
lations. As a global distribution network for liquid gas 
already exists, in the form of tankers and loading ter­
minals, it is to be expected that an effective gas market 
will develop, marked by competitiveness with regard 
to price fixing, and that oil and gas prices will cease 
to be linked. The rising share of liquid gas (currently 
around 10 % of overall gas consumption) significantly 
increases supply security, reducing the danger of sup­
ply interruptions that international pipeline networks 
are subject to, for example. 
Gas hydrates, dense, snowy methane aggregates 
that are solid under high pressure and low tempera­
tures, are another form of gas deposits, found both in 
the deep sea and subterraneously in permafrost. The 
possibility of continued greenhouse gas emissions 
from methane hydrates as a consequence of arctic per­
mafrost soil thaw, or a thawing of the relatively flat 
Siberian continental shelf, is being discussed as a pos­
sible nonlinear disruptive earth system process. The 
potential extraction of this energy carrier is also being 
examined. Many states, including the USA, Japan, 
India, China and South Korea, have launched rele­
vant research programmes. Estimates regarding glo­
bal deposits vary greatly; however, all are in the zet­
tajoule range, for example 70,000–700,000 EJ (Krey et 
al., 2009). The Global Energy Assessment report esti­
mates the theoretical potential to be 2,650–2,450,000 
EJ (GEA, 2011), i. e. possibly more than a thousand 
times the current annual total energy consumption. 
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Approximately a tenth (1,200–245,600 EJ) is rated 
as potentially extractable, from a technological point 
of view. In its special report ‘The Future Oceans’, the 
WBGU advised against applied research for methane 
hydrate extraction, as mining bears considerable risks 
and methane hydrates do not represent a sustainable 
energy source (WBGU, 2006).
4.1.2.3 
Risks and Framework Conditions for Use
Fossil energy carriers cause a wide range of different 
ecological damages over their entire lifecycle, from 
resource extraction to disposal. They frequently repre­
sent a health hazard to the population, damage natu­
ral ecosystems, land used for agriculture and forestry, 
impact negatively on yields, and are also harmful to 
buildings, cultural goods and technical infrastructures. 
The volume of material transported as a consequence 
of the fossil energy system is gigantic: annual recovery 
of fossil energy carriers already amounted to 970 mil­
lion t at the beginning of the 20th century. By 2005, 
this volume increased to around 11.8 billion t annu­
ally (Krausmann et al., 2009); it should be considered 
that these figures only relate to the direct extraction 
of resources, and exclude mining dumps, mobilised cap 
rock or  lixiviated oil sands.
Between them, supertankers and coal freighters 
make up more than half of the total sea freight vol­
ume (UNCTAD, 2009). Related accidents leading to oil 
spillage cause considerable ecological damage, as can 
chronic leakages during oil extraction, transport in 
pipelines and processing. 
As extraction initially focused on the largest and 
most accessible fossil resource depots, it has become 
increasingly necessary to explore energy resources in 
ever greater depths, offshore, or in remote, partially 
ice­covered regions. Increasingly, smaller deposits are 
also being mined. Both the initial resources required, 
and the energetic return on investment, have signifi­
cantly decreased over the course of the 20th century 
(Cleveland et al., 1984). 
However, without a doubt, the biggest risk asso­
ciated with the use of fuels is their climate impacting 
emissions. Table 4.1­3 shows the CO2 emissions which 
would be generated by an exhaustive use of the fossil 
energy resources, reserves and further occurences illus­
trated in Table 4.1­2. This is compared with the budget 
of CO2 emissions which should not be exceeded in order 
to avoid a rise in mean temperature of more than 2 °C 
compared to pre­industrial levels (Box 1.1­1). 
Carbon dioxide capture and storage creates possibili­
ties for the use of fossil energy carriers with signifi­
cantly lower emissions (Section 4.1.3).
4.1.3 
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage
As a technical option, to gain time for the conversion 
to emissions­free energy sources whilst utilising at 
least some of the large fossil energy carrier reserves, 
technical solutions for separating CO2 from the emis­
sions of stationary plants are under discussion, as well 
as options for the subsequent storage of compressed 
CO2 in geological formations (Carbon Dioxide Capture 
and Storage, CCS). CCS is a necessary mitigation meas­
ure for countries that continue to use fossil energies, 
if anthropogenic global warming of more than 2 °C is 
to be avoided. Beyond this, a combination of bioen­
ergy with CCS is also under discussion as an option for 
Table 4.1-2
Global occurrences of fossil and nuclear sources. There are high uncertainties associated with the assessment of reserves and 
resources. Please note: This table shows corrected values and differs from the printed and earlier pdf versions. 
Source: the representative figures shown here are WBGU estimates on the basis of the GEA, 2011
Historical  production 
up to 2008
Production in 
2008
Reserves Resources Further 
 deposits
[EJ] [EJ] [EJ] [EJ] [EJ]
Conventional oil  6,500 170  6,350  4,967
Unconventional oil  500  23  3,800  34,000  47,000
Conventional gas  3,400 118  6,000  8,041
Unconventional gas  160  12 42,500  56,500  490,000
Coal  7,100 150 21,000 440,000
Total fossil sources 17,660 473 79,650 543,507  537,000
Conventional uranium  1,300  26  2,400  7,400
Unconventional uranium  4,100 2,600,000
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withdrawing CO2 from the atmosphere in the long run 
(Box 4.1­3).
Technologies available today are capable of captur­
ing around 85–95 % of the CO2 generated by a power 
plant. Taking into account that the energy required to 
generate a certain amount of electric power increases 
by around 10–40 % through the use of CCS technology, 
CCS can achieve a net reduction of CO2 emissions from 
power plants of approx. 80–90 % (IPCC, 2005). 
There are already various ongoing projects for com­
pressed CO2 storage in geological reservoirs such as 
partially exhausted oil or gas fields, saline aquifers or 
unused coal seams. In 2007, four such enterprises were 
active; the longest­running project, Sleipner (carried 
out by the Norwegian oil company Statoil), has stored 
approx. 1 million t of CO2 per year in geological forma­
tions below the seabed since 1997. Other projects are 
Snøhvit (Norway), Weyburn (Canada) and Sala (Alge­
ria). The amounts of CO2 stored each year by these 
projects, however, are far lower than the amounts that 
would be generated by a coal power plant with CCS 
every year. Even though all of the components have 
been tried and tested, CCS technology as an overall 
system is far from fully developed, and carries many 
risks. The IEA recommended the initiation of at least 20 
large­scale CCS demonstration projects in 2010 to facil­
itate the use of CCS technology by 2020 (IEA, 2008c).
CCS technology increases the investments and oper­
ating expenditure required by fossil powered plants, 
and decreases their efficiency (Herzog, 2010). Capture 
costs are currently estimated to run at US$ 40–45 per 
t CO2 in coal powered, and US$ 50–90 per t CO2 in gas 
powered plants (IEA, 2008c). This excludes transport 
and storage costs, which vary depending on locality, 
estimated to be in the range of US$ 5–15 per t CO2 by 
Herzog et al. (2010). Further excluded are the potential 
costs for liability. As a consequence, in a modern coal 
powered plant, the cost of electricity would increase 
by US$ ct 4 per kWh (Herzog, 2010). The IPCC spe­
cial report on CCS states increased electricity costs of 
US$ ct 1–5 per kWh, based on the technology avail­
able in 2002 (IPCC, 2005). CCS is also under discussion 
as an option for process­related CO2 emissions from the 
industrial sector. There is a range of technologies avail­
able for direct CO2 capture from production processes. 
A common factor is that all of these technologies cause 
additional energetic and economic costs and are only 
viable if greenhouse gas emissions carry a price tag, or 
are taxed, as is the case already in Norway, for example. 
Apart from the four projects named above, plants like 
these have so far been installed only as pilot projects, 
with the corresponding scale, including in Germany.
Plants which produce different products simultane­
ously by means of process integration, for example liq­
Table 4.1-3
Potential emissions as a consequence of the use of fossil reserves and resources. Also illustrated is their potential for 
endangering the 2 °C guard rail. This risk is expressed as the factor by which, assuming complete exhaustion of the respective 
reserves and resources, the resultant CO2 emissions would exceed the 750 Gt CO2 budget permissible from fossil sources until 
2050 (Box 1.1­1). The figures refer to CO2 alone, other greenhouse gases have not been taken into account. They are based on 
the values in Table 4.1­2. Please note: This table shows corrected values and differs from the printed and earlier pdf versions. 
Source: based on Table 4.1­1 and GEA, 2011
Historical 
produc-
tion up to 
2008
Production 
in 2008
Reserves Resources Further 
 occurences
Total: 
reserves, 
resources 
and further 
occurences
Factor by 
which these 
emissions 
alone exceed 
the 2 °C emis-
sions budget
[Gt CO2] [Gt CO2] [Gt CO2] [Gt CO2] [Gt CO2] [Gt CO2]
Conventional oil  505 13  493  386 –  879  1
Unconventional oil  39  2  295  2,640  3,649  6,584  9
Conventional gas  192  7  339  455 –  794  1
Unconventional 
gas
 9  1 2,405  3,197 27,724 33,325  44
Coal  666 14 1,970 41,277 – 43,247  58
Total fossil fuels  1,411 36 5,502 47,954 31,373 84,829 113
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uid fuels, electricity, heat and CO2 for storage, do have 
economic benefits (GEA, 2011). Hybridisation of the 
raw material basis, for example the mixing of biofuels 
with fossil energy carriers, can also lead to a cost­effec­
tive improvement of process chains in terms of their 
greenhouse gas balance. 
4.1.3.1 
Geological Storage Capacity
The IPCC estimates the geological storage capacity of 
oil and gas fields (including storage options that are 
not economical) to be 675–900 Gt CO2, of unminable 
coal seams 3–200 Gt CO2, and of deep saline formations 
1,000 to possibly 10,000 Gt CO2 (IPCC, 2005). It should 
be taken into account that the storage potential of the 
oil and gas fields only becomes available once the fos­
sil energy carriers have been exhausted. Moreover, the 
application of extraction technologies which increase 
the permeability of the reservoir rock formations (frac­
turing) can impact the tightness of the storage sites. The 
IPCC estimates this century’s total economic potential 
for CCS to be 200–2,000 Gt CO2.
4.1.3.2 
Risks and Framework Conditions
Particularly important in terms of long­term climate 
change mitigation is the risk of gradual leakage of the 
stored CO2. If we really did store 2,000 Gt of CO2 this 
century, then a leakage rate of as little as 0.1 % annually 
(equal to a retention time of 1,000 years) would lead to 
2 Gt of uncontrolled annual CO2 emissions, which would 
endanger any stabilisation of the atmospheric CO2 con­
centration. The WBGU therefore recommends that only 
storage facilities with a guaranteed retention time of at 
least 10,000 years are used (WBGU, 2006). Whilst the 
WBGU objects to a feed­in of CO2 into seawater, it esti­
mates that the storage of CO2 in stores below the seabed 
is still less risky than the storage in land­based stores.
Since the 1970s, CO2 has also been injected into 
oil fields, together with other chemicals, to counter­
act sinking pressure and increase the yield (enhanced 
oil recovery, EOR). The Canadian Weyburn project, 
started in 2000, is the first EOR project with planned 
subsequent long­term CO2 storage (IPCC, 2005). Early 
in 2011, allegations were made that the injected CO2 
had leaked from the store, and already caused dam­
ages such as the death of animals (see, for example, 
the Frankfurter Rundschau, 24 January 2011); other 
reports, however, doubt this (PTRC, 2011). Undoubt­
edly, though, there is the risk of leakages, particularly in 
connection with boreholes, which, among other things, 
could lead to groundwater degradation. The sealing of 
boreholes and their long­term monitoring are therefore 
particularly important (IPCC, 2005). 
In 2008, according to the IEA, not a single compre­
hensive, detailed regulation framework for CCS appli­
cation had been set up in any country (IEA, 2008c). 
With its Directive on the Geological Storage of Car­
bon Dioxide (EU, 2009), the EU has since presented a 
comprehensive regulation framework for CCS applica­
tion. Some member states (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Austria, Roma­
nia, Spain) have already adopted the requirements of 
this directive as national law (as at March 2011). The 
implementation deadline was June 2011. 
Apart from the scientific, technical and regulatory 
questions still open, it is also unclear as yet whether 
Box 4.1-3
Sequestration of Biologically Fixed Carbon: 
‘Negative Emissions’
Through photosynthesis, plants absorb CO2 from the air, and 
store the contained carbon in form of biomass. Long­term 
storage of this carbon can therefore create a CO2 sink. A tech­
nical option for this would be the use of bioenergy together 
with capture and storage of the CO2 produced (CCS). In its 
‘Future Bioenergy and Sustainable Land Use’ report (2009a), 
the WBGU estimates that the sustainable bioenergy potential 
would allow the capture and sequestration of 1.8–3.5 Gt CO2 
per year from biomass. In 2009, the use of fossil fuels and the 
cement industry alone led to emissions totalling 31 Gt CO2, 
with deforestation in the tropics causing a further 4 Gt CO2 
emissions (GCP, 2011). If this were used as the benchmark, 
then it would take 10–20 years to compensate the emissions 
of a single year with the sequestration of CO2 from biomass. 
The WBGU believes that it is extremely difficult to achieve 
substantial negative emissions.
Another option could be the sequestration of biogenic 
coal. If this charcoal (biochar) were to be introduced into 
the soil, firstly, the carbon contained would be stored, and 
secondly, a further climate change mitigation effect could be 
achieved through enhanced plant growth due to improved soil 
properties. The carbon retention period in the soil, however, 
is not clear, and it therefore may not be justified to speak 
of negative emissions here. Research on this subject is still 
in its infancy, meaning that there are no potential estimates 
available either. Fundamentally, however, this option, too, is 
restricted by the sustainably available volume of usable bio­
mass, thus competing with bioenergy use. Both options are 
therefore neither immediately available, nor can they com­
pensate current anthropogenic emissions. They are therefore 
long­term and slowly effective possibilities for climate change 
mitigation, which will gain importance only once anthropo­
genic CO2 emissions have decreased to a fraction of current 
levels. 
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people would accept CO2 storage in their immediate 
vicinity (IPCC, 2005). 
4.1.4 
Nuclear Energy
4.1.4.1 
Emissions and Properties
Compared with coal powered plants, nuclear energy 
causes very low levels of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Process chain analyses point to lifecycle emissions of 
around 16–66 g CO2eq per kWhe, other references cite 
a range of 2–126 g CO2eq per kWhe. Variations result 
from, amongst other factors, the quality and concen­
tration of the uranium ore used, and whether it is being 
assumed that the reactor fuel is reprocessed (WEC, 
2004; Lübbert, 2007; Lenzen, 2008; Sovacool, 2008; 
Kleiner, 2008; GEA, 2011). 
As with most renewable energies, most of the costs 
for nuclear energy are incurred in advance. The oper­
ating costs of existing plants are relatively low; the 
planning and construction costs, on the other hand, 
are often substantial in comparison with these, not 
least because cost escalation and delays are common 
on these projects (Grübler, 2010). The achieved over­
all running time of the plants therefore impacts their 
viability, although this not only depends on technical 
factors, but also on political decisions.
Stringent safety requirements for control systems, 
cooling, reactor pressure vessels and containment, as 
well as for the overall quality control, incur average 
installation costs of between 2,500 and 3,800 US$ per 
kWe, depending on reactor type and location (GEA, 
2011). These prices are overnight costs, i. e. they do not 
include financing costs, which, due to the long plan­
ning and construction times, are substantial (Schneider 
et al., 2009). 
Globally, 442 reactors with a capacity of around 375 
GWe were in operation in 2011 (IAEA, 2011). 46 % of 
these are located in Europe (including Eastern Europe 
and Russia), 30 % in North America, and 21 % in the 
Far East (Japan and China). Only around 3 % of glo­
bal reactor output is generated in Africa, Latin America, 
the Middle East and southern Asia. Together, the USA, 
France and Japan produced around 57 % of electricity 
generated by nuclear power in 2010. 
Globally, nuclear reactors provide 8 % of installed 
power generating capacity, and contribute around 13 % 
to power generation, as the output capacity can be uti­
lised approx. 80 % of the time. Nuclear energy is there­
fore often used for base load supply in power grids. 
4.1.4.2 
Potentials
The raw material supply for nuclear fuels is guar­
anteed for decades from known geological deposits 
(Table 4.1­2). Explorative activities have significantly 
increased recently, and the discovery of further depos­
its is to be expected. Apart from uranium extraction 
through mining, there are several methods for using 
secondary sources, such as existing stores, fissile mate­
rial from nuclear weapons, or reprocessed waste. Cur­
rently, particularly the use of depleted uranium from 
nuclear weapons has led to power plants using con­
siderably more uranium than is being extracted. The 
IEA believes that it is certainly possible to triple global 
nuclear capacity by 2050. India is working on a ura­
nium­independent thorium based reactor type as it has 
considerably larger deposits of this.
Also decisive in terms of assessing resource sup­
ply security is whether spent fuel elements are being 
reprocessed, the plutonium contained in these is sep­
arated, or even whether highly enriched nuclear fuel 
is propagated in breeder reactors. From an economic 
point of view, however, there are currently no incen­
tives to do so. Most plants are therefore being run with 
fuel which is used just once. Some countries are never­
theless pursuing the development of technology for the 
production of mixed oxide fuel elements (plutonium or 
uranium, MOX), which have the potential to consider­
ably extend the resource basis. Their use, however, is 
associated with significant additional risks and far more 
elaborate disassembly. MOX fuel elements are mainly 
produced in England and France, and, to a lesser extent, 
in Japan, Russia and India; China is also pursuing such a 
programme. 30 of the reactors in Europe use MOX fuel 
elements, including reactors in Germany, Belgium and 
Switzerland. Breeder reactor technology for plutonium 
production is limited to only a few countries, including 
the USA, Russia, France and Japan, all of which, apart 
from Japan, are de facto nuclear weapons states. India 
is pursuing this path, hoping to be able to operate on 
a closed fuel cycle; China is also pursuing the use of 
breeder technology. 
4.1.4.3 
Risks and Framework Conditions for Use
Central events affecting nuclear energy development, 
significantly slowing down further expansion of the 
technology since the early 1990s in most countries, 
have been the disastrous accidents in Chernobyl in 
the Soviet Union (1986), and Three Mile Island in the 
USA (1979). The Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan 
(March 2011) has rekindled the global debate on the 
controllability of this technology, and safety standards. 
At the centre of the discussion are the risk of serious 
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damages, the still unresolved issues concerning final 
storage, the danger of uncontrolled proliferation, and 
also, not least, the high costs resulting from these. 
Germany – like a range of other countries – has 
already followed a strategy of phasing out nuclear power 
for several years, due to a decline in public acceptance, 
accelerated in the aftermath of the disaster in Japan. 
As a consequence of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, 
the German federal government decreed a three­month 
moratorium for the operation of seven of its older 
nuclear power stations. Austria outlawed the use of 
nuclear energy as early as 1978. Other countries view 
nuclear energy as an essential element of their strategic 
energy supply, and also of their climate change mitiga­
tion plans. Moreover, nuclear programmes are seen as a 
national status symbol by many developing and newly 
industrialising countries. Whether this will still apply in 
future, considering the events in Fukushima, remains to 
be seen. In China, where 27 new reactors are currently 
under construction, a moratorium for the building of 
new nuclear power stations, or those under construc­
tion, has been decided on, although a specific time­
frame has not yet been given. By now, reactor technol­
ogy is dominated by light water reactors, which account 
for around 89 % of installed capacity. As these can be 
operated with low enriched uranium, this technology 
bears comparatively low proliferation risks. 
Globally, there is no long­term repository for highly 
radioactive waste so far; numerous facilities and dif­
ferent technological approaches are currently under 
development. Most of the spent fuel material is accu­
mulated in interim storage facilities.
Cost escalation, delays on projects, lack of accept­
ance by the population and the existence of alterna­
tives make a ‘nuclear renaissance’ an unlikely prospect 
in many industrialised states. Due to the unsolved risks 
(reaching over the entire lifecycle, from mining to the 
unsolved problem of final storage, in particular also 
the risk of serious damages) and costs accompanying 
nuclear technologies, as well as the associated prolif­
eration and security risks and the above described path 
dependencies, the WBGU rejects a nuclear­based cli­
mate change mitigation strategy (WBGU, 2004).
4.1.5 
Renewable Energies
4.1.5.1 
Emissions and Properties
The use of renewable energies for power generation is 
usually associated with considerably lower greenhouse 
gas emissions than the use of fossil fuels. Extremely 
low specific lifecycle emissions of around 25 g CO2eq 
per kWhe electricity (WBGU, 2010a; 6.8–68 g CO2 per 
kWhe) are generated by wind power, followed by solar 
power with around 75 g CO2eq per kWhe (12.5–360 
g CO2 per kWhe). Hydropower can also be associated 
with extremely low emissions of around 25 g CO2eq 
per kWhe (WBGU, 2010a; 3.5–120 g CO2 per kWhe), 
although this depends on location. In some cases of 
shallow reservoirs in productive tropical regions, meth­
ane emissions can lead to higher emissions from hydro­
power. However, reservoirs acting as a carbon sink were 
also examined. Particular attention should be called to 
hydropower’s extensive co­benefits: 75 % of all dams 
are primarily built for agricultural irrigation, flood pre­
vention, or to secure the municipal water supply (IPCC, 
2007c). Hydropower can also frequently supply flexi­
ble balancing power. 
Analysis of bioenergy’s greenhouse gas emissions 
balance shows a mixed picture. It can vary greatly 
according to raw material basis, geographical location, 
process and final product. Some bioenergy pathways 
can certainly produce higher greenhouse gas emis­
sions than the use of fossil fuels (WBGU, 2010a). 
Greenhouse gas emissions from geothermal energy are 
location­dependent; scientific studies state values of 
20–120 g CO2 per kWhe (Sullivan et al., 2010). Some 
very deep water­bearing strata can contain consider­
able amounts of dissolved carbon dioxide and toxic ele­
ments, although this problem can be solved by recircu­
lation of the liquid or the transfer of heat into second­
ary cycles.
With the exception of geothermal energy, renewa­
ble energy sources are characterised by relatively low 
spatial energy density. Therefore, large areas of land 
are needed to cover the major share of the energy sup­
ply with renewable energy sources. This can be par­
tially solved through the multifunctional use of land, 
for example by establishing wind farms on agricultural 
land. 
Usually, capital­intensive conversion technologies 
are necessary to make renewable energy sources usa­
ble. The project risk can also be considerable, for exam­
ple in the case of major hydropower plants. Renewable 
energies therefore hold little economic appeal in con­
temporary market models, for example, when compari­
sons with other energy carriers are made whilst apply­
ing substantial discount rates, thereby marginalising 
the future cost of fossil options. Currently, the prime 
costs for renewable energies are frequently still above 
those calculated for fossil energy carriers. As many of 
the technologies are relatively new, it is to be expected 
that costs can be significantly reduced through tech­
nological learning progress. Well­located hydropower, 
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wind and biomass plants have already achieved cost 
parity to fossil sources. 
Renewable energies can make access to clean, safe 
and easy to use energy possible particularly in low 
income countries, thereby contributing considerably 
to the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals. If the energy carriers were to be integrated into 
international markets (electricity from hydropower, liq­
uid fuels), they could considerably improve the trade 
balance of the exporting countries. Renewable ener­
gies also contribute to economic development and 
value creation in rural or structurally weak regions of 
industrialised countries. They extend the value chain 
into rural regions (by generating business tax income 
and jobs), thus reducing regional income inequalities 
(DENA, 2010).
The various renewable sources have different char­
acteristics with regard to their integration into the 
energy system. Some of the economically attractive and 
technically relatively advanced renewable sources such 
as wind and solar power are also subject to considerable 
fluctuations in terms of energy availability. Integration 
of a larger share of fluctuating energy sources into the 
system requires a conversion of energy infrastructure 
(Section 4.4.2). As yet, there have been few analyses 
of the cost implications of such a conversion. In this 
context, regional studies such as the one carried out 
by the SRU (2010) indicate substantial potential sav­
ings, provided that the international trade with on­grid 
energy carriers is stepped up. Bioenergy and hydro­
power are renewable energies that are particularly rel­
evant in terms of system integration, as they can also be 
used to balance fluctuating feed­in. Pump storage cur­
rently represents the cheapest form of electricity stor­
age, although its potential depends on location. 
4.1.5.2 
Potentials
Not only the theoretical potentials, but also the techni­
cal and sustainable potentials of renewable energies far 
exceed current global energy demand – 492 EJ primary 
and 345 EJ final energy in 2008. A summary show­
ing the estimated technical potential of the different 
renewable energies from various literature sources can 
be found in Table 4.1­4. The technical potential of solar 
power alone exceeds the current overall consumption 
by more than one order of magnitude; in some sources, 
this also applies to geothermal energy. This means that 
in theory, it is possible to meet the overall global energy 
demand fully with renewable energies. 
From the WBGU’s point of view, the decisive fac­
tor for assessing the role of renewable energies in a 
future, sustainable transformed energy system is not 
their technical potential, but their sustainable potential 
(Box 4.1­1). The WBGU presented an extensive analy­
sis of this aspect in 2003. Since then, technological and 
other parameters have developed further, so the figures 
given in 2003 must be partially updated and reviewed. 
Table 4.1­4 shows the WBGU’s current assessment of 
the sustainable potential of various renewable energies.
The assessment of the technical potential in some 
cases varies greatly depending on the author. The range 
is particularly broad where geothermal energy is con­
cerned. Assessments of wind and solar power poten­
tials also show considerable differences; however, some 
of these are due to technological advances. In the case 
of wind power, for example, progress has been made 
with regard to turbine mast height and rotor area, i. e. 
individual turbine output capacity. Apart from this, off­
shore farms, for instance in the form of floating struc­
tures, can now be built in much deeper water than the 
40 metres frequently used in the past, meaning that the 
technical potential was adjusted upwards in comparison 
with earlier studies (IAEA, 2000; WBGU, 2004). Solar 
power has also seen considerable progress, for exam­
ple in the conversion efficiency of amorphous silicon 
and thin film technologies. New experiences have been 
gathered with plants which generate electricity through 
concentrating solar thermal processes. 
To evaluate the sustainable potential, individual 
restrictions were taken into account for the various 
sources. 
The main consideration with regard to biomass use is 
that it must not compete with food production, and that 
biodiversity must be preserved (WBGU, 2010a). Appli­
cations with little impact on climate protection, evident 
in certain biofuel pathways, have also been excluded. 
Where geothermal energy is concerned, a distinction 
must be made between thermal and electrical use. Only 
locations with a very high supply temperature can be 
considered for generating electric power, whereas the 
use of low temperature heat recovery shows by far the 
greatest potential. Although hydropower is an estab­
lished technology, its further extension is restricted 
through, amongst other aspects, the environmental 
impact on biodiversity, the siltation of large reservoirs, 
the sediment dynamics, the methane emissions from 
flooded areas and the effect on the groundwater table. 
Solar and wind power also exhibit restrictions in 
terms of their sustainable potential. Examples are the 
competition, in terms of land usage, with food produc­
tion in the case of solar plants, or the noise emissions 
associated with wind farms.
In comparison to earlier studies, the technical 
potentials of biomass are now viewed far more criti­
cally, owing to land­use competition (Box 4.1­4), and 
are rated as lower by newer studies than, for instance, 
in the World Energy Assessment (IAEA, 2000). The 
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WBGU (2003) specified the annual sustainable poten­
tial of biomass at 100 EJ for modern sources and 5 EJ 
for traditional use. More recently, the WBGU (2009a) 
estimated the annual sustainable bioenergy potential 
from energy crops to be 30–120 EJ, plus an additional 
50 EJ from waste and residues. 
4.1.5.3 
Risks and Framework Conditions for Use
The use of renewable energies can impact adversely on 
environment and society. Major hydropower projects, 
for example, can require the resettlement of the local 
population, and destroy valuable habitats. Major bio­
mass projects can also contribute directly to habi­
tat damage, and to soil overuse and water shortages, 
or impact negatively through indirect effects such as 
induced land­use changes in other regions of the world, 
or increased food prices (Box  4.1­4). In the case of 
wind energy, landscape conservation, bird protection 
and noise pollution are frequently cited as arguments 
against expansion. Accordingly, offshore plants in Ger­
many, for instance, are expanded at great water depths 
and out of sight of the coast, also taking into account 
bird protection areas, leading to additional costs.
Renewable sources can also be overused: biomass 
potentials can be reduced through erosion and humus 
loss, soil salinisation or nutrient depletion. The hydro­
power potential of reservoirs can sink drastically if 
these are filled with sediment. Geothermal sources can 
also lose their potential in the long run as a result of 
cooling down. These risks are far slighter with wind and 
solar power; however, their resource potentials could 
potentially be affected by climate change. Changes in 
precipitation patterns and meltwater flows from gla­
ciers, for example, can significantly impede the poten­
tial of hydropower and biomass. 
The temporary support of renewable energy expan­
sion, firmly recommended by the WBGU, must there­
fore be accompanied by a legal framework which guar­
antees the sustainability of the use of renewable ener­
gies. This applies particularly to the use of bioenergy 
(WBGU, 2010a). 
4.1.6 
A Vision as a Thought Experiment: Meeting 
 Global Energy Demand Fully with Renewable 
Energies
The sustainable potential of renewable energies is fun­
damentally sufficient to provide the world with energy 
(Section 4.1.5). The following thought experiment 
shows that if the expansion of renewable energies were 
vigorously pursued, from a technological point of view, 
sufficient renewable energies could be unlocked to meet 
the global energy demand by the middle of the cen­
tury. Barriers such as the economic lifetime of existing 
infrastructures or upfront costs have been consciously 
excluded from this calculation. This vision relies on a 
rapid phasing out of fossil­based electric power gener­
ation, the replacing of mineral oil in transport systems 
through electromobility and regenerative fuels, and the 
replacing of fossil fuels used for heating and cooling 
through electric heat pumps, solar thermal energy and 
CHP technology. 
If sufficient renewable energies are to be available as 
early as the middle of the century to fully cover global 
demand, the economy’s final energy intensity must sub­
stantially decrease. The vision assumes that, through 
efficiency measures, the global demand for heating and 
cooling can be lowered by 1 % each year, and that the 
growth in energy demand for transport systems, as well 
as the global growth of the demand for electric power, 
can be restricted to 1 % per year. This can be achieved 
with a range of measures. These include the introduc­
tion of electromobility (the conventional combustion 
Table 4.1-4
Renewable energies: theoretical, technical and economic potentials. The sustainable potentials are estimates by the WBGU. 
For comparison: global primary energy consumption in 2008 amounted to 492 EJ.
Sources: WBGU, 2004, 2010a; IEA, 2010a; GEA, 2011
Theoretical 
 Potential
Technical Potential Sustainable 
 Potential
Production 2008
[EJ/year] [EJ/year] [EJ/year] [EJ]
Biomass  2,400  800  100 50,3
Geothermal Energy  41,700,000  720  22  0,4
Hydropower  504,000  160  12 11,6
Solar Energy  3,900,000  280,000  10,000  0,5
Wind Energy  110,000  1,700  >1,000  0,8
Total: Renewable 
 Energies
 46,000,000  283,500  >11,000 64
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engine has an efficiency factor of merely 20–25 %, 
the electric motor, on the other hand, 70–80 %), the 
increased thermal insulation of buildings, the use of 
heat pumps, and the implementation of industrial effi­
ciency measures. Overall, the final energy demand is 
contained through these measures, to the extent that 
the fictitious yearly primary energy demand, accord­
ing to the substitution method (Box 4.1­2), rises up to 
a maximum of 700 EJ by 2050. The primary energy 
demand, determined according to the method of direct 
energy equivalency, even falls, due to the use of renew­
able energies, which do not cause any waste heat losses 
(Figure 4.1­1). For the expansion paths outlined in 
Figure 4.1­1, historical annual growth rates for wind 
power and photovoltaic energy were initially carried 
forward, then reduced once larger shares of overall gen­
eration were achieved. For the other technologies, for 
some of which no historical growth rates were known, 
or which are technologies not as yet established on the 
market (renewable gas such as, for example, hydrogen 
or methane, and electromobility), future growth rates 
were defined according to own assumptions. Biomass is 
restricted to a sustainable potential of 150 EJ per year 
(WBGU, 2010a), and is used exclusively in combination 
with CHP technology in 2050. Traditional biomass use 
in developing countries should have been fully replaced 
by modern technologies at this point in time. Hydro­
power undergoes only minor expansion as its sustain­
able potential is limited. 
The most difficult sector in the transition to renew­
able energies is the transport sector. This scenario 
excludes liquid biofuels, as bioenergy can make a more 
significant contribution to climate change mitigation 
in the electricity sector (WBGU, 2010a); instead, the 
introduction of electromobility, gas­powered mobility 
(hydrogen, methane in natural gas powered vehicles 
with combustion engine), complemented by fuel cell 
vehicles, is rapidly accelerated. For specific transport 
segments (long distance, flight, ship, etc.), the exclu­
sive use of wind and solar fuels is assumed. In this way, 
by 2050, 70 % of the energy demand in the transport 
sector is met by electricity, and 30 % by renewable 
wind and solar fuels (hydrogen, methane or other fuels 
from regenerative H2 and CO2). 
4.1.7 
Emissions from Land Use
Only two land­use sectors are the focus here: forests 
and agriculture. The issue of bioenergy, an important 
one in this context, was dealt with extensively in the 
WBGU’s ‘Future Bioenergy and Sustainable Land Use’ 
report (WBGU, 2010a), and also in Section 4.1.5 and 
Box 4.1­4. 
Around two­thirds of global long­lived greenhouse 
gas emissions, or 78 % of CO2 emissions, are created 
through energy generation, i. e. the use of fossil fuels. 
The majority of the remaining greenhouse gas emis­
sions can be attributed directly to agriculture and land­
use change. 
When allocating emissions from the terrestrial bio­
sphere to sectors or areas of need, it is important to 
avoid double counting. CO2 emissions from deforesta­
tion, for example, are particularly significant as they 
account for just under one­eighth of total global emis­
sions, and are attributed to the sector ‘land­use change 
and forestry’, whereas greenhouse gas emissions from 
the production of agricultural goods, like the outgas­
Box 4.1-4
Risks of Uncontrolled Bioenergy Expansion
Bioenergy can be gained either from waste and residues, or 
from dedicated energy crops. It is the latter variant that bears 
particular risks, as it is associated with additional and inten­
sified land use. Bioenergy use therefore competes directly 
with food security, nature conservation, and climate protec­
tion. To meet the food demand of a growing global popula­
tion, global food production must be increased significantly, 
thereby competing with the cultivation of energy crops (Sec­
tion 1.2.5). This land­use competition could, for example, 
result in higher food prices. The cultivation of energy crops 
can lead directly to a further conversion of semi­natural 
areas into cropland, or displace the already existing cultiva­
tion of foodstuffs, which then has to move to new areas. The 
conversion of semi­natural areas increases, for instance, the 
loss of biodiversity, and usually releases greenhouse gases. 
Whether energy crop cultivation has a beneficial or a damag­
ing effect on the climate therefore depends to a large extent 
on the type of land that is used. The conversion of forests and 
wetlands for bioenergy cultivation often releases more green­
house gases than could be saved over several years through 
the subsequent use of bioenergy. Nitrogen fertiliser produc­
tion, production mechanisation, pest control and transport­
ing harvests for further processing often require substantial 
amounts of fuel and other energy inputs. Therefore, the fact 
that the quantity of CO2 released during the combustion is 
equivalent to the amount previously absorbed by the plants 
does not imply that bioenergy causes no net CO2 emissions, in 
the overall equation. A sustainable bioenergy use is therefore 
only possible if, at national and international level, policy­
makers establish framework conditions which ensure the cli­
mate mitigation effect and sustainability of bioenergy use. 
In 2009, the WBGU made detailed recommendations on this 
topic (WBGU, 2010a). 
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sing of nitrous oxide from the soil, are allocated to the 
agriculture sector (IPCC, 1996). 
An analysis of emissions according to areas of need 
must include emissions over the entire lifecycle. In the 
case of food (Section 4.3.4), these are the direct agri­
cultural emissions, but also emissions attributable to the 
further lifecycle of the products (transport, processing, 
storage, etc.). In addition to this, there are the associ­
ated indirect emissions, for example from forest clear­
ance for the subsequent production of food or biomass 
for energetic or material use on these areas. 
These indirect land­use change emissions play a 
particularly important role in the production of agricul­
tural goods (WBGU, 2010a). The conversion of  forests 
and wetlands into cropland and pasture releases sub­
stantial amounts of greenhouse gases, both immedi­
ately and in subsequent years, previously stored in the 
biomass and the soils (including through soil erosion; 
Section  1.1.3). From 2000 to 2009, greenhouse gas 
emissions from land­use changes are estimated to have 
averaged 4.0 Gt CO2 per year. A downward trend has led 
to their respective share of global CO2 emissions fall­
ing from approx. 20 % in the 1990s to approx. 11.5 % 
in 2009, primarily due to a decrease in deforestation 
in the tropics (Friedlingstein et al., 2010; GCP, 2011). 
In 2005, just under two­thirds of global CO2 emissions 
from land­use changes were generated in Brazil and 
Indonesia (WRI­CAIT, 2011). Furthermore, clearance 
or draining of natural or semi­natural ecosystems usu­
ally turns greenhouse gas sinks into greenhouse gas 
sources, leading to additional emissions in subsequent 
years. Altogether, the quantification of emissions from 
land­use changes is more difficult than quantifying 
energy sector emissions (Herzog, 2009). 
4.1.7.1 
Forests and Climate Change Mitigation
Over 4 billion hectares of forests cover around 31 % of 
the global land surface (FAO, 2010a). The FAO’s current 
State of the World’s Forests report clearly shows that 
forest areas continue to be lost. The global deforesta­
tion rate of 13 million hectares per year, driven mainly 
by conversion of tropical forests into agricultural land 
and forest degradation, has remained at a very high 
level over the past decade. Large­scale tree­planting in 
China, India and Vietnam has led to a temporary reduc­
tion of global net forest loss over the past decade, down 
to a total of 5.2 million hectares per year.
Forests are amongst the Earth’s largest carbon stores, 
storing up to 650 Gt C (2,380 Gt CO2). Approx. 44 % of 
this is bound in biomass, 11 % in dead wood and lit­
ter, and approx. 45 % in the soil (FAO, 2010a). Defor­
estation and forest degradation are therefore one of 
the world’s major sources of CO2. Currently, the carbon 
stocks in forests are estimated to have been depleted by 
0.5 Gt C (1.8 Gt CO2) per year between 2000 and 2010, 
totalling 5 Gt C (18 Gt CO2) for the decade (FAO, 2010a). 
However, emissions due to deforestation could be con­
siderably higher, as the available sets of data on emis­
sions differ in their description of both regional distri­
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Vision for a global renewable energy supply by 2050: the figure shows the distribution of global primary energy demand by 
2050, using the direct energy equivalency method. The scenario is based on an extrapolation of current expansion rates for 
renewable energies. Renewables are accorded priority in the energy system, leading to the substitution of existing conventional 
energy carriers. The economy of existing infrastructures and the availability of key materials have not been taken into account. 
The dotted line shows the development of global primary energy demand without transformation, based on the GEA baseline 
scenario (Figure 1.2­4). CHP = combined heat and power. 
Source: WBGU
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bution and total quantity, and are not consistent. The 
Global Carbon Project estimates the emissions caused 
by the ongoing deforestation and anthropogenic forest 
degradation alone at between 2.6 and 4.0 Gt CO2 for the 
decade between 2000 and 2009 (GCP, 2010). 
Trends and Mitigation Potential
It is to be expected that the expansion of foodstuff 
and bioenergy production will continue to raise both 
the deforestation rate and emissions. Particularly the 
number of palm oil and soy plantations is rising fast. 
The draining and clearance of forested peatlands in 
Southeast Asia alone releases an estimated 632 Mt CO2 
per year, with a possible increase during the period 
2015–2035 to an emissions maximum of around 823 
Mt per year (Hooijer et al., 2006). Globally, emissions 
of over 2 Gt CO2 per year are estimated to be caused by 
draining of peatlands and peat fires (Joosten, 2010). 
As yet, the increasingly negative impacts of climate 
change, such as droughts, forest and peat fires, intense 
rain and floods, which all add to peatland deforesta­
tion and damage, remain to be seen. The incentives for 
forest and peatland protection, and sustainable and 
multifunctional forest management, should therefore 
become more important on a global level in order to 
bind and store CO2. Afforestation programmes must be 
adapted to the respective location, and must be ana­
lysed beforehand with regard to their greenhouse gas 
balance, as they do not necessarily lead to significant 
sink formation. Large­scale afforestation can have neg­
ative ecological and socio­economic impacts. 
Another way of mitigating climate change through 
forestry­related measures is by increasing the carbon 
stocks in existing forests through improved manage­
ment techniques, such as the lengthening of harvest 
cycles or the reduction of disturbance, e. g. through 
better protection against forest fires (particularly in 
sub­tropical latitudes), or by reducing soil compaction 
caused by heavy machinery (particularly in temper­
ate and boreal latitudes). Also crucial is the develop­
ment of an effective regime for the reduction of emis­
sions caused by deforestation and forest degradation 
in tropical forest countries in connection with forest 
protection, sustainable forest management and respon­
sible afforestation (REDD­plus) within the UN Frame­
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC; Section 
7.3.7.2). The various sustainability and development 
dimensions must be taken into account during this pro­
cess, such as, for example, the conservation of natu­
ral forests and biodiversity, and the participation and 
rights of local communities and indigenous peoples. 
The expansion and implementation of policies to sup­
port agro­forestry holds further potentials for carbon 
sequestration and the indirect mitigation of emissions 
(ICRAF, 2010). 
4.1.7.2 
Agriculture and Climate Change Mitigation
Direct Emissions from Agricultural Production
According to IPCC (2007c), around 10–12 % of global 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in 2005 were 
attributable to agriculture, a contribution of 5.1–6.1 
Gt CO2eq per year, or even as much as 16 %, accord­
ing to WRI­CAIT (2011). The overall greenhouse gas 
footprint of the area of needs category food alone is 
roughly the same size as that of the area of need mobil­
ity (Figure  4.3­1; Section 4.3.4; Fritsche and Eberle, 
2007). Agricultural CO2 emissions are hardly to blame 
here; it is nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4) that 
are responsible for this, in roughly equal measure. 
Nitrous oxide is a greenhouse gas with an atmospheric 
lifetime of 114 years. It is formed as a decomposition 
product after nitrogen fertilisation, and contributes 
around 2.8 Gt CO2eq per year to anthropogenic emis­
sions. 84 % of global N2O emissions are caused by agri­
culture (Smith et al., 2008). With only 12 years, meth­
ane has a considerably lower atmospheric lifetime; it is 
created mainly in the digestive system of ruminating 
cattle and through the cultivation of wet rice. In total, 
around 3.3 Gt CO2 per year, or 52 % of global CH4 emis­
sions, are caused by agriculture (Smith et al., 2008). 
Almost three­quarters of direct agricultural CH4 and 
N2O emissions can be attributed to developing coun­
tries (Smith et al., 2007; Thorpe, 2009). An increase 
is apparent, the consequence of agricultural expan­
sion and intensification and increased livestock farm­
ing, whilst the agricultural greenhouse gas emissions in 
industrial countries are stagnating (Smith et al., 2007). 
Trends and Mitigation Potential
Agricultural greenhouse gas emissions are expected to 
rise further, primarily due to population development 
and changed dietary habits (Section 1.2.5; IPCC, 2007c; 
Popp et al., 2010). However, the future development 
of emissions is highly uncertain; estimates range from 
6.7 to 10.2 Gt CO2eq per year in 2020 (Strengers et 
al., 2004; US­EPA, 2006). The technical greenhouse gas 
mitigation potential in agriculture by 2030 is estimated 
at between 5.0 and 6.0 Gt CO2 per year (Caldeira et al., 
2004; Smith et al., 2008). Depending on the CO2 price, 
the annual economic potential is between 1.5–1.6 Gt 
CO2eq (<20 US$ per t CO2eq) and 4.0–4.3 Gt CO2eq 
(<100 US$ per t CO2eq; Smith et al., 2008). Roughly 
estimated, around half of all direct agricultural emis­
sions are therefore avoidable. 89 % of this mitigation 
potential is based on increased carbon uptake of soils 
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through improved cropland and pasture land manage­
ment (Section 4.3.4.1). Around 70 % of the potential is 
in developing countries, approx. 20 % in OECD coun­
tries, and 10 % in transition countries (IPCC, 2007c). 
These technical potentials are however not as substan­
tial as the emissions reductions that could be achieved 
through changed dietary habits (Section 4.3.4.2). 
4.2
Insights from Energy Models and Climate Change 
Mitigation Scenarios
The respective literature encompasses several hundred 
complex global scenarios by now, elaborating long­term 
future energy system trends and their correspond­
ing greenhouse gas emissions. So far, however, these 
include only a few transformative scenarios that have 
been developed with the ambitious objective of avoid­
ing a global rise in mean temperature of more than 2 °C 
(IPCC, 2007c; Meinshausen et al., 2009). Many mod­
els assume strong inertia of the energy system, there­
fore allowing for only relatively slow, incremental devi­
ations from a projected business­as­usual path. They 
usually assume, for example, that a conversion can only 
happen following the investment cycles, i. e. an infra­
structure is kept for as long as the economic lifespan 
allows, or the conventional planning logistics require, 
say 40 years for a coal­fired power plant. Others are 
written based on a back­casting strategy, i. e. they 
assume a future target configuration and elaborate, 
from this perspective, the changing steps necessary 
to reach this point. The necessary rates of change, for 
instance in terms of carbon intensity of the economy 
or energy efficiency improvements, may under certain 
circumstances be far higher than the rates known from 
historical technical learning processes. Paths such as 
these are therefore also more speculative, and in part 
linked with optimistic assumptions with regard to tech­
nical learning progress or currently not yet developed 
technologies. 
In the present chapter, the WBGU analyses a number 
of transformative scenarios from the respective litera­
ture. The objective of the analysis is not to filter out 
the ‘best’, from the WBGU’s point of view, of those 
scenarios, and to suggest that the global community 
follow it. The initial idea is rather to sketch an over­
all picture. The scenarios show a range of transforma­
tive elements which, depending on their combination, 
certainly provide the basis for a great number of dif­
ferent possibilities as to how the energy system may 
be changed towards a sustainable and climate­friendly 
way of doing business. The answer to the question of 
whether a transformation is possible that allows com­
pliance with the 2 °C guard rail is therefore, at least in 
the world of models, a resounding yes. And not only 
that: the analyses suggest that even a transformation 
such as this, subject to considerable time pressure, still 
leaves considerable room for political manoeuvring. 
The exact significance of individual technologies does 
not ensue inevitably, but allows different options. 
4.2.1 
Dynamics of the Primary Driving Forces
Demographic trends and economic growth are the pri­
mary driving forces behind resource demand and, in the 
era of fossil energy use, therefore also behind green­
house gas emissions (Figures 4.2­1, 4.2­2, 4.2­3). Since 
the beginning of the 19th century, the global popula­
tion has risen roughly sevenfold to currently just under 
7 billion. The average rate of annual growth was 0.9 %, 
peaking at more than 2 % between 1965 and 1970. 
Since 2000, annual population growth has decreased to 
around 1.2 %, and the UN Population Division’s prog­
nosis expects a fall down to 0.34 % by 2050, meaning 
that the global population will then number around 9.2 
billion people (UN DESA, 2009b; Box 1.2­2). 
In the long term, the global GDP between 1800 and 
2008 has on average risen by 2.2 % per year, i. e. mul­
tiplied by a factor of 95 overall, to approx. 51,000 bil­
lion US$ (international purchasing power parity; Mad­
disson, 2010). In contrast to the population growth 
rate, this growth rate has recently accelerated. Between 
1990 and 2008, global GDP has roughly doubled, and 
the average growth rate between 2000 and 2008 was 
4.2  % per year (Maddisson, 2010). In 2000, an IPCC 
special report extrapolated these dynamics, elaborating 
the sensitivity of emissions trajectories to variations in 
primary driving forces (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). The 
relationship between primary driving forces and envi­
ronmental consumption has been under systematic dis­
cussion since the 1970s (Box 4.2­1).
Global primary energy consumption has risen by a 
factor of 24 since 1800 (on average 1.5 % per year), and 
final energy consumption by a factor of 17 (1.4 % per 
year). Both parameters have therefore grown at a faster 
rate than the population, but significantly slower than 
the rate of economic output. Between 2000 and 2008, 
years of rapid growth, particularly in Asia, primary 
energy demand rose by 2.6 % per year, final energy 
demand by around 2.2 % per year. The reason for the 
discrepancy between these core values is the rapidly 
progressing demand for superior energy carriers such as 
electricity and mineral oil products, whose production 
is accompanied by conversion losses.
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Figure 4.2-1
Global primary driving forces and emissions trends 1800–2008. The insertion shows the period 1950–2010 in larger scale. 
To afford trend comparison, data are shown as indices that are scaled to have a value of 1 in 1971. Data sources used in 
the comparison of historical long­term trends up to 2008 are Grübler, 2008b; Houghton, 2008; Schneider et al., 2009; IEA, 
2009a; Boden et al., 2010, updated with data from Friedlingstein et al., 2010. Future trends 2008–2050 are shown as a range 
(maximum and minimum values) of values based on the scenarios described in Section 4.2.3. 
Source: WBGU, based on the cited data sources
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Figure 4.2-2
Global energy consumption and CO2 emissions per unit of value creation. For trends to be comparable, data are shown as indices 
that are scaled to have a value of 1 in 1971. Future trends 2008–2050 are shown as a range (maximum and minimum values) of 
values based on the scenarios described in Section 4.2.3. 
Source: WBGU, based on the data sources cited in Figure 4.2­1
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In 1850, CO2 emissions were still around approx. 2 
Gt per year, of which emissions from land­use changes 
were responsible for around ten times the amount of 
emissions from the use of fossil fuels (Houghton, 2008). 
By 1910, both activities were roughly equally respon­
sible, and annual emissions amounted to 6.5 Gt CO2. 
Around 1970, total annual CO2 emissions amounted 
to 20 Gt, around three­quarters of which were attrib­
utable to fossil sources. CO2 emissions from land­use 
changes have decreased since 1990. Total CO2 emis­
sions for the year 2008 were approx. 35 Gt, around a 
tenth of which is still attributable to land­use changes 
(Friedlingstein et al., 2010). 
Some of the more complex integrated assessment 
models such as IMAGE or MESSAGE explicitly consider 
other greenhouse gases apart from CO2, for example 
agriculture­generated CH4 and N2O, and greenhouse 
gases from industrial processes; many other models do 
not feature these.
The energy intensity of global value creation has 
decreased during the course of the past 208 years 
roughly by a factor of 4 for primary energy, and a fac­
tor of 5 for final energy. The fossil CO2 intensity of 
value creation increased until the first decade of the 
20th century on a global level, then fell significantly 
from around 1970 onwards. The overall CO2 intensity 
(including land­use changes) has gone down roughly 
by a factor of 3 since 1850. Since 2000, primary and 
final energy intensity have been decreasing by an 
average of 1.5 % and 1.9 % per year, respectively; CO2 
intensity from fossil sources, or overall CO2 intensity 
(including land­use changes), is decreasing annually by 
1.2 %, or 2.3 %, respectively (own calculations based 
on the sources cited in Figure 4.2­1).
Per capita value creation has roughly risen by a fac­
tor of 14 since 1800, an average of 1.3 % per year. In 
the period since 1990, this value has on average been 
2.9 %. 
Final energy consumption per capita in 2008 was 
roughly 2.5 times the value of 1800, and primary 
energy demand rose by a factor of 3.5. Primary energy 
consumption per capita remained more or less constant 
between 1970 and 2000; since 2000, however, it has 
again continued to grow at a rate of 1.4 % per year.
Overall CO2 emissions per capita peaked in the early 
1970s at around 5.5 t. Since then, emissions initially 
increased in line with the population, resulting in more 
or less constant global per capita emissions. How­
ever, since 1990, CO2 emissions attributable to land­
use changes showed a considerable downward trend, 
which initially overcompensated for continually ris­
ing CO2 emissions from fossil energy sources. Between 
2000 and 2008, however, per capita emissions from 
fossil sources have risen by about 1.7 % per year, and 
Figure 4.2-3
Global energy consumption and CO2 emissions per year per capita. The insertion shows the period 1950–2010 in larger scale. 
For trends to be comparable, data are shown as indices that are scaled to have a value of 1 in 1971. Future trends 2008–2050 
are shown as a range (maximum and minimum values) of values based on the scenarios described in Section 4.2.3. 
Source: WBGU, based on the data sources cited in Figure 4.2­1
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total emissions (including CO2 from land­use changes) 
have increased by 0.6 % per year (Friedlingstein et al., 
2010).
4.2.2 
Climate Change Mitigation in Models
Climate change mitigation can be represented differ­
ently in models and scenarios. Initially, three roughly 
Box 4.2-1
Economic Growth and Transformation
On the one hand, economic growth can support the transfor­
mation towards a low­carbon society; on the other hand, it 
can impede it (Box 5.2­1). In the past, at least, there has been 
a strong correlation between global wealth and CO2 emissions 
(Raupach et al., 2007; Edenhofer et al., 2009a). In the context 
of environmental protection, there has been a long­running 
debate on the possibility or impossibility of unlimited growth, 
and on the compatibility of climate protection, or sustainable 
resource consumption, with economic growth (Georgescu­
Roegen, 1971; Box 5.2­1). So far, it remains completely open 
as to whether the global reduction of CO2 emissions required 
for the transformation is possible with economic and popula­
tion growth rates projected up to at least 2050. An absolute 
de­linking of economic activity from CO2 emissions would 
have to be achieved for this, although, from today’s perspec­
tive, it remains unclear whether this is feasible. 
According to the so­called ‘Kaya identity’ (Ehrlich and 
Holdren, 1971; Nakicenovic et al., 2000), there are four main 
input factors impacting an economy’s CO2 emissions: the 
population figure, the level of wealth (GDP per capita), the 
energy intensity of the GDP (energy consumption per unit of 
GDP), and the CO2­intensity of the energy generation (CO2 
emissions per unit of generated energy). There is a multiplica­
tory interrelation between these factors:
CO2 emissions = population x (GDP/population figure) x (ener-
gy consumption/GDP) x (CO2 emissions/generated energy)
Subsequent to peaking in the 1970s, global population growth 
has slowed down to a rate of currently 1 % per year (Maddi­
son, 2010). In its medium­term prognosis, the UN Population 
Division assumes that the annual population growth rate will 
decline to around 0.34 % by 2045–2050 (UN DESA, 2009b). 
Between 1800 and 2008, the long­term average of the global 
economic growth rate (measured in purchasing power pari­
ties) was around 2.2 %, between 2000 and 2008, the average 
was around 4.2 % (Maddisson, 2010). 
Absolute de­linkage could be considered to have been 
achieved if CO2 emissions remained constant, or even if they 
were to fall, despite an increasing population and continued 
economic growth. This needs either a reduction in GDP ener­
gy intensity (energy consumption/GDP), or a reduction of 
the CO2 intensity of energy generation (CO2 emissions/ener­
gy consumption, preferably both. Between 1980 and 2008, 
the energy intensity of the global production has decreased 
by around 32%, the equivalent of an average annual reduc­
tion of around 1.1% over the past 30 years (van Vuuren et al., 
2010; IEA, 2010c). Global CO2 intensity of energy generation 
fell by around 0.1% between 1971 and 2005 (US­EIA, 2010; 
van Vuuren et al., 2010). 
The reductions in energy intensity of GDP and the CO2 
intensity of energy generation achieved so far have there­
fore not been sufficient to achieve an absolute de­linking. 
Accordingly, global CO2 emissions continued to rise over the 
past years. Overall, global emissions increased by around 1% 
annually between 1990 and 1999, and by slightly more than 
3% annually between 2000 and 2005 (Raupach et al., 2007). 
This emissions trend is expected to continue over the coming 
years, as soon as the global economy has resumed its growth 
path, following the financial and economic crisis (Friedling­
stein et al., 2010). 
Is Complete De-linking Possible? Decomposition 
Analysis Results
In the past, economic growth has overcompensated the effi­
ciency gains achieved by technological innovations in energy 
generation as well as production. Various studies that use 
decomposition analyses to match the development of CO2 
emissions over time with the influencing factors have also 
come to this conclusion (for example, Hamilton and Turton, 
2002).
However, this does not mean that this has to continue 
in the future. Edenhofer et al. (2009a) have compared vari­
ous integrated assessment models (REMIND­R, IMACLIM­R, 
WITCH) in order to examine whether a decarbonisation of 
the global economy is compatible with an atmospheric CO2 
concentration stabilisation at 450 ppm. In their decomposi­
tion analysis, they have reached the result that in the case of 
an energy systems transformation with the aim of stabilising 
CO2 concentration at 450 ppm, technological innovations (i. e. 
improved energy efficiency accompanied by a decarbonisa­
tion of energy production) can overcompensate the global 
economic growth­related emissions increase. Assuming a 
long­term average annual global GDP growth rate of around 
2.1–2.4 % up to 2100, this could lead to a decline in CO2 emis­
sions as of 2020 or 2025, at least in their models (Edenhofer 
et al., 2009a; Jakob et al., 2009).
Edenhofer et al. (2010) carried out similar calculations 
with the models MERGE, POLES, TIMER and E3MG. This 
model comparison also assumes annual GDP growth rates of 
around 3 % until the middle of the century (Edenhofer et al., 
2010; van Vuuren et al., 2010). Overall, the model calcula­
tions by Edenhofer et al. (2009a, 2010) show that, assuming 
average annual growth rates of around 3 % up until the mid­
dle of the century, or 2 % up until 2100, a decarbonisation on 
the basis of technical innovations is possible, in theory, even 
if it is a huge challenge. It would require the multiplication 
of decarbonisation and energy efficiency increase measures 
at a global level. According to IEA estimates, to achieve a 
stabilisation at 450 ppm CO2eq, in the period the decrease 
rate of 2008 – 2020 the CO2 intensity of the global economy 
(t CO2 per GDP) would have to be twice that of the period 
1990–2008, and in the period 2020–2035 it has to be four 
times of it (IEA, 2010c). 
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complementary strategies for the avoidance of CO2 
emissions can be categorised.
1. Increased efficiency in terms of how energy is pro­
vided and consumed is the first, largest and usu­
ally most cost­effective greenhouse gas mitiga­
tion potential, not least because this saves future 
energy costs. In the past 200 years, the economy 
has continuously grown faster than the energy 
demand (Figure 4.2­2), the energy intensity of the 
global economic output has therefore continuously 
decreased. Apart from changes to the economic 
structure, and the increasing significance of the ter­
tiary sector, technical improvements in energy effi­
ciency are particularly effective. Improvements 
regarding end­use efficiency are especially rele­
vant, as these have a multiplication effect on the 
primary energy demand. Every unit of power that 
is saved replaces three units of primary energy and 
their emissions, as long as the energy is gener­
ated on a fossil basis. However, improvements with 
regard to end­use efficiency are impeded by the fact 
that they frequently have to occur close to the con­
sumer. They involve many actors, institutions and 
technologies, possibly also norms and behaviour 
patterns. The supply side of the energy system, on 
the other hand (for example electric power genera­
tion), is characterised by a high degree of centralisa­
tion, making technical changes easier to implement.
2. Energy supply decarbonisation is a general trend in 
the technical evolution of energy systems, advanc­
ing at a rate of around 0.3 % over the past 150 
years (Nakicenovic, 1996). In the long term aver­
age, energy­related greenhouse gas emissions have 
risen at a slower rate than energy consumption (Fig­
ure 4.2­1). This process is caused by the substitu­
tion of high­carbon energy carriers with a relatively 
low energy density, such as biomass and coal, with 
energy carriers which contain less carbon and have 
a higher energy density (such as oil, gas), and forms 
of energy almost entirely free of greenhouse gases 
(nuclear energy, renewable sources). The general 
trend on the demand side towards on­grid energy 
carriers (electricity, gas), which are safer and easier 
to use for consumers, supports this movement. A 
number of technical options are available to accel­
erate this process, including expansion of the ener­
gies low in greenhouse gas emissions (renewable 
sources, nuclear energy), as well as the technical 
capture and storage of carbon dioxide (CCS). How­
ever, in the years since 2000, a ‘recarbonisation’ of 
the global energy system could be observed, diverg­
ing from the long­term trend. This was caused pri­
marily by the rapid expansion of coal­powered 
power plants for electricity generation in China.
3. A number of measures can increase carbon uptake 
and storage in soils during agricultural and forestry 
use, and revert soil erosion and humus loss trends 
(Section 7.3.7). This includes initiatives to stop 
deforestation, and to protect forest areas from fires. 
Beyond climate change mitigation, measures such as 
these offer a great number of social and ecosystem­
relevant co­benefits; however, apart from invest­
ments in infrastructure, for example in irrigation 
systems or nutrient supply, they frequently require 
manifold changes to institutional structures, for 
instance land reforms. Friedlingstein et al. (2010) 
report recent progress with regard to the contain­
ment of land­use related CO2 emissions: according 
to their analyses, these have gone down from 5 Gt 
per year in 2000 to currently around 3.2 Gt.
The scenarios introduced in the following section can 
be compared on the basis of the core parameters elabo­
rated above (for example, rates of change in the green­
house gas emission intensity of the energy, the energy 
intensity of GDP, GDP and final consumption per cap­
ita, etc.), and also on the basis of differences in combin­
ing the measures introduced here. Ultimately, it is not 
only CO2 emissions that impact climate change mitiga­
tion – other greenhouse gas emissions are also relevant. 
However, these are not explicitly included in the calcu­
lation in all of the scenarios featured here. 
4.2.3 
Scenarios
The following section outlines 14 scenarios and model 
results that show possible alternative paths for a trans­
formation into a low­carbon energy system. Each of the 
scenarios consists of a combination of plausible meas­
ures, which determine future emissions trends. The 
models used differ considerably in their complexity, 
reaching from simple table calculations to fully inte­
grated assessment models that depict the links between 
the economy, the energy system and environmen­
tal processes with a high spatial and temporal resolu­
tion. The following introduces the models and scenar­
ios taken into consideration. 
Based on the MESSAGE model, scenarios have been 
calculated for the Global Energy Assessment (GEA, 
2011) which, apart from the target of climate stabili­
sation, also examine numerous co­benefits of a trans­
formative change of the energy systems. Apart from 
the challenge of providing universal access to energy 
services, implications for supply security and air pol­
lution, for example, are also analysed. To meet all of 
these requirements concurrently is the normative 
aim of the scenarios. Three scenarios were developed 
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for the Global Energy Assessment; these are comple­
mented by sub­scenarios featuring technology variants 
(the numbering of the models in the following sec­
tions equals the order of the scenarios shown in Figure 
4.2­2, from left to right): GEA­Efficiency (1) is a sce­
nario group that pays special attention to the maximum 
use of energy efficiency, particularly on the demand 
side. The scenario group entitled GEA­Mix (2) describes 
a middle path with a balanced combination of technol­
ogy elements. It is therefore situated between the two 
extreme positions of scenario group GEA­Efficiency 
(1) and GEA­Supply (3). GEA­Supply emphasises the 
possibilities offered by technology development on 
the supply side of the energy system, and advances in 
transport technologies and other growth sectors (Riahi 
et al., 2010). 
In preparation for the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
Report scheduled for 2014, Representative Concen­
tration Pathways (RCP) for alternative development 
trends are currently being developed (IIASA, 2009). 
The most complex scenario used there was developed 
with the aid of the IMAGE model, and aims at stabil­
ising the climate at less than 3 W per m² (van Vuuren 
et al., 2007). It is entitled IMAGE 3PD (4) (peak and 
decline), and describes a path where the concentration 
of greenhouse gases peaks in 2040, declining subse­
quently – reaching a maximum anthropogenic radiative 
forcing of 3 W per m² during this process, declining to 
2.6–2.8 W per m² over the remainder of the 21st cen­
tury.
The REMIND model (5) was used for the REC­
IPE (Report on Energy and Climate Policy in Europe) 
project, sponsored by the WWF and the Allianz Ver­
sicherung insurance company (Edenhofer et al., 2009a). 
The EU project ADAM (Adaptation and Mitigation 
Strategies) included, amongst others, a comparison 
between model results obtained by various European 
research groups with the models REMIND (6), MERGE 
ETL (7) and POLES (9) (Edenhofer et al., 2010). 
The scenario ETP blue (8) was created for the IEA 
report ‘Energy Technology Perspectives 2008’ with the 
aid of the Markal model.
At IIASA, scenarios entitled ‘Global Energy Perspec­
tives’ were calculated in cooperation with the World 
Energy Council, using the MESSAGE model (Nakicen­
ovic et al., 1998). One scenario, named C1 (10), is intro­
duced here. 
The energy system model MESAP was used by the 
German Aerospace Centre (DLR) to develop scenarios 
on behalf of Greenpeace and the European Renewa­
ble Energy Council under the title ‘Energy [R]evolu­
tion’. The first of these studies was published in 2007, 
updated in 2008 (EREC and Greenpeace, 2008) (11), 
and reviewed in 2010 (12). This year, another, more 
ambitious scenario variant entitled ‘Advanced Energy 
[R]evolution’ (13) was added (EREC and Greenpeace, 
2010). 
The scenario entitled ‘WBGU’ (14) discusses the 
vision of meeting the energy demand in full with renew­
able energy carriers by 2050. It is based on extrapo­
lation of the current expansion rates of these energy 
sources. The respective assumptions were already 
described in detail in Section 4.1.5.
Further details on the scenarios are shown in 
Table  4.2­1. The contrasting respective primary and 
final energy demands in the various scenarios, analysed 
according to energy carrier or energy form, respec­
tively, are shown in Figure 4.2­4 and Figure 4.2­5. 
To allow comparison, the historical development of 
energy consumption between 1800 and 2008 is also 
illustrated, and the development path ‘GEA Efficiency’ 
from 2010 to 2050. Figure 4.2­6 shows the respective 
relative contributions of the individual energy sources 
and types of final use. All representations use direct 
equivalents to describe primary energy (Section 4.1).
4.2.4 
Scenario Comparison
The GEA scenarios (2011), developed using the mod­
els MESSAGE and IMAGE, have an aggressive restric­
tion of demand increase to 375–481 EJ final energy in 
2050 in common. In the case of GEA­Efficiency, final 
energy demand in 2050 is hardly more than the current 
demand level of 352 EJ in 2008. The energy carrier mix, 
however, shows significant differences: 33–41 % of 
final energy demand is in the form of electricity, more 
than double the 2008 amount (17 %). The relative share 
of solid energy carriers reduces by around half (from 
currently 23 % to 12–14 %). The importance of liquid 
fuels, which currently dominate final energy with 42 %, 
also falls to 23–37 %, most significantly in the scenario 
GEA­Supply. The category ‘other energy forms’ includes 
direct heat use such as solar heating systems, as well as 
zone and district heating (for instance with CHP tech­
nology). These technologies multiply their contribution 
to final energy in all GEA  scenarios from currently 11 
EJ (3 %) to 17–65 EJ (4–13 %) by 2050. The supply 
side also shows significant shifts: the contribution coal 
and oil render to primary energy is reduced by around 
half, the contributions made by biomass and hydro­
power roughly double, and the category ‘other renew­
able energies’ (mainly wind and solar power) shows a 
growth factor of around 100 over the next 40 years in 
these scenarios. In the scenario GEA­Efficiency, climate 
change mitigation can be achieved whilst concurrently 
phasing out the use of nuclear energy. Current contri­
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Table 4.2-1
Comparison of transformative energy scenarios in terms of cumulative CO2 emissions up to 2050, and the probability of 
exceeding 2 °C. The scenarios marked with an * do not include all anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Non­CO2 greenhouse gases 
and land­use related emissions were not taken into account in these scenarios. Emissions from international air and maritime 
traffic, fugitive emissions, and process­related emissions from the industrial sector are also not included in some of the 
marked scenarios. To include the shares that were not taken into account (which is necessary in order to determine the 
probability of exceeding 2 °C), corrective factors were used, based on the relative contributions of these activities in 2005. 
The probabilities of exceeding 2 °C were calculated with the aid of the '2 °C­Check' tool from the supplementary material 
accompanying the publication of Meinshausen et al. (2009). 
§ Carbon Prices in US$ per t CO2eq.
Source: WBGU, based on the data sources cited in Figure 4.2­4
No. Model, 
 scenario name
Cumula-
tive CO2 
emissions 
from fossil 
sources 
2000–2049 
[Gt CO2]
Prob-
ability of 
 exceeding 
2 °C  
without 
CCS
[%]
CCS by 
2050 
[Gt CO2]
of which 
bio-CCS 
[Gt CO2]
Prob-
ability of 
exceeding 
2 °C with 
CCS
[%]
Average 
growth rate 
of renew-
able energies 
2010–2050 
[%/year]
CO2 prices 
[US$/t CO2]
2030 2050
(1) MESSAGE, GEA 
Efficiency
1,496 56  192  4,6 40 3 23 60§
(2) MESSAGE, GEA 
Mix
1,391 47  92  4,6 40 3.5 67 177§
(3) MESSAGE, GEA 
Supply
1,444 52  259  4,6 34 3.5 53 140§
(4) IMAGE, RCP 
3 PD
1,434 51  164 102 33 3 86 165
(5) REMIND, 
RECIPE
1,455 51  77  35 43 4.4 22 92
(6) REMIND, Adam 1,229 36  172  92 24 4.5 49 75
(7) MERGE, ETL 
Adam
1,345 43  83  33 36 2,1 14 45
(8) MARKAL, ETP 
Blue
? ?  59 3.6
(9) POLES, Adam 1,144 42  310  32 16 3.2 35 135
(10) MESSAGE, 
WEC C1
1,138* 53 2
(11) MESAP, Energy 
[R]evolution 
2008
? ? 3.7 30 50
(12) MESAP, Energy 
[R]evolution 
2010
1,107* 50 3.5 30 50
(13) MESAP, Ad-
vanced Energy 
[R]evolution 
2010
 970* 38 4.1 30 50
(14) WBGU 1,017* 41 4.8
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Figure 4.2-4
Global primary energy demand in transformative scenarios, broken down according to energy carriers. For the period 1800 to 
2008, actual primary energy demand is shown; for the period between 2010 and 2050, the results from the MESSAGE GEA 
Efficiency scenario are shown. On the right­hand side, there is an overview of the other scenarios analysed: the figure shows 
the energy mix in 2050 for each respective scenario. Important characteristics of these scenarios are summarised in Table 4.2­1.
Source: WBGU, based on data by Nakicenovic, 1998; EREC and Greenpeace, 2008, 2010; IEA, 2008b; Edenhofer et al., 2009a, 
2010; IIASA, 2009; GEA, 2011
WB
GU
 (1
4)
ME
SA
P a
dv
an
ce
d r
evo
lut
ion
 20
10
 (1
3)
ME
SA
P e
ne
rgy
[r]e
vo
lut
ion
 20
10
 (1
2)
ME
SA
P e
ne
rgy
[r]e
vo
lut
ion
 20
08
 (1
1)
ME
SS
AG
E W
EC
 C1
 (1
0)
PO
LE
S A
da
m 
(9)
MA
RK
AL
 ET
P B
lue
 (8
)
ME
RG
E E
TL
 Ad
am
 (7
)
RE
MI
ND
 Ad
am
 (6
)
RE
MI
ND
 RE
CIP
E (
5)
IM
AG
E R
CP
 3 
PD
 (4
) 
ME
SS
AG
E G
EA
 Su
pp
ly (
3)
ME
SS
AG
E G
EA
 M
ix (
2)
ME
SS
AG
E G
EA
 Ef
fic
ien
cy 
(1)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1800 1850
P
rim
ar
y 
en
er
gy
 [E
J/
ye
ar
]
1900 1950 2000
20
10
2050
2050
Year
Other renewables
Hydropower
Nuclear
Gas
Oil
Coal
Biomass
Figure 4.2-5
Global primary energy demand in transformative scenarios, broken down according to energy forms. For the period 1800 to 
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Source: WBGU, based on the data shown in Figure 4.2­4
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Figure 4.2-6
Current (2008) relative mix of primary (top) and final (bottom) energy, and mix in 2050, on the basis of various transformative 
scenarios (Table 4.2­1; Figures 4.2­4, 4.2­5).
Source: WBGU, based on the data shown in Figure 4.2­4
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butions by fossil energy carriers of 85 % are reduced to 
63–52 %, and the overall contribution of all renewa­
ble energies rises at around 3–3.5 % per year, from cur­
rently 13 % (64 EJ) to 205–257 EJ, the equivalent of 
37–43 % of primary energy. 92–259 Gt CO2 are stored 
through CCS in the GEA scenarios.
The scenario IMAGE RCP 3PD exceeds the GEA sce­
narios in the restriction of final energy growth: with 
361 EJ, the final energy demand is only 9EJ above 
2008 consumption figures. Unlike the GEA scenarios, 
this model shows a considerable increase in the signifi­
cance of energy gases. These currently (2008) provide 
roughly as much final energy as electricity (around 
16 %). IMAGE PCP 3PD shows their significance as 
increasing to 30 % by 2050, whereas the share of elec­
tricity declines to around 12 %. Solid and liquid energy 
carriers decrease in importance in terms of final energy 
in this scenario, too, although less drastically than in 
the GEA scenarios.
With regard to primary energy, IMAGE RCP 3 PD’s 
significant shifts concern the rapid increase of bioen­
ergy: by 2050, their contribution rises more than three­
fold to around 160 EJ, the contribution made by coal 
sinks from 28 % to 10 % of primary energy, and the con­
tribution made by oil products is also roughly halved. 
By comparison, other renewable energies and hydro­
power are expanded only moderately in this model. 
Strikingly high in this model are the losses between 
primary and final energy: only around 52 % of primary 
energy becomes usable as final energy. Currently, losses 
are running at 29 % at a global level, and go down in the 
majority of the scenarios. With 102 Gt CO2 being stored 
through bio­CCS, this model is dominated by the use of 
this mechanism to stabilise the climate.
Two versions of the REMIND model were analysed 
here. Both the results from the RECIPE project and the 
results from the EU project ADAM show, with 717 EJ 
and 696 EJ, respectively, the highest primary energy 
consumption of all scenarios (145 % of 2008 con­
sumption figures). At 190 and 200 EJ respectively, the 
assumed expansion of bioenergy surpasses the IMAGE 
model’s values and current consumption figures roughly 
by a factor of four. Like IMAGE, this model also shows 
extensive conversion losses between primary and final 
energy: only 62–65 % of primary energy is turned into 
final energy. This is due in particular to the relatively 
high losses in the processing of biomass into superior 
energy carriers, and the losses through coal­powered 
electricity generation (including CCS). On the side of 
final energy use, the REMIND results have many char­
acteristics in common with the GEA scenarios: at 38 %, 
electricity again becomes the dominant energy carrier, 
whereas solid energy carriers are reduced by a factor of 
4 to merely 6 % of final energy consumption. In these 
scenarios, too, the 51–77 EJ contribution made by the 
category ‘other energy forms’ (mainly direct heat use) 
rises to values that are five to seven times the 2008 
consumption figures. At 4.5­4.8 % per year, renewable 
energies’ growth rates are in the upper region of this 
model comparison; with 77–172 Gt CO2, the CCS total 
is mid­range. REMIND Adam, however, with 92 Gt CO2 
in the form of bio­CCS, ranks in second place in terms 
of the use of this mechanism.
The MERGE­ETL ADAM scenario, with 535 EJ, 
shows the highest increase in final energy demand 
(+52 % compared to 2008 level). With liquid energy 
carriers then accounting for 39 %, their share reduces 
only marginally. Again, electricity and energy gases are 
considerably expanded, and the share of solid energy 
carriers reduced to around half that of 2008. With 
around 50 EJ primary energy of nuclear energy each 
(7–8 % of primary energy in 2050), MERGE ETL and 
GEA­Supply, show the highest values in this scenario 
comparison.
The scenario Markal ETP Blue, published by the IEA 
during the course of Energy Technology Perspectives 
2008, is characterised on the demand side by increases 
in electricity demand to 30 % of final energy. On the 
side of primary energy, both nuclear energy and bio­
mass are increased by around a factor of 3 (to 30 EJ and 
150 EJ, respectively). 
Poles ADAM, with 44 %, shows a very high share 
of electricity in the final energy, and again an increase 
in nuclear energy to over 35 EJ primary energy. With 
more than 310 Gt CO2 being stored under CCS, this sce­
nario relies on this mechanism the most of all the mod­
els compared here. In this way, it manages to reduce the 
probability of exceeding the 2 °C to only 16 %.
MESSAGE WEC C1 is an early, ambitious climate 
change mitigation model, marked by high shares of gas 
in primary and final energy. At 2 % per year, the growth 
rates for renewable energy carriers are low here, com­
pared to the other scenarios.
The remaining four scenarios, MESAP Energy [R]
evolution 2008, 2010 and Advanced Energy [R]evolu­
tion 2010, and the WBGU scenario, are the most ambi­
tious in this comparison. All of them feature a primary 
energy consumption in 2050 that is lower than the cur­
rent level, even allowing for a slight increase in final 
energy demand. This is possible because all four scenar­
ios rely on a massive expansion of renewable electricity 
generation through wind and photovoltaic energy that 
surpasses even the REMIND scenarios (annual renew­
able energy increase rates of between 3.7 and 4.8 %). 
Particularly the scenario Advanced Energy [R]evolution 
2010 also features an increase in the use of geothermal 
energy. In the MESAP scenarios, the increase factors 
for primary energy production from these sources for 
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the period 2008 to 2050 are somewhere between fac­
tors 165 and 228; the WBGU scenario assumes a fac­
tor of 284. In all of the four scenarios, the final energy 
demand is dominated by electricity, with 29–65 %. In 
the WBGU scenario, overall electricity production by 
2050 is increased by a factor of 4.2. All four scenarios 
assume a global phasing out of nuclear technologies, 
and abstention from CCS. 
4.2.5 
Discussion
All of the scenarios selected here feature a signifi­
cant restriction of final energy demand, with only one 
expecting more than 500 EJ final energy consumption 
in 2050, whilst some remain below 350 EJ, which cor­
responds to the current consumption level. There is also 
a concurrence regarding a considerable transformation 
of the final energy form, with a massive increase in on­
grid energies, i. e. the considerable growth of electricity 
and gas as final energy. The requisite carbon prices are 
in the region of 14 and US$ 86 per t CO2 in 2030, and 
US$ 45–165 per t CO2 in 2050.
Without exception, all scenarios feature ambitious 
expansion rates for renewable energies, most with 
average growth rates of more than 3 %, or even 4 % 
per year over the 40­year period from 2010 to 2050. 
In four of the 14 scenarios compared, over 300 EJ pri­
mary energy per year can be provided by renewable 
energy sources by 2050. However, this is only suffi­
cient in scenarios with a significantly reduced final 
energy demand to reach a high percentage of renew­
able energies in primary energy. The scenarios that 
feature ambitiously controlled growth of final energy 
demand thereby create action paths on the supply side 
that allow the relinquishment of nuclear energy, whilst 
keeping fossil energy consumption in combination with 
CCS at a low level.
Technology variants within individual scenarios 
(knock­out or second­best­world variants), as car­
ried out in integrated assessment models, for example 
with MESSAGE in the GEA scenarios or in the REMIND 
model (Edenhofer et al., 2009a; Leimbach et al., 2010), 
indicate that restricting the technology portfolio would 
substantially increase climate stabilisation costs, for 
example if at the same time the biomass potential is 
limited, CCS is only available to a limited extent, nuclear 
energy is phased out, and no technical learning progress 
is made with regard to wind and solar technologies. The 
consumption losses through climate stabilisation calcu­
lated in the models then rise from 1 % to up to 4.2 % 
of GDP, and it is doubtful whether the substitution of 
energy through capital assumed in the models can be 
solved in reality. Only few of the analysed scenarios 
stay considerably below the 2 °C emissions budget of 
less than 750 Gt CO2 from fossil sources between 2010 
and 2050 (Box  1.1­1), and achieve a probability of 
more than 66 % with regard to limiting global warm­
ing to 2 °C. The WBGU estimates that 314 Gt CO2 have 
already been emitted in the period from 2000 to 2010. 
The cumulated CO2 emissions shown in the first column 
of Table 4.2­1, less those 314 Gt CO2, therefore provide 
a benchmark for the scenarios’ cumulated emissions for 
the period 2010 to 2050. Applying this rough calcu­
lation reveals that only MESAP Advanced Revolution 
and WBGU would comply with the 750 Gt CO2 budget. 
In general, the 2 °C target is defined across the whole 
of the 21st century, and some of the integrated assess­
ment models, for instance (4), pursue so­called over­
shoot trajectories to allow for an initial overshooting of 
the safe emissions budget, which is then compensated 
for later through substantial negative emissions during 
the second half of the 21st century. Assuming this pre­
condition again allows higher probabilities than those 
discernible by 2050 to make it highly likely that global 
warming can be kept below 2 °C. 
Not all of the models listed in Table 4.2­1 were able 
to include emissions from land use, and the emission 
of greenhouse gases other than CO2. In those cases 
(marked with an * in column 2 of Table 4.2.­1), the 
evaluation of climate compatibility featured in scenar­
ios (10), (11), (12), (13) and (14) is based mainly on 
the analysis of CO2 emissions from fossil energy car­
riers ­ other emissions were estimated based on their 
relative contributions in 2005 (Table 4.2­1). This meta­
analysis of climate change mitigation and energy sce­
narios allows the conclusion, from the WBGU’s point 
of view, that a complete decarbonisation of the energy 
systems is possible, and achievable, to allow a roughly 
50 % probability of compliance with the 2 °C guard rail. 
However, in order to achieve this, the conversion of 
the energy systems must be considerably accelerated. 
A conversion that merely allows incremental devia­
tions from a seemingly fixed BAU path will not lead to 
a transformation. 
Whether and how the transformation can succeed, 
however, is certainly not going to be decided within the 
energy systems alone. Numerous factors which cannot 
be illustrated in the current models influence feasibil­
ity. The growth of global energy demand, for example, 
will have a major impact on the room for manoeuvre 
during the conversion of the energy systems: the more 
successful we are in limiting the global rise in energy 
demand over the next few decades, the sooner we can 
abstain from using risky technologies such as nuclear 
energy and CCS. In many areas of life, changes which 
are worth pursuing anyway, or necessary in any case, 
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can be utilised to unlock efficiency and savings poten­
tials. One example of this is the advancing urbanisa­
tion: its form will be one of the deciding factors for the 
demands that a future energy system must meet. 
4.3
Implications for Areas of Need
The following intends to take a look at the implications 
a transformation towards sustainability and climate 
change mitigation has for the various demand sectors, 
or consumption fields. It is outlined how current con­
sumption practices and behaviours have to change in 
order to comply with the guard rail (Section 1.1) whilst 
ensuring that the whole of the global population has 
access to the energy­based services associated with 
prosperity (Section 1.2.4). The focus is, firstly, on the 
direct and indirect energy demand created by the sec­
tors. The restriction of the global final energy demand, 
concurrent with the increased provision of energy serv­
ices (particularly in developing countries) is an impor­
tant precondition for making the conversion of energy 
systems, and compliance with the 2 °C guard rail, pos­
sible (Section 4.2). In addition, there is also a focus on 
limiting those greenhouse gas emissions which are not 
energy­related, but caused directly or indirectly by var­
ious consumption fields.
A large part of the global population still has no 
access to modern forms of energy, i. e. to services in 
the areas of need defined here. 1.5–2.5 billion people 
have inadequate or no access to electricity, and around 
3 billion people still use traditional biomass for cook­
ing, and sometimes also for heating. This has serious 
economic and social consequences, as well as having 
an adverse effect on their health (IEA et al., 2010b). 
Frequently, there is also a lack of access to sufficient 
mechanical energy for transport and agriculture. Whilst 
these figures, without targeted measures, could even 
increase slightly, the provision of universal access to a 
minimum level of modern energy is still achievable by 
2030, despite the expected population growth in the 
regions concerned (IEA et al., 2010b; AGECC, 2010; 
GEA, 2011). The transformation of the energy systems 
in developed countries and the provision of access 
to modern energy services in countries where this is 
not yet universally given can trigger synergies, which 
should be utilised to achieve these two transformations 
at the same time (AGECC, 2010). The development and 
commercialisation of more efficient technologies, for 
example LED lighting, to lower electricity consumption 
in countries with universal access to electricity also 
improves the opportunities for accessing electric light­
ing in rural areas, as it is easier to cover the lesser need 
for electricity despite higher capital investment costs. 
This applies in particular to decentralised stand­alone 
systems. Although not all technologies are directly 
transferable, the majority of new technologies, such as 
smart grids, for example, are also well­suited for estab­
lishing decentralised networks for rural electrification. 
Furthermore, the provision of a sustainable energy 
supply prevents the acquisition of CO2­intensive tech­
nologies like diesel generators, thereby avoiding path 
dependencies in terms of increasing costs and green­
house gas emissions (Casillas and Kammen, 2010). 
The following initially elaborates briefly the meth­
ods which can be used to allocate the overall direct and 
indirect environmental impact, such as emissions, to 
the various consumption activities. Subsequently, the 
scientific findings with regard to current emissions and 
short­ to medium­term reduction potentials are illus­
trated for four central needs categories, complemented 
by an elaboration of some exemplary transformative 
changes in these areas. These are intended to demon­
strate potential and conceivable changes that make the 
future extension of this particular consumption cat­
egory possible without impacting on the natural life­
support systems.
Lifecycle Analyses to Allocate Emissions
The data on direct emissions of the various sectors is rel­
atively well­known, not least because they are reported 
by national governments to the UNFCCC on a regular 
basis. Far more difficult, and also more challenging in 
methodological terms, is the causal attribution of envi­
ronmental impact, such as, for example, emissions or 
water consumption, to consumption fields on the basis 
of process chains and lifecycle analyses. Hertwich and 
Peters (2009) analysed the greenhouse gas footprint, 
i. e. direct and indirect emissions, for eight consumption 
categories and 87 countries or regions for the year 2001 
(Figure 4.3­1). Greenhouse gas emissions from the use 
of fossil fuels, process emissions, and agricultural meth­
ane and nitrous oxide emissions were all taken into 
account. This analysis does not include CO2 emissions 
relating to Land Use, Land­Use Change and Forestry 
(LULUCF). Production­related emissions have been 
allocated on a pro­rata basis to the components of mac­
roeconomic demand (household consumption, govern­
ment consumption, investments, net trade) in order to 
include spacial shifts of environmental pressure caused 
by trade. If, for example, a country imports raw mate­
rials and industrial goods, the emissions caused by the 
production are allocated to the end­user in the recipi­
ent country. The authors conclude that 72 % of over­
all emissions were related to household consumption, 
10 % could be allocated to government consumption, 
and 18 % were connected to investments.
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This analysis shows food to be the consumption field 
which has the most impact on overall emissions, fol­
lowed by operation and maintenance of shelter and 
mobility. If only CO2 emissions are considered, on the 
other hand, food has much less influence, with shelter 
and mobility dominating here. However, it should be 
kept in mind that this analysis does not include CO2 
emissions from land use and land­use changes (i. e. also 
those caused by deforestation). But, as particularly 
for the food category, agriculture is one of the driv­
ing forces of land­use changes (Section 4.3.4), the fac­
tual relevance of the consumption field food for climate 
change is higher than represented here. 
A consumption­based analysis of the emissions also 
shows clearly that the influence which consumers, 
through their consumption decisions, have on climate 
change mitigation is not limited to their own country. 
Davis and Caldeira (2010) show that in 2004, 23 % of 
global CO2 emissions from fossil energy carriers (6.2 Gt 
CO2) were related to internationally traded goods. The 
majority were exports to industrialised nations from 
China and other newly industrialising countries. The net 
emissions ‘imported’ by Germany in this way amounted 
to 2.8 t CO2 per capita. Taking this perspective, Germa­
ny’s emissions responsibility per capita increases from 
10.7 t CO2 to 13.5 t CO2 for 2004.
4.3.1 
Sustainable Production and Sustainable 
 Consumption: Emissions Reduction and Circular 
Economy
4.3.1.1 
Reducing Direct and Indirect Emissions
In 2004, the production of industrial goods generated 
emissions amounting to 12 Gt CO2eq, the largest part of 
which (9.9 Gt CO2eq) was caused directly and indirectly 
by energy use. The energy­intensive industries alone 
(iron and steel industry, metals, chemicals industry, 
cement, glass) were responsible for around 85 % of this 
(IPCC, 2007c). As the demand for products from the 
energy­intensive industries will continue to increase 
over the coming decades due to the high consumption 
levels in the developed countries, the global popula­
tion growth and the rapid economic development in the 
newly industrialising nations, it is vital that production 
process specific emissions are substantially reduced. In 
the medium and long term, the transition into a circu­
lar economy is inevitable. Apart from reducing the raw 
materials needed and the raw material intensity, this 
also allows, in principle, a reduction of energy demand 
and greenhouse gas emissions. The gradual increase of 
recycled proportions, particularly of metals, is already 
contributing to a reduced energy demand (IPCC, 
Figure 4.3-1
Greenhouse­gas footprint of various consumption categories in 2001. 
Source: Hertwich and Peters, 2009
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2007c). In the short to medium term, absolute mate­
rial flows will however continue to increase, such that 
additional raw materials must be extracted, and signifi­
cant emissions reductions must also be achieved for the 
traditional use of raw materials. There are also signifi­
cant further potentials for efficiency improvement: the 
universal conversion of production techniques to the 
best available efficiency technologies alone could lead 
to an emissions reduction of 12–26 % (IEA, 2010a). 
The use of renewable energies can also contribute con­
siderably. In the light of limited sustainable potentials 
(WBGU, 2010a), and the other options for biomass use, 
it must be carefully deliberated to what extent biomass 
should be used for the generation of industrial process 
heat. It would therefore be preferable to increase the 
use of electricity from renewable sources, and energy 
efficiency, for example through the utilisation of waste 
heat. In particular with regard to direct, non­energy­
related process emissions, which amounted to a total 
of 1.4 Gt CO2 for the year 2007 (WRI­CAIT, 2011), 
CCS should be developed ready for use as an additional 
mitigation strategy. The availability of this technol­
ogy could reduce direct industrial emissions (including 
energy­related emissions) by a total of 1.7–2.5 Gt CO2 
in 2050 (IEA, 2010a). 
Consideration of Lifecycle Impact
Even though a substantial reduction of the specific emis­
sions in the industrial production should be achieved as 
soon as possible, various factors must be carefully con­
sidered with regard to the conversion of current pro­
duction forms. The optimisation of one environmental 
impact, for example of energy consumption or green­
house gas emissions, must not lead to the neglecting 
of other aspects, such as water consumption, toxic­
ity, resource consumption or social impact. The entire 
product lifecycle should be considered here, i. e. all the 
impacts of manufacture, transport, use and disposal of 
the products. Only a comprehensive analysis of lifecy­
cle impact can serve as the basis for informed technol­
ogy decisions. To furnish such a comprehensive analy­
sis, the data basis for goods production and usage pro­
cesses should be improved. The collection of all rele­
vant information regarding resource outlay (extraction 
and use) and environmental impact of production 
processes should be standardised to achieve a more 
detailed regional and sectoral breakdown of the data. 
If uniform databases were to be established, it would 
allow the comparative evaluation of different products 
and methods of production.
4.3.1.2 
Transition into a Circular Economy
Natural ecosystems are characterised by the functional 
full circularity and integration of material cycles: the 
waste products of one group of organisms are usually 
used by other life­forms as a resource and raw mate­
rial basis. A forward­looking design makes it possible 
to organise industrial production processes in the same 
way, such that secondary products and waste heat from 
one process, along with used products, can form the 
basis for further production processes (Braungart and 
McDonough, 2002). This creates a material flow cycle, 
so that both the introduction of new raw materials and 
the disposal of non­usable residue can be reduced to 
a minimum. The process of applying the energy still 
required by the various processes should be as efficient 
as possible and reliant on renewable energies; however, 
the amount required is generally less than when using 
raw materials. Manufacturing aluminium from recycled 
material, for example, requires only 5 % of the energy 
needed for producing the same amount of raw alumin­
ium from bauxite. Recycling also considerably reduces 
the amount of energy needed for processing a number 
of other metals, and paper (IPCC, 2007c). 
The speedy adoption of this design principle for all 
production and consumption processes is a prerequisite 
for expanding industrial production further whilst still 
complying with the guard rails (Section 1.1). Pioneers 
in this respect include, for example, ‘eco­industrial 
clusters’ such as the city of Kalundborg in Denmark, 
demonstrating how the proper integration of differ­
ent branches of industry, communal infrastructure and 
agricultural user groups can function under the dictum 
of waste avoidance and improved resource efficiency 
(Jacobsen, 2006). 
Resource efficiency must not be limited to the pro­
duction phase, even if this part of the lifecycle is fre­
quently accompanied by significant emissions. The 
actual use is also often, for instance in the case of long­
life consumer products like household appliances, elec­
tronics or vehicles, associated with considerable oper­
ating costs in the form of energy and other resources. 
The end of the lifecycle – for the consumer frequently 
the only point in time at which they are confronted 
with the resource dimension of their consumption 
– raises the question of how to dispose of a product 
that cannot be used any longer. Good design makes the 
extension of product lifecycles through repairs possi­
ble, ensures that at least parts of it are directly reus­
able, and, if that is not possible, enables the materials 
to be safely recycled. Electronic products in particular 
often contain heavy metals and other toxins that pose 
a hazard for both humans and nature, or larger amounts 
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of rare earths and precious metals which, for reasons of 
resource preservation, should not be wasted. 
In most OECD countries, the expansion of recycling 
systems as part of extended manufacturer and consumer 
responsibility is a key focus of environmental policy, 
and an element of ‘green growth’ and ‘green jobs’ strat­
egies (OECD, 2009b). Also, numerous newly industri­
alising countries, such as China and Korea, have pre­
sented ambitious plans and legislation with the aim of 
creating a circular economy (the ‘Circular Economy Law 
of the People’s Republic of China’, for instance). How­
ever, converting to new business models that provide 
manufacturers with incentives for recycling­friendly 
product design could make an even more effective con­
tribution to raising the recycling quota than policy­
based obligations. One such business model would, for 
example, be specialising in the recycling of production 
waste and product components. Toyota, for instance, 
has initiated a new business model for recycling used 
nickel­metal hybrid batteries from hybrid cars with 
the companies Toyota Chemical Engineering, Sumitomo 
Metal Mining and Primearth EV Energy (PEVE). The 
nickel part is extracted, so it can be reused for the man­
ufacture of new hybrid batteries (Toyota Motor Corpo­
ration, 2010). Similar business models would be con­
ceivable across the whole recycling sector, and, in view 
of rising energy and resource prices, in the long run, 
they would be competitive.
However, recycling systems are generally costly in 
terms of transport and energy consumption, which lim­
its the dimensions at which it still makes sense to recy­
cle. Urban areas, as production site centres and con­
sumer bases, are particularly suitable locations for the 
functional integration of material flows. The principles 
of a circular economy can be demonstrated and opti­
mised here with relatively little effort.
Efficiency Gains through New Consumption Models 
and Technological Trends
There are several comprehensive technological trends 
and new consumption models that can contribute con­
siderably to resource efficiency improvement in the 
medium term. Through targeted reinforcement of these 
trends, making transformative breakthroughs more 
likely (Chapter 3), they can also contribute to resource 
conservation.
 > Right to use instead of ownership: In many fields, 
object ownership appears to be becoming less impor­
tant (a car, for example, as a status symbol), whilst 
at the same time, the focus is shifting from selling 
towards offering rights of use and provision of serv­
ices as a business model. Through car sharing, but 
also through the leasing of car components (for 
example the rechargeable batteries of electric cars), 
the overall material need is reduced, whilst the 
establishment of circular economic structures is 
made easier.
 > Dematerialisation: This describes, on an abstract 
level, the trend towards a lower resource throughput 
per value creation unit. This is achieved by economic 
structural change, and through the conversion from 
industrial into service­based societies (tertiarisa­
tion), but also through the long­term substitution of 
materials, for example replacing the steel used in 
vehicle manufacturing with carbon fibre, or using 
aerated concrete instead of bricks in residential con­
struction. Another example is precision farming, 
which uses geo­information systems and GPS to cal­
culate fertiliser dosage, thus saving fertiliser and 
reducing water pollution.
 > Industrial use of renewable raw materials: The 
replacement of mineral oil products with biogenic 
materials as industrial base materials, as envisaged in 
the BioEconomy Research Strategy (BMBF, 2010b; 
Section 8.1.4.2), reduces resource pressure and 
import dependency for countries which do not have 
own oil deposits. Provided that the sustainability 
criteria for agriculture are adhered to, biogenic mate­
rials form part of a closed material cycle, which at 
the same time contributes to the structural change 
towards a circular economy. However, in all probabil­
ity, this will also lead to increased land­use competi­
tion (Section 1.2.5). According to WBGU estimates 
(2009a), if the per capita consumption were half as 
much as Germany’s current consumption, then the 
area required for bio­based products (textiles, chem­
ical products, plastics, bitumen and lubricants) for a 
global population of around 9 billion people would 
equal a total of around 10 % of the world’s agricul­
tural land.
 > Green chemistry: This describes a trend in which bio­
logical processes are increasingly simulated in appli­
cations in technical chemistry. Detergents and clean­
ing agents, for example, contain synthetically cre­
ated enzymes (biocatalysts) that clean much more 
effectively at much lower temperatures than tradi­
tional washing powders. These days, the manufac­
turing processes can also often be carried out under 
atmospheric pressure, and resulting waste waters are 
much more biodegradable. This significantly reduces 
the energy expenditure over the whole lifecycle, as 
well as water pollution.
 > Nanotechnology: The drastic reduction of particle 
and object sizes frequently leads to the creation of 
completely new properties: surface area is drastically 
increased in relation to volume, and a fraction of the 
matter needed for conventional processes can 
achieve similar catalytic effects. This technology also 
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harbours major advances for surface coatings, corro­
sion protection, or semiconductor electronics and 
photovoltaics, as the materials are often character­
ised by extremely high specific electrical or thermal 
conductivity, or stability, which can reduce the 
resources needed considerably.
4.3.2 
Buildings, Living and Land-Use Planning
Energy-Efficient Buildings
In 2004, construction sector emissions amounted to 
8.6 Gt CO2, plus 2 Gt CO2eq of other greenhouse gas 
emissions, three­quarters of which were CFC and HFCs 
(IPCC, 2007c). Around two­thirds of CO2 emissions 
were not created in the buildings as such, but in the 
power plants which generated the electricity and heat 
used in the buildings. The construction sector transfor­
mation must therefore minimise the emissions caused 
by the complex overall system that is a building. This 
can be achieved through a combination of energy 
demand reduction, the use of low­carbon or renewa­
ble energy carriers, and the reduction of non­CO2 emis­
sions. As a consequence of the decarbonisation of the 
energy supply, measures to reduce energy demand will 
have less impact than they would have if conventional 
energy carriers were used. A combination of both strat­
egies is nevertheless necessary in order to minimise 
emissions. This also has the advantage that delays with 
regard to technical innovation in the one strategy can 
be balanced by accelerated progress in the other, which 
contributes to the solidity of the transformation path.
As room climate control and warm water genera­
tion account for two­thirds of global buildings­related 
energy demand (IEA, 2008c), improved insulation of 
new buildings and the energy­efficient review and 
refurbishment of existing buildings (Box  4.3­1), par­
ticularly in the higher latitudes and along the equa­
tor, must enjoy absolute priority, as this promises sub­
stantial potential savings, often at negative costs (IEA, 
2010a). Especially in the case of a decarbonised elec­
tricity sector, the use of heat pumps and combined heat 
and power technology can supply the remaining heat 
needed efficiently and with low  emissions. Further­
more, the use of heat storage vessels and smart grids, 
Box 4.3-1
Building Services Engineering for Climate Change 
Mitigation
The energy consumption of existing buildings for heating and 
air conditioning can be drastically reduced through better 
insulation (around 80–90 %). New buildings can be designed 
in such a way that they need almost no heating or cooling, 
generate the energy needed for heating and cooling on site, or 
can even become net energy producers through the integra­
tion of photovoltaic technology. Here, a few of these modern 
technologies are introduced. Some of these are still in the 
development stage, but they are promising candidates for the 
achieving of substantial energy savings.
Vacuum Thermal Insulation, Vacuum Glazing
Vacuum offers extremely good heat insulation whilst needing 
very little space. To vacuum insulate the facades of buildings, 
panels made from a microporous silicic acid core material are 
wrapped in foil impermeable to gas and steam. Vacuum insula­
tion panels have an extremely low thermal conductivity, even 
with a rough vacuum of 1–10 mbar. Their insulating effect 
is five to ten times higher than that of conventional insula­
tion systems; therefore, they are far more space­saving than 
other insulating materials whilst providing the same insulat­
ing effect. Vacuum glazing can be an affordable alternative to 
conventional thermal glazing, which is filled with expensive 
inert gases. The German Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology supports the further development and testing of 
vacuum insulation as part of its 'Energy Optimised Buildings 
– Innovative Building Materials' research programme. Vacu­
um insulation is not only suitable for facades and windows, 
but also for roofs and floors.
Transparent Thermal Insulation
Conventional insulation usually reduces the thermal flow 
from the inside to the outside, transparent thermal insula­
tion additionally imports solar thermal gains into the house. 
Ordinary insulating materials reflect the sunlight before it hits 
the masonry. Transparent thermal insulation materials let the 
sunlight penetrate as far as the masonry, where large parts are 
collected by an absorption layer to allow solar heat to reach 
the inside of the house. 
Transparent thermal insulation can be particularly use­
ful in the renovation of period buildings. However, without 
adequate shading, the house can overheat in the summer. In 
future, this problem will be solved through electrically switch­
able layers (for example micro reflectors), which will safely 
avoid overheating by letting only so much solar radiation past 
as is needed for heating, and reflecting the remainder. 
Lighting 
LEDs should be used for the needs­based lighting of large 
areas in buildings. Replacing the sodium vapour lamps cur­
rently generally used to provide street lighting with LEDs can 
save a considerable amount of energy, not least because these 
are able to light up only targeted areas, and do not waste 
energy through all­round lighting of spaces where no light 
is required. Even today, the efficiency factors of some LEDs 
already exceed those of so­called energy­saving light bulbs 
(CFLs). LED efficiency factors can certainly be expected to 
increase even further.
Organic light­emitting diodes can be used for displays and 
the large­scale lighting of rooms.
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electricity can be consumed primarily in times with 
peak supply, so that both heat generation technolo­
gies contribute to power grid management. In addition, 
renewable sources such as solar thermal and geother­
mal energy and biomass can be used for supplying heat 
to buildings and local heat networks. In the IEA’s BLUE 
Map scenario, the combination of all of these meas­
ures allows the reduction of fossil fuels directly used 
in buildings from 44 EJ in 2007 to only 25 EJ in 2050 
(IEA, 2010a). 
Even if energy consumption by lighting and other 
electrical appliances in households and in the service 
sector represents the lesser part of the energy demand 
of buildings, the efficiency increase potential of these 
appliances should be tapped, in addition to the decar­
bonisation of the electricity supply. As their use con­
tinues to increase through new kinds of appliances, and 
the trend towards more and larger appliances, this is 
the only way to achieve absolute greenhouse gas emis­
sions reductions in this usage area. Efficiency increases 
through the use of LED­based lighting (Box  4.3­1), 
through new, energy­saving refrigeration appliances, 
improved computers and home media appliances, and 
the elimination of the stand­by losses of all appliances 
can lead to considerably less electricity being used in 
households. However, it must be considered that the 
effective electricity savings generated through these 
efficiency improvements may well turn out lower than 
the expected computed values due to changes in the 
consumers’ behaviour. Usually, in the case of energy 
supply services, energy cost savings from improved 
efficiency tend to tempt consumers into increasing their 
demand for these energy services (for example opera­
tion of electrical appliances). In this way, a proportion 
of the savings is compensated through increased con­
sumption (rebound effect; Box 4.3­2). 
Overall, global buildings­related electricity con­
sumption will increase even with these measures 
applied, due to the increased use of heat pumps and air 
conditioning; the IEA’s BLUE Map scenario, for exam­
ple, assumes an increase from 8,800 TWh in 2007 to 
just under 15,000 TWh in 2050. In total, through the 
decarbonisation of the electricity supply and the simul­
taneous introduction of cooling and heating measures, 
this scenario achieves a reduction of CO2 emissions 
from buildings down to 2.6 Gt CO2 by 2050, therefore 
a reduction of just under 70 % compared with 2007. 
Box 4.3-2
Rebound Effect
In the context of energy consumption, the term rebound 
effect is used to describe increases in energy consumption 
that are the consequence of a technical innovation which has 
increased efficiency. A rebound effect can result from the fact 
that the consumption of an energy service (for example driv­
ing a vehicle, or using a household appliance) costs less to use 
than it did before a technical innovation, due to its subse­
quent lower energy consumption. This cost saving acts as an 
incentive for the consumer to increase their consumption of 
the service in future, or to intensify it (for example, driving 
longer distances with a more energy­efficient car, more fre­
quent and longer use of an energy­efficient household appli­
ance). This also applies at corporate level, as the improved 
energy­efficiency of a production process is an incentive to 
step up production due to costs saved. These direct effects are 
referred to as ‘direct rebound’. 
However, another possibility is that consumption of the 
respective energy service is kept constant despite the cost 
saving; instead, the demand for another energy service 
increases as a consequence of the costs saved (for exam­
ple when the money saved through a more efficient car is 
invested in flying more frequently). Alternatively, the initial 
decrease in energy demand caused by the energy saving can 
lead to falling energy prices, which in turn motivates other 
consumers to consume more energy. These cases are referred 
to as ‘indirect rebound’. Direct and indirect rebound together 
make up the total macroeconomic rebound (Sorrell, 2007). 
The extent of rebound effects are difficult to estimate, and 
depend on the measured price flexibility of the energy used 
by various consumer goods. Direct rebound from residential 
heating and the use of privately owned cars in industrialised 
countries is estimated at between 10 % and 30 %, and var­
ies in proportion with the share of energy costs as part of 
the operating costs of an appliance (currently still relatively 
high for running a car or a heating system, rather low for 
household appliances). Due to indirect rebound effects, over­
all macroeconomic rebound is probably slightly higher than 
10–30 % in the industrialised countries, however, certainly 
below 100 %. In developing countries, however, the rebound 
effect, due to the unmet energy demand, probably even 
reaches values above 100 %; this is called ‘backfiring’ (Sor­
rell, 2007; Herring, 2008). 
In addition to the cost argument, the rebound effect can 
also be explained by socio­psychological research findings. 
According to Thaler’s ‘Mental Accounting’ theory (Thaler, 
1985, 1999), consumers usually keep mental accounts to 
which their consumption in various categories is allocated (for 
example, money spent on food, clothes, travel, etc.). In the 
perception of the consumer, the improved energy efficiency 
of a product can lead to ‘credits’ being booked to the ‘mental 
account for environmental damage caused’, which are now 
available to be ‘spent’ for additional environmentally damag­
ing consumption.
The overall macroeconomic rebound effect mitigates the 
positive impact energy efficiency has on environment and 
climate, or even, in the worst case, annihilates it. One possi­
bility for reducing the rebound effect is to gradually increase 
energy prices or carbon prices. 
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The Buildings Sector in Germany
In Germany, the electricity needed by private house­
holds and the ‘commerce, trade & services’ sector will 
decrease by 2050, as calculated by the reference sce­
nario in the energy study compiled for the federal 
government(EWI et al., 2010). Contrary to the glo­
bal average, the equipment of households with a great 
number of electrical appliances is already so advanced 
that the efficiency increases overcompensate increases 
in use. Nevertheless, all energy savings efforts should 
continue, firstly to free electricity loads for other uses 
whilst also covering preferably the entire electricity 
supply with renewable potentials, which are only lim­
ited in Germany, and secondly because the development 
of efficient appliance technologies promotes their glo­
bal use. 
In industrialised countries like Germany, the long 
usage period of existing buildings is a major barrier 
when it comes to implementing the outlined conversion 
in heating. As three­quarters of the buildings currently 
in use in the industrialised countries will still be in use 
in 40 years’ time (IEA, 2010a), the bigger part of the 
potential savings can only be realised through active 
promotion of energy­efficient refurbishment. Partic­
ularly the investment barriers in the case of residen­
tial and commercial lets (frequently referred to as the 
‘principal­agent barrier’) must be removed, which can 
be achieved through a combination of tenancy law reg­
ulations, financial incentives, information campaigns 
and standard setting (IEA, 2007).
Transformation of the Buildings Sector and Spatial 
Planning
Overall, the buildings sector shows pronounced path 
dependencies, due to the existing building infrastruc­
ture. It is therefore particularly difficult to achieve a 
transformative change of consumption patterns here. 
The ownership structure of existing buildings is also 
strongly fragmented: a great number of actors must 
act to accomplish significant changes. To implement 
the optimal decarbonisation strategies, the respective 
actors must also reach a consensus in certain cases (for 
example local heat network, pedestrian­friendly spatial 
planning). Economically, the fragmentation of respon­
sibilities has the effect that many of the initially cost­
efficient refurbishment measures become uneconomi­
cal during the refurbishment planning stage, due to the 
high transaction costs. 
Changes to business models can therefore make an 
important contribution to realising the transformation 
in the buildings sector as well. The Energy Service Com­
panies (ESCO) model, or that of energy contracting, are 
examples of this. ESCOs take over the planning, car­
rying out, and upfront financing of energy efficiency 
measures for their clients as contracted partners, with 
any income generated by capital investment in the form 
of energy cost savings being passed onto the ESCOs. 
Accordingly, ESCOs are often trusts. This helps to over­
come two further barriers preventing efficiency invest­
ments, apart from ownership fragmentation and the 
corresponding transaction costs: a lack of knowledge 
about efficiency technologies, and the resultant sav­
ings, and a lack of initial, upfront financing options. 
In Germany, the regional energy agencies and DENA’s 
Centre of Expertise for Contracting provide information 
and advice regarding energy savings contracting.
Energy contracting, however, plays a role not only in 
terms of one­off efficiency investments, but also in the 
efficient continuous provision of energy services. In 
Germany, the electricity provider Lichtblick, for exam­
ple, offers customers the installation of small­scale CHP 
units in their basements in cooperation with Volkswa­
gen. These units are then operated and maintained by 
Lichtblick. Apart from a one­off payment for the instal­
lation, and a monthly service charge, the customer only 
has the running costs to pay for heating, simultaneously 
receiving a monthly rental income for the space the unit 
occupies, plus an annual rebate on their heating bills for 
the power fed into the grid (Lichtblick, 2010).
Spatial planning path dependencies are even more 
pronounced, as the usage timeframe for the respec­
tive infrastructures is considerably longer even than 
the timeframe for the capital goods related to buildings 
and their energy use (Figure 4.3­2). However, as spatial 
planning and infrastructure have a major influence on 
transport systems (Section 4.3.3), rapidly growing cit­
ies must plan land use in a way that is compatible with 
sustainable mobility systems. For existing urban struc­
tures, on the other hand, framework conditions must 
be created which allow the transformation of land use 
whilst largely preserving the major existing structures. 
Examples of this could be the redevelopment of inner­
city areas to feature both residential spaces and work­
places, or the creation of cycle path systems, exclusive 
bus lanes, and car­free residential and inner­city areas.
4.3.3 
Mobility and Communication
In 2007, 20 % of global energy­related CO2 emissions 
were caused directly by the transport sector, mainly 
through road transport (WRI­CAIT, 2011). The demand 
for transport services will grow further in line with the 
continuing intense economic growth in newly industri­
alising and developing countries. A sustainable scenario 
should therefore also include an at least partially decar­
bonised transport sector, as well as the substitution of 
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mobility through communication. Core elements of a 
future sustainable transport system should therefore 
be developed today, and investments should be steered 
towards sustainable transport systems. In particular, 
the goal of emissions reduction calls for substantially 
reducing the use of fossil fuels, which provided around 
94 % of the 96 EJ primary energy used for transport in 
2008 (IEA, 2008c). 
In scenarios like those featured in Section 4.2, where 
a certain CO2 reduction target has been set for the entire 
economy, the reduction of transport sector emissions 
is disproportionately small, as emissions reductions are 
cheaper to achieve in other sectors. Fossil fuels there­
fore still provide more than half of the final energy for 
the transport sector in 2050, even in ambitious studies. 
In the Advanced Energy [R]evolution scenario (EREC 
and Greenpeace, 2010), for example, the proportion 
of fossil fuels is reduced down to 91 % in 2020, and 
to 57 % in 2050; the IEA’s ETP 2010 Blue­Map/Shifts 
scenario (IEA, 2010a) shows 55 % in 2050. Important 
elements of this kind of gradual energy system conver­
sion towards sustainability that are taken into account 
in these scenarios are:
 > Avoidance of unnecessary and unwanted traffic: 
Reducing the volume of traffic is the most effective, 
as well as the most affordable, measure for reducing 
negative environmental influences such as energy 
and land consumption, and noise and greenhouse 
gas emissions. There is scope for traffic avoidance, 
both in freight and passenger traffic, especially 
where traffic is perceived as a burden, or makes eco­
nomic sense only through distorted incentive struc­
tures. Integrated urban and regional planning which 
prioritises mixed usage (Section 4.3.2), and extend­
ing the options for teleconferencing, home working, 
and other long distance services can contribute to 
this. In addition, communication technologies are 
also tasked with reducing journey distances, and 
avoiding traffic jams, through traffic management. 
As, over the next few decades, the decarbonisation 
of current traffic volumes is to be achieved whilst 
also providing improved access to mobility services 
for many people, it is vital that resource usage is 
carefully deliberated. The substitution of individual 
with public transport is an important element of this 
strategy.
 > Switching to more efficient means of transport: As far 
as short journeys are concerned, particularly non­
motorised forms of mobility, i. e. walking or cycling, 
are encouraged as alternatives, not least because this 
also impacts positively on health (Woodcock et al., 
2009). Local public transport usage can be increased 
by making it more attractive through the use of 
modern communication technologies to complement 
walking or cycling. For long distance passenger and 
freight traffic, making part of the traffic rail­bound 
harbours considerable potential for increasing effi­
ciency. To ensure that this potential is fully tapped, 
the range of available rail­bound services and high 
speed train routes must be expanded, particularly 
freight transport routes. Shifting passenger and 
freight transport away from the road (and away 
from air traffic) onto rails is a particularly effective 
measure for reducing CO2 emissions, as rail traffic is 
more efficient than road or air traffic. Furthermore, 
with the decarbonisation of the electricity sector, 
the CO2 emissions resulting from rail traffic are 
reduced even further.
Figure 4.3-2
The economic life­span of various energy­relevant investments.
Source: IEA, 2002
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 > Increasing the efficiency of all means of transport: 
Increasing engine conversion efficiency, either by 
improving the current technology, or by changing to 
more efficient locomotion technologies such as the 
electric engine, reducing energy demand and chang­
ing in part to low­carbon fuels reduces the specific 
emissions of all means of transport. Mobility must 
therefore be increasingly based on electricity, mak­
ing it two to three times more efficient than our cur­
rent motor vehicles. This includes battery­based, 
fully electric vehicles with or without a range 
extender, which can consist either of small­scale 
combustion engines or of fuel cells in combination 
with methane or hydrogen. Urban freight transport 
also relies on hybrid technologies. Cars, railway 
trains and buses obtain their energy from overhead 
lines, batteries or fuel cells. Batteries are charged by 
means of bidirectional charging devices at charging 
stations. In addition, the storage batteries can be 
recharged through contactless charging when driv­
ing (inductive transmission). For freight and long­
distance traffic, and for aeroplanes and ships, renew­
able fuels (methane or hydrogen) are produced from 
surplus energy from wind, solar and hydroelectric 
power. Also conceivable are biomass fuels, which 
meet stringent sustainability requirements. 
 > Promotion of new business models and infrastruc-
tures in the area of mobility: Sustainable mobil­
ity should be integrated into the everyday lives of 
users, with the aid of new business models (for 
example, car sharing, multimodal transport) and the 
corresponding infrastructures. It is necessary to 
optimise the framework conditions for this (for 
instance, the infrastructure for car sharing), so that 
the new offers are sufficiently attractive for all users 
with regard to flexibility, cost, and ease of access to 
information, and can be easily integrated into habit­
ual daily routines. In this context, information and 
communication technology solutions are particu­
larly important, as they can considerably increase 
the flexibility and user friendliness of public and 
shared means of transport. IT solutions, for example, 
could provide integrated route planning which 
includes different modes of transport (electromobil­
ity, public transport). In a pilot project in Singapore, 
for instance, the Bosch group is currently testing a 
software­based services platform (eMobility Solu­
tion) that helps drivers of electric cars to optimise 
their route by taking charging station locations into 
account, as well as integrating public transport 
options (Bosch, 2010). 
 In this way, car sharing models could become very 
important in future. In Switzerland, a country­wide 
car sharing system for private and commercial cus­
tomers that can be directly combined with local pub­
lic transport and railway services has already become 
established (Mobility, 2010). The Deutsche Bahn’s 
car sharing service can also be booked directly in 
conjunction with railway tickets, allowing flexibil­
ity at the destination (DB, 2010). Systems such as 
these could be particularly important in urban areas 
in connection with the introduction of electromo­
bility. On the one hand, they serve to increasingly 
reduce the dependency on own cars; on the other 
hand, they can facilitate the introduction of a fleet 
of energy­efficient cars and electromobility.
Unlike in other sectors, currently available or already 
advanced technologies are insufficient to fully decar­
bonise the transport sector in the above described sce­
narios, which represent comparatively ambitious devel­
opments. Whilst rail traffic and motorised individ­
ual transport can, for the most part, be decarbonised 
in the medium term through electrification, there are 
as yet no sustainable solutions for road freight traffic, 
or for air and shipping traffic, that are at the stage of 
being launched commercially. It is certainly possible to 
run ships and aeroplanes on methane or hydrogen. The 
annual sustainable biomass potential of 80–170 EJ pri­
mary energy (WBGU, 2010a) will probably not be suf­
ficient to completely cover the future energy demand 
expected in these transport sectors, which will be just 
under 100 EJ in 2050 (IEA, 2010a; WBCSD, 2004). Fur­
thermore, the WBGU considers the use of biomass for 
electricity generation and heating as the more efficient 
climate policy path, as long as these, too, still depend on 
fossil energy carriers, especially coal (WBGU, 2010a). It 
therefore seems doubtful whether biomass can offer a 
sustainable energy supply for these transport sectors. 
However, these scenarios merely show possible 
developments that are plausible from today’s point 
of view, which ultimately means that they generally 
extrapolate from current consumer behaviour and tech­
nical change. Significantly more profound transforma­
tions, however, are certainly conceivable. Passenger 
transport is determined by direct customer decisions, 
which are not arrived at on a purely economic basis, 
and could therefore change even without changes in 
technology. As the speed of technical development 
also depends on the degree to which a technology is 
in demand, mutually reinforcing dynamics can develop, 
which can create completely new mobility systems. The 
decisive aspect here will be the development of suit­
able business models which utilise the advantages of 
technical innovations for innovative mobility products, 
offering an added value to customers in comparison 
with the current systems (Box 4.3­3). Which innova­
tions will ultimately become accepted is hardly predict­
able; a number of options are technically conceivable. 
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Magnetic levitation trains, or hydrogen­powered aero­
planes, could take over long­distance passenger trans­
port, for example. The major extension of metropoli­
tan public transport networks, along with multimodal 
systems that allow easy, needs­driven changes between 
few but fast public railway systems and buses, bicycles 
or electric bicycles, and electric cars, offers a vision of 
cities worth living in. 
In light of the many local problems, too, it is highly 
likely that urban mobility systems will change dramati­
cally over the next 40 years. In the WBGU’s view, com­
pliance with the guard rails (Section 1.1) also makes 
a profound change inevitable. However, the long life­
cycle of traffic infrastructures and the profound social 
integration of the prevalent car­ownership based sys­
tem create strong path dependencies, so that changes 
require considerable effort.
A stabilisation of the greenhouse gas concentra­
tion at a very low level (400 ppm CO2eq) will probably 
require a complete decarbonisation of the transport 
sector by the end of the century (van Vuuren et al., 
2010). It is therefore very important to rapidly develop 
and use those technologies and business models which 
allow sustainable and zero­carbon mobility. Demon­
strating these concepts, particularly in the technologi­
cally highly developed and fast growing regions of the 
world, can begin immediately, and serve as a model and 
inspiration for leapfrogging technological development 
phases in rapidly developing regions. Even if the ulti­
mately successful model is as yet not predictable, it is 
vital to shape the framework conditions now in such a 
way that innovations can penetrate the market.
4.3.4 
Food
In 2005, direct emissions from agriculture amounted 
to around 14 % of global anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions (WRI­CAIT, 2011; Section 4.1.7). Agri­
cultural emissions are expected to continue to increase 
in future (IPCC, 2007c). However, to obtain an overall 
picture of the needs category food, all greenhouse gas 
emissions ‘from field to plate’ would have to be taken 
into account (production, processing, preparation, stor­
age, transport, spoilage and waste of foodstuffs in 
households, etc.). Indirect emissions, for example CO2 
emissions from the conversion of forests and wetlands 
into farmland and pasture (land­use changes), must 
also be included alongside those emissions directly 
related to the agricultural sector. 
Food production (including distribution and trade) 
accounts for almost half of the lifecycle emissions of 
food (Fritsche and Eberle, 2007). In contrast to the 
direct emissions, the indirect emissions consist prima­
rily of CO2. Around half of the emissions are gener­
ated subsequent to agricultural production, for exam­
ple through storage and preparation. Freight transport 
accounts for only around 3 %, although here, trans­
porting foodstuffs by air is of particular consequence 
(Wiegmann  et  al., 2005). Waste­related emissions, 
through post­harvest losses, through spoilage caused 
by incorrect storage, or through being wasted in house­
holds, should not be neglected. Of the 4,600 kcal per 
capita per day (including livestock feed) average global 
harvest achieved in 1990, only 2,000 kcal were ulti­
mately consumed (Smil, 2000; Nellemann et al., 2009). 
Overall, the greenhouse gas footprint of the needs cat­
egory food slightly exceeds that of the needs category 
mobility (Figure 4.3­1). 
Box 4.3-3
New Business Models for a Low-Carbon Society
According to the transition management approach devised by 
Grin et al. (2010), the interaction of all actors at all levels of 
society, including niche actors, experimental spaces and pio­
neering change agents, is required in order to trigger a system 
transformation (Chapter 3). Particularly important are change 
agents, who develop and try out alternative business mod­
els in market niches and experimental spaces. As important 
actors within a social system, companies, supported by the 
transition management approach, can on the one hand review 
their own existing business models, whilst, on the other hand, 
thus triggering important changes to the existing social sys­
tem (Loorbach et al., 2010). Innovative products and services 
offer alternatives to current consumption patterns and prac­
tices, and can overcome usual action and thought patterns in 
the entire social system. They therefore have an important 
part to play in the low­carbon transformation. 
Corporate transformations such as these will especially 
take place once transformative changes are also occurring at 
meso­ and meta­level, for example due to changes in regu­
lations. However, governments can also promote corporate 
transformations through new criteria in national procure­
ment policies (Section 5.2), and offering financial support for 
the establishment of new business models (Section 4.5). A 
public dialogue on paths towards a low­carbon society can 
increase environmental awareness in companies, and trigger 
business strategy review processes. According to Loorbach et 
al. (2010), new business models develop particularly well if 
they are initially tested parallel to the company’s core busi­
ness, until they are stable as independent business models. 
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4.3.4.1 
Climate-Compatible Agricultural Management 
Roughly estimated, around half of the direct emissions 
from agricultural production would be avoidable by 
2030 (Caldeira et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2008), with 
around 70 % of the potential in developing countries, 
around 20 % in OECD nations, and 10 % in transition 
countries (IPCC, 2007c). The most important measures 
to achieve this are improvements in farmland, pasture 
and organic soil management (Section 4.1.7.2). 
Since the beginning of agriculture, soils have lost 
roughly 40–90 billion t of carbon (the equivalent of 
150–330  Gt  CO2) (Caldeira et al., 2004). At 89 % of 
the overall technical mitigation potential, the reversal 
of this process, in other words using soils for carbon 
sequestration by changing agricultural practices, is the 
most promising option for climate change mitigation 
in the agricultural sector (Lal, 2004; IPCC, 2007c). In 
view of the soil carbon already lost though degrada­
tion (erosion, for instance), this will be of particular 
importance in future (WBGU, 1995a). It includes, for 
example, refraining from ploughing (Lal et al., 2004), 
conserving or restoring hedgerows to avoid wind ero­
sion, avoiding the draining of organic soils (peatlands, 
etc.), restoring degraded land, for instance by adapting 
soil tillage and crop rotation, improving nutrient and 
water management, and energy­extensive irrigation 
(Smith et  al., 2008). The remaining technical mitiga­
tion potential refers to CH4 (9 %) and N2O (2 %; IPCC, 
2007c). A number of these already available manage­
ment improvement methods have additional benefits, 
as they increase production, and make adaptation to 
climate change easier (Smith et al., 2008; FAO, 2009c). 
However, as these options usually carry no short­term 
cost benefits for agricultural businesses, additional 
incentives in the form of pricing or policies are neces­
sary (Schneider and Smith, 2009). The costs for the 
introduction of these measures differ widely, according 
to region and option; at project level, they often range 
between US$ 200–300 per hectare (FAO, 2009c). 
This substantial potential must be considered in light 
of the fact that there has been very little progress made 
with regard to the reduction of agricultural emissions 
since 1990. The enforcement of regulations is gener­
ally fraught with difficulties in many regions, and many 
areas of agriculture and forestry, so that the effective­
ness of regulatory approaches is limited. A sensible 
starting point would therefore be additional incen­
tives in the form of pricing or policies (for example, the 
phasing out of environmentally damaging subsidies, 
incentives and payments for ecosystem services; Sec­
tion 7.3.7) for climate protection (Schneider and Smith, 
2009; Eger et al., 1996; Section 5.2).
4.3.4.2 
Dietary Habits and Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Agriculture’s technical emissions reduction poten­
tial through climate­friendly management is, however, 
not as substantial as the reductions which could be 
achieved through changed eating habits (Popp et al., 
2010). The reason for this is that the lifecycle emis­
sions of animal­derived foodstuffs (such as meat, dairy 
products, eggs) are up to ten times higher than those 
of the equal weight of plant­derived foodstuffs. How­
ever, these values differ greatly according to product 
and country. Cattle production in the Sahel, for exam­
ple, causes only around half as many GHG emissions as 
cattle production in the USA (Subak, 1999). 
Livestock farming is the most influential factor of 
global anthropogenic land use. Overall, around 70 % of 
the world’s cultivated land is used for livestock farm­
ing (as pasture, or for feed production), which pro­
vides only 15 % of global calorie supply (Steinfeld et 
al., 2006; PBL, 2009b). Correspondingly sized, at 18 %, 
is the total, i. e. both direct and indirect, contribution 
of livestock farming to anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions (Steinfeld et al., 2006). In addition to the cli­
mate impact, livestock farming also accelerates biodi­
versity loss, causes the overuse and pollution of water 
resources and environmental nutrient loading, and, not 
least, promotes the spreading of infectious diseases (for 
example avian flu, BSE). Due to the significantly lower 
land intensity, the change towards a healthier diet with 
less animal products would therefore have a consider­
able leverage effect not only for emissions, but also for 
the preservation of biodiversity (PBL, 2010). In terms 
of the environmental compatibility of eating habits, 
the consumption of beef makes an outstanding dif­
ference (Marlow et al., 2009). On the other hand, this 
sector provides around 1.3 billion people with employ­
ment and an income, and it is often the only practica­
ble option for producing income from marginal land, by 
pasturing particularly in developing countries.
In accordance with the important part which ani­
mal products play in diets, the current ecological foot­
print of North American and European eating habits is 
around twice as large as Africa’s or Asia’s (White, 2000). 
This ratio is currently changing fast; the per capita con­
sumption of meat in the developing countries has more 
than tripled over the past 50 years, for example (FAO, 
2010b). This trend is expected to continue, so that 
meat production could double by 2050 (Steinfeld et al., 
2006). This is not only the result of population growth, 
but also primarily of the changed eating habits noted all 
over the world, in line with increasing prosperity. The 
diet in developing and newly industrialising countries 
is becoming richer in fats and proteins, and features 
more animal­derived foodstuffs, particularly in Latin 
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America and East Asia (von Koerber et al., 2008). In 
China, for instance, meat consumption has quintupled 
over the past three decades (FAO, 2006). The dairy sec­
tor contributes around 4 % to anthropogenic GHG emis­
sions, with around half of this being accounted for by 
CH4 (FAO, 2010c). 
Development dependent, these trends can lead to 
substantial additional GHG emissions (Keyzer et al., 
2005; Popp et al., 2010). Conversely, in 2055, global 
agricultural GHG emissions might even be below 1995 
figures, if eating habits were to change towards a diet 
with a lower proportion of animal products. In com­
bination with the technical mitigation potentials, this 
could even lead to a reduction of agricultural emissions 
down to around 2.5 Gt CO2eq per year by 2055, which 
would be the rough equivalent of half of today’s agri­
cultural GHG emissions (Popp et al., 2010). Reducing 
meat consumption therefore harbours a considerable 
potential for mitigating climate change. 
From a health point of view, the industrialised coun­
tries’ prevalent diet contains too many animal products. 
Stehfest et al. (2009) conclude that a reduction of meat 
consumption down to a healthy level would also reduce 
the mitigation costs for achieving stabilisation at 450 
ppm by half. Considerable land areas would be released 
to be used for other purposes. An appropriate change 
in eating habits would therefore have a twin benefit: 
it would be beneficial for people’s health, and for the 
environment (McMichael et al., 2007; Tukker et al., 
2009). 
Another important factor is the losses in households 
through spoilage and waste of foodstuffs, almost two­
thirds of which would be avoidable. This would not only 
reduce emissions, but also save on costs (WRAP, 2009). 
Therefore, the message is: a healthy diet is also cli­
mate­friendly. Today’s average proportion of animal 
products in the diet of industrialised countries, and the 
growing high­income groups in developing and newly 
industrialising countries, is higher than is healthy. 
This certainly does not mean that eating habits must 
become fully vegetarian or even vegan. Even the sug­
gested diet change towards eating less meat in general, 
and particularly less beef, would have a considerable 
impact on climate change mitigation (PBL, 2009a). 
Possible approaches include improved communication, 
and national framework setting (Brand et al., 2007; 
 Section 7.3.7.4). 
4.4
WBGU Exemplary Transformative Path for the 
EU-27
In the following, the WBGU discusses transformation 
scenarios for Germany and the European Union that 
lead to an energy supply which is widely, or even fully, 
reliant on renewable energies by 2050. For this pur­
pose, existing studies were analysed (EREC and Green­
peace, 2009, 2010; Sterner, 2009; SRU, 2010; Klaus 
et al., 2010; BMU, 2010c; Roadmap 2050, 2011). As 
shown in Section 4.1, renewable energies have suffi­
cient technical potentials to achieve this. The follow­
ing intends to underline the technical feasibility of an 
energy system that is based on energy efficiency and 
renewable energies. The realisation of these scenarios 
depends on political and economic course setting. The 
objective of this chapter is to illustrate core elements of 
a decarbonisation of the energy system, and to identify 
ways of combining conventional and renewable energy 
management.
Whilst so far, there are few detailed research activi­
ties for the technical realisation of a global energy sup­
ply that relies fully on renewable energies (for exam­
ple, Teske et al., 2008), high temporal resolution stud­
ies on 100 % renewable electricity have already been 
carried out for Europe, a combined European/North 
African electricity system, or a combined German/Nor­
wegian system (Roadmap 2050, 2011; Czisch, 2005). 
Czisch (2005) illustrated that, if the best possible sites 
for wind farms and solar power plants, bioenergy, and 
run­of­river hydropower schemes were chosen within 
the area covered by the scenario, the average costs for 
electricity generation and transport via a transnational 
grid would amount to between €ct 5–6 per kWh, even 
at the price renewable energy carriers were in 2005. 
They would therefore more or less equal the costs for 
conventionally generated electricity.
The German Advisory Council on the Environment 
(SRU, 2010) has shown in a detailed analysis that 
the potential of renewable energies for power gen­
eration in Germany and Europe is sufficient to allow 
a fully renewable electricity supply in Germany at all 
hours, and at an affordable cost, whilst meeting strin­
gent nature conservation demands, and avoiding other 
usage conflicts. Pan­European grid extension and the 
link­up with neighbouring countries play a decisive role 
in this. Common to all scenarios is the fact that they are 
driven by both resources and policies. 
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4.4.1 
A Renewable Energy Supply in Europe
The scenario Energy [R]evolution 2010 (EREC and 
Greenpeace, 2010) features two exemplary paths 
that would allow Europe to meet its climate protec­
tion targets by 2050. The basic scenario meets the cur­
rent  minimum target concerning an 80 % reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 compared to 1990, 
or the reduction of CO2 emissions by around 85 %. The 
ambitious Advanced Scenario even achieves a reduc­
tion by 95 %, through an energy supply that is almost 
100 % renewable, and through substantial increases 
in energy savings. Because of this, both paths lead to 
considerably more security in terms of Europe’s supply 
than is given today, and focus the energy value crea­
tion chain on Europe. 
This study’s key demographic, structural and eco­
nomic data, which characterise the economy and there­
fore also energy demand, largely agree with those on 
which the IEA World Energy Outlook scenarios are also 
based. 
Significant structural changes appear by 2050. The 
currently still high conversion losses are considerably 
reduced through the expansion of renewable electric­
ity generation, and the corresponding sharp decline in 
condensation power stations. Their contribution goes 
down from currently 76 % (fossil and nuclear) to 57 % 
by 2020, and 32 % by 2030. In 2050, only flexible gas 
power stations (including gas­powered CHP) supplying 
performance security play a role. The remaining fossil­
fuelled power plants (coal and gas) rely on CHP tech­
nology. The main contribution is made by renewable 
energies. Furthermore, transport is mostly electric, and 
major energy savings measures have been implemented 
where heating is concerned. 
These developments result in a significantly reduced 
primary energy input, which, in the reference scenario, 
rises by 3 % compared to today, to 76 EJ in 2050, whilst 
in the Energy­[R]evolution scenarios, it is covered 
through the widespread use of renewable energies, and 
therefore considerably lower: according to the physical 
energy content method, it goes down to 87 % of 2007 
levels by 2020 in the Advanced Scenario, and down to 
62 % of the initial value by 2050.
The same level of supply despite a lower primary 
energy demand stems from the fact that wind and solar 
energy, as well as hydropower, avoid waste heat, and 
that a significant intensification of energy savings in all 
sectors is assumed (Figure 4.4­1).
Energy­related greenhouse gas emissions are 
reduced by 95 % compared to 1990 levels by 2050 in 
this scenario. In terms of electricity and steam gener­
ation alone, emissions of 1.4 Gt CO2 per year can be 
avoided through energy savings and the continued 
expansion of renewable energies. In the medium term, 
CO2 reduction is particularly important in the heating 
sector, as is renewable electricity generation in the long 
term. 
The transformation of the European energy supply 
is not possible without high initial investments; how­
ever, in the long term, these will prove to be cost sav­
ings. The additional costs in the Advanced Scenario 
amount to € 82 billion for 2020, and € 73 billion for 
2030; however, it should be considered that these 
costs, compared to current energy imports of around 
€ 350 billion, remain within reasonable bounds. In the 
long term, these investments will lead to an energy 
turnaround through discontinued energy imports and 
a higher degree of independence from raw materials, 
savings which will amount to € 85 billion in 2050 for 
Europe.
Cities are the transformation nuclei: a number of 
European cities have set themselves the target of a 
100 % renewable supply. This leads to the creation of 
beacon projects, which serve as an inspiration in these 
times of increasing urbanisation in order to make this 
process sustainable.
Europe’s Electricity Supply According to the Energy 
[R]evolution 2010 Scenario
The transformation of the energy systems rests on the 
electricity sector. In this sector, decarbonisation is eas­
ier to achieve than in the heating or transport sector. 
However, heating and mobility can also be made more 
efficient, climate­friendly, and in part also cheaper 
through the use of renewable electricity. For these rea­
sons, renewable electricity will become primary energy 
in the long run, with the consequence that, despite 
energy savings, there is no reduction of the overall 
electricity demand by 2050.
In the Advanced Scenario, the regenerative share 
rises from 16 % (2007) to 43 % (2020), 68 % (2030), 
and 97 % (2050), with a capacity of around 1,500 GW 
by then. Most of this increase can be attributed to wind 
and solar power. The sustainable biomass potential is 
used to its maximum extent by around 2030. In this 
scenario, importing electricity from renewable energy 
sources (wind, solar thermal power plants) gradually 
becomes more important from 2030 (Figure 4.4­2).
This scenario, featuring a particularly extensive 
expansion of renewable energies, would not be obso­
lete even if some countries choose to continue to 
employ nuclear energy as part of their electricity mix. 
Concurrently with the widening expansion of renew­
able energies, conventional power plants will increas­
ingly have to go into part load operation. This ineffi­
cient and uneconomical plant operation, which, in the 
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Figure 4.4-1
Primary energy consumption in the EU­27 for electricity according to the Energy [R]evolution Advanced Scenario 2010 
compiled by EREC and Greenpeace (2010) for the period 1970–2050. The main contributors are wind energy, solar power, 
and biomass. Substantial primary energy savings result from the avoidance of waste heat through direct electricity generation 
by means of wind, solar and hydropower. Gross electric power generation continues to rise moderately until 2050 (red line; 
 Figure 4.4­2). The historical data up to and including 2008 is based on the International Energy Agency’s energy balance tables 
(IEA, 2010d).
Source: WBGU, based on the cited data sources
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Figure 4.4-2
Gross power generation in the EU­27 according to the Energy [R]evolution Advanced Scenario (EREC and Greenpeace, 2010) 
for the period 1970–2050. The proportion of renewable energies is gradually increased up to a share of 86 % in 2050. Wind, 
solar and hydropower have the largest share. Electricity transport, energy storage facilities and energy management offset 
fluctuations in generation and consumption. The increasing electricity demand between 2030 and 2050 is the result of 
increased demand for electricity for heating (heat pumps) and transport (electromobility) purposes. The historical data up to 
and including 2008 are based on the International Energy Agency’s energy balance tables (IEA, 2010d). 
Source: WBGU, based on the cited data sources
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case of fossil­powered plants, leads to added emissions, 
and may potentially cause technical complications, can 
be avoided through the construction of storage facili­
ties, and expansion of the European grid. 
Heating Europe, modelled after the Energy  
[R]evolution 2010 Scenario
Europe­wide, the proportion of renewable sources used 
for heating rises from 13 % today to 27 % by 2020, and 
to 95 % of final energy consumption by 2050. Fossil 
energy is gradually replaced by more efficient technol­
ogies. 
The reduction of the heating need is achieved 
through energy savings with the aid of improved heat 
insulation, and improved heat recovery from ventila­
tion. Both measures dramatically reduce the heating 
requirements of new builds. In existing buildings, the 
implementation of these measures is tied in with the 
refurbishment rate, which is accelerated, compared to 
historical levels.
The remaining heating need and process heat is 
met through a combination of electrical heat pumps, 
CHP technology, solar thermal energy, and renewable 
gases such as hydrogen or methane (Figure 4.4­3). Heat 
pumps and CHP technology are particularly suitable 
for balancing power grid fluctuations: whilst the heat 
pump can be activated when there is surplus electric­
ity, CHP helps to counteract power generation deficits. 
In both cases, the thermal mass of the buildings, or the 
suitable dimensioning of heat storage vessels, allows 
the delinking of the electricity and heat flow. 
Deviating from the Advanced Scenario, the variant 
shown here uses more biomass in the heating sector, as 
the degree of usage and usage efficiency in this sector 
is double that of the transport sector. Biomass such as 
wood is used in heating systems as a 1:1 replacement 
for fossil oil, whilst biomass for fuel production in part 
has to undergo multiple conversions, accompanied by 
high losses, to be usable for mobility. Therefore, bioen­
ergy, which is limited in any case, can achieve far more 
substantial CO2 savings in the heating sector (WBGU, 
2010a). The mineral oil thus released from heating sys­
tems is used as a fuel for mobility.
Renewable Mobility in Europe, modelled after the 
Energy [R]evolution 2010 Scenario
In the transport sector, the dependence on fossil 
resources is still most pronounced; accordingly, the 
transformation poses a challenge (Figure 4.4­4). Due to 
the considerable freight transport growth rates, com­
bustion engine efficiency increases only slow down 
consumption growth. 
The main efficiency gains are achieved by renewable 
electromobility, which has an efficiency factor that is 
three or four times higher than that of fossil combus­
tion engines. The challenge with regard to the wide­
spread introduction of electric vehicles lies in tech­
nology development, cost reduction, sustainable raw 
material cycles, and technical maturity.
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Figure 4.4-3
Final energy consumption in the EU­27 heating sector, with reference to the Energy [R]evolution Advanced Scenario 2010, for 
the period 2007–2050, showing increased biomass and decreased crude oil reliance up until 2050. Energy saving measures and 
the introduction of heat pumps, solar thermal energy, CHP technology, biomass and renewable gases (hydrogen, methane) allow 
100 % renewable heating by 2050.
Source: WBGU, with reference to EREC and Greenpeace
WBGU Exemplary Transformative Path for the EU-27  4.4
149
The sustainable potential of biofuels is fully tapped 
for certain transport systems (long distance, flight, 
ship, freight transport) that rely on chemical energy 
carriers with a high energy density. Renewable gases 
(hydrogen, methane) play an important role in comple­
menting the limited potential of biofuels. On the one 
hand, the introduction of wind and solar fuels prevents 
competition over use, which can occur with biofuels; on 
the other hand, it overcomes the limitations in terms of 
their availability.
With the speedy introduction of electromobility, 
the limited use of sustainable biofuels, and the launch 
of wind and solar fuels, approx. 90 % of mobility can 
be based on renewable energy by 2050. The remain­
ing 10 % will continue to be powered by the mineral 
oil that is released thanks to its replacement in heating 
systems with biomass.
Transferability of European Conclusions to other 
World Regions
Europe enjoys the advantage of a well­developed grid 
infrastructure, and high technology diffusion. These 
conclusions could equally apply to North America, 
and some of Asia’s densely populated areas. DLR stud­
ies (for example EREC and Greenpeace, 2010), which 
are also used for the IPCC’s special report on renewable 
energies, are suitable for globally differentiated anal­
yses.
4.4.2 
The Linking of Energy Systems as the 
 Transformation’s Core Element
Integration of renewable energies into the existing 
energy supply structures requires cross­sector linking. 
The expansion of electricity and gas grids, their inter­
linkage, and their smart connection with the IT network 
are indispensable. 
Dynamic Simulations for Integrating Renewable 
Energies into the Electricity Supply
To analyse a renewable supply with high proportions 
of wind and photovoltaic energy, the temporal feed­in 
fluctuations caused by meteorological conditions must 
be adequately mapped, as these demand the use of 
compensating measures such as storage or generation 
and load management, which must be co­analysed in 
technical and economic terms. 
This problematic issue shall be illustrated for Ger­
many on the basis of the study carried out by Klaus et 
al. (2010), which examines the realisation of a 100 % 
renewable energy supply for Germany in 2050. The 
study shows that through the ambitious expansion of 
national renewable energies, the introduction of elec­
tromobility for transport, improved building insulation 
to low­energy standard, the substitution of conven­
tional heating systems with electric heat pumps, and the 
use of large­scale storage facilities (pump stores and gas 
Figure 4.4-4
Final energy consumption in the transport sector across the EU­27, with reference to the Energy [R]evolution Advanced 
Scenario 2010, for the period 1970–2050, with biomass as interim technology, and including the crude oil that will be released 
in the heating sector by 2050 (EREC and Greenpeace, 2010). The introduction of efficient electromobility can significantly 
reduce final energy consumption in the transport sector. Renewable gases (methane, hydrogen) complement biofuels in the long 
distance segment. The historical data up to and including 2008 are based on the International Energy Agency’s energy balance 
tables (IEA, 2010d). 
Source: WBGU, based on the cited data sources
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network) to compensate for imbalances between gener­
ation and consumption, the complete decarbonisation 
of the energy sector by 2050 is, in principle, techni­
cally and sustainably possible. To improve the balance 
between generation and consumption, load manage­
ment with the aid of electrical heat pumps, room cli­
mate control, and electromobility can make an impor­
tant contribution: at times when generation exceeds 
the current consumption, the batteries of the electric 
vehicles connected to the grid are charged, the thermal 
storage vessels of the heating systems, which are based 
on heat pumps, are heated up, or the air conditioning 
units are switched on to increase current consumption 
in order to avoid the interim storage of electric energy 
in electricity storage facilities. 
Figure 4.4­5 illustrates the feed­in simulated in Klaus 
et al. (2010) for the months December and August. 
Whilst during the summer months, through the com­
bination of wind and solar energy, there are only short 
periods of differing consumption and generation, con­
fined to a few hours, the simulation shows a fortnight 
in December with considerable energy supply deficits, 
which would have to be compensated for in a reliable 
energy system. 
Expansion of Energy Grids
The expansion and linking of the grids allows the 
Europe­wide transport of energy. Electricity grids must 
be extensively expanded, both nationally and inter­
nationally (DENA, 2010). Today’s gas networks could 
already be described as supergrids, as they feature high 
transmission levels, and well­developed storage capac­
ities of around 220 TWhth in Germany alone. A strong 
trans­European high­performance transport grid for 
electricity and gas is a prerequisite for, on the one hand, 
facilitating the transport of energy from wind and solar 
power plants from sites with high yields to consump­
tion centres, and, on the other hand, ensuring wide­
ranging compensation of local generation fluctuations. 
In this way, the power produced by large­scale offshore 
wind farms and solar power generated in the Mediterra­
nean could be integrated into the European energy sup­
ply, and existing possible storage facilities in gas net­
works or pumped­storage hydroelectric power in Scan­
dinavia, the Pyrenees and the Alps could be unlocked. 
Integration of Storage Facilities and Linking of 
Electricity, Gas and Heat Grids
The need for storage increases in line with the share 
of wind and solar energy. A distinction must be made 
between short­term and long­term storage facilities. 
To compensate output fluctuations lasting only a few 
hours, pump storage power stations with high effi­
ciency factors can be used. A further expansion of this 
proven technology is at least in Germany currently lim­
ited, mainly due to acceptance issues. An appealing 
option, however, would be to use the immense capac­
ities of storage power stations, particularly those in 
Norway. However, high­capacity transmission lines 
between the European heartland and Norway would 
have to be built. The currently planned link between 
Germany and Norway, with a transmissions capacity of 
1.4 GW, at a cost of around € 1.5 billion, can only be the 
first step (NorGer, 2011). The storage capacity can be 
improved further through the conversion of Norway’s 
already existing pumped­storage hydroelectric power 
plants, taking into consideration ecological aspects 
such as the mixing of saltwater and freshwater. Against 
the background of these extremely large­capacity stor­
age potentials (approx. 80 TWhel), the building of com­
pressed air energy storage plants with considerably 
lower efficiency factors and higher costs appears sec­
ondary (SRU, 2010).
In principle, electrical batteries are also suitable for 
the stabilisation of power grids. The expected costs of 
battery storage, however, both today and in the fore­
seeable future, do not allow competitive use. An excep­
tion is the storing of power for electric vehicles, partic­
ularly in the case of optimised charging management. 
Feeding energy from the batteries of electric cars back 
into the power grid on a regular basis, however, is also 
not economically viable, although this could become an 
attractive option during critical times, when a lucrative 
income could be achieved for grid support. 
With the exception of the Norwegian pump stores, 
however, long­term stop­gap storage, for example if 
there is a wind lull lasting 1–2 weeks, is not possible 
with any of the above described types of storage facility 
(Figure 4.4­5). These gaps could initially be closed with 
the aid of dedicated back­up power plants, for instance 
fast­response gas turbines, but also with virtual power 
stations, consisting of a number of local CHP plants that 
are synchronised and controlled through smart grids. 
Along with the decreasing proportions of fossil 
energy carriers, natural gas can initially be supple­
mented by biogas. However, a full substitution requires 
the generation of renewable methane from wind and 
solar power. Gas­powered back­up power plants and 
local CHP units, which are required in any case, are 
suitable for the reconversion. Overall, this combina­
tion results in a long­term store that initially converts 
renewable electricity into methane, which is the same 
as natural gas, stores this energy carrier with the aid 
of the existing natural gas infrastructure, and supplies 
electricity with the aid of the back­up power plants 
when it is needed. Gas store storage capacities can close 
electricity supply gaps of up to two months.
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Figure 4.4-5
Simulated renewable energy feed­in (coloured areas) according to the UBA scenario projected to 2050 across one month in 
relation to basic load (dotted red line), and the resulting overall load with a managed use of electromobility, heating and air 
conditioning, and heat pumps (continuous red line). Exemplary illustration of one month in summer, and one in winter 
(a: August, b: December), using the meteorological data for 2007. Extreme electricity supply fluctuations are caused by both 
wind and solar energy; these can be compensated with the three measures of grid expansion, generation and load management, 
and storage facilities. Despite ideal grid expansion and ideal load management, gaps in the supply for intervals of one to two 
weeks occur regularly; these can only be closed through integration of the large Scandinavian storage capacities, or the linking 
of gas and energy grids.
Source: Klaus et al., 2010
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In this way, the electricity grid can be sensibly con­
nected to the gas network. This linking allows the sta­
bilisation of power grids by utilising the storage capac­
ity of gas networks, which is several times higher 
(Sterner, 2009). The expansion of local heat networks, 
and their connection to the power grids or gas net­
works, leads to a further synergy: the electricity gen­
eration from stored methane can be carried out in CHP 
units with high overall efficiency factors, thereby also 
covering part of the heat supply (Nast, 2007). 
Linking Electricity Grids and IT Networks: 
Production and Load Management
As a precondition for efficient energy services manage­
ment, all energy networks (electricity, gas, heat) should 
be linked by information technology (smartgrids). 
The employment of generation and load management 
helps to even out electricity supply fluctuations, firstly 
through a needs­based use of electric vehicles, cool­
ing appliances, heat pumps and other electricity­pow­
ered devices in households, commerce and industry, 
and  secondly through the needs­controlled use of CHP 
technology. Industrial production, trade and private 
households offer sizeable potentials for load manage­
ment (Stadler, 2006). 
The Natural Gas Network as a Multifunctional Grid 
for Energy Transport and Storage
CHP technology in the form of small, local CHP units, 
or larger gas­steam power plants, is already predomi­
nantly gas­powered, which also provides an excellent 
basis for the linking of the various different energy 
carriers in future. Today’s natural gas network can take 
over several functions in a networked energy system 
(Figure 4.4­6). Through CO2 separation, biogas can be 
converted into methane, which can then be fed into 
existing natural gas networks to supply all of the typ­
ical natural gas consumers, such as CHP units, gas 
power plants, gas­powered cars, or conventional heat­
ing appliances. Synthesis gas from biomass conversion 
units can also be synthesised, with the separation of 
CO2, into pure methane, and fed in. Similar processes 
can also be used for the conversion of coal into meth­
ane via coal gasification, again with the separation of 
CO2 (US­DoE, 2006).
A new alternative is the production of methane 
from electricity production surpluses. Firstly, hydrogen 
is produced through electrolysis. This hydrogen is then 
converted into pure methane in a subsequent conver­
sion process by reacting with CO2, and can then also 
be fed into existing natural gas networks (Specht et al., 
2010). This path can provide the long­term storage that 
is needed to shift the various seasonal surpluses from 
wind­powered and solar­powered electricity produc­
tion to cover troughs lasting one to two weeks. Another 
important characteristic of the existing natural gas net­
work can be used during this process: the possibility 
of storage in existing natural gas storage facilities with 
a capacity of 220 TWhth, which exceeds the required 
capacities for power generation compensation several 
times over (Sterner et al., 2010; Klaus et al., 2010). 
A further attractive option provided by methane 
synthesis from hydrogen and carbon dioxide results 
from the fact that it enables the initial collection of 
locally accumulated CO2 streams, for example from 
biogas plants, but also from cement and chalk produc­
tion, which can be converted into methane and subse­
quently added to large central units, for instance gas 
and steam power plants, for sequestration via the exist­
ing natural gas network.
This strategy also allows the use of coal in combina­
tion with CO2 sequestration, thus generally represent­
ing a collection system for locally accumulated CO2. For 
the compensation of wind and solar power plant out­
put fluctuations, this allows the delinking of biomass 
availability, which will dramatically reduce the land­use 
competition with food production. Using the natural 
gas infrastructure also allows the long­distance trans­
porting of this energy carrier from biomass, coal and 
electricity via existing natural gas / liquid gas termi­
nals, and the inclusion of unconventional natural gas 
deposits (shale gas). 
Finally, the Fischer­Tropsch synthesis allows the 
production of liquid energy carriers for transport use, 
or raw materials for the plastics industry. The natural 
gas network is also an ideal basis for the transition stage 
towards a sustainable energy system: natural gas­based 
power stations can already be rapidly extended today 
to compensate for power grid output fluctuations, 
whilst on the production side, natural gas can gradu­
ally be supplemented, and subsequently fully replaced, 
by biogenic methane or methane from electricity sur­
pluses.
4.5
Financing the Transformation towards a 
 Low-Carbon Society
4.5.1 
Investment Requirement for the Transformation 
of Global Energy Systems
The global rebuilding of energy systems, necessary for 
the transformation into a sustainable and low­carbon 
society, including the adaptations required for the dif­
ferent areas of need (Section 4.3), requires substan­
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tial additional investments, compared to the continu­
ation of ‘business as usual’ (BAU). These investments 
must be made above all in the area of research and 
development of new technologies (particularly energy­
related technologies), as well as technology diffusion, 
but also into the expansion of renewable energies, into 
more energy­efficient production technologies, into 
the rebuilding of communication and transport sys­
tems, and into improvements regarding end­use effi­
ciency (including the areas of mobility, housing, com­
munication). 
A further important precondition for the transfor­
mation is the increase of investments into infrastruc­
tures: apart from new transportation infrastructures, 
additional transmission networks and energy storage 
facilities are particularly important to allow the inte­
gration of large proportions of renewable energies into 
the energy mix.
The global energy sector is already one of the largest 
and most important economic sectors, attracting annual 
investments of at least 1–2 % of global GDP. These cur­
rently amount to around US$ 740 billion. Annually, 
US$ 210 billion are invested into electricity generation, 
US$ 170 billion into transmission and distribution, US$ 
130 billion into industry, and a further US$ 3,800 bil­
lion in the transport sector alone (IEA, 2010a). This 
does not include all of the investments in the area of 
buildings and numerous smaller industries, as these are 
difficult to distinguish (IEA, 2010a). 
4.5.1.1 
Comparison of Investment Requirement Estimates
Various studies have reached the conclusion that the 
average additional global investment requirement for 
a transformation into a low­carbon society (compared 
with BAU) per year ranges from at least US$ 200 billion 
to around US$ 1,000 billion for the period up to 2030, 
and substantially more than US$ 1,000 billion per year 
for the period between 2030 and 2050 (UNFCCC, 2008; 
McKinsey, 2009; IEA, 2010a; Edenhofer et al., 2009a; 
Project Catalyst, 2010; AGECC, 2010; World Bank, 
2010b; GEA, 2011). The various estimates have been 
summarised in Table 4.5­1. 
At the lower end of the global investment require­
ment range are the UNFCCC Secretariat’s estimates 
(2008), which assume the additional annual invest­
ment required in 2030 to reduce global greenhouse gas 
emissions by 25 % compared to 2000 levels to be just 
over US$ 200 billion, half of which would have to be 
invested in developing countries. This figure already 
takes a reduction of investments in fossil­based energy 
generation into account. Unlike subsequent studies, the 
UNFCCC Secretariat’s estimates only cover the invest­
ment costs for the realisation of a technology mix con­
sisting of already existing technologies, whilst all other 
Figure 4.4-6
Possible linking of energy grids, example methane. The existing natural gas grid is used as a central element for the 
transportation and storage of conventional and renewable energies. This architecture allows CO2 recycling, or the collection 
of decentrally captured CO2 via the natural gas grid, including CO2 storage after use in power plants. In combination with 
biomass, this allows the creation of 'negative emissions' in the form of a carbon sink. Renewable energies from wind, solar and 
hydropower can be stored temporarily in the form of methane in gas storage facilities, and, together with biomass and (in the 
transition period) coal, fed into all energy sectors – including the transport sector, optionally in liquid form through Fischer­
Tropsch conversion (FT conversion).
Source: WBGU
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studies also take the development costs of various (cur­
rently not yet developed) technologies into account 
(UNFCCC, 2008).
McKinsey (2009) assumes upfront investments for 
the rebuilding of global energy and land­use systems 
of around US$ 660–720 billion (€ 530 billion) in 2020, 
or respectively up to around US$ 1,100 billion (€ 810 
billion) in 2030; these extrapolations also include the 
area of land use, unlike other studies. McKinsey’s esti­
mates should also be seen as additional investments, 
compared to the BAU scenario. The additional invest­
ments amount to 5–6 % of the investments in the BAU 
scenario (McKinsey, 2009).
Table 4.5-1
Overview of various estimates of annual upfront investment costs for the global decarbonisation of energy systems.
Source: WBGU
Study Level of estimated 
 investments
Region this 
estimate 
refers to
Sectors this 
 estimate refers 
to
Assumptions for emissions 
paths or calculation basis
UNFCCC (2008): Investment 
and Financial Flows to Ad-
dress Climate Change – An 
Update
US$ 200–210 billion annually 
(additional) in 2030, around 
half of which to be invested 
in developing countries
Global Energy systems 
and land use 
(agriculture and 
forestry)
Reduction by 25 % below 2000 
emissions levels 
McKinsey (2009): Pathways to 
a Low-Carbon Economy
€ 530 billion annually (ad-
ditional) in 2020 ~US$ 660 
billion; 
€ 810 billion annually 
 (additional) in 2030 ~US$ 
1,000 billion
Global Energy systems 
and land use 
(agriculture and 
forestry)
Stabilisation at 450 ppm 
CO2eq; pure investment costs, 
 excluding programme and 
 transaction costs; 
excluding rebound  
Additionality: compared to BAU
IEA (2010a): Energy 
 Technology Perspectives 2010
On average US$ 1,150 billion 
annually (additional) until 
2050 (overall US$ 46,000 
billion up to 2050)
Global Energy systems 
in general (in-
cluding final use 
in the industry, 
buildings, trans-
port sector)
Stabilisation at 450–490 ppm 
CO2eq; 
also includes learning and 
development costs for new 
technologies; 
Additionality: compared to basis 
scenario
Edenhofer et al. (2009a): 
RECIPE
US$  480–600 billion annu-
ally until 2030; US$ 1,200 
billion in 2050 in addition to 
baseline (assuming decline of 
investments in fossil energy 
generation of US$ 300–500 
billion)
Global Energy systems 
(excluding 
demand-side 
investments)
Stabilisation at 410–450 ppm 
CO2eq
GEA (2011): Global Energy 
Assessment
Overall investments: US$ 
1,700–2,100 billion annu-
ally (in total), equivalent to 
US$ 65,000–85,000 billion 
cumulatively between 2010 
and 2050 (in total); overall 
investments for  renewable 
energies:  US$ 150–590 billion 
(in total); Investments in 
transmissions and storage 
technology: up to US$ 300–
520 billion up to 2050 (in 
total) 
Global Energy system in 
general including 
final use
Climate stabilisation below 2 °C;
Universal access and end 
of energy poverty by 2030; 
improvement of energy security; 
significant reduction of air 
 pollution and other emissions
Project Catalyst (2010): From 
Climate Finance to Financing 
Green Growth
US$ 290 billion annually (in 
total) from 2020
Developing 
countries
Energy system in 
general
Compliance with the 2 °C guard 
rail (stabilisation at 450 ppm 
CO2eq)
World Bank (2010b): World 
Development Report 2010
US$ 264–563 billion  annually 
(in total) until 2030
Developing 
countries
Mitigation meas-
ures in general
Stabilisation at 450 ppm CO2eq 
(values based on works by 
 McKinsey, 2009; IIASA, 2009; 
IEA, 2008c, and Knopf et al., 
2010)
AGECCC (2010): Energy for a 
Sustainable Future
On average US$ 35–40 billion 
annually until 2030  
(in total)
Developing 
countries
Overcoming 
energy poverty
Goal: addressing energy poverty
GEA (2011): Global Energy 
Assessment
Around US$ 7–38 billion an-
nually until 2030 (in total)
Developing 
countries
Overcoming 
energy poverty
Goal: access to electricity and 
clean energy carriers for cooking
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The International Energy Agency (IEA) assumes that 
average annual additional investments for an emissions 
reduction of 50 % compared to 2005 figures (Blue Map 
scenario) will amount to around US$ 1,150 billion by 
2050; the largest part of this (more than 50 %) would 
have to be invested in the rebuilding of the transpor­
tation systems (particularly new vehicle technologies). 
These estimates also include private (demand­side) 
investments in new low­carbon vehicles and durable 
products, buildings efficiency, and energy­efficient 
industrial plants (IEA, 2010a). The IEA reaches the con­
clusion that the majority of the investments will have 
to be made after 2030. In 2030, investments totalling 
around US$ 750 billion will probably be required, rising 
to US$ 1,600 billion per year between 2030 and 2050. 
This means that the investments required between 
2015 and 2030 in the Blue Map scenario exceed the 
basis scenario’s investments by around 8.6 %, and by 
16 % between 2030 and 2050. However, according to 
the IEA, these additional investments will be fully off­
set by savings on fossil fuels. The current value of net 
savings, i. e. the savings on fossil fuels over the period 
2010–2050, less the additional investments over the 
same period, should therefore still amount to around 
US$ 8,000 billion, even at a (comparatively high) dis­
count rate of 10 % (IEA, 2010a).
The RECIPE study assumes that the energy transfor­
mation will require slightly lower investments (Eden­
hofer et al., 2009a). They are estimated at around 
US$  480–600 billion per year until 2030. However, 
contrary to the estimates provided by McKinsey and 
the IEA, this does not include demand­side investments 
(such as new vehicles or buildings insulation). RECIPE’s 
results also lead to the conclusion that the major part of 
the investments must be carried out before the middle 
of the century. By the middle of the century, additional 
investments would have to rise to up to US$ 1,200 bil­
lion.
The Global Energy Assessment (GEA) assumes 
annual supply­side investments totalling US$ 1,700–
2,100 billion, thereby presenting the highest figures. 
However, unlike the figures arrived at in the other stud­
ies, these are not just additional investments, but the 
required overall total. Moreover, the scenarios devel­
oped for the GEA are not limited to the objective of sta­
bilising the climate. They also cover the achieving of the 
Millennium Development Goals, and the overcoming of 
other negative environmental impacts of the current 
energy system. According to this, current supply­side 
investments of US$ 740 billion per year would have 
to increase to US$ 1,600–2,100 billion per year (the 
equivalent of US$ 65,000–85,000 billion cumulatively 
between 2010 and 2050). Investments in renewable 
energies are responsible for a substantial share of this, 
as they would have to rise from currently US$ 162 bil­
lion (UNEP­SEFI and BNEF, 2010) per year to up to US$ 
590 billion per year, and investments in high­voltage 
grids and storage technology, which would have to rise 
from currently US$ 190 billion per year to up to US$ 
300–520 billion per year in 2050 (GEA, 2011). 
Allocating the Global Investment Requirement to 
Sectors and Regions
The allocation of investments to the various sectors 
is similar in all of the estimates. The transport sec­
tor accounts for around half of the total investments. 
The buildings sector is in second place. According to 
UNFCCC estimates, around 44 % of global invest­
ments would have to be made into the transport sec­
tor, a further 25 % into the buildings sector, roughly 
20 % into research and development, around 18 % each 
into industry and agriculture, respectively, and 11 % 
into forestry (UNFCCC, 2008). According to McKin­
sey’s estimate, again more than half of the investments 
are necessary in the transport and building sectors for 
energy­efficient buildings and vehicles (McKinsey, 
2009; Figure  4.5­1). Around 16 %, or 18 %, respec­
tively, of the additional total investments would have 
to be spent on electricity generation from renewable 
energy sources and nuclear power, and CCS. Region­
ally, the most sizeable investments are needed in North 
America, Western Europe, and China (Figure  4.5­1; 
McKinsey, 2009). According to IEA estimates, as much 
as 50 % of the overall investments required must be 
made in China, the USA, and the EU (IEA, 2010c).
Investments in transport also dominate in the IEA 
analysis, with investments into the buildings sector in 
second place, followed by energy sector investments 
(IEA, 2010a; Figure 4.5­2).
With regard to the investment cost estimates shown 
in Table 4.5­1, it must be taken into account that these 
cannot be compared directly, due to the differing 
methods used, and different assumptions (for instance 
in relation to energy mix and stabilisation path). The 
stated values should therefore be understood as rough 
indications. More precise and reliable estimates for the 
requisite additional initial investment costs in the vari­
ous sectors and areas of need in different countries and 
regions, and for different decarbonisation paths, should 
be calculated during the course of research activities for 
the energy system decarbonisation to provide a solid 
basis for political decisions (Chapter 8). 
However, even if the values shown in Table 4.5­1 
are only estimates, they still allow the conclusion that 
the globally required additional investments over the 
next two decades will lie in the region of US$ several 
hundred billion, and can reach values of up to more 
than US$ 1,000 billion annually by the middle of the 
4 Technical and Economic Feasibility
156
century. Evidently, two sectors that need particularly 
substantial investments are transport and buildings. 
Whilst up until 2015, buildings attract a major part of 
the investment requirement, this subsequently shifts 
to the transport sector (McKinsey, 2009; IEA, 2010a; 
Mehling et al., 2010; Figure 4.5­1). 
The increase in investment requirement over time 
reflects the fact that globally, ever higher emissions 
reductions must continue to be achieved. Particularly 
high annual investment flows can be expected from 
2030, when many of the low­carbon technologies will 
be marketable, whilst the demand for consumer goods 
and energy in the developing and newly industrialis­
ing countries will have risen considerably in the mean­
time (IEA, 2010a; McKinsey, 2009; Mehling et al., 
2010). The International Energy Agency estimates that 
between 2010 and 2035, around US$ 316 billion per 
year would be needed for the expansion of renewable 
energies alone, in order to reach the target of stabilisa­
tion at 450 ppm CO2eq. Most of this would have to be 
invested in wind power and hydropower (IEA, 2010c). 
According to IEA estimates, total investments into cli­
mate­friendly technologies would have to increase 
around fivefold by 2030, and tenfold by 2050 (IEA, 
2010a), which serves to illustrate the dimension of the 
imminent challenge. 
Investment Requirement Estimates for the WBGU’s 
Exemplary Transformation Path 
The WBGU’s exemplary transformation path, leading to 
almost 100 % renewable electricity in Europe, is part 
of the global energy transformation (Section 4.4). The 
expansion of the grid to link European and North Afri­
can power grids for the large­scale use of solar energy 
alone would lead to annual investment costs of around 
€ 47 billion in 2020, and these could rise to € 395 bil­
lion per year by 2050 (DLR, 2006). Moreover, addi­
tional capacities for the generation of renewable ener­
gies would have to be installed in Europe. 
The authors of the scenario ‘Energy [R]evolution 
– Towards a Fully Renewable Energy Supply in the 
EU 27’, which is more or less comparable to the WBGU 
scenario, reach the conclusion that in order to achieve 
an almost 100 % renewable energy supply for Europe 
by 2050, Europe­wide average annual investments into 
the energy sector would have to amount to € 87 billion 
(EREC and Greenpeace, 2010). These figures must be 
considered as overall totals, and not additional to the 
reference scenario. The investment requirement there­
fore exceeds the reference scenario’s, which estimates 
annual energy sector investments of around € 45 bil­
lion, by around 90 %. This must be compared to aver­
age annual fossil fuel savings of € 62 billion by 2050. 
The realisation of the Advanced Energy [R]evolution 
scenario required cumulative investments amounting 
to € 3,800 billion by 2050, accompanied by cumula­
tive expected savings on fossil fuels of € 2,600 billion 
(EREC and Greenpeace, 2010).
Falling Investment Costs for Renewable Energies 
due to Learning Curve Effects
Due to the learning curve effect, investment costs per 
kWh generated for renewable energies will go down in 
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Figure 4.5-1
Additional annual global investments by sector (a), and 
countries or regions (b) during the stated periods of time (left: 
2011–2015; right: 2026–2030) in € billions. The analysis 
refers to an emission path which allows the stabilisation 
of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at 450 ppm 
CO2eq.
Source: McKinsey, 2009
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line with an increasing number of new plant installa­
tions (Neij et al., 2003). Even when meeting a share of 
as little as 10–30 % of global energy demand, the pro­
duction costs of renewable energies are generally com­
parable to those of conventional electricity generation, 
thus enabling them to compete (Figure 4.5­3). 
Figure 4.5­3 shows the cost reduction potentials of 
four renewable electricity generation technologies in 
comparison with the cost ranges of conventional coal­ 
and gas­powered electricity generation (€ct 3–5  per 
kWh). It is estimated that fossil­powered plants with 
CCS will cost an additional €ct 3 per kWh (IPCC, 2005). 
The bandwidths of the cost of electricity generation 
with photovoltaic and wind energy are the result of 
location­dependence, i. e. degree of solar irradiation, or 
wind speed. In the case of solar thermal power plants, 
the bandwidth is not as wide, as it only makes sense to 
use these in latitudes with a high share of direct radi­
ation, due to the employment of concentrators. The 
wide bandwidth of biomass electricity generation costs 
is due to the various different bioenergy technologies. 
Learning curves were used for the calculation of 
expected power generation costs. For photovoltaic and 
wind energy, these have been recorded for over 20 
years, and so far, they are following an extremely stable 
trend: a doubling of the cumulative globally installed 
Figure 4.5-2
Breakdown of the additional 
global investment costs 
for the various sectors, 
cumulative over the 
respective period, in US$. 
The analysis refers to 
an emission path which 
allows the stabilisation of 
atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations at 450–490 
ppm CO2eq.
Source: IEA, 2010a
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Global development potential of costs for electricity from renewable energies. 
Source: WBGU, own illustration
1
1
2
4
6
8
10
20
40
60
80
100
10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000
1% 10% 50% 100%Share of global energy demand 2010
Electric power generation [TWh/year]
Biomass
El
ec
tr
ic
ity
 c
os
ts
 [€
ct
/k
W
h] Photovoltaic 
Wind
Solarthermal power stations
Conventional with CCS
Conventional
4 Technical and Economic Feasibility
158
generation capacity reduces the cost of electricity from 
photovoltaic energy by 20 %, and of wind energy by 
10 % (Staffhorst, 2006). Up to now, there are too few 
experiences with solar thermal power plants to allow 
the determination of a stable trend. Therefore, a learn­
ing rate of only 10 %, equalling the wind energy rate, 
has been assumed. In the case of biomass electricity 
generation, there is a broad mix of fermentation, gasi­
fication and combustion technologies. Because of the 
comparatively conventional technologies, the assumed 
learning rate is only 5 %. The band showing biomass 
electricity generation is limited to a maximum of 
15,000 TWh, or 54 EJ, per year (Figure 4.5­3), which 
represents the limit of the sustainable potential (with 
an electricity conversion efficiency factor of approx. 
50 %). It must be considered here that the electricity 
generation costs for conventional fossil­powered plants 
are assumed to remain constant for the purpose of this 
illustration. On the one hand, learning curve progress is 
made there, too; on the other hand, it can be expected 
that fuel costs as well as costs for emissions allowances 
will rise, which will probably more than compensate 
any learning progress.
Estimates of Investment Requirement in Developing 
Countries
The investment requirement for the energy transfor­
mation in developing countries is proportional to the 
global investment requirement, and different studies 
estimate the amount to range between around US$ 100 
and 563 billion per year (Table 4.5­1) by 2030. Accord­
ing to UNFCCC (2008), around half of the estimated glo­
bal additional US$ 200 billion of investments required 
must be made in developing countries; the decrease 
of investments into fossil­fuelled energy generation is 
already included here. According to the Project Catalyst 
analysis, around US$ 290 billion will be required annu­
ally in the developing countries as of 2020 to finance 
the investments necessary for a low­carbon economy 
that is compatible with the 2 °C guard rail. Over half 
of this (US$ 155 billion) would have to be invested in 
new energy generation plants, a further US$ 123 bil­
lion would be needed for energy efficiency invest­
ments, whilst the investments which would have to be 
made into agriculture and forest management are not 
particularly substantial (Project Catalyst, 2010). How­
ever, the World Bank assumes that in order to achieve 
stabilisation at 450 ppm CO2eq, total investments of 
up to US$ 264–563 billion annually would have to be 
made between 2010 and 2030 in developing countries 
(World Bank, 2010b). This estimate includes mitigation 
measures in all sectors, though, not only those pertain­
ing to energy generation and use, therefore exceeding 
the Project Catalyst estimates. 
In addition, financial transfers for the REDD­plus 
mechanism for the reduction of deforestation in devel­
oping countries are also needed (Section 7.3.7.2). To 
halve global deforestation, these amount to approx. 
US$ 20–33 billion per year (Stern, 2008; Strassburg 
et al., 2008; Project Catalyst, 2010). 
Investment Requirement to Reduce Energy Poverty
Reducing the energy poverty in developing coun­
tries, on the other hand, requires ‘only’ two­digit bil­
lion amounts. The UN Secretary General’s Advisory 
Group on Energy and Climate Change, for instance, 
has calculated that up to 2030, investments averaging 
US$ 35–40 billion per year are necessary in developing 
countries in order to provide a climate­friendly foun­
dation for local energy systems, whilst also achieving 
the aim of global universal access to energy services 
by 2030 (AGECC, 2010). This would allow all house­
holds access to basic energy services (AGECC, 2010; 
IEA, 2010c). These estimates are based on IEA (US$ 35 
billion annually for access to electricity; IEA, 2009b) 
and UNDP (US$ 2–3 billion annually for access to mod­
ern fuels; UNDP and ESMAP, 2005) figures. The Global 
Energy Assessment (2011) arrives at similar amounts, 
quantifying the required investments for the creation 
of universal access to energy as US$ 7–38 billion by 
2030. Around 50 % of this is needed for grid expan­
sion, the remainder for clean cooking facilities, and 
energy carriers for cooking (GEA, 2011). Each of these 
investment estimates refers to absolute values – not to 
additions to business as usual. It must also be taken 
into account that the reduction of energy poverty can­
not be viewed independently of the transformation 
towards a low­carbon society. Accordingly, the invest­
ment requirements overlap, and must not be viewed as 
an addition.
4.5.1.2 
Energy Systems Transformation Cost
The investment requirement for the transformation 
towards a low­carbon society cannot be equated with 
its costs. To determine the costs, the resultant sav­
ings must be allowed for (lower energy consumption, 
lower expenditure on fossil energy carriers). As already 
mentioned, according to IEA estimates (2010a) and 
Mc Kinsey (2009), the additional investments will be 
either fully, or almost fully, compensated by savings 
on fossil fuels. Furthermore, any macroeconomic cost 
assessment would also have to take the effects on glo­
bal GDP, caused by the structural changes in the energy 
and production sectors, into account. This macroeco­
nomic assessment can be carried out with the aid of 
integrated assessment models that link climate with 
economic models (Section 4.2). These calculate the 
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development of global GDP with and without climate 
policies. The difference between both developments at 
any point in time, discounted to a basis year, reflects 
the costs of mitigation policies.
Comparing Different Cost Estimates
A comparison of different integrated assessment mod­
els yields the result that the aggregated macroeconomic 
costs of an ambitious decarbonisation strategy (stabili­
sation of CO2 concentration at 410 ppm CO2eq) by 2100 
in current values (i. e. discounted on the basis year 
2005, assuming a discount rate of 3 %) will probably be 
in the region of 0.7–4 % of global GDP (Edenhofer et 
al., 2009a). A slightly less ambitious stabilisation at 450 
ppm CO2eq would, in current values, result in costs that 
could even be as low as only 0.1 %, up to a maximum 
1.4 % of global GDP, again calculated over the period 
up to 2100 (Edenhofer et al., 2009a). The level of costs 
depends strongly on the model assumptions with regard 
to technology development. Under the assumption of 
an endogenous technological change, the models calcu­
late lower costs (Edenhofer et al., 2009a; Fisher et al., 
2007). In the ADAM model comparison, the maximum 
of wealth loss calculated amounted to 0.8 % of global 
GDP by 2100, at a stabilisation of 550 ppm CO2eq, or, 
respectively, 2.5 % of global GDP by 2100, at a stabili­
sation of 400 ppm CO2eq. Again, a discount rate of 3 % 
was assumed (Edenhofer et al., 2010).
A model comparison for the IPCC’s 4th assess­
ment report leads to the conclusion that a stabilisa­
tion at 445–535ppm CO2eq would lead to wealth losses 
amounting to 3 % of global GDP by 2030, and 5.5 % of 
global GDP by 2050 (Fisher et al., 2007). This equates 
to a reduction of annual global GDP growth of 0.12 % 
maximum. 
The range of cost estimates for the decarbonisation, 
depending on model assumptions, timeframe and sta­
bilisation scenario, therefore lies between 0.7 and a 
maximum 5.5 % of global GDP in current values, spread 
across a period of several years. This must be compared 
to the high costs of unabated climate change, which, 
according to Stern (2006) could amount to as much as 
up to 20 % of global GDP.
Cost of a Delayed Transformation
Delaying the transformation will increase the costs fur­
ther, as this would lead to even more drastic reduc­
tion measures having to be implemented over a shorter 
period of time in order to comply with the 2 °C guard 
rail. Edenhofer et al., (2009a) expect that delaying 
an ambitious global climate policy (stabilisation at 
450ppm CO2) for another decade alone would cause 
the cost of emissions reduction to rise by more than 
46 %. The current IEA scenarios even suggest a dou­
bling of the cost of the transformation in 2035, in the 
event that only the reduction pledges offered at the 
UN climate change conference in Copenhagen were to 
be implemented by the pledging countries in the com­
ing decade. This would demand a drastically acceler­
ated transformation speed after 2020 in order to keep 
within a CO2 emissions budget that is compatible with 
the 2 °C guard rail (Box 1.1­1). This target could only 
be reached through accelerated innovation activities in 
all transformation areas. A delayed change of course 
would also lead to economically not justifiable deci­
sions such as the switching off of fossil power plants 
before the end of their amortisation period. Consider­
ing these facts, and on the basis of higher projections 
for economic growth by 2035, the IEA’s cost estimates 
for the transformation of the energy systems have been 
revised, and now exceed the 2009 (pre­Copenhagen) 
estimates by US$ 1,000 billion (IEA, 2010c). 
Co-Benefits of the Transformation
However, it is not only costs that go hand in hand with 
the energy systems transformation; it also offers co­
benefits above and beyond the avoidance of danger­
ous climate change. The integrated assessment mod­
els do not take these co­benefits into account. Compli­
ance with the 2 °C guard rail also leads to improved air 
quality, reduces health care costs, and generally reduces 
the environmental damages caused by pollutant emis­
sions. These advantages would become particularly vis­
ible in developing and newly industrialising countries. 
In a 450 ppm scenario, the global air pollution con­
trol costs could be roughly reduced by 23 %. Far more 
than 750 million life­years could be saved through this, 
especially in China and India. An early transformation 
would also considerably reduce climate change adapta­
tion costs (IEA, 2010c). Also to be considered are co­
benefits resulting from increased energy security and a 
lesser dependency on fuel imports (GEA, 2011).
Ultimately, it can also be expected that the expan­
sion of investments in sustainable and low­carbon 
technologies and infrastructure will create new indus­
tries, and, correspondingly, employment opportunities. 
In a global perspective, this could contribute to contin­
ued economic growth, and to poverty reduction (UNEP, 
2011; Jaeger et al., 2011).
4.5.1.3 
Investments so far, Investment Gaps, and 
 Investment Barriers
Current Investments in Low-Carbon Energy 
Technologies
Compared to the estimated annual investment require­
ment for renewable energies of at least US$ 150–300 
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billion per year, new investments into low­carbon ener­
gies amounted to around US$ 173 billion in 2008, and 
around US$ 162 billion in 2009 (UNEP­SEFI and BNEF, 
2010; Figure 4.5­4). 
The figures shown in Figure 4.5­4 include research 
and development expenses (R&D), and costs for instal­
lation of low­carbon energy generation plants; savings 
have not been taken into account. A considerable pro­
portion of these investments made in 2009 went into 
wind energy (56 %), followed by solar energy (20 %) 
and bioenergy (15 %). Some investments were also 
made in geothermal energy, small­scale hydropower 
plants, and other climate­friendly technologies. Most 
of these were made in Europe, Asia and Oceania, partic­
ularly in China (UNEP­SEFI and BNEF, 2010). It is inde­
terminable whether these were made on top of busi­
ness­as­usual investments. The positive development 
of investments into renewable energies in Europe can 
largely be ascribed to promotion through feed­in tariffs 
(UNECE, 2010). Globally, feed­in tariffs are currently 
used in more than 50 countries, and at least 25 regional 
states or provinces (BNEF, 2010; REN21, 2010). 
Investment Gaps
Nevertheless, the global additional investments needed 
to convert the energy systems (at least US$ 200 billion 
per year) have overall not reached the required dimen­
sions. An IEA report concludes that there are substan­
tial investment gaps in the area of research and devel­
opment alone. Annually, another US$ 40–90 billion 
would have to be invested in R&D of new vehicle tech­
nologies, bioenergy, CCS, energy efficiency, efficient 
coal use, smartgrids, and wind and solar power (IEA, 
2010a). And yet, in the IEA member states, govern­
ment support for R&D in the energy sector has continu­
ally decreased since 1979, and this despite the fact that 
national spending on R&D in general has risen in the 
last decade (IEA, 2010a). Current R&D expenditure pri­
orities do not seem to focus on the challenge of climate 
stabilisation at all (Grübler and Riahi, 2010). 
During the economic and financial crisis, investments 
in renewable energies and energy efficiency went down 
drastically (UNEP­SEFI, 2009b; IEA, 2010b). In future, 
to comply with the ambitious stabilisation targets, the 
level of pre­economic and financial crisis investments 
into energy systems conversion will therefore have 
to be exceeded many times over. One particular chal­
lenge is the rapid generation of the necessary funds 
for investments in end­use efficiency (IEA, 2008b). 
The area of energy efficiency in particular is currently 
extremely underfinanced (IEA, 2010b). New financing 
and business models can turn this around (Sections 4.3, 
4.5.2.2; Box 4.3­3).
Investment Barriers
An important reason for the underfinancing of renewa­
ble energies and energy efficiency projects is presented 
by certain specific investment barriers. For instance, 
no long­term and binding policy targets for the decar­
bonisation of the energy systems have so far been set, 
and investors therefore have to bear high uncertainty 
regarding future climate and energy policy develop­
ments and the resultant market potentials (Holmes and 
Mabey, 2010; Mehling et al., 2010). Granted, individual 
countries have set policy targets; however, for the most 
part only up until 2020, whilst investment horizons for 
major projects like power plants tend to be much longer 
(sometimes up to 40 years). As currently a new invest­
ment cycle in the field of electricity generation is com­
mencing in most of the OECD countries, the next few 
years will define the technological course for the com­
ing 40–50 years. The risk of lock­in effects is therefore 
high (IEA, 2010a).
Moreover, in many cases, the technology develop­
ment in the area of renewable energies and efficiency 
technologies is still in its initial stages, so there are risks 
with regard to the future return on investment (Hol­
mes and Mabey, 2010). There are also often informa­
tion gaps with regard to efficiency technologies on the 
part of users and consumers, which leads to profita­
ble investments not being carried out. One of the con­
sequences of this is that many small­scale efficiency 
potentials, which would nevertheless be significant if 
taken together (for example in households), are not 
tapped (Ohndorf et al., 2010). In the area of build­
ings efficiency, the unfavourable incentive structures 
for property owners and tenants in the case of rented 
Figure 4.5-4
Global investments into low­carbon energies between  
2004–2009 in US$ billions.
Source: UNEP­SEFI and BNEF, 2010
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property, also pose a significant investment barrier 
(IEA, 2008b; Sections 4.3.2, 5.2).
Moreover, in developing countries, the basic condi­
tions for larger investments in low­carbon technolo­
gies and renewable energies are often lacking. In these 
countries, a regulatory environment must initially be 
created, which stimulates investments, for example 
with the aid of market incentive programmes. The pro­
motion of renewable energies with feed­in tariffs, effi­
ciency standards for vehicles, or a fuel tax could be 
important incentives for low­carbon technology invest­
ments. In addition, initial points of contact could be 
established for companies willing to invest, for example 
in the form of investment support agencies, and infor­
mation centres for CO2 mitigation projects (UNCTAD, 
2010b). Many countries will need the financial and 
technical support of the international community for 
this. Resources from the bi­ and multilateral mitigation 
funds should be reserved for these purposes.
4.5.2 
Financing the Transformation
Due to the necessary extent of the transformation, it 
can only be jointly financed by states, private com­
panies and investors, international financing organ­
isations (including the World Bank, IMF), and devel­
opment banks. A major part of the financing must be 
provided by private companies or institutional inves­
tors (including investment funds, pension funds, insur­
ances), as the scale of the investments exceeds gov­
ernment budgets. Many low­carbon investments are 
hampered by the fact that they require relatively high 
upfront investments, whilst rather low annual returns 
on investment are spread across a comparatively long 
period of time. The amortisation period of such invest­
ments is therefore usually longer, and they have a lower 
rate of return compared to alternative investments. In 
addition, the expected rates of return have been unre­
alistically high over the past few years, particularly on 
the capital markets, which disadvantaged sustainable 
capital investments even further.
The state, the international financing organisations, 
and the development banks could provide incentives 
for private investments (Section 5.2) through long­
term and binding policy targets and economic and reg­
ulatory measures (including carbon pricing, efficiency 
standards, technology­specific support), and support 
these through the provision of loans with favourable 
conditions or credit guarantees, which would also serve 
to make investments more profitable (leverage effect). 
However, the financing of infrastructure investments 
and large­scale projects, such as the extension of 
energy transmission grids, above all requires funding 
by states, national and regional investment banks, and 
development banks, as such projects frequently have 
the character of public goods, are accompanied by high 
risks, and require large sums of capital (Helm, 2010). In 
order to make sufficient funds available, new financing 
sources must be unlocked at state level. Developing and 
newly industrialising countries should be supported by 
financial transfers in the transformation of their econ­
omies (Section 7.3.9). And, not least, new business 
models could help to reduce the burden of high upfront 
costs for households and companies.
4.5.2.1 
New Financing Sources at State Level
On the one hand, governments can fall back on tax rev­
enue to finance the transformation. Particularly the 
revenue from carbon pricing, either in the form of tax­
ation or of emissions trading, can generate additional 
public revenue. Revenues released through the phas­
ing out of fossil energy and agricultural subsidies, lev­
ies on international aviation and shipping, and a tax 
on international financial transactions are also possi­
ble new financing sources. On the other hand, govern­
ments have the option of obtaining external financ­
ing, for example through loans from national banks or 
the international financing organisations. However, the 
majority of international financing offers are focused 
on the governments and financial institutions of devel­
oping countries. For these, the UNFCCC financial trans­
fers are an additional important financing source for 
the transformation.
Public Revenue from Carbon Pricing
At a national level, carbon pricing, in the form of either 
a carbon tax, or emissions trading, can generate sub­
stantial funds (Section 5.2). The UN Secretary­General’s 
High­Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financ­
ing (AGF) estimates, for example, that the introduc­
tion of carbon pricing mechanisms in the  industrialised 
countries by 2020, at a price of US$ 20–25 per t CO2eq, 
could generate a total annual revenue of US$ 300 bil­
lion (AGF, 2010). This could be partly used to finance 
the transformation in the industrialised countries and 
partly for financial transfers to developing countries. 
The potential revenue can vary considerably, 
depending on the carbon tax scale, or the amount of 
emission allowances in an emissions trading scheme. 
The WBGU believes that in Europe and the OECD coun­
tries, the carbon price would have to be a minimum of 
US$ 40–50 per t CO2 in 2020, and in 2050 a minimum of 
US$ 110–130 per t CO2 to have a transformative impact 
in terms of achieving compliance with the 2 °C guard 
rail. In this case, the annual revenue can be expected 
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to be considerably higher than the US$ 300 billion esti­
mated by the AGF. IEA extrapolations confirm this. The 
IEA expects that an emissions trading scheme involving 
all OECD and EU countries, which aims at mere com­
pliance with the hardly ambitious mitigation pledges 
made in Copenhagen, would already yield a revenue 
of US$ 250 billion in 2020, assuming full auctioning 
(IEA, 2010c). 
A CO2 tax would have to increase over time, and 
the amount of allowances in an emissions trading 
scheme would have to be reduced in order to develop 
the desired steering effect for compliance with the 2 °C 
guard rail. The revenue from carbon pricing can there­
fore be expected to continue to rise over several dec­
ades, roughly until 2030/2040. However, towards the 
middle of the century, the revenue can be expected 
to fall, as by then, emissions should have gone down 
drastically, leading to a much lower taxation basis, or a 
greatly reduced amount of allowances. In the WBGU’s 
view, revenue generated from CO2­pricing, either 
through a tax or the auctioning of emissions allow­
ances, would represent a reliable source of revenues for 
climate financing over a long period, and at the same 
time develop the requisite steering effect for future 
investments, as well as for consumption and produc­
tion decisions (Section 5.2). 
Phasing Out Fossil Energy and Agricultural 
Subsidies 
A further potential financing source is the phasing 
out of fossil energy subsidies, which are currently 
still widespread, particularly in non­OECD countries, 
for example, Russia, Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, India, 
Indonesia, and the Ukraine (UNEP, 2008). According 
to IEA estimates, worldwide consumption subsidies for 
fossil energies amounted to US$ 557 billion in 2008, 
and US$ 312 billion in 2009. Two­thirds of this was 
accounted for by subsidies for crude oil and natural gas, 
whilst coal subsidies amounted to a comparatively small 
amount of US$ 6 billion. Other estimates take the total 
energy subsidies, both for the producer and the con­
sumer side, to amount to up to US$ 700 billion annually 
(GSI, 2009). According to IEA estimates, if the subsidies 
for fossil energy carriers were to be completely phased 
out by 2020, global energy demand would decrease by 
around 5–6 %, which would lead to a reduction of CO2 
emissions of around 6–7 %, compared to the status quo 
(IEA et al., 2010a; IEA, 2010c). 
In either case, fossil energy carrier subsidies far 
exceed the financial support currently enjoyed by 
renewable energies, which amounted to US$ 57 billion 
in 2009 (IEA, 2010c). The public funds which could be 
released through the phasing out of fossil energy car­
rier subsidies in the industrial countries within the G20 
alone are estimated to amount to around US$ 8–10 bil­
lion per year (AGF, 2010), and could also contribute to 
the financing of the transfers needed by the developing 
countries. In the non­OECD countries, the funds thus 
released could be used for extending the electric power 
infrastructure, and providing energy access based on 
renewable energies, particularly in rural areas (IEA et 
al., 2010a). 
Taxation of International Transportation and 
International Financial Transactions 
Levies on international aviation and shipping or, alter­
natively, the introduction of an international emissions 
trading scheme for these sectors, can generate addi­
tional revenue for investments into the transformation. 
By putting a price on the emissions of to international 
aviation and shipping, their negative impact on climate 
would be acknowledged. According to AGF estimates, 
if 50 % of the revenue generated globally through tax­
ation were to be made available for the transformation, 
this could lead to an annual financial flow of around 
US$ 10 billion (AGF, 2010). 
The AGF estimates further that an equally substantial 
amount could be generated if a tax of between 0.001 % 
and 0.01 % were introduced on international financial 
transactions (AGF, 2010). However, it is uncertain what 
impact a financial transaction tax would have on the 
international capital markets. It could result in the real­
location of substantial amounts of financial flow, which 
would considerably reduce the taxation basis (Camp­
bell and Froot, 1993; Honohan and Yoder, 2010). If a 
financial transaction tax were to be introduced, the rate 
should therefore be kept extremely low, as exemplified 
in the AGF’s sample calculation. 
Fund Generation via UNFCCC and Development 
Cooperation
Apart from grants and loans from international finance 
organisations, the financial transfers negotiated under 
the UNFCCC and international development assistance 
are also important sources of finance for many devel­
oping countries. Added to this, there are further bilat­
eral and multilateral funds, which provide resources for 
mitigation projects in developing countries. 
Under the UNFCCC, there is so far only one financ­
ing mechanism to support mitigation projects, the Cli­
mate Change Focal Area provided by the Global Envi­
ronment Facility’s (GEF) trust fund. Other funds under 
the UNFCCC umbrella (Adaptation Fund, Special Cli­
mate Change Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund) 
predominantly focus on adaptation financing. In 2010, 
at Cancún, the UNFCCC agreed the establishment of a 
new fund, the so­called Green Climate Fund, poten­
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tially the most important future multilateral financing 
mechanism (Box 4.5­1). 
The provision of new and additional funds totalling 
up to US$ 30 billion between 2010 and 2012 for miti­
gation and adaptation in developing countries (fast­
start finance) had already been announced at the cli­
mate negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009. As of 2020, 
US$ 100 billion annually are envisaged to be provided 
for mitigation and adaptation measures from a range 
of sources (public, private, bi­ and multilateral, includ­
ing new financing instruments). A proportion of these 
resources is to be distributed via the future Green Cli­
mate Fund, as yet to be established. Particularly funds 
for adaptation measures are planned to be managed by 
the fund. 
Considering the amounts required for mitigation and 
adaptation in the developing countries, which are esti­
mated to lie somewhere in the region of three­digit bil­
lions for mitigation (approx. US$ 300 billion from 2020; 
Project Catalyst, 2010; World Bank, 2010c), and in the 
region of two­digit billions for adaptation (approx. US$ 
10–100  billion; Project Catalyst, 2010; World Bank, 
2010c), the funds should be allocated adequately to the 
different areas that require financing (adaptation, miti­
gation, technology transfer, capacity building). In the 
WBGU’s view, the proportion of the pledged US$ 100 
billion that should be used for mitigation projects or 
measures should average around 60–70 %, independ­
ent of whether these funds are made available via the 
Green Climate Fund, or other channels. 
Also to be decided is the question of whether the 
monies provided by the Green Climate Fund should be 
granted in the form of non­repayable transfer finance, 
or as loans and credit guarantees. Although loans and 
credit guarantees are often sufficient to have a consid­
erable leverage effect (World Bank, 2010c; Neuhoff et 
al., 2010), equitability considerations indicate that a 
large part of the pledged resources should be defined 
as true grants or financial aid. This can not least be jus­
tified by the high level of cumulative emissions from 
industrialised countries in the past (WBGU, 2010a).
However, the US$ 100 billion pledged annually from 
2020 will not be enough to cover all of the financing 
needed for the transformation in the world’s develop­
ing regions. It can be expected that the investments 
required for the transformation in developing and 
newly industrialising countries will increase even fur­
ther after 2020 (Section 4.5.1). Therefore, in addition 
to establishing the Green Climate Fund, existing bi­ 
and multilateral funds for mitigation projects in devel­
oping countries should also be increased. This applies, 
for instance, to the World Bank’s Carbon Partnership 
Facility, as well as the two funds under the umbrella of 
the Climate Investment Fund (Clean Technology Fund, 
Strategic Climate Fund; World Bank, 2010c). 
World Bank funds for mitigation and adaptation 
currently amount to a total of roughly US$ 9.5 billion 
for 2008–2012 (IEA, 2010a). Apart from the multilat­
eral funds, there are also some bilateral initiatives, for 
example the Cool Earth Partnership (Japan), equipped 
with US$ 10 billion of funding, the International Cli­
mate Initiative (Germany), with US$ 564 million, or 
the European Union’s Global Climate Change Alliance 
(GCCA) (US$ 76 million; World Bank, 2010b). How­
ever, the millions available in these individual funds, 
usually to be distributed over a number of years, are 
hardly enough to cover the required investment vol­
ume, which is in the region of billions; they would 
therefore have to be increased considerably. Accord­
ing to World Bank estimates, the sum total of climate 
change related transfers (i. e. taking all financial flows 
for mitigation and adaptation, as well as technology 
transfer and capacity building into account) amounts to 
around US$ 10 billion annually (World Bank, 2010c), 
i. e. still far under the pledged US$ 100 billion to be 
made available from 2020. 
Under UNFCCC, yet another potential financing 
mechanism is currently developing, independent of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The developing countries undertake to 
Box 4.5-1
The UNFCCC Green Climate Fund
One result of the 16th United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change in Cancún has been the establishment of 
the Green Climate Fund to provide funds for mitigation, adap­
tation, capacity building and technology transfer in develop­
ing countries (§ 102–112 of the Cancún Agreements). The 
fund’s Board is to comprise of 24 members, with an equal 
number of members from developing and industrialised coun­
tries; the fund will initially be administered by the World 
Bank. However, the extent of the fund has not been deter­
mined as yet, and nor have its financing sources. The Annex I 
Countries have pledged a sum of 30 billion US$ for the period 
2010–2012 for fast­start financing, and with a view to long­
term financing, committed to a goal of jointly mobilizing US$ 
100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of develop­
ing countries. According to the Cancún Agreements, a signifi­
cant share of new multilateral funding for adaptation should 
flow through the Green Climate Fund. The fund's exact struc­
ture and method of operation has not been determined yet. A 
Transitional Committee has been suggested to design the 
fund; this is to comprise 15 representatives from industrial­
ised, and 25 from developing countries (UNFCCC, 2010; 
Müller, 2011). 
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implement appropriate mitigation efforts at national 
level (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, 
NAMAs), which enjoy the support of the industrial­
ised countries in the form of financial and technology 
transfers. It is not yet clear to what extent these will 
be project­based measures, and whether and to what 
extent the supporting industrial countries will be able 
to offset the mitigations thus reached against their 
own. One option would be to make payments from 
the Green Climate Fund dependent on the implemen­
tation of planed mitigation measures (NAMAs) (Sec­
tion 7.3.9). This could then also serve to finance secto­
ral and mitigation measures of a more strategic nature, 
such as grid infrastructure expansion or feed­in tariffs, 
embedded in an overall concept for emissions reduc­
tion. The additionality of the resources, and their dif­
ferentiation to official development assistance, would 
also have to be verified (Box 4.5­2).
Financing via the Carbon Market
So far, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has 
been an important financing source for CO2 mitigation 
projects in developing countries (World Bank, 2010b). 
In 2008 alone, it had a transaction volume (primary 
transactions) of US$ 6.5 billion (IEA, 2010a). 
The continuation of the CDM in the framework of 
the Kyoto Protocol was decided in Cancún– the future 
of the latter, however, is currently uncertain. The role 
the international carbon market in its current form will 
play for developing countries is therefore also unclear. 
Box 4.5-2
Balancing Act between Climate and Development 
Financing
Since 1992, in developing countries activities to mitigate cli­
mate change as well as activities to adapt to the impacts of cli­
mate change have primarily been financed from development 
funds. Contributions by the UNFCCC funds established under 
the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) have been consid­
erably lower. The focus has always been on climate change 
mitigation. On the one hand, the relationship between climate 
and development financing shows marked overlaps and syn­
ergies: investments in development can serve climate change 
mitigation, and also help in terms of resilience against the 
impacts of climate change. On the other hand, there is some 
concern that prioritisation of low­carbon infrastructure con­
struction could be at the expense of poverty reduction. 
Increased development budgets would decrease the risk 
that, under the pressure of the climate negotiations, invest­
ments in mitigation and adaptation could be accorded a high­
er priority than investments into poverty reduction relevant 
areas (aid diversion). However, as the public budgets of most 
of the contributing nations are strained due to the financial 
or the euro crisis, respectively, as well as due to the slowing 
down of economic growth, it seems unlikely, from a political 
perspective, that developing budgets which do not include 
climate financing will grow or even remain stable. In the EU, 
development cooperation budgets are expected to reduce in 
the medium term: the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s budget, which represents 
around 70 % of German public development cooperation 
funds (ODA), will shrink from € 6 billion in 2010 to € 5.6 bil­
lion in 2013 (EU COM, 2010d). 
The fact that there is no official definition of ‘additionality’ 
increases the risk of aid diversion. The Framework Conven­
tion on Climate Change does not discount ODA as a financ­
ing source. However, the defined targets of ODA and climate 
financing are not identical: according to the OECD definition, 
ODA is primarily intended to promote development and wel­
fare in developing countries, whilst climate financing has both 
global and local benefits. If developing countries are sup­
ported in adaptation to the impacts of climate change, this 
can also directly impact positively on local welfare, whilst the 
mitigation of their greenhouse gas emissions primarily serves 
global welfare, as well as indirectly reducing the local need for 
adaptation. In the OECD, the contributing countries see fast­
start financing as ODA; however, there is no joint definition 
of ‘additionality’ (Brown et al., 2010). Germany defines all 
investments that go beyond the level already reached in 2009 
as ‘additional’. This means that this level remains stable, and 
climate financing as a whole will increase, although within a 
shrinking overall budget. 
Not least, the lack of transparent procedures and joint cri­
teria for climate financing reporting on the part of the donor 
countries adds to the uncertainty with regard to the payments 
made. OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) pro­
cedures for measuring bilateral climate financing are not 
satisfactory. Two independent empirical studies have found 
that the funding countries have a systematic tendency to pro­
vide inexact reports. Only 25 % of the measures reported as 
relevant for climate change mitigation by the funding coun­
tries could really be classified as such (Roberts et al., 2008; 
Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010). The DAC procedure (the 
so­called ‘Rio markers’) relies on the funding countries them­
selves determining, according to their own criteria, which 
measures represent a considerable or significant contribution 
to climate change mitigation. Comparability is therefore not 
guaranteed, and there is also no subsequent adjustment of 
data with regard to changed or discontinued measures. A Rio 
marker for climate change mitigation measures was agreed in 
1998, one for adaptation not until the end of 2009. Agree­
ments on definitions and reporting procedures are therefore 
vital for further negotiations on public climate financing.
However, in the medium term, these issues will lose their 
relevance, as the impacts of climate change, and their associ­
ated investment risks, will in time become common parame­
ters, and an integral part of project planning. Also, a stronger 
focus on low­carbon infrastructures will become part of main­
stream development policies. However, these strategic issues 
are important in the transitional period, during which the 
course for the transformation must be set. Uncertainty with 
regard to aims, instruments and financing are hardly helpful 
for the strategic redefinition of political aims.
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If, under the Kyoto Protocol, a second commitment 
period to follow on directly from the first is not suc­
cessfully agreed, the demand for CDM emission reduc­
tion credits can be expected to fall. At best, the demand 
would be maintained through other emissions trading 
schemes, such as the EU ETS, or the voluntary market. 
The past has also shown the CDM in its current form 
could not meet a number of the expectations originally 
riding on it. Various studies have, for instance, reached 
the conclusion that the additionality of the emissions 
reductions is, in many cases, not given. According to 
estimates by Michaelowa and Purohit (2007), and Wara 
and Victor (2008), the proportion of registered CDM 
projects that does not fulfil the additionality criterion 
could be a fifth, or even two­thirds. This would effec­
tively represent an extension of the EU ETS member 
countries’ emissions caps. Vasa and Neuhoff (2011) 
have calculated that an infringement of the addition­
ality criterion in a fifth to two­thirds of the registered 
projects in the trading period 2008 to 2009 would have 
been the equivalent of extending the EU ETS emissions 
by 30–106 million t CO2eq.
In addition, the expectations that the CDM would 
make a guaranteed contribution to sustainable devel­
opment and would trigger significant technology trans­
fers have not been met. Moreover, it has led to undesir­
able incentives for the expansion of climate­damaging 
activities, particularly in the case of CDM projects for 
the reduction of industrial gases (for example, HFC­
23 projects; Vasa and Neuhoff, 2011). There is fur­
thermore the risk that the CDM offers particularly the 
large newly developing countries incentives to aban­
don their own climate mitigation policies in favour of 
the required additionality of projects. For this reason, 
there are deliberations to limit the CDM to the least 
developed countries (LDC), which currently profit only 
marginally from the CDM due to their very low number 
of CDM projects (UNEP­Risoe, 2011). 
From the WBGU’s perspective, it would make sense 
to limit the CDM to the LDC in future, thereby empha­
sising the CDM’s development aspect. In addition, if the 
mechanism were extended to include sectoral measures 
– not unlike the programme­based CDM – it would 
allow, for example, the bundled financing of many 
small­scale and scattered energy efficiency potentials 
in microbusinesses and households (Figueres, 2008; 
Ohndorf et al., 2010). A programme­based or secto­
ral CDM could also contribute considerably to energy 
poverty reduction by financing biomass­fuelled cook­
ers, for example, or small­scale solar­powered units 
for water heating in private households. By adjust­
ing some of the regulations of the programme­based 
CDM, this potential could be maximised even further in 
future (Figueres, 2008). The continuance of the CDM 
restricted to LDC, however, would have to be accom­
panied by clearly more ambitious reduction targets in 
the Annex I Countries, and reforms with regards to the 
accounting of international emissions credits (CER; for 
instance from HFC­23 projects), as already intended by 
the EU.
4.5.2.2 
Supporting and Mobilising Private Investments
Apart from the government, private companies and 
investors will also have to take over a major share of 
the transformation­related investments. On the one 
hand, this can take the form of own capital due to prof­
its from commercial activities or capital investments. 
On the other hand, there are various options for exter­
nal financing available to private investors, for example 
in the form of venture capital, private equity, or capital 
provided by institutional investors (such as infrastruc­
ture or pension funds), plus debt financing through pri­
vately owned financial institutions (mezzanine/senior 
debt: Figure 4.5­5). Whilst debt financing through pri­
vately owned financial institutions is more easily avail­
able if an innovative technology has already proven its 
worth in the field, private equity and venture capital 
financing tend to be particularly relied on in the ini­
tial stages (especially at the second stage; demonstra­
tion), due to the high level of uncertainty with regard to 
the future revenue yielded by the investment (UNEP­
SEFI, 2009a).
Private investors frequently have to rely on govern­
ment support for their investment activities, as there 
are often investment barriers presented by the size 
of the project, or the market risks which accompany 
the launch of any new technology. These barriers can 
be overcome through public financing mechanisms 
(including low interest rate loans, credit guarantees or 
technology­specific subsidies).
Depending on the stage of technology development 
(R&D, demonstration, deployment, diffusion, commer­
cial maturity), different forms of government support 
for private investors make sense (UNEP­SEFI, 2008). 
Figure 4.5­5 shows the financing offers of private 
financial institutions and capital providers (commer­
cial financing mechanisms), along with the financing 
offers of government institutions (public finance mech­
anisms). This also graphically illustrates the fact that 
government financing is particularly called for from the 
initial research stage to the diffusion stage.
Government Support of Investments and 
Strengthening of the Venture Capital Market
Whilst direct governmental support appears to be a 
sensible option for the research & development stage, 
loans and credit guarantees can have a considerable 
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impact at other financing stages. One particularly wide 
financing gap (‘valley of death’) in any project cycle 
is usually experienced during the demonstration and 
deployment stage. During these phases, the technol­
ogy innovation is already on the way to commercialisa­
tion. However, further development often means high 
costs, and technological risks also remain an issue due 
to the lack of practical experience (UNEP­SEFI, 2008; 
IEA, 2010a). This is where government grants, low­
interest loans and credit guarantees allow the acquisi­
tion of funding from private venture capital providers, 
who would otherwise not invest without government 
aid. Additional funds can also be unlocked by the com­
bination of government and private venture capital in 
one fund, such as the UK Carbon Trust Venture Capital 
Fund, or the California Clean Energy Fund (BASE and 
SEFI, 2006). In this case, government funds enhance 
the attractiveness for private venture capital providers.
In the diffusion stage, access to private financial 
capital can also be improved through the provision 
of soft loans and credit guarantees, helping to make 
extended commercialisation easier (UNEP­SEFI, 2008; 
 Figure  4.5­5). However, access to financing for com­
mercialisations is only a necessary condition, and not 
a sufficient one. Also decisive is the demand side. In 
order to generate the appropriate market demand, the 
government can ultimately also support the market 
entry of a technical innovation through information 
policies, a policy framework, and incentive schemes 
(Section 5.2). 
Improving the General Investment Climate
In many OECD countries, particularly in Germany, 
there are considerable deficits in terms of investment 
dynamics. The net investment ratio (i. e. the ratio of 
gross domestic investments minus depreciation to the 
NNP) in Germany, for example, between 1995 and 
2008 amounted to only 5.3 %, significantly below the 
European and OECD average (Figure  4.5­6; Sinn, 2010; 
SVR, 2008, 2010). 
The investment climate has not been particularly 
dynamic between 1995 and 2008, both in terms of 
public and private sector investments. Particularly 
public net investments have been at an extremely 
low level, even running at negative values since 2003 
(SVR, 2010; Priewe and Rietzler, 2010). The share of 
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net investments in business profits has fallen dramati­
cally since 2001, remaining at this low level ever since 
(Priewe and Rietzler, 2010). The low net investment 
ratios have been accompanied by rising business prof­
its across the same period (Figure. 4.5­7; Priewe and 
Rietzler, 2010). 
The business cycle is one explanation for the low 
net investment: the private sector investment ratio 
had gone up significantly between 2005 and 2008 as 
a consequence of economic recovery (Figure  4.5­7; 
SVR, 2010); however, due to the poor global economic 
development in 2009, it broke down again. Independ­
ent of the business cycle, the long­running low level 
of investment activities can also be explained by the 
fact that Germany, like many other industrialised coun­
tries over the past few decades, has undergone a struc­
tural change away from investment intensive industries 
towards service industries. One of the further causes 
for Germany’s sluggish investment dynamics can also 
be seen in the introduction of the euro, the announce­
ment of which already led to the harmonisation of inter­
est rates at the end of the 1990s in the euro­countries, 
thereby triggering an investment boom in former high­
interest countries, whilst capital from the former low­
interest country Germany tended to go abroad (Sinn, 
2010; Priewe and Rietzler, 2010). The increasing open­
ing up of factor and goods markets in the course of glo­
balisation and the European integration have led to pri­
vate sector investment decisions being generally more 
likely to be influenced by more profitable opportuni­
ties abroad, where investments frequently yield higher 
profits, which in turn impacts the return on domestic 
investments (Hinze and Kirchesch, 1999). This trend 
has probably grown stronger due to the deregulation of 
the capital markets. 
Above all, Germany’s structural weakness in terms 
of investments should be addressed with changes to 
monetary and fiscal policies (SVR, 2009, 2010; Priewe 
and Rietzler, 2010). With regard to the transforma­
tion, extraordinary depreciation, for example, or the 
introduction of investment­related business, trade and 
income tax allowances, investment subsidies, or gov­
ernment soft financing offers could all help to create 
a specific incentive for transformative investments. At 
the same time, non­transformative capital investments 
would be made less attractive (Jaeger et al., 2009). 
Favourable taxation of ‘green’ investments could be a 
further element of a transformation­promoting fiscal 
concept. However, above all, to steer the fundamen­
tally available capital towards transformative invest­
ment projects in particular, long­term and stable pol­
icy framework conditions are crucial for increasing 
the return of transformative projects, and expectation 
security for companies. The uncertainty regarding the 
government’s future energy and climate policy contin­
ues to be a considerable barrier against investments. 
Long­term and stable policy framework conditions 
should, most importantly, include a carbon price, the 
phasing out of fossil energy carrier subsidies, technol­
ogy­specific support, and energy efficiency standards 
(Section 7.3). 
Establishment of National Green Investment Banks
A further option for governmental support for private 
investments is the provision of public funds through 
national Green Investment Banks. Public and private 
sector deposits could be combined here to support pri­
vate investments in transformative fields with low­
interest loans and credit guarantees. A good example of 
this is the UK’s Green Investment Bank, with a planned 
£ 2 billion  (approx. € 2.3 billion) of funding to finance 
renewable energy projects in the UK (Green Invest­
ment Bank Commission, 2010). Together with the KfW 
Development Bank, the German federal government 
has also established a revolving global climate protec­
tion fund for developing countries (KfW, 2010). The 
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fund provides financial support to small and medium­
sized enterprises and private households in developing 
countries for renewable energy and energy­efficiency 
projects. The fund also pays for corresponding consul­
tancy services (KfW, 2010). 
The combination of existing funds, and various fund­
ing sources – to finance both national and international 
transformation­related projects – in a Green Investment 
Bank such as this could generate the requisite order of 
magnitude of resources needed for the transformation. 
National and supra­regional investment banks (such as 
the European Investment Bank or the regional devel­
opment banks) would have a particularly major role to 
play in financing infrastructure investments. It is also 
important in this respect that the financing criteria are 
sustainability­oriented, and that they are transparent. 
Integration of Institutional Investors and Issuing of 
Climate Bonds
In particular institutional investors, such as pension 
schemes and insurance companies, could be approached 
to generate deposits into Green Investment Bank funds. 
They could make a considerable contribution to financ­
ing the transformation towards a low­carbon society, as 
they command the necessary capital, and tend to work 
with long­term investment horizons. Their deposits into 
the fund could yield revenue in the form of a fixed rate 
of interest. Funds such as these would provide institu­
tional investors an opportunity to make low­risk cap­
ital investments with a steady interest rate whilst also 
providing a way of investing into a low­carbon future 
(Caldecott, 2010). 
One option for additional fund generation for the 
Green Investment Banks would be the issuing of climate 
and energy project specific bonds (for example, in the 
form of climate bonds issued by the EU, the World Bank 
and the USA). There are already some successful mod­
els for this. The European Investment Bank (EIB), for 
instance, issued its first climate bonds onto the capital 
market in 2007 (EIB, 2007). The bonds, with a maturity 
period of five years, serve climate protection twofold: 
in terms of allocation of the deposits and also in terms 
of the rate of return. The € 600 million bond issuance 
proceeds were used exclusively to finance projects in 
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the area of renewable energies and energy efficiency. 
The rate of return relies on the ‘FTSE 4 Good Environ­
mental Leaders Europe 40’ index, which is made up of 
40 major European corporations chosen for their sus­
tainability criteria.
In 2009, the EIB launched further Climate Aware­
ness Bonds, together with the Swedish bank Swed­
bank, i. e. capital market securities in Swedish Krona, 
whose proceeds also go towards EIB projects in the 
area of renewable energies and energy efficiency (EIB, 
2009). Other climate bonds are currently issued by the 
World Bank, and the US government (Clean Renewable 
Energy Bonds), for example (World Bank, 2011a; US­
DoE, 2011). 
Support through Development Banks and 
International Financing Organisations
In developing countries, and particularly in the least 
developed countries, the financial markets are not 
appropriately developed, so that frequently, there is 
insufficient liquidity to finance large­scale projects; 
moreover, due to the LDCs’ low credit rating, markets 
are also reluctant to supply capital. For this reason, 
the international financing organisations (IMF, World 
Bank) are particularly important for these countries. 
The institutions’ various financing mechanisms (includ­
ing loan programmes, credit guarantees) could enable 
local private financing intermediaries to grant loans 
for projects, even though they would not usually have 
granted these due to particular high risks (for instance 
political risks, currency risks, technological risks). Pub­
lic monies (grants, soft loans, credit guarantees) are 
usually transferred via development banks to private 
financial institutions, which then use them to finance 
projects, frequently also attracting additional funds 
from institutional investors. Public resources therefore 
act as a catalyst (UNEP­SEFI, 2008). 
In developing countries, financing must also be 
complemented by technical cooperation and human 
resources, as often, there is limited local experience 
available in project development and realisation. 
Financing commitments should therefore be combined 
with consultancy services. Especially where energy 
efficiency investments are concerned, private financing 
intermediaries often overestimate the risk represented 
by the lack of relevant expertise. Financing via Devel­
opment Finance Institutions (DFI) and intermediaries 
such as Energy Service Companies (ESCO), who have 
the relevant technical expertise, are therefore most 
effective (Taylor et al., 2008; Ohndorf et al., 2010).
A probable leverage effect of between 3:1 and 15:1 
is attributed to government resources, depending on 
the financing mechanism. Accordingly, making US$ 10 
billion of public monies available could attract private 
investments of between US$ 50 and 150 billion (UNEP­
SEFI, 2008). The empirically determined leverage rates 
vary, from 1:1 for the GEF Small Grants programme, to 
3.6:1 for the Forest Partnership Facility and the World 
Bank’s Carbon Partnership Facility, 6.3:1 for the GEF 
Trust Fund (climate focal area), and 8.3:1 for the Clean 
Technology Fund to 15:1 for the IFC Partial Credit 
Guarantee for Energy Efficiency (Norad, 2010; World 
Bank, 2010c). The leverage effect of government funds 
generally increases in line with the risk, and therefore 
at the rate at which government funding reduces the 
risk for private investors (Neuhoff et al., 2010).
Microfinancing to Overcome Energy Poverty
Microfinancing also plays a major role in transform­
ing the energy systems in developing countries, par­
ticularly in the rural regions. Through microfinancing 
offers, energy poverty can be overcome with the help 
of renewable energies. Microfinancing has been used 
in developing countries for the past 25 years. The basic 
concept of this instrument is providing access to capital 
to poor and people on low­incomes who, due to a lack 
of securities, have no access to formal financial markets 
and banks (Terberger, 2002; Rosenberg, 2010). Micro­
loans granted are usually used for enterprise­related 
investments, and paid back from the resultant prof­
its generated, monitored by the community. Over time, 
this financing model has been extended to include per­
sonal loans, savings and insurances (Bunse et al., 2007). 
At the same time, a grid­independent micro­energy­
system has evolved in developing countries, partic­
ularly in rural regions (MicroEnergy International, 
2008). Apart from the traditional biomass use, this 
includes rechargeable car batteries, kerosene and die­
sel generators. The Grameen Shakti company, a subsidi­
ary of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, has managed 
to substitute fossil energy usage by combining microfi­
nancing with renewable energies for micro­energy­sys­
tems. The company offers small­scale solar power units 
for homes, with the purchase being financed through 
loan repayment in instalments over two to three years. 
The company also specialises in technical advice and 
the maintenance of these solar power units, and so the 
purchase also includes a service package (advice, instal­
lation, maintenance). The instalments are equivalent to 
the monthly costs of alternative energy sources such as 
diesel or kerosene. Once the consumer credit is repaid, 
the household can generate a profit, and use the money 
that would have been spent on energy for other pur­
poses (MicroEnergy International, 2008; Kamal, 2010; 
UNEP, 2011). 
The microfinancing model is also used in a busi­
ness environment, for example by using solar energy 
to light business premises, or in order to provide new 
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kinds of energy services such as telephone, internet, 
or the recharging of batteries (Mohiuddin, 2006; US­
AID, 2009). Larger rural electrification projects would 
be small­scale hydropower or biogas plants, requiring 
both larger sums of capital and community cooperation 
(WI, 2006; Bunse et al., 2007). Projects such as these 
can also be financed through microfinancing institu­
tions (Mohiuddin, 2006).
An important precondition for the transformation 
in developing regions is that the microfinancing insti­
tutions take rural electrification into account as an 
objective, and build up a pool of expert consultants 
(Mohiuddin, 2006; Bunse et al., 2007). It is also help­
ful when national governments initiate programmes for 
the diffusion of renewable energies, and information 
campaigns. Microfinancing makes it possible to supply 
wealthier villages and villagers, who are already using 
energy services, with renewable energies that do not 
necessarily have to be on­grid.
4.5.2.3 
New Business Models to Reduce Investment 
 Barriers
The burden of high upfront costs can be reduced for 
individual investors – whether in developing or indus­
trialised countries – by spreading the capital invested 
‘across several shoulders’. This can for example be 
achieved by turning traditional buyer­seller models 
into new business models, with new ownership and 
financing structures, which reduce investment barriers 
and change incentive structures. 
Rental, Leasing and Shared Use
These kinds of models are characterised, for instance, 
by the fact that they offer their customers combined 
packages in certain areas (for example mobility, hous­
ing, production and consumption) which include ser­
vices as well as real assets, instead of just tangible 
goods. The property rights to the goods remain with the 
provider, who is committed to efficient resource utilisa­
tion and reintroduction of the goods into the recycling 
cycle. Concepts such as car sharing, in the mobility sec­
tor, and energy contracting, through so­called Energy 
Service Companies (ESCO), in the energy supply and 
energy efficiency sector, are already established (Sec­
tion  4.3.2). The tangible goods (i. e. car, heating sys­
tem, energy raw material) again remain the property 
of the provider, whilst the goods required to meet user 
needs are only rented, or leased, or used communally 
together with other customers. Customers thus pay pri­
marily for the actual mobility or energy services they 
have used, rather than for a larger package’ of poten­
tial future uses. 
This reduces several investment barriers at the same 
time. Users of mobility or energy services are not faced 
with upfront investment costs, and the investment risk 
is carried fully by the provider, who is usually better 
placed to carry such risks than individual households 
or individual people. The users’ information and trans­
action costs are minimised, as the provider has the rel­
evant knowledge, and is usually also responsible for 
product maintenance and repair, as well as for reintro­
ducing any tangible goods into the recycling cycle. This 
also has the effect that, as the subject of the contract 
is not the sale of tangible goods, but the fulfilment 
of mobility, energy or similar needs, raw material and 
energy efficiency directly benefit the provider. 
These kinds of services, or integrated product­serv­
ice systems, should be increasingly advertised and pro­
moted during the course of the transformation, for 
example also tax incentives. In order for the use of such 
business models, oriented to results rather than con­
sumer goods, to become widespread among potential 
users, a fundamental value change is required, both on 
the part of private customers (for example with regard 
to the status value attached to consumer goods), and in 
the business world. 
Cooperative Financing Models
A further important business and financing model for 
the transformation is cooperative society financing. As 
early as the beginning of the 20th century, cooperative 
societies were founded for the electrification of rural 
areas (Holstenkamp and Ulbrich, 2010). The coopera­
tive society is a society which serves the purchase or 
management of a business by its members through col­
lective operation. Cooperative society members all have 
equal rights, and the self­administration is independent 
of the contribution of capital, i. e. each member has one 
vote. Cooperative societies are usually communities of 
value, i. e. they do not operate for profit, but under­
stand themselves as self­help organisations for their 
members. As solidary enterprises, cooperative societies 
operate all over the world, and are represented by the 
International Co­operative Alliance (ICA) (UN, 2009b). 
In Germany, an increasing number of renewable 
energy cooperative societies have been established over 
the past few years. They usually concern photovoltaic 
energy units (Holstenkamp and Ulbrich, 2010), for 
example installed on public buildings, such as schools. 
They are financed by both own and debt financing, to 
which a cooperative society is more likely to be given 
access than individuals. In many cases, cooperative 
banks also participate in energy cooperatives. Through 
the feed­in tariffs under the law on renewable energies 
(EEG), such joint investments in renewable energies 
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can refinance themselves (Holstenkamp and Ulbrich, 
2010).
Because of this, energy cooperatives are also a pos­
sible model for developing countries for the electrifica­
tion of rural areas with the aid of renewable energies. 
4.5.3 
Interim Conclusion 
The level of the investments required is at least known, 
and a substantial investment level has already been 
reached in the area of renewable energies and energy 
efficiency. However, the further mobilisation of finan­
cial means for the transformation of the energy systems 
requires considerably improved policy framework con­
ditions for private investors for investments into low­
carbon technologies. In particular, this requires a clear 
commitment on the part of governments to the rebuild­
ing of energy systems, and the acknowledgement of 
this commitment through concrete policy framework 
conditions, which create investment security for pri­
vate capital investors (Chapter 5).
4.6
Conclusions: Central Elements and Framework 
Conditions for the Transformation
The preceding analysis shows that a transformation 
towards a global low­carbon economy is technically 
feasible, and economically achievable. The transforma­
tion’s central element is a global energy turnaround; 
however, this must also take current global dynamics 
of development into account. Almost 3 billion people 
still have no access to essential modern energy serv­
ices, particularly for cooking, heating and lighting. At 
the same time, more than 80 % of the global energy 
supply still relies on environment and climate damag­
ing fossil fuels. The challenge lies in giving these peo­
ple, so far excluded, access to clean and safe energy 
services as soon as possible, whilst at the same time 
rapidly and drastically reducing CO2 emissions from the 
use of fossil fuels. 
The long­term economic costs of a global decarboni­
sation of the energy systems amount to just a few per­
cent of global GDP. If the transformation is to succeed, 
a vastly accelerated reduction of the global economy’s 
CO2 intensity is indispensable. Assuming an economic 
growth rate of 2­3 % and an emissions path leading to 
emissions of no more than 750 billion t CO2 from fossil 
sources by 2050, the CO2 intensity of the global eco­
nomic output would have to decrease at least twice as 
fast as it has done in the past over the next few years. 
The technology portfolio for such an ambitious 
decarbonisation of the energy system differs greatly in 
various analyses; there is more than one way of trans­
forming the energy systems to become low­carbon. The 
actual energy path followed will differ between states 
and regions, depending on political, technological and 
cultural circumstances and preferences, and individual 
geographical features. Particularly the use of nuclear 
energy and the significance of CCS (Carbon Dioxide 
Capture and Storage) have attracted much controversy 
and heated debate, both globally and within the EU. 
The extent to which these technologies are used could 
develop in very different directions, regionally and 
nationally, primarily on the basis of policy decisions. 
The WBGU generally advises against the expansion 
of nuclear energy use, above all because of the risk of 
serious damages, the still unresolved issues concerning 
final storage, and the danger of uncontrolled prolifera­
tion, and not least also because of the resultant high 
costs. CCS is a necessary mitigation option for countries 
which continue to use fossil energies if the 2 °C climate 
protection guard rail is to be complied with. CCS could 
also play an important role in the active withdrawal of 
CO2 from the atmosphere at a later point in time. Even 
though the WBGU rejects a path that relies primarily 
on the expansion of CCS, it nevertheless recommends 
stepping up research and in­depth examination of the 
risks. Germany should also participate in the draft­
ing of standards. In its recommendations, however, 
the WBGU focuses on development paths that accord 
nuclear energy and CCS only a marginal role. Rather, 
the WBGU recommends a strategy that relies prima­
rily on an accelerated expansion of renewable energies, 
with the prospective aim of covering 100  % of demand 
with renewable energies. An important characteristic of 
the energy systems transformation, from the WBGU’s 
point of view, is the general switch to on­grid energy 
carriers as a major share of the energy mix. Electric­
ity and gas should prevail as the dominating energy 
forms. A precondition for the transformation’s success 
is therefore the expansion of transcontinental energy 
infrastructures (supergrids, gas pipelines and termi­
nals), and smartgrids.
The rapid expansion of renewable energies unlocks 
opportunities that allow the achieving of climate miti­
gation targets, without burdening society with high 
risks in the form of unresolved final storage issues, 
or the risk of nuclear material proliferation. However, 
particularly the expanding use of bioenergy also bears 
significant risks for various sustainability dimensions 
(Box 4.1­4). The international trade with agricultural 
goods leads to the creation of non­obvious effects 
that, for example, accelerate deforestation and lead to 
rising food prices. Only the establishment of a global 
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regulation framework can guarantee the sustainability 
of bioenergy use (WBGU, 2010a). Until this is estab­
lished, the expansion of bioenergy should therefore be 
advanced only very carefully. 
The analysis further shows that the global final 
energy demand should not rise to more than 400–500 
EJ per year if the transformation is to succeed; cur­
rent global final energy demand is around 350 EJ per 
year. Without additional political measures, the final 
energy demand could more than dou ble. Limiting final 
energy demand, particularly in the industrialised coun­
tries, is therefore a major challenge, and correspond­
ing strategies are extremely important. That is one of 
the important factors leading to the WBGU’s conclu­
sion that the transformation will concern all areas of 
human need (Section 4.5). As CO2 emissions accumu­
late in the atmosphere, a lower energy demand in the 
current high­carbon energy system will afford more 
room for manoeuvre with regard to the emission reduc­
tion rates that will be required in future. Therefore, a 
lower energy demand also automatically allows more 
freedom in relation to the choice of energy generation 
technologies. 
Due to catch­up development, rapidly progressing 
urbanisation, and population growth, developing and 
newly industrialising countries are responsible for most 
of the current rise in energy demand (IEA, 2010a). The 
transformation is therefore not only about restructur­
ing of existing energy systems, but also about steering 
investments in energy infrastructure expansion neces­
sary due to rising demand into sustainable infrastruc­
ture right from the start. 
Many low­carbon technologies still do not fare well 
in an energy generation cost comparison. One major rea­
son for this is that the negative externalities from fossil 
and nuclear energy generation do not appear as costs. 
To promote the transformation, and the switch to low­
carbon energy systems, policy­makers are called upon 
to make the impact that energy generation has on envi­
ronment and climate visible for the market, for instance 
through carbon pricing, or a cap on emissions accompa­
nied by the introduction of tradable emissions certifi­
cates. The transformation can succeed only if the use 
of climate­damaging technologies becomes economi­
cally unattractive. At the same time, many sustainable 
technologies are still at a stage where high cost reduc­
tions can be expected through learning effects. More­
over, renewable energies (not unlike nuclear energy) 
are associated with comparatively high upfront invest­
ments which amortise only after a longer period. For 
these reasons, the WBGU believes that the technology­
specific promotion of renewable energies for a limited 
period of time is important in order to make the trans­
formation possible. The instruments mentioned above 
are also very important for steering the transforma­
tion in newly industrialising and developing countries. 
However, this does not imply that these countries must 
bear the cost of the transformation on their own; on the 
contrary, mutual interests are served best by intensify­
ing international cooperation, and increasing the sup­
porting measures offered by the industrialised nations. 
Other than decarbonisation, the second objective of 
a conversion of the energy systems is the overcoming 
of energy poverty to provide universal access to mod­
ern, clean and safe energy in the form of electricity or 
gaseous energy carriers by 2030 (WBGU, 2004). To 
meet this target, the developing and newly industrial­
ising countries primarily need support to leapfrog past 
stages of technological development, both for the over­
coming of energy poverty, as well as general support 
for the establishment of a sustainable energy infra­
structure. If this does not succeed, there is a risk of 
path dependencies on emissions­intensive, fossil­based 
energy systems that would be very difficult and costly 
to overcome, and it would take decades to do so. Access 
to energy services is also a precondition for achieving 
the majority of the Millennium Development Goals. In 
the WBGU’s view, the limiting the global final energy 
demand is compatible with the aim of overcoming 
energy poverty. If efficiency potentials were exploited 
worldwide, and the current focus on the amount of 
available energy were replaced by the goal to provide 
certain energy services, the energy demand in regions 
with currently high energy use can decline without the 
loss of comforts, thereby compensating for the rising 
energy demand in currently energy­poor countries.
A development path as outlined by the WBGU can 
hardly be reached with the currently predominant 
energy infrastructure financing patterns. For exam­
ple, there is no inherent incentive for current energy 
suppliers to improve energy efficiency. Their turno­
ver grows in line with rising energy consumption. New 
approaches, such as energy service companies (ESCOs), 
on the other hand, make the unlocking of energy 
potentials one of the central elements of their business 
model. Similar incentives for the exploitation of effi­
ciency potentials are offered by business models such 
as car sharing, where, instead of a commodity or a con­
sumer good, an energy service is offered for sale. 
Further important approaches to promote private 
investments in renewable energies and energy effi­
ciency are financing mechanisms that reduce invest­
ment risks, and increase the yield of transformative 
investments. These include, for instance, government 
loan programmes with particularly low­interest, long­
term loans, and government credit default guarantees 
– consolidated in so­called national Green Investment 
Banks, the establishment of venture and equity capital 
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funds with contributions by the state, and the promo­
tion of cooperative financing models and micro­financ­
ing.
Cities, as focal points of energy demand, are areas 
where partial aspects of the transformation would have 
to effectively interact. They are places of innovation 
and investment in new infrastructures and (together 
with the private sector) are increasingly becoming 
multi level governance actors (Corfee­Morlot et al., 
2009) who, because of their dimension, can achieve 
their own scaling and agglomeration effects. Through 
the spatial integration of urban functions, traffic can be 
reduced whilst at the same time achieving a high qual­
ity of life for inhabitants. Energy infrastructure inte­
gration (CHP technology, heating and cooling systems, 
smartgrids, electromobility, etc.) can benefit consider­
ably from the spatial density.
Around a quarter of worldwide greenhouse gas 
emissions are direct emissions from agriculture and 
land­use change. These can be substantially mitigated, 
but land­use systems cannot become completely emis­
sions­free, or at least, not in this century, alone because 
of the nitrous oxide resulting from the use of nitrogen 
fertilisers. However, as climate stabilisation cannot suc­
ceed without a significant contribution from land use, 
all of the available mitigation options should be uti­
lised. Emissions reduction should become another core 
element of new strategies for global, integrated land­
use management. The most important starting points 
for this are stopping deforestation and switching to sus­
tainable forest management, as well as the promotion 
of climate­friendly agriculture and dietary habits. 
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5.1
Introduction: New Problems, New 
Statehood!
In contrast to the civilisation leaps described in Chap­
ter 3, the forthcoming transformation is hardly likely 
to occur gradually and successively. Rather, it must be 
driven forward actively and simultaneously all over the 
world within a very short period of time. The trans­
formation towards a low­carbon society must include 
industrialised and newly industrialising, the poor, and 
even the poorest, developing countries if dangerous cli­
mate change and the loss of natural life­support sys­
tems is still to be averted. To achieve this, a new level of 
statehood, and a level of to date unprecedented inter­
national cooperation must be achieved. 
In Chapter 4, we showed that the transformation 
towards a low­carbon society is both  technically and 
economically feasible. In this chapter the WBGU exam­
ines the opportunities and limits of governance. Each of 
the transformation fields analysed – energy, urbanisa­
tion and land use – constitutes a different global chal­
lenge in terms of governance:
1. The availability of the relatively cheap, but most 
carbon­intensive fossil energy source coal is a great 
obstacle to the transformation of the energy sys­
tem (Section 4.1.2). As coal is found in many coun­
tries, it is the number one local energy source. The 
countries with the largest coal deposits are the USA, 
Russia, China, Australia, India and Indonesia (IEA, 
2010c; Heinberg and Fridley, 2010). The continued 
intensive use of coal around the globe thwarts any 
policy­making with regard to the transformation 
towards a low­carbon energy system. 
2. Today, 50 % of the world population already lives 
in cities and a dynamic, uncontrolled urbanisa­
tion process is emerging, particularly in the newly 
industrialising and developing countries. At present, 
three­quarters of the global final energy demand 
originates in cities, as does the same proportion 
of greenhouse gas emissions (Section 1.2.4). Cit­
ies therefore play a decisive role in the transforma­
tion process (Chapter 4). If this rapid urbanisation 
does not increasingly take the transformation per­
spective into account, urban growth processes could 
become one of the main barriers on the course to a 
low­carbon society. 
3. Demand for forestry and agricultural products 
and the importance of ecosystem services will rise 
considerably in future. At the same time, climate 
change and soil degradation are reducing cultiva­
tion areas, and respectively productivity. Land­use 
competition will therefore increasingly become a 
global field of conflict (Section 1.2.5; WBGU, 2008, 
2009a). There is largely a consensus concerning the 
scale of the challenges and the need for reform and 
development. In contrast, there is no broad scien­
tific or political consensus on which strategies are 
best suited to ensure sustainable global land use. 
So what do these three main issues typically lack? The 
scale and speed of the already initiated transformation 
processes are a long way from meeting the challenges 
outlined. ’Slowly drilling of hard boards’ (Max Weber) 
is not a practicable route in climate policy­making if 
global warming is still to be halted at a maximum of 
2 °C. Political processes at national, European and glo­
bal level must therefore be considerably accelerated 
and actively advanced. 
Evidently, any illusion that a regime change on a glo­
bal scale can be purely technocratically organised and 
steered top­down must be avoided. Certain individual 
aspects of transformations of the kind described can 
be managed, but overall, they are not directly steer­
able (Chapter 3). Active political steering is also not 
necessarily a guarantee for a successful transforma­
tion. Rather, the progression of the transformation pro­
cess must be steered in a certain direction by means 
of appropriate framework setting, and the setting of a 
decisive course towards structural change (Chapter 3). 
The transformation towards a low­carbon society is a 
complex process, as it will continue to be character­
ised by uncertainty. We are aware of the signs of dam­
age, and the damage to be expected, but nobody can 
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predict what a climate­friendly system will look like 
exactly, and above all how to proceed politically in a 
way that will prove to be effective and legitimate on 
a global scale. Anyone wanting to shape the transfor­
mation practices the ‘multilevel architecture’ politics of 
global governance, as the forthcoming changes concern 
all political action levels, from local through national to 
global level, and involve numerous government, civil 
society and private sector actors with varying interests, 
beliefs and resources (Messner, 1998). This is both 
about the reorganisation of markets and the restruc­
turing of institutional systems and, in equal measure, 
‘hard’ technological innovations and ’soft’ socio­cul­
tural mindset changes. Such a transformation process 
will ultimately have to be pushed through, despite the 
many blocking mechanisms and forces persisting on the 
status quo. Policy­making to achieve a climate­friendly 
society is therefore a highly demanding, long­term and 
comprehensive goal. 
In the following sub­chapters, the WBGU exam­
ines the opportunities and limits of governance, iden­
tifies barriers impeding the transformation process, 
and reveals approaches to solve these problems. In 
this respect, Chapter 5 concentrates on sub­national, 
national and international government measures and 
actors, whereas Chapter 6 primarily focuses on actors 
from civil society, such as companies, consumers and 
citizens. Chapter 5 initially discusses the structural fac­
tors impeding change. It then elaborates how political 
barriers in democratic systems and at international level 
can be overcome with improved statehood. Require­
ments and problems with regard to accelerating polit­
ical processes in the light of a lack of long­term ori­
entation are elaborated, as are the legitimacy founda­
tions for a global transformation policy. And finally, this 
Chapter evaluates the current governance structures 
in the three transformation fields. Here, the WBGU 
principally looks at the altered role of the state in the 
transformation process; the Herculean task of a global 
transformation requires new normative foundations, 
improved instruments and unusual approaches on all 
levels of governance. 
5.2
Political Instruments for Managing the 
 Transformation
Managing the transformation by means of govern­
ance is about correcting various forms of market fail­
ure (e. g. positive and negative external effects, pub­
lic goods, information asymmetries, market entry bar­
riers and natural monopolies). The WBGU assumes that 
essentially, the political instruments, such as adminis­
trative command­and­control, taxation, tradable per­
mits, market regulation, or regional and urban plan­
ning, needed to correct the present market failure and 
to manage the transformation are known and available. 
All of the political instruments applicable in the trans­
formation fields analysed here, namely energy, urban­
isation and land use, have also been recommended in 
other transformation studies. 
For a transformative effect on production and con­
sumption, the simultaneous use of various instruments 
is required for a policy mix to initiate systemic and 
fundamental changes in the economy and society. The 
WBGU recommends designing transformation policy in 
a way that initiates systemic structural changes, avoids 
path dependencies, and overcomes existing structural 
impediments. This calls for taking a long­term course on 
a global scale today to achieve broad legitimisation (Sec­
tions 3.4, 5.4). As there is considerable time pressure 
to achieve the transformation, the policy mix should 
include instruments that can be introduced quickly and 
take effect within a short time. At the same time, politi­
cal instruments are required which provide incentives 
for medium to long­term transformative changes, and 
which promote social and technological innovations.
First of all, this chapter introduces recommendations 
for action from selected transformation studies, each 
with a different focus, in order to demonstrate that 
essentially, the range of political instruments needed to 
achieve the transformation towards a low­carbon soci­
ety is known. A policy mix is then derived from this, 
with elements which the WBGU considers necessary 
and appropriate for the transformation fields of energy, 
urbanisation and land use.
5.2.1 
Recommendations for Action from Selected 
Transformation Studies
Various studies on the transformation of economy 
and society towards a low­carbon economy and life­
style include recommendations on how the transforma­
tion process outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 can be ini­
tiated and promoted. The transformation studies con­
sidered here can be roughly divided into four groups: 
there are for instance many studies on the transforma­
tion of energy systems with the primary aim of decar­
bonising the economy, presenting a pragmatic and more 
functionalistic view of the associated governance pro­
cesses (Group 1). Other studies emphasise the compat­
ibility of economic growth and decarbonisation (green 
growth) and underline the potential benefits of a trans­
formation (Group 2; Box 5.2­1). In contrast, other 
studies yet again assume that a transformation can be 
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achieved only through a new economic and growth par­
adigm, therefore presenting new approaches to make 
the predominant economic system a thing of the past 
(Group 3; Box 5.2­1). The fourth type focuses on gov­
erning the transformation politically under inclusion of 
all social groups (Group 4).
Group 1 studies on the decarbonisation of the econ­
omy view the transformation of the energy system as a 
central lever for achieving significant emissions reduc­
tions (WBGU, 2004; Stern, 2008; Jochem et al., 2008; 
McKinsey, 2009; UKERC, 2009; Ziesing, 2009; Eden­
hofer et al., 2009a; Knopf et al., 2010; GMF and Eco­
logic, 2010). They focus on political measures in the 
areas of climate, energy and innovation policy. Most 
of these studies recommend market­based instruments 
such as taxation, subsidies, feed­in tariffs or an emis­
sions trading scheme to accelerate the development and 
diffusion of low­emission technologies. They also spec­
ify efficiency standards in industry, for buildings, and 
for vehicles. Technology promotion should also include 
both direct support for research and development 
(R&D) and targeted support for investments. These 
studies emphasise the need for intensified technology 
and financial transfers to developing and newly indus­
trialising countries to extend the transformation of the 
energy system to an international level.
Group 2 studies on green growth recommend a pol­
icy mix that is similar to those in Group 1, with incen­
tive and regulatory instruments (UN DESA, 2009a; 
PBL, 2009a; UNEP, 2009; UNCTAD, 2010a; OECD, 
2010a). However, these studies take additional cri­
ses into account, such as the global financial market 
and economic crisis (2007–2009) and the energy and 
food crisis in 2008. Accordingly, the recommended 
measures are selected from a broad spectrum of pol­
icy areas. Apart from climate and energy policy, they 
also include economic, trade, labour market, social and 
development policies, as well as agricultural policies in 
developing and newly industrialising countries. Most of 
these studies describe a structural change that creates 
new employment opportunities, strengthens new sec­
tors and reduces social inequalities, all in the course of 
energy systems decarbonisation. Under the premise of 
further global economic growth, resource consumption 
and CO2 emissions should be decoupled from economic 
growth through efficiency improvements in production 
and consumption. 
Group 3 studies take an entirely different view, as 
they assume an irresolvable conflict between economic 
growth and decarbonisation (Adler and Schachtsch­
neider, 2010; Bread for the World et al., 2008; Jack­
son, 2009; NEF, 2009; Raskin et al., 2002; Rosen et 
al., 2010; Ulvila and Pasanen, 2009). They advocate 
a transition to a new economy which operates within 
clear ecological limits, and focuses on social equity and 
environmental compatibility. Primarily recommended is 
a government information and communication policy 
that triggers a value change towards frugality, towards 
solidarity, a pronounced environmental conscious­
ness, and greater social participation (Chapters 2, 6). 
In the opinion of the authors, any steering by means of 
state policies must be legitimised through participation 
and social debate. Management by governance should 
encompass social redistribution, the democratisation of 
decision­making processes, renunciation of the present 
consumer behaviour, and the introduction of new wel­
fare indicators and new narratives for a ‘good life’. The 
differing recommendations of Groups 2 and 3 studies 
with respect to the transformation towards a low­car­
bon economy and society are rooted in the long­con­
troversial scientific and political debate on whether 
unlimited economic growth is possible within the guard 
rails, and whether it is in fact essential for solving social 
and ecological problems (Box 5.2­1).
Group 4, represented by a joint study of Atomium 
Culture and Lund University, points out important fac­
tors of a political and social governance of the transition 
towards a low­carbon society. Here, the importance of 
information and communication between government 
and citizens, the involvement of all actors in the pro­
cesses of change (multilevel/multi­actor governance), 
an interdepartmental system­oriented approach, and 
innovation and learning processes are highlighted (Ato­
mium Culture and Lund University, 2009).
The recommended action options vary depending 
on the transformation studies’ focus. Group 3 and 4 
studies concentrate primarily on the political and social 
framework conditionsthat are crucial for a transforma­
tion towards a low­carbon society. This is elaborated in 
Section 5.4, also particularly in Chapter 6. By contrast, 
Group 1 and 2 studies focus on political instruments, 
such as carbon pricing and other measures for realising 
and accelerating a transformation. In the WBGU’s view, 
both the use of governance instruments and the crea­
tion of new political and social framework conditions 
are indispensable for the transformation. The following 
presents the mix of instruments recommended by the 
WBGU to overcome various forms of market failure and 
to accelerate the transformation.
5.2.2 
Carbon Pricing as a Necessary Political Measure 
for the Transformation
Groups 1 and 2 studies show that CO2 pricing is a neces­
sary precondition for a transformation towards a low­
carbon, sustainable society (Section 5.2.1). Through 
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Box 5.2-1
The Debate on Growth
Since the 2007 – 2009 global financial and economic crisis, 
the growth debate has been rekindled in political and pub­
lic discussion (Chapter 2; Group 2 and 3 studies). The debate 
focuses on the economic growth of a national economy 
measured by gross domestic product (GDP). Since the Second 
World War, after which the industrialised countries showed 
high growth rates, their economic policies have focused on 
the aim of increasing GDP. Apart from rising wealth, economic 
growth is associated with sufficient employment opportuni­
ties, equitable distribution of wealth, stable social security 
systems, and technical progress (Seidl and Zahrnt, 2010). 
The first debate on growth
The first growth debate in 1972 was inspired by Meadows et 
al. with their study ‘The Limits to Growth’. It focused on the 
limited availability of natural, non­renewable resources. At 
that time, conventional economic models taking into account 
only the production factors of capital and labour were criti­
cised from an ecological perspective. The economic macro­
models used considered neither natural resources as input 
into the production process, nor emissions or waste as output 
(Daly, 1996; Irmen, 2011). As such, the models featured no 
ecological limits to national economic growth. However, even 
when conventional macromodels did take natural resources 
into account as a production factor, growth could be main­
tained in the models, as the production factors could be 
substituted for each other, and technical progress took place 
exogenously (Daly, 1996; Irmen, 2011).
This kind of modelling was criticised time and again by 
various different ecological economists, and alternative mod­
els were developed. Starting with the laws of natural science, 
particularly thermodynamics, attention was called to the 
fact that, as a subsystem of the Earth system, the economic 
system is also subject to its principles and can therefore not 
grow indefinitely (Georgescu­Roegen, 1971; Box 1­2). Daly’s 
‘steady­state economy’ exemplifies this (1974; Czech and 
Daly, 2009). According to this approach, the material and 
energy flows, respectively the throughput of an economy, 
should be in balance with the natural system, i. e. resources 
should not be overexploited. Assuming a constant popula­
tion, a constant capital stock, and a constant throughput vol­
ume (energy, material), a steady state is theoretically achiev­
able (Daly, 1974; Czech and Daly, 2009). However, in terms of 
sustainable development, a steady­state economy can grow 
qualitatively, but not quantitatively (Daly, 1996).
At that time, Hirsch (1977) was the first scientist to note 
that there were also social limits to economic growth. The new 
debate on growth revisits his scientific findings.
Binswanger recognised the economy’s ecological limits 
at an early stage, and wondered whether monetary econ­
omies imply the ‘necessity to grow’. According to Binswanger 
(2006), the expansion of the money supply through private 
banks which can borrow from central banks, and the predom­
inant system of joint stock companies leads to ‘the necessity 
to grow’. The joint stock companies have to make profits in 
order to pay back loans and the interest thereon, and dis­
tribute dividends to the investors. In his model, investment, 
production and sale diverge temporally, up­front financing 
is therefore required for the investments. A discontinued 
growth process results in a cumulative shrinkage process. 
Based on his model, Binswanger calculates that 1.8 % is the 
maximum global growth rate at which a monetary economy 
does not shrink, but rather continues to grow moderately. 
Irmen (2011) has criticised the model, reaching the conclu­
sion that the monetary theory perspective affords no compel­
ling argument for the necessity to grow in market economies. 
A functioning credit system is not a sufficient condition for 
economic growth. Tichy (2009) also points out that growth 
is not an imperative for capitalist systems. Victor (2008) has 
developed a growth simulation model for Canada in which he 
demonstrated that Canada’s wealth could be maintained and 
increase even if the economy were to grow only moderately, 
or not at all.
The new debate on growth
Natural scientists, economists and social scientists have intro­
duced critical arguments and alternative ideas to the current 
growth debate, questioning the concept of ‘qualitative’ or 
‘green’ growth (Adler and Schachtschneider, 2010; Seidl and 
Zahrnt, 2010; Martinez­Alier et al., 2010; Group 3 studies). 
The French ‘décroissance’ social movement, which now also 
has followers in other European countries, fundamentally 
questions economic growth, and particularly the political 
fixation on it (Latouche, 2010; Martinez­Alier et al., 2010). 
Those following this movement are of the opinion that the 
political promises made by economic growth, such as greater 
wealth and equity, have not been fulfilled in recent years. To 
date, however, there is no alternative model for the economy.
Other growth critics assume that, as long as there is con­
tinued economic growth with the associated rising demand 
for consumer goods and services, the global consumption of 
energy and resources will also continue to increase, despite 
improvements in efficiency, and that it cannot be reduced to 
a sustainable level (Jackson, 2009). This particularly applies if 
not only CO2 emissions are taken into account, but also finite 
natural resources in general. Decoupling economic activities 
from the consumption of natural resources requires not only 
technical efficiency, but also improved recycling systems and 
changes in consumption behaviour. Several studies (Jackson, 
2009; Simms et al., 2010; Adler and Schachtschneider, 2010) 
therefore assume that is not possible to totally decouple eco­
nomic growth from resource consumption, and that it will not 
be possible in future, either. This is mainly due to the rebound 
effect (Box 4.3­1). 
The model and scenario analysis in Chapter 4 has shown 
that decarbonisation can be consistent with positive, 
although moderate, economic growth (Box 4.2­1). Neverthe­
less, according to Jackson’s calculations, the global economy’s 
carbon intensity would need to fall by an average of 7 % per 
year in order to limit the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere 
to 450 ppm. According to his data, global carbon intensity has 
improved by an average of only approx. 0.7 % per year since 
1990. This would mean that efficiency increases would need 
to increase by a tenfold in future to ensure compliance with 
the 2 °C guard rail (Jackson, 2009). However, other authors 
specify the average decline in carbon intensity during recent 
years at 1.2–1.3 % (Section 4.2.1; Canadell et al., 2007; IEA, 
2010c), which would mean that current reduction rates would 
need to increase by a fivefold.
These figures must nevertheless be interpreted with cau­
tion: in order to comply with the 2 °C guard rail, the econo­
my’s carbon intensity does not necessarily have to fall over a 
long period at a constant rate that is relative to the percentage 
rate of the previous year, as could be inferred from Jackson 
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the introduction of a price for negative external effects, 
such as CO2 emissions, their social costs are internalised, 
triggering changes in the behaviour of market players. 
Carbon pricing can essentially be introduced through a 
CO2 tax or the restriction of CO2 emissions and intro­
duction of an allowance trading scheme (cap and trade) 
(Box 5.2­2). Both are market­based instruments which, 
compared to regulatory instruments, can archieve the 
emission reduction target more cost efficiently. 
CO2 pricing can systematically guide production, 
consumption and investment decisions towards low­
carbon and accelerate the decarbonisation of energy 
systems, as well as climate­friendly urbanisation and 
land use. On the one hand, CO2 pricing increases the 
incentives on the supplier side to expand renewable 
energies and increasingly use low­emission produc­
tion technologies. Moreover, an appropriately high CO2 
price is a prerequisite for the earning power of many 
(2009), nor would this be sensible. In fact, this would actually 
result in extremely unrealistic emission paths with initially 
very high absolute reduction rates. In order to roughly follow 
the emission paths illustrated in Box 1.1­1, where emissions 
will peak in the next few years, and no more than 750 Gt CO2 
are emitted by 2050, a more or less linear decline in carbon 
intensity would be necessary if the economic growth rate 
were 2–3 %. Carbon intensity would therefore need to decline 
around 3–4 % per year, relative to the present. Accordingly, 
the past 45 years’ average abatement rate of approx. 1.2 % 
(Canadell et al., 2007) would have to be more than doubled 
in the coming years.
Using a similar approach, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) also concludes that doubling the average 1990–2008 
abatement rate in the period of 2008 – 2020, or quadrupling 
this rate in the period 2020 – 2035 would be sufficient to 
achieve a 450 ppm path. 
What are the impacts of an economy without growth?
Essentially, a market economy with little or no growth is con­
ceivable; however, from a social perspective, this would have 
some problematic impacts, and require respective, supporting 
policies (Tichy, 2009; Victor, 2008). Many economists point 
out that even in the case of population growth stagnation 
without economic growth, redistribution could no longer rely 
on increment of growth in material wealth, but would have to 
come out of the existing capital stock. This would be accom­
panied by distributional conflicts. Either way, there would be 
losers. A fundamental structural change such as the trans­
formation towards a low­carbon society would also be much 
more difficult to achieve in an economy without growth, as 
a nominal wage renunciation would also be accompanied by 
structural unemployment in the shrinking sectors. Overall, an 
economy without growth provides fewer incentives, particu­
larly with regard to investment and innovation (Schneider, 
1991; Tichy, 2009). 
If an economy without growth in GDP were the theoretical 
goal, investments would have to be reduced to pure replace­
ment investments, and profits would have to be cut back to a 
minimum, barely enough to cover these replacement invest­
ments. Consequently, production capacity would stagnate at 
a certain level. Consumption would adjust to this stagnant 
production capacity. Given production capacities and an 
increasing world population, the global per capita consump­
tion would decrease, and the global GDP would have to be 
redistributed. This would require a cultural change towards 
foregoing consumption, a shortening of people’s working lives 
in the industrialised countries accompanied by increases in 
household production, and acceptance of intensified national 
and international redistribution (Tichy, 2009). 
The above impacts of an economy without growth are 
not insignificant, and would require the broad acceptance 
of the population. At present, it is difficult to imagine that 
an individual country in this globalised world could simply 
‘decide’ on an economy with slow growth, or even no­growth. 
This would mean that a country would have to largely with­
draw from international competition and the international 
financial and product markets. For ethical reasons, slowing 
down, or foregoing growth cannot be demanded presently, 
particularly from the developing and newly industrialising 
countries. It would run contrary to the development goal of 
poverty reduction, as established in the Millennium Develop­
ment Goals, for example (MDG; Section 1.2). Slowing down 
the growth rate would therefore essentially be conceivable 
only for industrialised countries. However, in this respect, it 
has to be considered that slowing down economic growth in 
the industrialised countries would also impact considerably 
on the economic activities in developing countries as a result 
of the interdependency of global trade, as recently seen in the 
course of the 2008 financial and economic crisis (ODI, 2008). 
Economic growth and the transformation towards a 
low-carbon society
The capital need for the global transformation of the energy 
system, urbanisation and land­use systems will run into bil­
lions (Section 4.5). Economic growth can therefore provide 
the financial resources and incentives needed to reduce CO2 
emissions and resource consumption by means of technical 
innovations. Urgently required investments in technical inno­
vations (energy and efficiency technologies, recycling sys­
tems, etc.), for example, could thus be financed more easily. 
Furthermore, workers released as a result of the transforma­
tion in certain sectors (e. g. fossil energies) could take advan­
tage more easily of newly created employment opportunities 
in other sectors. Potential decarbonisation losers could be 
compensated more easily from additional national revenue 
(for instance from taxes, emissions trading).
If a national economy can successfully produce goods and 
services whilst keeping the consumption of energy and natu­
ral resources low, economic growth need not necessarily con­
flict with decarbonisation. A suitable framework can advance 
the desired decoupling of resource and energy consumption 
from economic growth. Consumption patterns observed 
today would need to be redirected to increase the demand for 
less resource and energy intensive goods. Profit­oriented 
companies would be forced to adapt their production meth­
ods to the new market conditions. Current insights do not 
allow predictions as to whether decoupling can actually be 
achieved in this way. 
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investments in low­emission technologies (Garz et 
al., 2009; Section 4.5). It accelerates the substitution 
of fossil with renewable energy sources, for example, 
which also, in a dynamic perspective in the context of 
renewable energies expansion, not least in the field of 
urbanisation, leads to learning effects and cost reduc­
tions. 
On the other hand, it causes changes on the demand 
side. A high CO2 price thus leads to rising energy and 
product prices, thereby reducing energy consumption, 
and the consumption of goods which are carbon inten­
sive. This stimulates an increased tapping of (energy) 
efficiency potentials (Fischer and Newell, 2008). The 
higher the CO2 price, the stronger the incentive for 
investments in energy efficiency and other measures 
to reduce energy consumption. Moreover, in the long 
run, a CO2 price signal provides investors and consum­
ers with planning security and prevents lock­in effects 
with respect to long­term investment and consumption 
decisions. The greater the number of countries opt­
ing for carbon pricing, the more comprehensively and 
effectively this measure can impact. For carbon pric­
ing to achieve maximum impact, the subsidies for fos­
sil fuels which still exist in many countries should also 
be phased out at the earliest opportunity (Section 4.5). 
Emissions from land use and land­use change should 
be dealt with separately from the emissions generated 
by fossil energy use. The CO2 dynamics associated with 
the terrestrial biosphere differ substantially in many 
fundamental aspects – such as measurability, reversibil­
ity, long­term controllability, interannual fluctuations – 
from the CO2 flows associated with the industrial use 
of coal, crude oil or natural gas (WBGU, 2010a). It is 
therefore appropriate to develop specific instruments 
and measures for this sector, rather than linking it with 
solutions for fossil sources.
Subsequent to considering the advantages and dis­
advantages of price and quantity control, the WBGU 
argues in favour of quantity control, i. e. restricting 
the emissions from fossil sources whilst introducing 
tradable emissions rights. The establishment of a CO2 
emission trading scheme that is as global as possible is 
 recommended at corporate level in order to generate a 
widely impacting, uniform price signal for the transfor­
mation. The WBGU suggests moving towards a global 
CO2 certificate trading scheme in three stages: by devel­
oping the European emissions trading scheme further, 
linking existing national emissions trading schemes, 
and through supranational agreements on emissions 
restriction in high­emission countries (Section 7.3.2). 
In those countries where the requisite administrative 
structures and institutions, such as legal security, are 
not in place, a national CO2 tax may prove to be the 
more appropriate instrument (Goldblatt, 2010; OECD, 
2009a).
Ultimately, however, a CO2 emissions trading scheme 
can only guarantee an adequately high CO2 price and 
secrurity in terms of long­term expectations through 
Box 5.2-2
A CO2 Tax versus CO2 Emissions Trading
Essentially, external effects resulting in market failure can 
be internalised with price control (taxes, subsidies) or quan­
tity control (tradeable permits). For a detailed elaboration on 
the choice between price or quantity control, see Weitzman 
(1974). With full knowledge of both the damages from emis­
sions on the one hand, and of emissions abatement costs on 
the other, a CO2 tax and CO2 emissions trading are equivalent, 
in theory. A welfare­maximising emissions volume, or a price 
leading to this volume, can be identified in a static analysis. 
However, due to existing uncertainties in the area of climate, 
an accurate assessment of damage costs and abatement costs 
is not possible, either statically or dynamically. 
Price control – in the form of an emissions or CO2 tax – 
gives companies and consumers certainty about the costs 
incurred, for example the costs of a tonne of CO2 emis­
sions. Nevertheless, the desired emissions reduction can be 
achieved only in a trial and error process through carbon tax 
adjustment. In other words, ecological effectiveness is not 
necessarily given with this instrument. This applies even in 
the case of rather high taxation rates (Sinn, 2008; Edenhofer 
and Kalkuhl, 2009). Greater effectiveness in terms of the goal 
of emissions reduction is therefore to be expected from quan­
tity control.
Pursuing the guard rail concept outlined in Chapter 1, 
which defines the still acceptable dimension for anthropo­
genic intervention in nature, the more sensible strategy seems 
to be quantity restriction in the sense of a global CO2 budget 
(Box 1.1­1; WBGU 2009b). It may prove to be a disadvantage 
that emission allowance price development is unpredictable, 
therefore calculating the cost may be difficult for market 
players. 
As a global instrument, CO2 emissionss trading has advan­
tages over taxation, as ‘only’ one market place needs to be 
established for trading, rather than a global fiscal authority to 
collect and redistribute the tax. A further political advantage 
of emissions trading is the option of allocating emission rights 
on the basis of a politically negotiated distribution key 
(WBGU, 2009). In this way, the principle of ‘common but dif­
ferentiated responsibilities’ anchored in the 1992 Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, for instance, can be put into 
practice whilst maintaining the advantages of clear emission 
restrictions and cost­efficiency. The WBGU believes that 
financial transfers could be generated much more reliably 
through tradable emissions rights as a fraction of a global 
emissions budget (WBGU, 2009). They would be an indirect 
result: whilst maintaining the advantages of a uniform carbon 
dioxide price in all countries involved, auction revenues could 
be allocated to countries in proportion to their share in the 
global emissions budget.
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very strict restrictions in order to develop transforma­
tive impact. Where the requisite institutional oppor­
tunities are not given, a CO2 tax at a corresponding 
level represents an alternative instrument for effec­
tive, transformative management by governance. As a 
guideline, the WBGU assumes that the carbon price in 
Europe and the OECD countries will have to be at least 
US$ 40–50 per t CO2 in 2020, and at least US$ 110–130 
per t CO2 in 2050 in order to comply with the 2 °C guard 
rail (Sections 4.2, 7.3.9; IEA, 2010c). According to IEA 
estimates, the CO2 price in developing and newly indus­
trialising countries will need to reach approx. US$ 60 
per t CO2 by 2030, and at least US$100 per t CO2 by 
the middle of the century to achieve stabilisation at 450 
ppm CO2eq. These conclusions were derived from IEA’s 
model calculations (2010c) and the scenarios in Sec­
tion 4.2.4; however, they probably at most denote the 
lower limits for the required overall total. 
Globally uncoordinated carbon pricing holds the risk 
of distoring the competition in international trade, and 
a risk of carbon leakage as a result of production shift 
(Box 5.2­3). Both problems have been discussed inten­
sively in the context of the further development of the 
European emissions trading scheme. One solution to 
these problems may be border adjustment measures 
(for example border tax adjustment on imports). Meas­
ures such as these are intended to prevent any freerid­
ing by individual countries and distortions of competi­
tion as a result of higher costs due to carbon pricing, 
and to increase the incentives for cooperative behav­
iour (Edenhofer et al., 2009a, b; Box 5.2­3). However, 
border adjustment measures only have a limited impact 
and carry a high potential for causing trade disputes. 
They can therefore at most be applied as an accompa­
nying measure, rather than as an independent instru­
ment within any policy mix for the transformation. At 
best, extremely moderate border adjustment measures 
should be introduced in order to reduce the competitive 
disadvantages suffered by energy­intensive companies 
(Section 7.3.2). 
Phase Out Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
The introduction of carbon pricing should be accom­
panied by the phasing out of all subsidies for fossil 
energy carriers as these artificially maintain their com­
petitiveness and weaken the impact of the CO2 price 
signal (Section 4.5). This also includes all direct pay­
ments, tax concessions, fixed prices, import financing, 
or public assumption of risks from fossil energy use. 
The majority of fossil fuel subsidies is currently paid 
in non­OECD countries, including China, India, Saudi 
Arabia, Indonesia, Russia, Egypt and Iran. The phasing 
out or reform of these subsidies was decided at the G20 
summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009. It was to be 
ensured that poor population groups were not disad­
vantaged (IEA et al., 2010a; Section 4.5).
5.2.3 
Policy-mix for the Transformation
Carbon pricing encourages market players to consider 
the social cost of CO2 emissions in their decision­mak­
ing. However, carbon pricing alone is not sufficient to 
induce changes in market player behaviour in the trans­
formation fields of energy, urbanisation and land use, 
as the relevant markets show various forms of market 
failure, such as positive and negative external effects, 
information asymmetries, market entry barriers, natural 
monopolies and the supply of public goods. These cases 
call for state action; including legislation (administra­
tive command­and­control, planning), money (market­
based instruments) and ‘good words’ (information, vol­
untary agreements with the threat of regulation). These 
political instruments acts as direct or indirect incentive 
for market player behaviour and coordinate changes in 
behaviour (Section 5.4). 
For a transformative impact on production and con­
sumption, the simultaneous use of various instruments 
is required in the context of a policy mix to initiate sys­
temic and fundamental changes in the three transfor­
mation fields. The design of a transformation policy 
should trigger fast and long­term oriented structural 
changes, avoid path dependencies, and help to over­
come present obstructive short­term orientations.
McKinsey (2009), for example, discuss on the basis 
of its global greenhouse gas abatement cost curve the 
political instruments which have to be enforced to 
overcome present market imperfections whilst exploit­
ing existing abatement cost potentials (Figure 5.2­1). 
In the first third of the cost curve, which includes 
abatement measures that could generate profits, if 
implemented, market development and the demand 
for known technologies, techniques and land manage­
ment methods can be promoted through regulatory 
instruments such as standards or requirements. These 
are generally efficiency measures, currently not imple­
mented due to lack of information, for reasons of con­
venience, because of a lack of long­term orientation, 
or loss aversion on the part of the agents. In terms of 
investments at the increasing part of the cost curve, 
various political instruments are required in order to 
develop a long­term international regulatory frame­
work to facilitate the introduction of emerging tech­
nologies, techniques and management methods. This 
particularly applies to the currently expensive abate­
ment measures. With the aid of market­based instru­
ments and policy­based technology support, the com­
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Box 5.2-3
Distortions of Competition, Carbon Leakage and 
Border Adjustment Measures
Competition and Carbon Leakage
Until a global price for CO2 exists, and until all countries have 
introduced climate policy measures, a country’s unilateral 
climate policy may result in competitive disadvantages for 
companies based in this country but operating internation­
ally. This particularly concerns companies in energy intensive 
sectors with strong international competition, for example 
companies in the lime, fertiliser/nitrogen, iron/steel, alumin­
ium, paper and chemical production sectors. This could lead 
to the problem of carbon leakage, caused by three different 
aspects: firstly, it can be related to the potential relocation of 
companies suffering a competitive disadvantage in the form 
of higher production costs as a result of climate policy. How­
ever, their relocation to a country without a climate policy 
does not impact the high level of global CO2 emissions. Sec­
ondly, products from countries with a climate policy may be 
substituted by products from countries without a climate 
policy, produced with less efficient production technologies, 
therefore leading to a rise in global CO2 emissions. Thirdly, 
global CO2 emissions can rise as a consequence of the declin­
ing demand for fossil fuels in industrialised countries in the 
course of climate policy ; world market prices for fossil fuels 
would come down, leading to an increased demand for fossil 
fuels in countries that have not adopted a climate policy. This 
effect is also known as the ‘green paradox’ (Sinn, 2008; Eden­
hofer and Kalkuhl, 2009). The relocation of energy intensive 
companies abroad to unregulated countries is also associated 
with job losses and a decline in profits and tax revenues. This 
represents a not insignificant negative incentive with regard 
to implementation of national climate protection measures 
(Babiker and Rutherford, 2005).
Border Adjustment Measures
The introduction of border adjustment measures is one pos­
sible option for maintaining the competitiveness of energy 
intensive production companies and preventing carbon leak­
age (WTO and UNEP, 2009; Dröge et al., 2009). These were 
already discussed in the context of the GATT in the 1960s. 
They can be divided into direct and indirect adjustment meas­
ures. In the context of the introduction of an emissions trad­
ing scheme, indirect measures include, for example, a free of 
charge allocation of emission rights to energy intensive com­
panies in international competition. As an additional incen­
tive for investment in more energy efficient technologies, the 
companies can also be offered subsidies in the form of soft 
loans (Dröge et al., 2009). Direct measures would for instance 
be: an import tax on high­carbon goods; the compulsory pur­
chase of CO2 permits for importing goods in accordance with 
the CO2 emissions generated in the course of their production; 
the corresponding subsidisation of exported products; or the 
introduction of production technology standards backed up 
by international treaties (Dröge et al., 2009). In the case of 
import taxation, the tax rate can be based either on the actual 
CO2 emissions attributable to the production of the goods, or 
based on a fixed value, for example a product’s CO2 emissions 
assuming the best available technology (BAT), or the CO2 
emissions attributable to the production of a similar domes­
tically produced product (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Fischer 
and Fox, 2009). This also leads to technical problems, as the 
production carbon intensity would have to be determined for 
all products and all countries under consideration of all pre­
liminary products. 
Calculations using general equilibrium models show 
that the problematic issue of carbon leakage can generally 
be classified as not quite so significant, whilst the competi­
tive disadvantages can turn out to be quite considerable for 
certain energy intensive industries (Burniaux et al., 2010). 
Various authors conclude that the introduction of border tax 
adjustments (BTA) would have little impact on the problem of 
carbon leakage. On the other hand, the introduction of BTA 
could substantially improve the reduced competitiveness of 
energy intensive companies (Babiker and Rutherford, 2005; 
Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Fischer and Fox, 2009; Mattoo 
et al., 2009; WTO and UNEP, 2009; Böhringer et al., 2010). 
However, they must also be assessed differently in terms of 
their compatibility with WTO law (Dröge et al., 2009; WTO 
and UNEP, 2009). Equally, it is not clear whether they could 
provide cooperation incentives for countries previously 
unwilling to cooperate with regard to climate policy. 
Border Adjustment Measures and WTO Law
The issue of whether border tax adjustments are combatible 
with WTO law is highly controversial in academic legal litera­
ture (WBGU, 2004) and must not be assumed to be finally 
resolved until a relevant decision is made by the WTO dispute 
settlement bodies. There are nevertheless good arguments for 
their compatibility with WTO law, providing the requirements 
formulated by the WTO dispute settlement bodies in other 
cases are observed in the design of border tax adjustments 
(UBA, 2008): essentially, the purposeful introduction of a fee 
for the import of goods produced in countries with less strin­
gent environmental standards does not contravene the Gen­
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) principle of non­
discrimination. In particular, it does not contravene the prin­
ciple of national treatment (Article III: 2 GATT), providing the 
border tax adjustments for imported products is not greater 
than the costs created by the higher environmental standards 
for similar domestic products (Ruddigkeit, 2009). The pro­
duction costs of domestic products should therefore be 
assessed such that they cause no discrimination. Appropriate 
as a basis would be the costs generated by the use of best 
available technology. Should these fees nevertheless contra­
vene the non­discrimination requirement, the contravention 
would be justified in accordance with GATT Article XX lit. (b) 
and (g): pursuant to these, measures can be taken to protect 
the climate as a global environmental good (Epiney, 2000; 
Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007) if no less moderate measures are 
available, and the duty of cooperation as defined in Article 
XX GATT has been sufficiently exercised to a minimum, i.e. 
through international climate protection negotiations (UBA, 
2008). The reimbursement of additional costs due to climate 
protection when exporting domestic products (so­called 
export refund) causes no concerns with regard to WTO law; 
this merely requires compliance with the duty of notification 
pursuant to Article XVI: 1 GATT.
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mercial launch of these technologies and the further 
development of technical solutions should be acceler­
ated through learning curve effects (McKinsey, 2009). 
In the field of land use, it is important to establish the 
necessary political and institutional capacities for sus­
tainable land management internationally and to inte­
grate this goal into international cooperation as land­
use policy is too fragmented in many countries (Chap­
ter 1, Section, 5.4).
The abatement cost curve in Figure 5.2­1 clearly 
shows that in the short term, demand for new technol­
ogies in the areas of durable consumer goods and the 
building and transport sectors can be generated through 
a combination of administrative command­and­control 
as well as market­based instruments, and information. 
The transformation towards greater energy efficiency 
can therefore commence. 
For systemic and long­term changes in the transfor­
mation fields of energy, urbanisation and land use, a 
combination of political instruments is required to also 
contribute to stable framework conditions with a trans­
formative impact at an international level. The WBGU 
recommends to focus not exclusively on technologies 
here, but also on encouraging changes in behaviour and 
social innovations.
Usually, not just one policy instrument but rather 
a portfolio of measures (policy mix) should be used if 
the various market imperfections and barriers are to 
be overcome (Gupta and Tirpak, 2007; Edenhofer et 
al., 2009a; McKinsey, 2009; Knopf et al., 2010; Mat­
thes, 2010; OECD, 2009a, 2010a). The measures should 
mutually support one another, rather than impede each 
other’s impact. The policy mix can be used on all politi­
cal levels, from local authorities through to regional 
states/provinces, to national and supranational level. 
National governance measures should be flanked by 
international agreements for the transformative impact 
to develop globally. The measures in the policy mix can 
continue for very different lengths of time, as some 
instruments, such as technology­specific support, for 
example, should be used only temporarily. The policy 
mix for the transformation should concentrate pri­
marily on the following three areas: firstly, it should 
support the development of new markets for innova­
tions; secondly, it should provide incentives for climate­
friendly market behaviour; and thirdly, it should target 
the supply of public goods such as infrastructures and 
ecosystem services.
Table 5.2­1 on political instruments in the three areas 
specified (innovations; investment, production and 
consumption decisions; supply of public goods) illus­
trates a suggested policy mix the WBGU considers sen­
sible. This policy mix principally applies to the indus­
trialised countries, as these already have the requisite 
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Figure 5.2-1
Proposals for regulations in four areas (energy efficiency, power and industry, agriculture, key technologies) according to the 
greenhouse gas abatement cost curve for the cost efficient reduction of CO2 emissions.
Source: McKinsey, 2009
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Table 5.2-1
Exemplary policy mix for the transformation towards a low­carbon society.
Source: WBGU
Regulatory 
instruments
Incentive 
instruments
Government 
investment
Informative 
instruments
Promotion of 
Innovation 
 > Technology and Effi-
ciency Standards (for 
example for vehicles, 
buildings, durable 
consumer goods)
 > Production standards
 > Sustainability stan-
dards in land use
 > Government procure-
ment policy
 > Regulation of capital 
markets
 > Prohibitions (for 
instance of certain 
land uses or products, 
F-gases)
 > Regulation (for exam-
ple bioenergy quotas)
 > Urban, regional and 
infrastructure plan-
ning
 > Patent law
 > CO2 tax
 > CO2 emissions 
permits
 > Public support for 
research and 
development
 > public venture 
capital
 > soft loans and 
credit guarantees 
by the govern-
ment
 > Fiscal innovation 
incentives
 > Promotion of new 
business models 
as experimental 
projects (for 
example Energy 
Contracting)
 > Competitive pro-
motion of experi-
ments
 > Public infrastructure 
provision
 > public demonstra-
tion projects
 > Staging of competi-
tions and granting 
of awards (Jugend 
Forscht, encourag-
ing young people to 
engage in research, 
Low-Carbon City, 
innovation prizes)
 > Voluntary agree-
ments with a threat 
of regulation
Investment, 
production and 
consumer 
decisions
 > Technology and effi-
ciency standards
 > Production standards
 > Sustainability 
 standards (biomass, 
land and forest 
 management)
 > Emissions capping
 > Nudging (‘libertarian 
paternalism’)
 > Government procure-
ment policy
 > Regulation (bioen-
ergy quotas, organic 
products)
 > Market regulation 
(energy law, Tenancy 
law)
 > Urban, regional and 
infrastructure plan-
ning
 > CO2 tax
 > CO2 emissions 
permits
 > Technology-spe-
cific market entry 
promotion (for 
example feed-in 
tariffs)
 > Promotion of new 
business models
 > Fiscal investment 
incentives
 > Phasing out of dis-
torting subsidies 
(fossil fuels, agri-
cultural subsidies)
 > Payment for eco-
system services
 > Road use charges
 > Public transport 
tariff structure
 > Public infrastructure 
provision
 > Public-Private 
 Partnership
 > Information cam-
paigns (on energy 
efficiency, dietary 
habits, new forms of 
housing and mobil-
ity) 
 > Labelling (organic 
products, carbon 
footprint, sustain-
ability)
 > Voluntary agree-
ments with a threat 
of regulation
Availability of 
public goods
 > Urban, regional and 
infrastructure 
 planning
 > Certification
 > Market regulation
 > Bans
 > Payment for eco-
system services
 > Governmental infra-
structure provision
 > Information cam-
paigns, labelling
 > Voluntary labelling
 > Voluntary agree-
ments with a threat 
of regulation
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political and institutional capacities for implementation 
and enforcement (OECD, 2010a). However, a transfor­
mation policy must also be introduced concurrently in 
developing countries. It has to be supported by capac­
ity building and international cooperation, technology 
transfer and financing. Compared with the industrial­
ised countries, measures which are particularly promis­
ing in the developing countries, other than carbon pric­
ing approaches, are state regulations (for example in 
the form of efficiency standards for buildings, vehicles 
and appliances), the subsidising of renewable energies, 
financing support and information policy (UNCTAD, 
2010a; UNEP, 2009).
5.2.3.1 
Promotion of Innovation
Developing a national innovation strategy in which all 
subsystems of the national innovation system focus on 
solving a particular problem supports innovation. In 
this case, this includes the transformation of the energy 
system and steering urbanisation and land­use systems 
towards climate­friendlyness. The areas of education 
and research, capital markets, the legal framework, the 
corporate structure, and the entire economic structure 
should be integrated into such an innovation system 
(OECD, 2010b). 
Moreover, public support of research and develop­
ment through the use of subsidies or tax concessions for 
businesses can provide incentives to develop more inno­
vations. Government­financed cooperation between 
science and industry and international research and 
technology cooperation can ensure that new, low­car­
bon technologies are diffused and deployed all over the 
world as quickly as possible.
Temporary, direct government support for private 
sector investments is also necessary in order to accel­
erate innovation. Depending on the stage of technol­
ogy development (research, demonstration, deploy­
ment, commercial roll out, diffusion), different forms of 
government support for private investments would be 
sensible measures (UNEP­SEFI, 2008). In the research 
phase, direct public support for research projects is 
important. Likewise, the promotion of public­private 
partnerships in applied research and development is also 
of major importance. The greatest funding gap (valley 
of death) is often at the demonstration and deployment 
stages, as the invention is already on the way to com­
mercialisation, yet further development is frequently 
(for example due to limited numbers of unit quantities) 
associated with high costs, and high technological risks 
due to little practical experience (UNEP­SEFI, 2008; 
IEA, 2010a; Figure 4.5­5). This is where government 
grants and guarantees could further the acquisition of 
private venture capital providers who would otherwise 
not invest without public support. Additionally, the 
state should create an environment that is attractive to 
venture capitalists. One option would be the combina­
tion of public and private risk capital in venture capital 
funds, examples of these are the UK Carbon Trust Ven­
ture Capital Fund or the California Clean Energy Fund 
(Section 4.5; BASE and SEFI, 2006). Government dem­
onstration projects or the provision of infrastructure by 
the government could also help to reduce the risks for 
private investors in the deployment stage. In the dif­
fusion stage, access to private capital for financing can 
also be improved through the provision of soft loans 
and credit guarantees, helping to facilitate extended 
commercialisation (Section 4.5). 
Apart from CO2 emissions pricing, regulatory instru­
ments such as dynamic technical standards in the trans­
port sector, the building sector or for durable consumer 
goods can provide incentives for investment in research 
and development. These also include policy­based 
standards for the transformation of systems, such as 
the introduction of electromobility, which requires 
new solutions along the entire private transport value 
creation chain, thereby offering incentives for private 
research spending. The introduction of sustainabil­
ity standards in agriculture will provide incentives for 
research and development spending in this sector. This 
applies not only to technological innovations, but also 
to social innovations such as new business models, for 
example energy contracting (Sections 4.3, 4.5). 
5.2.3.2 
Investment, Production and Consumption 
 Decisions
A policy mix is also needed in order to achieve changes 
in market players’ behaviour. Again, various financing 
choices should be an element. The transformation of 
energy systems, of urban infrastructures and of land­
use systems is usually associated with high up­front 
investments which generate returns only in the long 
term. Such investments therefore often require long­
term and low­interest financing, which is, however, not 
always available through commercial financial institu­
tions (Section 4.5). Here, the government can support 
private investments with soft loans or credit guaran­
tees.
Energy efficiency investments in buildings, heating 
systems and production technologies, generally also 
characterised by high up­front investments with contin­
uous long­term returns, can also be accelerated through 
soft loans and grants by the government. In addition, 
regulatory instruments such as efficiency standards for 
consumer goods, buildings, machines, vehicles or entire 
production processes are also  appropriate. 
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In the area of land use, minimum standards and a 
certification scheme can ensure that climate­friendly 
management processes are applied in agriculture and 
forestry or in the provision of bioenergy. The Euro­
pean Union’s minimum bioenergy standards could, for 
example, be extended to all biomass products (WBGU, 
2010a). 
And finally, a government procurement policy that 
focuses on efficiency or low­carbon products, and a 
targeted information policy (campaigns, road shows) 
can advance technology development and investments 
in efficiency quickly and extensively, and promote 
changes in behaviour on the part of consumers. 
The commercial attractiveness of investments in 
low­carbon technologies should also be ensured with 
a long­term oriented, stable regulatory environment. 
Besides the introduction of a CO2 price signal, tech­
nology­specific support increases the return on invest­
ments in low­carbon technologies and minimises their 
risks (Box 5.2­4). To make investments in renewable 
energies particularly attractive, targeted support for the 
commercial roll out of renewable energies in the form of 
a feed­in tariff (FiT) has proved to be very effective in 
the past (Box 5.2­4). 
Regulations on market access, prices, quality, natu­
ral monopolies or the obligation to contract into pub­
lic utilities guide market player decisions. For example, 
the German Renewable Energy Source Act (EEG) made 
large­scale market entry possible by obliging grid oper­
ators to purchase electricity from renewable energies. 
The liberalisation of energy markets has led to compet­
itiveness in production, trade and distribution to end 
customers. However, the grid­bound electricity and gas 
markets networks are still subject to regulation. 
Network operators in Germany, for example, have 
so far been subject to incentive regulation (revenue­
cap regulation) in order to provide incentives for cost­
effective production through an upper revenue cap for 
the duration of a regulation period. Efficient companies 
thereby receive a higher rate of return on theit invest­
ments. This keeps the transmission fees low. However, 
incentive regulation bears the risk that network opera­
tors are not adequately encouraged to expand networks 
and ensure grid quality. There is therefore also an addi­
tional obligation to prepare replacement and expansion 
investment plans, and to have these investment budg­
ets approved by the regulatory authority (Monopol­
kommission, 2009).
Because of a lack of investments, a regulation review 
is under consideration (von Hirschhausen et al., 2010; 
Helm, 2009). Apart from aspects of operating effi­
ciency, the regulatory design should also include long­
term objectives serving the development of a sustain­
able infrastructure. In addition to the imputed interest 
rate on own capital as an incentive for investments into 
the grid, competitive tendering for network develop­
ment could be considered. The specific design of mar­
kets allows the state to provide incentives for a sys­
temic transformation in the three transformation fields. 
Changes in consumer behaviour, for example when 
purchasing food or even timber­derived products such 
as furniture, can be supported further through informa­
tion measures such as product labelling, product stand­
ards and targeted communication policies (for instance 
information campaigns). This applies to energy effi­
cient appliances as much as to encouraging low­carbon 
eating habits. Carbon footprint labels on groceries or 
campaigns to encourage a low­meat diet, for instance, 
or the purchase of regional and seasonal products can 
lead to changes in behaviour. In the area of mobility, 
campaigns for new services such as car sharing, for 
example, can encourage climate­friendly behaviour 
(Section 4.3). 
Consumer decisions can also be influenced in the 
direction of sustainability by the specification of so­
called ‘default’ options. One option for overcoming bar­
riers for behavioural changes not caused by a lack of 
environmental preferences but by loss aversion, a lack 
of long­term orientation, or barriers present for rea­
sons of convenience (Section 2.4) could be so­called 
‘nudges’. This strategy is also known as ‘libertarian 
paternalism’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). One promi­
nent example for nudges are default options, i. e. those 
that would also be preferred by the majority of con­
sumers even after careful consideration of all argu­
ments, yet are still not selected because of the above 
mentioned barriers and a lack of information. At the 
same time, the option of selecting another alternative 
(opt out) is always kept open. When there is a diver­
gence in terms of time between the costs and benefits 
of an action, nudges can help individuals to make their 
decisions in such a way that the resultant benefit is 
optimised in the long run (Box 5.2­5).
5.2.3.3 
Supply of Public Goods
There are various political instruments available for 
public goods such as ecosystem services or technical 
and social infrastructures, which are important for a 
low­carbon economy. 
All transformation fields (energy, urbanisation, 
land use) have a common problem: how, in the long­
term, can spatial requirements be met at different lev­
els (local, regional, nationwide, cross­nationally). The 
necessary infrastructure changes and low­carbon land 
use require the coordination of different interests 
(mobility, supply, economic development, population 
development, nature conservation), the settlement of 
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conflicts and precautionary provisions for spatial func­
tion and spatial use. As a coordination instrument, pub­
lic planning allows forward­looking, formative man­
agement of these areas of government responsibility. 
It serves the embedding and coordination of individ­
ual projects into an overall strategy. In the context of a 
transformation towards a low­carbon society, planning 
primarily concerns the areas of environmental, regional 
and urban planning, as well as infrastructure plan­
ning. Regional value creation chains and the integrated 
management of land, energy and material flows are of 
great importance, for example, for planning sustainable 
land use. Another specific challenge is the planning of 
infrastructures such as new supra­regional power grids 
(for example the supergrid; Chapter 4). Infrastruc­
ture and land­use planning must increasingly be car­
ried out supra­regionally, for example at EU level (Sec­
tion 5.4.3). Transnational planning processes within the 
EU must therefore be reinforced (EEAC, 2009). In the 
case of infrastructure investments, planning law is vital 
in order to obtain quick approvals for private invest­
ments, thereby providing an adequate incentive for 
these (Matthes, 2010). 
Box 5.2-4
Feed-In Tariffs for Renewable Energies
Feed­in Tariffs (FiT) provide investors with long­term plan­
ning security, thereby overcoming investment barriers. Tech­
nology­specific feed­in tariffs also allow the parallel promo­
tion of different forms of renewable energy, thereby unlock­
ing various options for securing the future energy supply. In 
these respects, feed­in tariffs are preferable to instruments 
such as quotas and tradable permits for renewable energies 
(Neuhoff, 2005; Lesser and Su, 2008). In the past, expan­
sion of renewable energy has tended to be faster in coun­
tries with feed­in tariffs than in countries with quota­based 
promotion (IEA, 2008a). Germany is generally regarded as a 
role model in terms of accelerated expansion of renewable 
energies because of its early introduction of feed­in tariffs 
(Sijm, 2002; Ragwitz et al., 2007; Rickerson et al., 2007; IEA, 
2008a; Fulton et al., 2009).
Feed­in tariffs are usually paid out differentiated accord­
ing to the various energy technologies over a set period of 
approx. 15–25 years, ideally subject to degression over the 
entire term. They therefore afford investors sufficient plan­
ning security and long­term, secure returns on their invest­
ments (Fulton et al., 2009). However, the degression also 
provides an incentive for technological innovations. Learn­
ing effects impact favourably on reduction of the prime costs 
(IEA, 2008a; Klein et al., 2008; Lehmann, 2009; Fulton et 
al., 2009).
To ensure that feed­in tariffs are cost­effective, yet also 
effective in terms of their impact, various aspects must be 
taken into consideration during their design. The rate of tariff, 
or the premiums paid, for example, and the payment periods 
should be set technology­specific. As already noted above, 
the feed­in tariff should be subject to a gradual degression 
over time which takes into account changing market condi­
tions (including prime costs, CO2 price) along the lines of 
the German Renewable Energy Source Act (EEG). However, 
on the basis of the experiences regarding the various mar­
ket dynamics gained there, the degression of feed­in tariffs 
should not be linked to a certain number of years, but rather 
to the cumulative installed capacity of the respective technol­
ogy. This would provide additional cost­reduction incentives, 
making the operating efficiency for renewable energies finan­
cially viable sooner. At the same time, in order to provide 
planning security for investors, the tariffs applicable in the 
year of investment should be guaranteed over a fixed period 
of 10–25 years. Tariffs or premiums should be used as sup­
porting instruments for new capacities only until the tech­
nologies have become competitive. 
At present, feed­in tariffs have been introduced in over 50 
countries and 25 regional states or provinces (REN21, 2010). 
These include many developing and newly industrialising 
countries, such as China, India, South Africa, Thailand, Indo­
nesia, the Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Argentina, 
Ecuador and Nicaragua. Through the use of appropriate tech­
nologies, feed­in tariffs can also be introduced in small, local 
island networks, which is why they are so important, particu­
larly for overcoming energy poverty in developing countries 
(Moner­Girona, 2008). 
The wide­spread use of feed­in tariffs at a global level 
would significantly accelerate renewable energies expansion. 
To support the further diffusion of feed­in tariff systems, 
Germany should start a global political initiative and encour­
age an ongoing exchange of experiences between countries 
with feed­in tariff systems to facilitate system effectiveness 
and efficiency improvement (Section 7.3.4). For the least 
developed countries, funds would have to be made available 
for both the feed­in tariff itself, and for renewable energy 
capacity building. According to estimates, a comprehensive 
funding of renewable energies in developing countries 
(including the BASIC states) through feed­in tariffs could 
require gradually increasing financial transfers of up to 
US$ 250–270 billion per year between 2025 and 2030 (fund­
ing peak). Prior and subsequent requisite transfers would be 
lower, although still in the region of several billion US$ per 
year (DeMartino and Le Blanc, 2010). If nothing else, at least 
the payments during the funding peak far exceed the sums 
currently flowing into these areas in the form of loans. They 
are also far in excess of the annual US$ 100 billion financial 
transfers as of 2020 agreed to by the Annex I countries in the 
Cancún Agreements. By way of comparison: in 2009, global 
annual investments in clean energy technologies were some­
where in the range of around US$162 billion, of which around 
a third was in developing and newly industrialising countries 
(UNEP­SEFI and BNEF, 2010). What a financing mechanism 
for the global diffusion of feed­in tariffs could look like has 
been elaborated in the Deutsche Bank Climate Investment 
Research’s draft concept ‘Get FiT’, for instance (Fulton et al., 
2010). This could form the basis for a political initiative to 
support feed­in tariffs in developing countries. 
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The provision of environmental goods can also be 
managed by governance. Sustainable agricultural or for­
estry production supports the conservation of regional 
and global public environmental goods (for example air 
pollution control, climate, water and soil protection). 
Ecosystems can be economically valued based on their 
various functions: provisioning (production of food and 
feed, biomass, drinking water, genetic resources), regu­
lating (air pollution control, climate, water and soil pro­
tection) and cultural (aesthetic value, recreation and 
tourism, social networks) in order to supply a price sig­
nal. Reward systems in the form of Payments for Envi­
ronmental Services (PES) can accelerate the transfor­
mation towards low­carbon land use. Farmers and for­
est managers are rewarded for providing certain eco­
system services, such as carbon sequestration, water 
cycle regulation, soil formation or primary production, 
in order to create economic incentives for their long­
term provision (Wunder, 2005). The EU agricultural 
subsidies should therefore be reformed and carried over 
to a system of payment for ecosystem services (SRU 
2008). Initiatives based on this principle, in which even 
private beneficiaries pay either directly or voluntarily 
for ecosystem services, are currently evolving all over 
the world. These include hydroelectric power stations, 
for example, which are dependent on the regulation of 
the water cycle in their catchment areas. 
5.2.4 
Conclusion
The majority of the political instruments required to 
shape the transformation are already available. The 
policy mix should comprise carbon pricing in combi­
nation with other political measures to overcome mar­
ket imperfections and transformation barriers in the 
three transformation fields. The policy mix must pro­
mote innovation, guide investment, production and 
consumption decisions, and ensure the supply of public 
goods. Due to the tight timeframe for the transforma­
tion, the various political instruments must be imple­
mented and enforced quickly for the transformation to 
commence simultaneously in all markets and transfor­
mation fields. Market player planning reliability should 
be created by taking long­term objectives into account. 
5.3
Transformation Impediments and Barriers: It’s 
Politics, Stupid!
Although there has been an awareness of Earth system 
crisis tendencies and the finiteness of natural resources 
for over 40 years now, and these problems have been 
discussed at various international conferences (Mead­
ows et al., 1972; UN Conference on the Human Envi­
ronment in Stockholm, 1972; UN Conference on Envi­
Box 5.2-5
‘Nudges’: Green Electricity as Default Option
One example of how ‘nudging’ can be useful in the context 
of the transformation towards a low­carbon society is the 
offer of eco­electricity as the default option, as introduced, 
for example, by the Zurich electricity company Elektrizitäts­
werke der Stadt Zürich (EWZ). In the course of a tariff adjust­
ment in October 2006, the EWZ introduced a combined prod­
uct, consisting of ecologically certified hydroelectric power 
and a small proportion of certified eco­electricity from wind 
or bioenergy as their standard electricity product. This new 
standard product met sustainability criteria to a far higher 
degree than the previous, cheaper standard product. Fur­
thermore, various high quality eco­electicity products (water, 
solar) were offered as well as an ecologically less valuable 
option with electricity from nuclear power, waste incineration 
plants and non­certified hydroelectric power plants. The new 
eco­electricity mix was delivered as a standard. If customers 
wanted to use one of the other products, they had to give 
notice of this in writing. In consequence, around three­quar­
ters of private customers opted for the eco­electricity mix, 
i. e. the standard product following the tariff adjustment, 
and only around 20 % deliberately selected the option with 
nuclear power. A further 3 % of customers deliberately opted 
for an ecologically higher quality electricity product. Once the 
increased eco­electricity demand from business customers is 
added, the total proportion of certified eco­electricity sup­
plied by the EWZ rose from 40 to 60 % (EWZ, 2007). 
On the one hand, these kind of projects are successful due 
to the fact that those purchasing electricity tend to be less 
than willing to change their electricity company or their elec­
tricity products on their own accord. Reasons given are time­
consuming procedures, products that require explanation, 
non­transparent tariff systems and long­term contractual 
relationships (Kosakova, 2005; Burkhalter et al., 2009). On 
the other hand, there are indications that electricity custom­
ers in Switzerland, at least, wanted an ecologically higher 
quality electricity product even before the tariff adjustment, 
and that the new standard product responded to their prefer­
ences, in contrast to the old electricity product from conven­
tional hydroelectric power plants, nuclear power and electric­
ity from waste incineration plants (Burkhalter et al., 2009). 
What is certain is that, if default options are offered, the 
probability that this option will be kept is very high. One rea­
son for this is that it takes less effort to make no decision. 
Moreover, particularly with regard to complex products that 
require explanation, decision­makers tend to feel that certain 
default options already contain elements of a recommenda­
tion representing the best choice for them (Thaler and Sun­
stein, 2008; Dinner et al., 2009).
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ronment and Development, 1992, etc.), and numerous 
measures have been taken to implement a more sustain­
able economic order and lifestyles, these efforts have 
so far yielded only limited success. In the key prob­
lem areas (climate change, loss of biodiversity, deser­
tification), the situation has even become exacerbated 
(Section 1.1). Most recently, the issue of change resist­
ance has become a focus for sustainability and transi­
tion research (Harich, 2010; Kastenhofer and Rammel, 
2005). The fact that the doubtlessly existing transfor­
mation willingness of people in OECD, newly industri­
alising and developing countries (Chapter 2), which has 
increased over the decades, has not automatically been 
translated into sustainability transformation is prima­
rily due to the objection of influential social forces and 
barriers and institutional impediments deterring, frus­
trating and ultimately putting off actors who are will­
ing to change. The WBGU has identified these barriers 
as mainly political, i. e. on the level of political debate, 
interest intermediation and implementation.
5.3.1 
Political Barriers in a Multilevel System
The transformation towards a low­carbon society is a 
global task in which nation states continue to play a 
central role. In democratically structured constitutional 
states, public policies are based on a collective will 
which essentially depends on national association but 
also requires a transnational perspective. International 
law, particularly the Law of Treaties (still) does not have 
the necessary effective regulation and sanction mech­
anisms at its disposal. The scope for determining an 
effective transformation policy must therefore largely 
be sought and sounded out at a national level (Giddens, 
2009; Ostrom, 2009), however, concurrently also at a 
sub­ and supranational level and in non­national and 
para­state transnational networks (for example major 
cities and non­governmental organisations; Leibfried et 
al., 2010). 
On this level of politics, the WBGU has primarily 
identified four factors overshadowing the problem 
horizon of state actors in multilevel systems which 
reduce their problem­solving capacity: the huge time 
pressure that climate change has placed on the tried 
and tested mode of the incremental and dilatory pol­
icy of ‘muddling through’ and procrastination (Sec­
tion 5.3.1.1); existing path dependencies and the veto 
power of high­carbon regime interest cartels (Section 
5.3.1.2); the inadequacy of a cooperatively moderat­
ing government organisation to deal with new prob­
lems (Section 5.3.1.3); and a representation deficit 
(Section 5.3.1.4). The clear strengths of modern state­
hood – gaining time through compromise, integration 
of well­organised interests into the political decision­
making process (neo­corporatism) and a well­meaning 
balancing of these on the part of a moderating state – 
have become weaknesses endangering the future via­
bility of post­industrial societies.
5.3.1.1 
Short-Term Orientation and Politics of Delay
The politics of transformation requires public policies 
that focus on the long term, and which are valid over 
a number of years or even decades, thereby travers­
ing cyclical government changes and political opinion 
swings (Giddens, 2009; Nullmeier and Dietz, 2010). 
By contrast, politics in democracies naturally focus on 
short parliamentary terms and the current constraints 
of staying in power (Weber, 1992; Downs, 1968). More 
or less the same applies to economic elites, particularly 
under the conditions of the financial market economy 
(Windolf, 2005). They also neglect longer­term devel­
opments, instead focusing on quarterly balance sheets, 
annual financial statements or stock­market quo­
tations. This sometimes extremely short­term focus 
favours concentration on fast impact measures which 
are easily communicated in the mass media; it has, 
however, an adverse effect on issues where both short­ 
and long­term effects have to be taken into account 
(Sprinz, 2009; Hovi et al., 2009). To date, our societies’ 
social, economic and political institutions are not capa­
ble of responding to these challenges. Solutions need to 
be found which enhance the capacity for long term pol­
icy­making and establish institutional continuity.
The ’short­termism’ (Giddens) of political attention 
is coupled with dilatory (delaying) methods of handling 
dissent and finding compromises in political negotiation 
arenas: difficult to solve problems tend to be shelved. 
This applies without a doubt to the big reform agendas 
of western democracies, such as demographic change, 
exploding healthcare costs, or mass unemployment and 
national debt. Adressing climate change also falls into 
this category. Many of the harmful effects of global 
warming will impact fully only at some point in time in 
the future; the policy­making system therefore favours 
delays in tackling dangerous situations such as these. 
Contemporary politics like this are not objection­
able per se. Gaining time is often necessary in order 
to maintain stability, and the struggle to do so is an 
appropriate reaction to the contingencies and risks of 
modern societies (Günther, 2006). However, the com­
bined ecological and fiscal crisis increasingly calls the 
positive effects of a policy functioning on the princi­
ple of ‘muddling through’ into question. Responding to 
uncertainty and mitigating conflicts with procrastina­
tion reaches its limits when risks (believed to be far off) 
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revert into (present and close) fundamental dangers. 
This new situation’s difficult consequence is, on the one 
hand, ‘deceleration’ whilst the political process shakes 
off its media­driven shortness of breath, and, on the 
other hand, ‘acceleration’, as the clear requirement that 
certain climate stabilisation or land­use change targets 
set at intervals of five, ten or twenty years must not 
be missed results in the need to draw up more realis­
tic schedules for current decision­making. Impediments 
are the braking influence of veto groups and an ineffec­
tive administrative structure.
5.3.1.2 
Opposing Forces and Resistance: Lobby and 
Interest Groups
In addition to the institutional factors determining the 
chances of political change, interest and ideology­based 
differences play a central role. The transformation 
towards a low­carbon society is only achievable if social 
and political majorities are in favour of it. It is the only 
way to initiate and develop the changes that are the 
basis for the transformation on a legislative level and in 
civil society. It requires an extremely broad cross­party 
coalition far beyond a simple majority. Not surprisingly, 
the most obstructive groups impeding the transforma­
tion process are those which will experience material or 
status losses as a result of the intended change (Sec­
tion 2.4.1). The positive impact of interest group activ­
ities in liberal democracies is undisputed; without the 
contribution of these intermediary agents in negotia­
tions between specific core constituencies and the gov­
ernment, the specialist knowledge required for legis­
lative and administrative actions in complex societies 
would hardly be available. Furthermore, society tends 
to respond better to the communication of government 
measures through interest groups, which not least also 
relieves governments of yet another task (von Ale­
mann, 1989).
Unfortunately, however, neo­corporatist power 
constellations dating from the zenith of industriali­
sation still enjoy a particularly high level of consoli­
dated power and informal political influence. Associa­
tions from the economic sector have far greater con­
flict handling capacities than associations in socio­eco­
logical cross­sectional areas representing general and 
public interests. There is also a lack of transparency in 
the interaction of ministerial or local bureaucracy and 
certain interest groups, some of which seem to have 
evolved into downright ‘private interest governments’ 
(Streeck and Schmitter, 1985), leading to lobbyists 
excessively influencing legislation (Maras, 2009). At 
the same time, an increasing reluctance on the part of 
both employers and employees to join in these capi­
tal and employment interest groups can be observed in 
most OECD countries. In his ‘Post­Democracy’ analysis, 
Crouch identified the growing direct political influence 
of corporations as the ‘driving force’ of the democracy 
crises in Europe and the USA (Crouch, 2004). Accord­
ing to Crouch, one characteristic of the state of post­
democracy is that politics increasingly function on the 
liberal model basis of lobby work and interest repre­
sentation. From a democracy theory perspective, this 
development is problematic as the resources individu­
als can draw on to defend their interests differ widely. 
Firstly, lobby groups can effectively threaten with the 
fact that one sector currently assigned a high level of 
’system relevance’ is going to make losses, and will 
potentially migrate. As long as economic success is one 
of the most important parameters in the evaluation of 
a government’s political performance, this argument is 
extremely effective with politicians (Crouch, 2004). 
Secondly, business representatives can spend huge 
sums of money on their lobbying work. 
In the problem areas of sustainable development 
analysed by the WBGU, the influence of lobbyists rep­
resenting oil and coal manufacturers or energy­inten­
sive industries and the automotive industry is currently 
significantly greater than that of civil society organi­
sations or the ‘green industry’ (Streeck, 1994; Brun­
nengräber, 2009). A prime example for this was the 
’scrappage premium’ introduced in Germany and other 
countries (2008), where the interests of the automo­
tive industry – usually an alliance of both employer and 
labour organisations – were easier to express and more 
forceful than more ‘general’ environmental interests, 
which would have favoured linking the premium with 
environmental requirements.
Transformation objectors and lobbies opposed to 
decarbonisation strategies on the grounds of short­ 
and medium­term interests can be found in various dif­
ferent industries and other areas of society. An immi­
nent renunciation of fossil energy carriers, for exam­
ple, means huge reductions in profit for the oil, gas and 
coal industries, and for energy suppliers with a large 
portfolio of coal­powered power stations. Accordingly, 
oil industry lobby groups in the USA and Europe have 
campaigned particularly intensively and persistently 
against any political handling of the climate problem 
in the past – even to the extent of challenging the sci­
entific proofs for anthropogenic global warming with 
‘counter assessment’ campaigns (Brunnengräber, 2009; 
Levy and Egan, 2003). Without international climate 
protection regulations, energy­intensive industry and 
production sectors (for example the cement, steel, glass, 
and paper industries) fear competitive disadvantages 
on the world market (Box 5.2­3). Automotive industry 
representatives, particularly the manufactures of large 
cars with high fuel consumption, have also repeatedly 
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influenced political decision­makers in the past, for 
example with respect to changing the CO2 guide values 
for car emissions in their favour (Brunnengräber, 2009). 
Certain political formations (for instance some elements 
of the Republican Party in the USA) also reject climate 
protection measures for ideological reasons (as indeed 
they fundamentally object to any kind of intervention 
in the economy). Not least, the growing ‘global con­
sumer class’ (Worldwatch Institute, 2004; Bread for 
the World et al., 2008) also features groups of people 
who object to change because a climate­friendly life­
style means deprivation, or is perceived as such (Urry, 
2010; Ulvila and Pasanen, 2009). Socially disadvan­
taged groups could also become potential opponents of 
the transformation as a result of price increases. 
Functional regulations and institutions are structural 
preconditions for implementing a transformation pol­
icy. In this respect, from a global perspective, corrup­
tion – i. e. the abuse of entrusted power for private gain 
(Transparency International, 2005) – is a serious barrier 
and represents a further, illegitimate scope of influence 
for lobby groups or veto players (von Alemann, 2005). 
Corruption is particularly prevalent in the areas iden­
tified as central transformation fields by the WBGU: 
the construction sector (urban planning), the energy 
sector, and land use (here particularly in forestry and 
agriculture; Transparency International, 2005, 2008, 
2011; Kenny, 2007). In these sectors, corruption is not 
merely a temporary phenomenon during a transitional 
period of modernising societies, and therefore particu­
larly virulent in weak states or developing and newly 
industrialising countries (Giannakopoulus and Tänzler, 
2009). Corruptive interrelations in society, economy 
and politics are also present in the democratic systems 
of OECD countries, as ‘corruption in affluent countries 
frequently takes forms that are as equally ‘advanced’ as 
the countries themselves’ (Piepenbrink, 2009).
Even more important than the subjective attitudes 
and preferences of the economic elite, which can be, 
and are currently already being, corrected with a view 
to the advantages of a ‘green development path’, are 
political and economic routines and path dependencies. 
Past developed and established procedures and prob­
lem solving paths are blindly followed, even if they no 
longer adequately address the problem, and problem 
case contexts have changed. The reason for this persist­
ence on the part of actors and the institutional conserv­
atism lies in the assumption that a path change is associ­
ated with uncertain and potentially expensive risks. It is 
difficult to estimate the impacts of a path change (Pier­
son, 2000; Lehmbruch, 2002, 2003). Administrations 
in political bureaucracies and commercial corporations 
spontaneously rely on the familiar, and on the benefit 
expectations of the old path; on the other hand, the dis­
appointment of such expectations, a greater willingness 
to take risks, and ‘creative destruction’ (Joseph Schum­
peter) are everyday aspects of corporate decisions and 
generational change. Contrary to the convenient pre­
conception, administrations are institutions continu­
ously undergoing a learning process. Yet the rigidity of 
administrative routines is fostered through inadequate 
problem perceptions and departmental architectures.
5.3.1.3 
Institutional Fragmentation and Lack of Coherence 
and Coordination
According to a widely­followed theory by Tsebelis 
(2002), the feasibility of reshaping a policy area gen­
erally depends on policy stability. Political innova­
tions are therefore condemned to failure if objected to 
by actors whose approval is essential either under the 
constitution or in real political terms. The more collec­
tive or independent veto players emerge, and the more 
uniformly and competitively they act, the less likely a 
status quo change. So political systems differ according 
to how many veto players they feature. Horizontal and 
vertical policy integration and fragmentation into dif­
ferent levels, such as federal state and individual states 
(Länder), in the case of Germany, or nation states and 
the EU therefore also result in self­imposed horizontal 
and vertical barriers in the state system. 
The problem of institutional fragmentation is exac­
erbated by a lack of coherence and coordination 
(Scharpf, 1993; Mayntz, 1997; Blanke et al., 2002). An 
effective transformation strategy needs a new, coher­
ent, integrated policy. Applying an understandable yet 
factually problematic kind of conflict prevention and 
resolution strategy, however, modern policy­making 
tends to adhere to the maxim of ‘good for everybody 
and harming nobody’. As everyone’s interests are more 
or less served, this results in, for example in Germany, 
the extensive promotion of renewable energy expan­
sion whilst continuing financial support for fossil and 
conventional energy carriers. This impedes the expan­
sion of renewable energies and dilutes the political goal 
of a true energy system transformation. 
A further barrier arises from the poor coordination 
of individual departmental policies. Obviously, trans­
formation policy cannot be the remit of a single depart­
ment, but must be systematically taken into account in 
all governance branches (Giddens, 2009). Admittedly, 
there are now a number of government agencies tasked 
with climate protection and decarbonisation, but there 
is a lack of effective coordination and no appropriately 
strong anchoring in the state apparatus.
Nowadays, climate protection, biodiversity conser­
vation and sustainable urban planning are addressed 
and taken into consideration by government agencies 
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far more than they were in the early stages of envi­
ronmental policy­making. However, what remains 
unchanged is the institutional marginal nature of these 
departments in comparison to policy areas dedicated 
to the historic core problems of industrial and welfare 
societies which, accordingly, occupy the key depart­
ments, claiming respective reputations and the corre­
sponding budget shares. Central in most OECD states 
and many newly industrialising countries are the finan­
cial, infrastructure and social departments that deal 
with the development of the industrial infrastructures 
of ‘labour societies’ and handle any associated social 
problems (such as mass unemployment, demographic 
change, etc.) by means of distribution and compensa­
tion measures. In comparison with these, environmen­
tal policy is generally positioned to take into account 
externalised damages in industrial processes and serv­
ices either subsequently or preventively, and attempts 
to keep them within limits. In the WBGU’s view, the 
current departmental architecture prevents climate 
protection, nature conservation and urban planning 
from reaching the status they should have, not least 
with respect to shaping a post­fossil future and estab­
lishing a sustainable economy. 
5.3.1.4 
Representation Deficit and Lack of Acceptance
A perceived participation deficit on the part of the cit­
izens – irrespective of whether this is actually the case, 
in legal terms – can be another significant barrier to 
transformation implementation and result in a lack of 
acceptance. A growing representation deficit is becom­
ing apparent in political systems that are incapable of 
identifying, consolidating and programmatically imple­
menting the environmental and climate policy related 
demands and expectations of an increasing number of 
the electorate. At the same time, the population’s will­
ingness to take grassroots action, and to become active 
predominantly outside of the parliamentary system, 
is increasing. A general mood in favour of sustainable 
environmental and climate policy – as documented for 
example by World Values Survey (2010) data (Chap­
ter 2) – therefore often stays locked in the ‘pre­polit­
ical’ domain. What is therefore lacking is appropriate 
consolidation and representation on a parliamentary 
level, and other options for productively realising citi­
zen commitment (Section 5.4).
Participation (as an ‘input legitimisation’ tool) is 
generally viewed as the normative foundation, and 
a precondition in practical terms, of democratic com­
munities, which in turn are tasked with providing the 
structural requirements. In this interplay, the quality 
of democratic politics is highly dependent on whether 
citizens have the opportunity to make themselves 
heard, whether they feel taken seriously or patronised, 
whether they feel mistrust in their activity or can trust 
their representatives. Social capital and political action 
in the life­world environment, and legal institutional 
guarantees of civic autonomy are closely linked. They 
have to be well­balanced in order to avoid a tight, legal­
istic interpretation of the status of citizen and its dis­
tention into activism (Seubert, 2009).
Overall, in view of the ecological problems, an out­
dated administrative culture is predominant in most 
states, which integrates too little, is not sufficiently 
open and transparent, and is lacking in innovative abil­
ity and permanence, instead relying on ad­hoc solu­
tions and isolated or extremely formalised negotiation 
arrangements (Jann, 1983). In contemporary policy­
making, a short­term orientation and playing for time 
predominate where quick and long­term decisions are 
needed. The primacy of structurally conservative inter­
ests remains in place even though a forward­look­
ing and pro­active policy would be what is needed to 
secure the life­support systems and living conditions of 
future generations. A political administrative structure 
is required which operates in the ‘future II’ tense – ask­
ing today what politics, the economy and civil society 
should have done in 2011 to achieve goals in 2020 or 
2050 that a consensus can fundamentally be reached 
on. Vested interests systematically dominate the inter­
ests of what is understood to be the global common 
good. This tendency, consistent in the history of mod­
ern states despite repeated periodical interruptions, is 
now growing even stronger in the face of ‘natural dan­
gers’ such as climate change and biodiversity loss.
5.3.2 
Dare more Democracy! 
The world’s nations are at different development stages, 
and have different politico­institutional and socio­eco­
nomic action capabilities for coping with the transfor­
mation. In the WBGU’s view, the democratic consti­
tutional state forms the reference frame for transfor­
mation assessment. The Great Transformation goes far 
beyond greenhouse gas reduction, it is about establish­
ing legitimate, fair, creative and durable problem solu­
tions. The democratic process provides exactly those 
institutions that are needed for a sustainable transfor­
mation. 
As this is frequently disputed in the current debate, 
and autocratic regimes are sometimes considered more 
suitable, for example in terms of developing and imple­
menting large­scale energy efficiency and infrastruc­
ture programmes, a brief reminder is required of the 
structural elements and advantages of democratic gov­
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ernance and life­worlds: democracy’s core element is 
the congruence between rulers and ruled – or, as Abra­
ham Lincoln so famously said, democracy is ‘govern­
ment of the people, by the people, for the people’. Its 
most important achievement is therefore the legiti­
mation requirement for all acts of governance, which 
in democratic systems is guaranteed by the political 
equality of all (inclusion). For 2500 years, democra­
cies have put their trust in the (political) ‘wisdom of 
crowds’. That is why they function according to differ­
ent variants of the majority rule, which must, however, 
not be construed as a ‘tyranny of the majority’, but 
must rather effectively and fairly allow minorities to 
have a say, to be involved, and to be protected. Moreo­
ver, democratic political systems are embedded in legal 
orders and the rule of law; fundamental constitutional 
standards are explicitly eliminated from revision by 
majority decision. 
Effective decision­making advantages such as the 
reversibility of decisions and effective stakeholder par­
ticipation on the part of the citizens, instigated through 
direct and indirect involvement in the decision­mak­
ing process and public multi­level communication, go 
hand in hand with these principles. Improved consoli­
dation of preferences and interests, best­possible use of 
widespread knowledge, and the highest level of ‘input 
legitimation’ of any political system therefore reflect 
the rationality and comparative advantage of democ­
racies. What this effectively means is that citizens do 
not merely receive services from an authoritarian state, 
but make a sovereign contribution to their composi­
tion and direction. In this respect, modern democracies 
respond to the general decoupling of modern societies 
from hierarchies and the proven ethical impact of pub­
lic discussion and deliberation; both ensure that each 
individual develops a relatively strong awareness for 
the (notional) common good whilst also enjoying the 
chance to pursue and assert their own individual inter­
ests.
It is obvious that no democratic system has ever 
achieved this ideal, and the theory of a ‘post­demo­
cratic’ development of liberal systems with a long dem­
ocratic tradition is widely discussed in socio­scientific 
literature (Crouch, 2004; Jörke, 2010). Essentially, 
there are three problematic factors: (1) the growing 
social inequality in many developed societies, impact­
ing negatively on participation opportunities and will­
ingness; (2) the discouragement of civic activity caused 
by global economic imperatives undermining the civil 
culture of cooperation, responsibility and solidarity by 
providing incentives for individual competition; and (3) 
the empirical linking of welfare state systems with the 
paradigm of an economic growth that erodes the natu­
ral foundations of democratic societies through dispro­
portionate consumption of resources (Section 2.3; Box 
5.2­1). Despite such by all means serious crises ten­
dencies, the general democratisation trend outlined in 
Section 1.2.2 continues worldwide beyond the western 
core countries. Democracy could, then, be considered 
as a system model for political order which has become 
globally established; it would therefore have to prove 
its effectiveness with a view to the forthcoming Great 
Transformation.
Democratic Performance
At present, democracy has certainly not yet proven 
its future viability (Box 5.3­1). Time pressure and the 
complexity of the transformation inevitably lead to the 
question of the performance and suitability of dem­
ocratic systems. The quality and the performance of 
democracies are usually measured by their input, i. e. 
by effective citizen participation and the willingness of 
policy­makers to respond to citizens’ interests and aspi­
rations, and by their output, i. e. their political effec­
tiveness in the form of effective and efficient action 
by the executive powers (Brusis, 2008). The measures 
required by a transformative policy place the usual 
form of democratic governance under pressure, both 
in terms of time and space. Democratic processes gen­
erally need time, as they take many different inter­
ests into account. Moreover, they usually focus on the 
short­term achievement of political objectives, making 
the handling and resolution of long­term problems dif­
ficult (Section 5.3.1.1). Slowness is, however, not an 
inherent property of democratic systems and institu­
tions. As demonstrated by the handling of the finan­
cial and economic crisis in the autumn of 2008, democ­
racies are certainly able to react quickly to financial 
and economic crisis situations and to make far­reach­
ing reform decisions. Under the pressure of financial 
and economic crisis, multi­billion bank bailout and eco­
nomic stimulus packages were adopted within a very 
short time (Meyer­Ohlendorf et al., 2009). In summary 
proceedings, the passing of the German financial mar­
ket stabilisation act (FMStG) and the establishment of 
a € 480 billion fund were decided by the Bundestag 
and the Bundesrat, i. e. the German parliament, and 
signed off by the German Federal President within a 
week (BMF, 2008). If the requisite legislative coalitions 
are in place, democratic systems also allow far­reach­
ing reform decisions to be made within a very short 
period of time. 
However, as far as a transformation policy is con­
cerned, there is no sign of any such blanket coalitions 
and rapid decision­making processes, despite aware­
ness of the grave consequences of global warming. This 
fuels the democracy scepticism mentioned earlier, and 
a belief in the allegedly greater efficiency of autocratic 
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or expertocratic systems (Shearman and Smith, 2007; 
Friedman, 2009; Pötter, 2010; Siller, 2010): the non­
consideration of lengthy parliamentary procedures 
and individual rights can considerably accelerate gov­
ernment action, so the critics say. Extraordinary legal 
authorities, such as emergency laws to overcome exis­
tential crises, are therefore common even in democ­
racies (Nullmeier and Dietz, 2010). They represent a 
regulated and temporary extension of the executive 
authority. In its initial phase in the 1930s, the ‘New 
Deal’ policy under US President Roosevelt also used the 
unparalleled extension of federal government authority 
over that of the individual states and in new areas of 
policies in order to expand the government’s capacity 
for action (Adams, 2008). The use of emergency law or 
other dirigiste measures for accelerated redirection can, 
however, hardly claim democratic legitimisation. The 
acceptance and implementation of the planetary guard 
rails for maintaining the natural life­support systems 
in a politico­economic system can therefore not pro­
ceed on the strength of authoritarian regulatory pol­
icy, but must in the long term be based on broad pub­
lic approval (Section 5.4.1.2). In the contrary, a policy 
which does not appear to have been legitimised by the 
public can seriously damage said transformative poli­
cy’s prospects of success (Nullmeier and Dietz, 2010; 
Leggewie, 2010). 
In addition, there is no empirical proof for the prob­
lem­solving capabilities of authoritarian systems or 
processes in the context of the necessary transforma­
tion (Box 5.3­1). The Great Transformation can suc­
ceed only if the systems produce innovative solutions 
and involve as many actors as possible from all areas 
of society. It is dependent on active, interested and 
responsible citizens. Only an open, democratic society 
is able to develop the kind of creativity and innova­
tion demanded by the transformation. The question is 
therefore not whether, but rather how the transforma­
tion is to be carried out democratically. The main prob­
lems are the time pressure, and the Great Transforma­
tion’s transnational nature. As democratic processes 
are inevitably time­consuming, the political redirection 
must commence immediately.
There is no lack of political programmes and poli­
cies with regard to the transformation into a sustain­
able society; the problems lie in the political process 
with its political competitiveness and power struggles. 
Transition­impeding barriers such as these must now 
Box 5.3-1
Environmental Performance of Democratic and 
Autocratic Regimes
In view of the present ecological crises and more far­reaching 
disaster scenarios, the ecological problem solving capacity of 
democracies is under review. Autocratic regimes are, some­
times openly, sometimes covertly, credited with a greater 
capacity for limiting environmental and climate change and 
overcoming its consequences (Meadows et al., 1972). It was 
long assumed that the structuring of political institutions and 
policy processes played a minor role in solving environmental 
problems – or rather, this aspect was considered less impor­
tant than economic factors or (im Original falsch) technology, 
population growth, geographical location, etc. Since 1989/90, 
researchers have increasingly focused on the environmental 
performance and ecological problem solving capacity of both 
democratic and autocratic regimes. 
To date, the various studies have yielded no clear result. 
Payne (1995) states that a democratic regime type has a 
positive impact on the condition of the environment, as 
democracies usually showed a higher level of responsiveness 
to environmental concerns, their citizens had unrestricted 
access to information about environmental problems, and 
democratic systems generally demonstrated greater capaci­
ties to adapt. Other studies (such as Gleditsch and Sverdrup, 
2002; Li and Reuveny, 2006) have also empirically proven 
a positive relation between democracy and environmental 
performance, and have shown that – relative to the level of 
economic development –democracies have a lower CO2 out­
put than autocratic regimes. Zahran et al. (2007) and Bättig 
and Bernauer (2009) have furthermore shown that democ­
racies are more willing to embrace international cooperation 
on matters of environmental and climate protection. In the 
Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI), which measures 
the climate protection performance of countries, the ten 
top positions in 2009 and 2010 were also held exclusively 
by democracies (Germanwatch and Climate Action Network 
Europe, 2008, 2009).
Midlarsky (1998), on the other hand, argued that a demo­
cratic governmental system has a negative impact on the 
ecological problem solving capacity of a society, as it is more 
difficult in democracies – which strive more for consensus 
and compromise – to overcome self­serving interest groups 
that block effective environmental protection. Essentially, the 
proponents of environmental interests have to battle against 
dominating, purely profit­orientated lobby groups. Based on 
a random sample of 98 countries in relation to three indica­
tors for measuring environmental performance (including CO2 
output and deforestation), Midlarsky (1998) has empirically 
proven a significantly negative relationship between democ­
racy and environmental protection.
Although the results of the research with respect to a 
positive effect of democracy on ecological performance 
remain ambiguous, it should nevertheless be noted that to 
date, there is no evidence whatsoever for the assumption that 
the environmental performance of autocracies is better than 
that of democracies (Saretzki, 2007). Above all, there are so 
far no empirically well­founded arguments for seeking politi­
cal systems outside the realm of democracy promising a bet­
ter environmental performance. 
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be overcome in national systems and at a global level; 
political processes must be accelerated and take a long­
term perspective whilst also increasing the legitimisa­
tion basis for these decisions (Leggewie, 2010). Not 
least, the Great Transformation is therefore a test of the 
future viability of democratic systems (Leggewie and 
Welzer, 2009).
5.3.3 
The Transformation in Newly Industrialising 
Countries – Affluence and Political Trends in 
China, Brazil and India
Analysis of the institutional and political requirements 
for the transformation towards a low­carbon society 
highlights the high demands this process places on soci­
eties. Considerations to date have concentrated prima­
rily on transformation potentials and barriers in west­
ern industrialised societies and democracies. For the 
global transformation to succeed, however, particularly 
the newly industrialising countries must become actors 
in the low­carbon transition. A detailed policy analysis 
of the transformation dynamics in newly industrialising 
countries cannot be carried out here, but the respec­
tive developments in China, Brazil and India are briefly 
outlined to illustrate the very different basic patterns 
of socio­economic change in typical newly industrialis­
ing countries. If Germany and Europe intend to nudge 
newly industrialising countries towards the transforma­
tion, or hope to build on any already existing reform 
tendencies, they must take into account these coun­
tries’ very different starting positions and framework 
conditions (Section 5.3.3).
5.3.3.1 
China
Economic growth and energy demand in China con­
tinue to rise strongly despite the worldwide economic 
crisis of recent years. At present, a good 70 % of the 
energy supply is covered by coal­powered power sta­
tions. Due to the rapidly increasing energy demand, 
the government is also investing heavily in the expan­
sion of nuclear energy and renewable energies. The 
country’s institutional efficiency is high for a country 
with an authoritarian government, and has constantly 
improved in the growth regions on the east coast of the 
country. They are roughly comparable with the govern­
ance capacities of South Korea or Taiwan in the 1980s, 
and therefore in clear contrast to the institutional scle­
rosis currently apparent in the North African autocra­
cies.
High investment dynamics and the investment struc­
ture show that national and international investors are 
willing to realise long­term projects in China (Winters 
and Shahid, 2007; Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008). This 
willingness would probably continue even if the future 
course were set in the direction of decarbonisation. Ini­
tially, the government’s own interests and its political 
will to make ‘green reforms’ are crucial for the trans­
formation’s chances of success. It must be noted here 
that there are strong interest groups corresponding to 
the sheer size of the fossil­based energy industry – just 
like in many OECD countries – lobbying for the con­
tinuation of the established development path. There 
are also many reasons that speak for China becoming 
a low­carbon development driver: certain elements of 
the Chinese government and economy, for instance, 
believe that China has a much better chance of making 
the technological change towards climate­compatibility 
and sustainability, and to make it faster, than western 
industrialised countries. It could therefore unlock asso­
ciated competitive advantages for itself. The serious 
consequences China might suffer from climate change 
are now systematically considered in discussions on 
the country’s future development strategies. Foreign 
policy thoughtleaders at Chinese universities and in 
its ministries consider the potential pioneering role of 
China in the area of ‘green development’ a central ele­
ment for enhancing the emerging superpower’s repu­
tation abroad, as it currently still enjoys only limited 
international approval on the grounds of its democracy 
and human rights deficiencies (Gu et al., 2008; Wang, 
2009). The linking of these discourses could lead to the 
development of a transformation momentum which the 
Chinese government’s 12th Five­Year Plan, published in 
early 2011, appears to promise (Chinese Government, 
2011).
Whether such a transformation could meet with the 
support of China’s civil society, or even be advanced by 
it, is difficult to assess. Classic environmental issues (for 
example air and water pollution) and concern regarding 
food safety (contamination from chemical fertilisers, 
contaminated drinking water) play an important role in 
public debate and the media. At the same time, social 
advancement is at the very top of the personal agenda 
for many Chinese people, so a ‘green transforma­
tion’ could be perceived as slowing economic progress 
(Heberer and Senz, 2007). Nevertheless, there is no 
reliable data that could provide reputable information 
on the actual views of the Chinese population. Indeed, 
the fragile acceptance and legitimisation of the Chinese 
government is the Achilles’ heel of Chinese develop­
ment: the fact that the Chinese government suppressed 
any news in the media on the democratic movements 
in North Africa in early 2011 and the seriousness of 
the nuclear accident in Fukushima proves its incapabil­
ity of holding public discussions on the future in ’sen­
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sitive areas’.
It is difficult to say how long China’s dynamic eco­
nomic development will function without radical politi­
cal reforms. Since the Industrial Revolution, there have 
been no relevant historic examples of autocracies that 
have enjoyed sustained economic success. As of a cer­
tain development level, considered by many authors to 
be reached at an average income of 5,000 US $ per cap­
ita, modernising autocracies must either liberalise polit­
ically in order to continue to be economically successful 
(as Taiwan, South Korea, Chile and a few other former 
socialist countries did in the 1990s), or fall into stag­
nation traps in the medium term (as is the case in the 
former Soviet Union, Russia, Egypt, Tunisia; Sen, 1999; 
Faust, 2006; Reinert, 2007). The Chinese government 
is presently already experiencing problems with imple­
menting central state decisions in the regions and local 
communities (Heberer and Senz, 2007).
The Chinese government is therefore facing the chal­
lenge of combining the continued fight against poverty 
and increasing economic welfare with a transforma­
tion to sustainability and a gradual political opening. 
Indicative of progress towards climate­compatibility 
is the fact that these challenges have been recoded in 
Chinese discussions in recent years, from an environ­
mental to an economic and innovation issue (CCICED, 
2009). Herein lies the relevant starting point for climate 
partnerships with this huge Asian country.
5.3.3.2 
Brazil
In Brazil, the current situation is completely different. 
Political legitimisation and government acceptance by 
the population have risen constantly in the last two 
decades. The comprehensive modernisation of public 
institutions, advances in democratisation, and socio­
economic improvements impacting even the weak­
est social stratas have all contributed to this (Schirm, 
2007). Brazil can also already meet around 40 % of its 
energy needs from renewable sources, primarily hydro­
power. Moreover, with political support, the Brazilian 
economy has established a high­performance etha­
nol economy. The initial situation would therefore be 
favourable for developing Brazil into a pioneering low­
carbon economy. On the one hand, the natural geo­
graphical conditions for the use of renewable energies 
are very good; on the other, the international commu­
nity shows significant willingness to support Brazil in 
protecting the Amazon rainforest: 70 % of the country’s 
greenhouse gas emissions can be attributed to defor­
estation.
However, Brazilian policy­makers, its economy, and 
its society are currently still guided predominantly by 
the industrial era’s established modernisation para­
digms. The discourse on climate­compatibility is less 
pronounced than in China (Stuenkel, 2010). In addi­
tion to this, there are large oil deposits off Brazil’s 
coastal areas, triggering economic desires and hopes of 
increasing Brazil’s role in the global economy. Brazil is 
therefore a ‘potential low­carbon economy: on the one 
hand, it has excellent natural geographical conditions 
and enjoys favourable political conditions for a post­
fossil transition (democracy, institutional capacities, 
high government legitimisation); on the other hand, its 
social transition does so far not seem to have promoted 
such a transformation. The most important driver of a 
development like this would therefore probably be a 
change towards sustainability in the important centres 
of the global economy, for example Europe and China. 
This would create incentives to see the green transfor­
mation as an economic opportunity, thereby generat­
ing signals which to date seem to lack majority appeal 
in Brazilian society.
5.3.3.3 
India
Until a few years ago, the Indian government essen­
tially argued that the low­carbon restructuring of the 
economy was a challenge and an obligation to be met 
by the OECD countries, rather than by developing 
countries. This discourse has ultimately changed. Just 
recently, the government announced energy efficiency 
programmes and placed the issue of controlling emis­
sion increases on the political agenda (ADB, 2009). At 
1,180 US $, the average Indian income (net domes­
tic product per capita) in 2009 was significantly lower 
than the average income in Brazil, at 8,040 US $, and 
in China, at 3,650 US $; the central issue of political 
debate in India in the foreseeable future is and remains 
increasing economic performance and reducing the still 
high level of poverty (World Bank, 2011a). It is there­
fore unlikely that India will provide any strong impulses 
for a low­carbon transformation of the global economy. 
However, if relevant national economies can demon­
strate that low­carbon development pathways, compet­
itiveness and poverty reduction can be combined, the 
conditions for learning from their experience would be 
particularly favourable in India. Despite the high eco­
nomic growth of the past two decades, India’s per cap­
ita CO2 emissions from fossil sources were only 1,3 t in 
2007 (China 5,1 t; Brazil 2,0 t; WRI­CAIT, 2011). The 
fossil path dependencies impeding the transformation 
in the OECD countries and in China are therefore sig­
nificantly lower. In contrast to China, India still has a 
chance of steering its modernisation process without 
taking the ‘fossil detour’, and to rely on a low­carbon 
development path early on in the process.
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5.3.4 
Supranational Expansion and Further 
 Globalisation
In addition to the limited timeframe normally applica­
ble in democratic governance, the problem also lies in 
the transgression of global boundaries and the democ­
racy deficiencies of supra­, trans­ and international 
regulation. Governments make their decisions with a 
view to the interests and expectations of their local, 
national clientele and electorate. And this considera­
tion of their immediate interests again disregards the 
consequences which decisions made today have for 
future generations. Democracy again runs into struc­
tural deficiencies in this respect. For some time now, 
these ‘limits of majority democracy’ (Offe and Gug­
genberger, 1984) have been subject to discussion, as, 
in good conscience, majorities must not be allowed to 
make far­reaching and irreversible decisions which not 
only potentially deprive future generations of the free­
dom to act, but also have a huge impact on populations 
beyond their borders. In terms of both space and time, 
the gulf between those with decision­making authority 
and those affected by those decisions (or authors and 
recipients of legislation and jurisdiction) has grown, 
which is untenable in democratic politics. 
This is particularly true for policy areas concerning 
climate protection and other Earth system boundaries, 
as democratic participation also determines the chances 
for survival (Möllers, 2010). A high­carbon lifestyle in 
western industrial societies threatens the interests of 
people whose very existence is threatened by the con­
sequences of climate change. To date, most of these 
live in developing and newly industrialising countries. 
The transformation can therefore succeed only if lib­
eral societies impose self­restrictions, as elaborated in 
Section 2.5, and show a greater awareness of the geo­
graphical effects and temporal consequences of their 
decisions than they have done so far. Any policy that 
seeks to manage the global agendas merely at nation 
state level is therefore an anachronism. Because it is not 
only financial markets and transnational corporations 
that are globalised; many environmental problems are 
also of a planetary scale. 
As there is no world government (or even a world 
state), global politics must promote supra­ and tran­
snational approaches offering regional formats for risk 
identification and problem solving below this level. 
In this respect, the EU is exemplary: as a sui generis 
polity somewhere between a union of states and a 
 federal state with 27 member states (Landfried, 2002; 
Jachtenfuchs and Kohler­Koch, 2003; Lepsius, 2000). 
As described in Section 3.5.6, it is an example for, and 
the result of, a transformation. As a supranational asso­
ciation of states, it offers its member states – and also 
effectively included non­member states such as Swit­
zerland, neighbours such as Norway, and candidate 
countries such as Croatia and Turkey – the chance of 
transnational problem solving with regard to energy, 
environmental and climate policy, both through the 
application of supranational law in ‘communitised’ pol­
icy areas and through intergovernmental cooperation 
on common issues. Interestingly, the classic policy areas 
of social security are less ‘communitised’ than struc­
tural policies such as agricultural and environmental 
policy, they are therefore largely a matter for the mem­
ber states. Thus, the EU represents a historically unique 
removal of a national sovereignty which has become 
anachronistic by means of a supranational horizontal 
and vertical policy integration, and through its conver­
gence into a transnational European society whilst still 
preserving each country’s local characteristics and tra­
ditions. Both tendencies are counteracted by the dys­
functional consequences of horizontal and vertical pol­
icy integration (Scharpf, 1985), and tendencies towards 
(symbolic and actual) renationalisation.
Impediments for a Common European Energy Policy
The EU is potentially going to play an important role 
in the Great Transformation, as the expansion of the 
energy infrastructure to link new power sources in 
northern and southern Europe with energy storage 
facilities and (primary) consumption centres, for exam­
ple, requires an EU­wide process for cost­effective and 
efficient implementation (EU COM, 2010e). Apart from 
the barriers already described (Section 5.3.1), the insti­
tutional framework and the relationship between the 
EU and its members states represent further impedi­
ments preventing the EU from embracing its trans­
formative tasks. Regulations and directives, fundamen­
tally available to the EU, are the appropriate tools for 
initiating transformative measures in its member states 
to serve a common, EU­wide goal. From the perspec­
tive of the member states, a directive is the more mod­
erate method, as it only specifies a binding goal. The 
means needed to achieve this goal, including the struc­
turing of the administrative process, are up to the mem­
ber states themselves. By contrast, a regulation and all 
of its provisions apply directly in the member states 
(art. 288 TFEU). 
The means for implementing a supranational infra­
structure policy are therefore essentially available; 
however, the fact that the EU, as a supranational insti­
tution, can use these means only if it has the power or 
authority to act in a respective area, as stipulated by the 
basic principle of limited individual authorisation (art. 7 
TFEU), is proving to be a hindrance. In the three trans­
formation fields of energy, urbanisation and land use, it 
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does not have the requisite competencies. With respect 
to energy systems, the EU lacks the authority for regu­
lating the establishment of a comprehensive transna­
tional energy network, and setting the legal framework 
for an energy mix leading its members states towards 
a low­carbon future without nuclear energy (Chapter 
4). Since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the EU 
has been given the (explicit) authority for energy pol­
icy decisions and, within this context, also the chance 
to support energy network interconnection (art. 194 
par. 1 lit. d TFEU). Under the treaty, however, the EU 
can only initiate its own projects, although it has been 
given general competence for tasking its member states 
with implementation (‘whether’). In terms of the mode 
of implementation (‘how’), for example with respect 
to specific power cable routing, it is unable to act due 
to its lack of planning authority. This remains with the 
member states. An EU­wide energy network expan­
sion, however, involves not only the ‘whether’ but also 
the ‘how’ to ensure the effective linking of networks. 
Moreover, the energy policy competency recently 
inserted in art. 194 TFEU also does not include the 
authority to determine the legal framework for the 
energy mix in the member states. On the contrary, art. 
194 par. 2 sub­par. 2 TFEU explicitly excludes meas­
ures from EU competence in areas that touch on a 
member state’s right to define the conditions for the 
use of its energy resources, to choose between vari­
ous different energy sources, and to determine the gen­
eral structure of its energy supply. This clearly limits 
EU authority (Calliess, 2010); the determination of the 
energy mix therefore remains solely a sovereign matter 
for the member states. The EU’s lacking energy politi­
cal authority to determine the energy mix is a conse­
quence of the lack of the member states’ political will 
to hand over this area to the supranational level, and 
to thereby expose it to the influence of other member 
states (Fischer, 2009).
Ultimately, the EU also has only a limited influence 
on national energy mix standards on the grounds of 
its environmental policy­making authority, as this pri­
marily serves the protection of the environment and 
human welfare and the careful handling of natural 
resources (art. 191 par. 1 TFEU). This also includes any 
ecologically motivated promotion of renewable energy 
carriers, the reason for passing the Renewable Energy 
Directive (2009/28/EC) on environmental policy. It 
determines the proportion of renewable energy carri­
ers to be achieved by the member states in their gross 
final energy consumption and their transport sector by 
2020, thereby at least partially regulating the energy 
mix with respect to these energy carriers. However, 
even with such an ecologically­motivated influence 
over the energy mix, the EU can use its environmen­
tal policy authority only under extremely difficult con­
ditions. Measures resulting from this authority which 
have a considerable impact on the energy sources and 
general energy supply structure of a member state 
require a unanimous decision of the member states, 
and are therefore subject to national veto (art. 192 par. 
2 lit. c TFEU). Ergo, the authority does not extend to 
determining the legal framework for the energy mix. 
EU competency in terms of environmental policy deter­
mination only allows any influencing of the energy mix 
solely under the aspect of ecological impact as approved 
by all member states. 
The EU cannot obtain the authority to determine 
the legal framework for the energy mix by means of 
treaty interpretation, either, as the basic principle of 
limited individual authorisation still applies to the EU, 
as a supranational organisation. According to this, the 
EU only has the authorities it has been specifically 
assigned by treaty, which it can also not expand auton­
omously. As it has no treaty competency, it cannot 
authorise itself to regulate. 
5.3.5 
Global Governance in a Multipolar World
Just like the physical climate system, the global politi­
cal constellations are currently also undergoing radical 
changes. The system is in transition from a US­domi­
nated, unipolar world order to a multipolar global sys­
tem, conceivably marked particularly by the relative 
growth in the importance of China and India (Messner, 
2006; Zakaria, 2008). It is also to be expected that other 
emerging regional powers such as Brazil or South Africa 
will in future equally play a more important role in the 
world than they have in recent decades, whereas the 
relative importance of the established ‘western powers’ 
will diminish (Khanna, 2008; Flemes, 2010; Kappel, 
2011). In view of the rise of large, newly industrialising 
countries and the growth in importance of new political 
forums such as the G20, one cannot speak uncondition­
ally of a western­dominated global system even today 
(Cooper and Antkiewicz, 2008; Nuscheler and Messner, 
2009; Kumar and Messner, 2010).
In consequence, serious conflicts of interest can be 
expected; overcoming these peacefully will be a fur­
ther Herculean task for global governance in addition 
to conserving or providing global public goods (Bauer, 
2009). National demands and international distribution 
issues in the context of ‘peak oil’, ‘peak soil’, or atmos­
pheric pollution rights are prime examples for this. The 
multipolar constellation here is far less clearly arranged 
than the bipolarity of the Cold War. This is also backed 
up historically by the insight that power shifts in the 
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international system are generally turbulent and fre­
quently violent (Kennedy, 1988; Kupchan et al., 2001; 
Münkler, 2005). As a result, the trend towards multipo­
larity threatens to become a fundamental barrier to 
transformation­conducive global politics. In any case, it 
will significantly co­determine future framework con­
ditions for global governance (WBGU, 2008; Chapter 
4). In the light of international relations theories, four 
alternative global political order models appear to be 
particularly plausible scenarios:
1. A multipolar structured world order, within the 
framework of which a geopolitical power struggle 
moves between the poles of ‘cold peace’ and ‘hot 
conflict’;
2. A strained, possibly violent transition to a new, 
unipolar, hegemonial order, for instance under the 
leadership of China;
3. A largely peaceful, cooperative further develop­
ment of a multilateral order based on international 
law and the United Nations with the familiar short­
comings and limits in terms of global problem solv­
ing capacities and power to act;
4. A progressive erosion of the international political 
order as a result of cumulative policy disasters and 
global policy failures.
Accordingly, it remains to be seen how an order model 
that is normatively desirable and effective in terms of 
the transformation into a low­carbon global society 
could manifest itself, facilitating a peaceful, legitimate 
and, not least, effective global governance.
5.3.5.1 
Altered Framework Conditions Through 
 Multipolarity
In the scientific debate on global governance that fol­
lowed the end of the East­West conflict, the growing 
importance of China and India was initially not recog­
nised, or largely dismissed (Messner, 2006). If China 
and India actually do rise to become major global power 
poles alongside the USA, however, they will decisively 
determine the system’s further institutional architec­
ture and organisation (Box 5.3­2). Particularly from a 
European perspective, this leads to the question of the 
extent to which the protagonists of world politics will 
contribute to a functional multilateralism, or whether 
they will impede global governance efforts (Bauer, 
2009; Nuscheler and Messner, 2009).
If the USA, for example, insist on defending the sta­
tus quo and, by contrast, China, India or Brazil pur­
sues a decidedly unilateral foreign policy, this would 
conceivably result in supposedly outdated balance­of­
power politics, and tie up considerable capacities and 
resources, accordingly impeding global governance 
(Messner, 2006). In this respect, the multipolar con­
stellation emphasises the classic ’security dilemma’ of 
international politics (Herz, 1950): correspondingly, 
relative shifts in power potentials in an anarchic, inter­
national system can trigger self­powering dynamics 
Box 5.3-2
Sino-American Relations as the Parameter of 
Future World Politics
The summit meeting of US president Barack Obama and Chi­
nese president Hu Jintao in January 2011, accompanied as 
it was by all the insignia of high intergovernmental diplo­
macy, demonstrated the mutual increased awareness of the 
fact that the fate of the world cannot be determined without 
consideration of the respective other nation to the entire glo­
bal public. The questions of whether this will result more in 
rivalry, or in partnership­based bilateral relations, and which 
implications this will have for the rest of the world, remain 
open. A new ‘Cold War’, or even a ‘Hot Escalation’ of con­
flicting interests between the old superpower and the new 
one is just as conceivable as a ‘Cold Peace’, or the continuous 
expansion of constructive bilateral relations for the good of 
all (Figure 5.3­1).
On the one hand, the US­American fear of an ever stronger 
growing China and the loss of sole superpower status, and of 
a distinctly confident Chinese nationalism is growing stronger 
and threatening to escalate. This would accentuate the rivalry 
of the two states, increasing the likelihood of a conflictive 
‘realpolitik’ style of foreign policy that could certainly esca­
late, for instance when it comes to the Taiwan question, or in 
the course of the exploitation of scarce raw material deposits. 
On the other hand, not only the demands of global problem 
solving, but also the close links in trade, fiscal and economic 
policy of the two states in the context of a globalised world 
economy suggest the route of greater communication and 
cooperation. Stable trade and financial relations, for example, 
are essential for the development prospects of both national 
economies. This would favour the incremental institutionali­
sation of constructive intergovernmental relations.
Ignorance, prejudices and mistrust favour the first route; 
communication, transparency and confidence­building facili­
tate the second. If the decision­makers in the USA and China 
opt for conflictive strategies, the chances for a constructive 
reform of global multilateralism would accordingly fall. It is 
therefore in the interest of all other nations to support both 
superpowers in choosing the route of trusting cooperation. 
Europe could play the constructive role of mediator here on 
the global political stage: traditionally, it enjoys close relations 
with the USA, has comparatively less to lose with regard to 
China, and as a central global economic market, it is of vital 
interest to both the American and the Chinese national econ­
omies. The overcoming of the Franco­German ‘hereditary 
enmity’ after the Second World War, and the defusing of the 
Cold War through confidence­building measures can provide 
some important lessons here. 
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that undermine cooperative behaviour and make unco­
operative or even aggressive behaviour towards less 
powerful states appear rational.
The demands of an effective, steering global gov­
ernance would run contrary to such action logics, and 
subvert the goal of transformation. Against this back­
ground, the answers found by the community of states 
to problematic issues with regard to collective action 
will therefore show whether the applicable conflicting 
interests mean a return to a ‘world of superpowers’, or 
create a world that is a network of international coop­
eration, where ‘global governance islands’ can unite to 
form a structuring system model for global governance 
(Kohler­Koch, 1993; Messner et al., 2003).
In any case, the present, multilateral architecture is 
under strong pressure to adapt. To be able to act for 
global transformation purposes, it must be guided by 
the demands of the planetary guard rails (Box 1­1), 
and take the power shifts in the international system 
into account. The growing tensions this leads to can be 
schematically positioned along the axes of the interna­
tional power shift (cooperative/conflictive) and global 
climate change (moderate/radical) (Figure 5.3­1).
Irrespective of how new global system models and 
cooperation patterns balance out within this system of 
coordinates, they will become an inherent element of a 
world in transition. The sudden importance of the G20 
in the course of the global financial crisis appears to 
illustrate this, in line with the ‘form follows function’ 
principle. At the same time, however, the international 
summit diplomacy of the G8, G8+5 and G20 shows 
increasingly clearly that there are not only changes in 
the traditionally difficult relationships between indus­
trialised and developing countries, and established and 
emerging powers, but that there are also important 
changes in South­South relations: together with the 
industrialised countries, emerging economies such as 
China, India, Brazil and South Africa are increasingly 
experiencing an ‘explanatory crisis’ when facing small 
and particularly poor developing countries (Bauer, 
2009; Conzelmann and Faust, 2009).
However, exactly how a lasting functional adapta­
tion of the international system that meets the chal­
lenges of a politically steered global transformation and 
of a multipolar world order might look like remains to 
be seen. The fundamental structural problems of global 
governance will vanish neither through a renunciation 
of the slow business­as­usual multilateralism of the 
United Nations, nor through focusing all hope on the 
G20 as the carthorse of global problem solving author­
ity. Individually, neither the United Nations nor the G20 
can guarantee a satisfactory global governance: on one 
– balance of interests, rule based cooperation
   in the multipolar order
– global low carbon economy
– power transition management (trade, security,
   finance) absorbs resources of international
   politics
– climate induced destabilizations of the
   international sysem since 2030/2050; Earth
   system changeRadical
climate 
change:
4–6°C
Moderate
climate
change:
2°C
Conflictive power transition
„cold peace“/„conflicts“
Low Carbon Global Economy instead
of confrontative global order
Cooperative global governance
Confrontative global order, power
politics, turbulent global economy,
climate crisis
Peaceful power transition
„warm peace“
Peaceful power transition but failing
climate policy 
Figure 5.3-1
Scenarios of world political futures in the context of international power shifts and global climate change. The multilateral 
architecture is under strong pressure to adapt. This can be schematically demonstrated using the axes of the international power 
shift (cooperative/conflictive) and global climate change (moderate/radical).
Source: Messner, 2009
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side, the United Nations’ inadequate capacity to act, 
on the other, the limited legitimacy of the G20 summit 
structure (Bauer et al., 2011). The development of the 
G20 is a further expression of the former G8’s limited 
powers to act and faded legitimacy. The global commu­
nity of states and the world society thus see themselves 
confronted by a cooperation paradox that has led to a 
huge gap between the increased awareness of global 
problems and the global ability to act.
5.3.5.2 
Structural Problems and Democracy Defi-
cits of Global Governance and International 
 Organisations
Whilst world markets and the world society have 
changed rapidly in the age of globalisation, particularly 
since the end of the East­West conflict, standards and 
regulations for global political steering have kept pace 
only in some sectors, and to a very limited extent. New 
actors have also entered the playing field of transna­
tional politics. They have changed the action constel­
lations of global governance (Keohane and Nye, 2000; 
Pattberg, 2007; Reinalda, 2011). This has, however, not 
affected the fundamental structural problems of the 
international system and the multipolar community of 
states: namely the lack of a global sovereign and a glo­
bal monopoly on the use of force. For this reason, both 
political and scientific actors have progressively dis­
tanced themselves from the idealistic concepts of a glo­
bal state or a global government over the decades, grad­
ually replacing these with conceptual and normative 
discourses on global governance (Rosenau and Czemp­
iel, 1992; Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006; Weiss, 2009).
Despite the academic paradigm shift, there remains 
a fundamental deficit of democracy in the many dif­
ferent international organisations embodying the clas­
sic locus of intergovernmental cooperation and global 
governance (Karns and Mingst, 2004; Neyer and Beyer, 
2004). The tangible consequence of this deficit, aris­
ing from the delegation of nation state sovereignty to 
international governmental organisations, is the grow­
ing decision­making power of international bureaucra­
cies, the relative loss of importance of national parlia­
ments and decision­making bodies, and the intergov­
ernmental nature, i. e. domination by executive actors, 
of negotiations between states (Neyer and Beyer, 2004; 
Barnett and Finnemore, 2005; Hawkins et al., 2006). 
With respect to the advancing juridification of interna­
tional political processes, international courts are also 
acquiring a special role, as states seem to delegate sov­
ereignty to supranational actors here, sometimes with­
out any rational need to do so (Alter, 2006; Zangl and 
Zürn, 2004).
The questions of the legitimacy of global govern­
ance and the power of international organisations to act 
largely revolve around the significance of sovereignty 
transfer and technocratisation, or the balance between 
a participative ‘input legitimacy’ and an ‘output legit­
imacy’ that is based on efficiency and effectiveness 
(Scharpf, 1999). This balance can differ considerably 
on local, national or intergovernmental level, between 
private and public areas, and between democratic and 
authoritarian actors. In the international field, however, 
legitimisation chains are per se more complex than at 
local or national level (Nullmeier and Dietz, 2010). 
Although intergovernmental interactions are formally 
legitimised by the principle of state sovereignty under 
international law, there are also, understandably, some 
doubts with regard to the subtle politicisation and the 
effectively supranational influence of international 
organisations (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Keohane, 
2006; Zürn et al., 2007).
The opening of international organisations to non­
governmental actors, and the efforts for greater trans­
parency are only little compensation for the inherent 
structural deficits of democracy (Dingwerth, 2007; 
Müller, 2008; Gupta, 2010). Furthermore, precisely 
these efforts to improve input legitimacy are frequently 
made at the expense of the efficiency and effective­
ness of international processes. The consequence is that 
output legitimacy is often undermined. In the absence 
of a democratically legitimised world government or a 
cosmopolitan world state, this dilemma is impossible 
to solve. As the subjects of global governance, nation 
states will remain the central actors for the time being 
in view of the existing international system and its tran­
snational steering requirements. Consequently, interna­
tional governmental organisations, particularly within 
the framework of the United Nations, and despite all 
inherent autonomy efforts of their sometimes certainly 
influential bureaucracies remain an expression of col­
lective nation state politics and the basis for future glo­
bal governance (Messner, 1998; Hawkins et al., 2006; 
Weiss and Daws, 2007; Biermann and Siebenhüner, 
2009).
The multilateral system represented by the UN is 
therefore the international political action framework 
within which the requisite course for the transforma­
tion to a low­carbon global society must be set, even 
though it was founded more than seven decades ago, 
and despite all its institutional failings. International 
climate policy, international environmental policy 
and international development cooperation are given 
important impulses through actors such as the G20 and 
transnational networks or strategic ’sub­global’ alli­
ances of powerful states, whilst their concrete form and 
implementation remain the subject of the community 
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of states, universally organised only in the form of the 
United Nations. Apart from urgent institutional reforms 
and an improved financing base, this world organisa­
tion, dominated by the victorious powers of the Sec­
ond World War (and originally founded by only 51 
states) must above all allow the developing and newly 
industrialising countries a level of participation that is 
appropriate to the empirical realities of the 21st cen­
tury in order to increase its effectiveness (Bauer et al., 
2011). The great number of more or less detailed UN 
system reform efforts proves that the international sys­
tem is apparently almost impossible to reform under 
the present conditions (Malloch­Brown, 2008).
This inventory of the structural problems of global 
governance does not look quite as gloomy if viewed in 
the context of the ‘longue durée’ of the civilisation pro­
cess. Compared with the era of the League of Nations or 
the post­WWII founding era of the United Nations, the 
institutionalisation of international cooperation and 
the associated containment of classic power politics 
has undoubtedly been relatively successful (Kennedy, 
2006; Müller, 2008). Irrespective of all their functional 
deficiencies, the present importance of international 
organisations is based on a fundamental insight into 
their value, and the resultant willingness to delegate, if 
not to transfer national sovereignty in a way that would 
have been almost unimaginable even as recently as in 
the first half of the 20th century. The evolution of the 
European Union, or the virtually supranational role of 
international courts such as the International Maritime 
Court or the International Criminal Court, would be vir­
tually inconceivable without the long­term regulation 
and juridification of a wide range of different policy 
areas, not to mention the concept of a universal claim 
for Human Rights.
With their ideas on nation formation, separation 
of powers, democratic rule and an international law 
of treaties, the state theoreticians and philosophers 
of the 17th and 18th centuries were also far ahead 
of the political realities and conjectural feasibilities of 
the feudal age (Chapter 3). The historic transition from 
different kinds of feudal systems to more democratic 
forms of society, however, needed the Enlightenment’s 
preliminary intellectual groundwork as a foundation 
(Chapter 3). Immanuel Kant’s reflections on ‘Perpetual 
Peace’ and a world citizenship, for instance, are now 
viewed as important basic principles in modern inter­
national law and international organisation (Rochester, 
1986; Delbrück, 1998). In terms of the demands on 
international politics to be expected from a global tran­
sition, the crux of the matter is therefore not so much 
its utopian character, but the inertia of civilisation pro­
cesses and the difficulty of steering and accelerating 
social change (Sommer, 2011).
5.3.5.3 
Interim Conclusion
The central, but by no means new, problematic issue 
of global governance lies in the fact that although the 
necessity for global governance to effectively tackle 
genuinely global problems is widely recognised in inter­
national politics, the structural foundations and the 
resultant action incentives for intergovernmental coop­
eration continue to impede effective global govern­
ance. A great deal therefore speaks for the fact that the 
established basic pattern of international politics – the 
interaction between nation states on the basis of sover­
eign national interests, either whittled down to the low­
est common denominator through lengthy negotiations 
or determined by the most powerful actors according 
to their preferences – is not suitable for resolving the 
problems of a global society of soon­to­be almost 9 bil­
lion people, characterised by an unprecedented level of 
global interdependence and a wide range of risks to the 
global system (including the planetary guard rails out­
lined here; Section 1.1).
In view of this, there is no alternative but the pursuit 
of effective and legitimate global governance: the world 
desperately needs a higher level of international coop­
eration if climate­ and environmentally­friendly global 
development is to be achieved in the long­term.
Firstly, from a functionalistic perspective, it is not 
clear how the interdependent problems of humankind 
in the 21st century, characterised on the one hand by 
the incongruity between transnational problem constel­
lations, particularly climate change, and on the other by 
the geographically limited reach of nation states, could 
be tackled at all without overcoming the traditional 
concepts of sovereignty in favour of increased interna­
tional cooperation and global rules.
Secondly, this conversely implies that there is a risk 
that the lack of international cooperation will advance 
counterproductive conflict dynamics to the same extent 
as the unresolved problems will lead to distributional 
conflicts and recriminations with regard to the causes 
and impact of environmental damage and climate 
change.
Thirdly, international cooperation is rational in as 
far as it reduces the problem solving costs; or rather, 
non­cooperation increases the costs unnecessarily. This 
is particularly true of cooperation with respect to the 
establishment and modification of the transformation 
fields identified by the WBGU (energy, urbanisation, 
land use; Section. 5.4.5).
Fourthly, international cooperation is needed in 
order to nudge political, economic and social learning 
effects to be able to exploit the resulting economies of 
scale for the global transformation. National and uni­
lateral action approaches necessarily lag behind the 
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potentials offered by transnational and transregional 
learning processes.
Fifthly, a cooperative international spirit is one of 
the most elementary requirements for the development 
of a global ‘we’ identity. Without it, a permanent, suc­
cessful global transformation seems hardly conceivable.
Although awareness of global problems has increased 
dramatically all over the world, national decision­mak­
ers continue to waver between helpless incrementalism 
(see United Nations Environmental Programme), major 
symbolic global management events of limited scope 
and effect (see G20), sheer fatalism (all notions above 
and beyond the established international system are 
utopian global governance fantasies), and relapses into 
classic, nation state power and interest­driven politics. 
Almost seventy years after the founding of the United 
Nations, the international community of states is still 
helpless and at a loss when faced with the cooperation 
paradox and urgent global challenges. If this coopera­
tion paradox is not overcome, a steered transformation 
towards a low­carbon global society cannot succeed. It 
requires a global evolutionary leap towards a greater 
willingness for global cooperation and the appropriate 
coordination skills. Its scale would be comparable with 
the substitution of feudal societies with democratically 
structured constitutional states during the course of 
the 18th and 19th centuries (Section 3.2). The commu­
nity of states in the still very young 21st century will 
therefore manage this profound historic change coop­
eratively. Alternatively, the global society will founder 
on the demands of the transformation. 
5.4
A New Statehood within the Multilevel System 
In political terms, the major transformation process 
challenges are the acceleration of politico­adminis­
trative procedures and processes, improvements with 
regard to the implementation of a long­term orienta­
tion in policy­making, the resolute overcoming of path 
dependencies, the empowerment and involvement of 
the civil society, and a historically unparalleled expan­
sion of international cooperation. The following chapter 
develops solution approaches to overcome the impedi­
ments and barriers highlighted in Section 5.3. 
5.4.1 
Proactive State with Extended Opportunities for 
Participation
5.4.1.1 
The Vision of a Proactive State with Extended 
 Participation 
The state plays an important role in the transforma­
tion process. Legislative, executive and judicative must 
create or extend the regulatory framework required 
to empower the economy, science and the civil soci­
ety to use their resources and apply their capabilities to 
developing, implementing and using measures such as 
the expansion and reorganisation of the energy supply, 
the redesigning of urban spaces, and changes in land 
use (Chapter 4), rather than merely paying a rhetorical, 
symbolical lip service to putting the spotlight on inno­
vations development. In the opinion of the WBGU, the 
present situation generally requires states to return to 
playing a more active role. Particularly since the 1970s, 
a liberal­libertarian philosophy of extensive denation­
alisation and deregulation has become prevalent as 
a reaction to certain bureaucratic excesses and rising 
public spending. Parallel to this, many OECD states’ 
resources for fiscal intervention have diminished whilst 
average public spending has not decreased. At the same 
time, the governmental regulatory and steering capac­
ities in the newly industrialising countries have grown 
as a result of economic success whilst in many develop­
ing countries, statehood as such has largely or entirely 
failed, even breaking down completely in some places. 
States have been perceived as both powerless and over­
powering in these conflicting developments; as colossi 
with feet of clay. 
The global economic and financial crisis (2007– 
2009) emphatically demonstrated the failure of dereg­
ulated market mechanisms. The disadvantages of 
deregulated market mechanisms become particularly 
apparent not least also with respect to environmen­
tal quality: the inability of companies in free markets 
to consider the long­term dimensions of their busi­
ness models and technology applications makes envi­
ronmental regulation on the part of the state inevita­
ble (Winter, 2010). However, it should be noted that 
top­down government planning is an illusion. The state 
itself does not know the best options, but is tasked with 
activating both corporate and civil society, and politico­
administrative system potentials whilst also refraining 
from restricting itself to the purely moderating and 
remedial role that is typical for pluralistic negotiation 
democracies. The WBGU therefore encourages its fur­
ther development, without underestimating the risks 
of interventionist politics or subscribing to yet another 
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illusion with regard to policy­based steering, from a 
moderating to a ‘proactive’ state that also pursues a 
proactive transformation policy itself. This ‘more’ in 
state interventionism must be offset by a ‘more’ in citi­
zen involvement in the form of a new social contract 
(Section 7.2). The key aspect of this (virtual) contract is 
that it confers rights and obligations to government and 
civil society actors by giving them responsibility for the 
ecological future with a view to common welfare goals 
and global collective goods.
Historic Role Models for Statehood 
The chequered history of modern state intervention 
illustrates the opportunities and architectures of such a 
proactive state with extended opportunities for partici­
pation. The (European) state is an ‘acting subject with a 
will of its own’ (ad­hoc translation by the WBGU, Kosel­
leck, 1990) which takes on the organisation of politi­
cal authority in modern societies. Within this state, the 
separate public political institutions of government, 
legislature, administration and jurisdiction as we know 
them today have been combined on a basis of division 
of labour. For this purpose, the state has been awarded 
a monopoly on the use of force over its citizens, and the 
authority for making collectively binding political deci­
sions. In order to avoid despotism and the abuse of this 
power, government actions are subject to laws and the 
constitution. States interact with third parties and each 
other by tangible and intangible means, including: law 
(mandatory regulations and bans), money (positive and 
negative monetary incentives) and ‘good words’ (per­
suasion, and also orders and deterrents). These instru­
ments impact as direct or indirect governance impulses 
on the environment and the legal relationships in the 
economy, families, religious communities, etc. 
The intervention capacities of the modern state are 
defined and structured in very different ways, depend­
ing on politico­cultural tradition, economic capacity 
and social level of modernisation. In the liberal model 
of the minimal state, state duties are intended to be lim­
ited to ensuring international and national peace and 
providing a basic technical­economic infrastructure and 
elementary education, whereas in socialist systems, the 
state had a command and control function that affected 
all areas of life, including those usually private and 
intimate. Between these two models, there have been 
countless variants of state intervention primarily of a 
socio­political nature, called for and also implemented 
by both social democratic and conservative powers. 
In the affluent industrial labour societies, as well as 
in some newly industrialising countries, the concept of 
the welfare state is central. Until the 1970s, the con­
sensus was to transfer the responsibility for collective 
action with regard to common goods not available to 
individuals at an acceptable level as a matter of course 
to the welfare state, including access to comprehensive 
health care, education and culture, public transport, 
security against unemployment and old­age poverty. 
Even in countries where a ‘neoliberal’ countermove­
ment started to question the expansion of state duties 
and increased state spending during the 1970s, pub­
lic spending and borrowing have generally remained at 
a high level, primarily for crisis management reasons. 
Since the 1970s, state intervention has largely con­
sisted of preventing the consequences of any kind of 
crisis, rather than consistently and sustainably encour­
aging social self­organisation. The concept of the ‘ena­
bling state’, mainly discussed in socio­political debates 
in the United Kingdom and Germany, can therefore 
be viewed as something of a departure from the clas­
sic interventionist state (Giddens, 2009). The enabling 
state combines support of disadvantaged social groups 
with demands for their greater self­reliance and self­
help. 
Proactive state action features neither in the liberal 
constitutional state model, which primarily focuses on 
maintaining public safety and order, nor in that of the 
welfare­oriented fulfilment state, which first and fore­
most governs its population’s welfare improvement. 
Likewise, the new role model of the guarantor and reg­
ulatory state, which the EU member states, particularly 
Germany, seem to aspire to at least in part does not do 
justice to the state’s enabling and proactive function. It 
is rather an expression of retreat on the part of the state 
to ensuring the functioning of public utility markets 
(for example the supply of water and energy, the pro­
vision of telecommunication networks and public pas­
senger transport). For decades, the provision of public 
utilities has been one of the classic duties not delegated 
by the state; as the sole infrastructure and service pro­
vider, the state therefore held a monopoly position. 
The creation of a common EU market and the requisite 
liberalisation of network management hailed the end 
of this monopoly position. The public utilities market 
was opened up to private suppliers (Hoffmann­Riem, 
1999b). The guarantor state is now therefore merely 
obliged to ensure, through the creation of appropri­
ate regulations, that the duty to the public of provid­
ing said public utilities is exercised by private sector 
companies under the aspect of ‘common good’ (Schoch, 
2008). The current role models for statehood therefore 
do not adequately describe the kind of proactive and 
enabling state considered necessary for the transforma­
tion by the WBGU, and must be redefined.
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5.4.1.2 
The Responsibilities of a Proactive and Enabling 
State
The WBGU believes that the state must act proactively 
yet also enabling, particularly in the areas of climate, 
environmental and energy policy, and that these pol­
icy areas should be key to a new perception of the wel­
fare state. To fulfil their proactive role, the nation states 
should set clear national and international climate and 
energy policy goals. They should establish a climate­
friendly macro framework and create an effective set 
of legal instruments supported by an appropriate pol­
icy mix involving private sector, public­private and 
public actors (Section 5.2); ensure transparency and, 
not least, make suitable spaces at various levels availa­
ble for experimentation and ensure leeway (Box 5.4­1; 
Chapters 3, 6) to allow the progressive consideration of 
scientific insights and technological innovations requis­
ite for the implementation of the transformation, and 
incorporate these into social life­worlds. Nation states 
should – within the scope of their competencies – work 
towards regulating the measures needed for the trans­
formation by international law in a multilevel sys­
tem. Furthermore, the steps already taken towards the 
transformation must be continuously evaluated, not 
least also through participative research (Chapter 8). 
In fulfilling its proactive role, the state must pro­
mote the innovations necessary for the transforma­
tion, mobilise the actors important for this process, 
and remove barriers (Jänicke and Lindemann, 2009; 
Section 5.2). One of the central components of such a 
proactive state open to innovation are regulations that 
encourage innovation. Of the three organs of state, the 
legislature is therefore the first one tasked with action 
(Eifert, 2009). This could take the form of, for exam­
ple, incorporating climate protection in the German 
constitutional law as a national objective whilst also 
stipulating that this goal should be achieved particu­
larly through regulations which encourage innovation, 
to be supported by the appropriate legal rights to bring 
action. Moreover, the fulfilment of this duty to estab­
lish national objectives also tasks ordinary law­makers 
with the creation of a legal infrastructure which pro­
motes the development and diffusion of innovations. 
This includes a mix of instruments covering the entire 
innovation cycle (Sections 4.5.2, 5.2.3.1). However, the 
‘more’ in state governance resultant from regulations 
encouraging innovation does not automatically mean 
less market, or fewer private initiatives. On the con­
trary: state action should be aimed at using and sup­
porting market forces and civil society commitment for 
the purpose of the transformation. 
Equally, a proactive legislature open to innovations 
should remove (legal) impediments or barriers prevent­
ing the implementation of innovations. This includes, 
for example, the long time outlay between planning 
and implementation of innovative projects. However, 
the necessary acceleration of approval and infrastruc­
ture authorisation processes must not result in the sac­
rificing of public participation (Section 5.4.1.3). Empir­
ical analyses have shown that, contrary to all assump­
tions, this particular step in the process does not 
contribute to the considerable delays experienced in 
approval processes (Zschiesche and Rosenbaum, 2005). 
In fact, effective public participation at the earliest pos­
sible stage, i.e. participation at a point when all options 
are still open (Article 6 Section 4 Aarhus Convention) 
can actually improve the decision­making process and 
its result (von Danwitz, 2004). Public participation is 
therefore an expression of the communication process 
in an enabling state in which the citizen is mobilised to 
enforce the law (Masing, 1997).
However, a proactive state open to innovation must 
also not push innovations through at any cost. In the 
promotion of innovation, the constitutional obligations 
of the state continue to apply – above all the basic 
rights, constitutional procedural law and the estab­
lishment of national objectives to take environmental 
protection into account. This may be described as the 
state’s responsibility for innovation (Hoffmann­Riem 
1999a; Eifert, 2009), which must of course be offset 
by its ‘responsibility for the future’. 
5.4.1.3 
Legitimisation Through Participation
The WBGU agrees with the demand for ‘bringing the 
state back in’ (Skocpol, 1982), under discussion for a 
number of years now in the expert community. How­
ever, a strengthening of the state’s enabling function 
can only claim legitimacy if the citizens participate in 
the decisions to be made, rather than being merely 
expected to give their consent or accept them ex­post. 
Not only must every individual share in the greater 
ecological responsibility, the transformation towards a 
low­carbon society also requires a new culture of par­
ticipation. The democratic legitimisation of state con­
trol and planning has been a subject for debate in polit­
ical science since the end of the 1960s (Offe, 1972). 
Political decisions in representative democracies can be 
considered legitimate firstly through the input of citi­
zen participation, which amounts to far more than just 
elections and votes (or party membership), also includ­
ing various non­parliamentary formats, from signing 
petitions to demonstrating (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; 
Verba et al., 1995), and secondly through the output, 
i.e. the performance and quality of a decision made on 
this basis (Scharpf, 1999). 
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Box 5.4-1
Experiments: Promotion and Acceleration of 
Transformative Innovations
Social and technological innovations are a prerequisite for the 
transformation. Innovations are also based on experiments, 
which can be locally­focused search processes, for example. 
Innovative, climate­friendly technologies, behaviours, pro­
cesses and forms of organisation for the various elements 
of the Great Transformation are developed and tested in 
experiments. Successful innovations provide climate­friendly 
alternatives, and can challenge the established high­carbon 
regime alone on the strength of their existence (Chapter 3). 
To support innovations, policy­makers should create room for 
experiments, consolidate promising innovations into niches, 
and support their rapid diffusion beyond these. Experimental 
spaces should be given certain time limits in which they are 
protected from market selection pressure and conventional 
funding evaluations in order to be able to develop success­
fully (van den Bosch and Rotmans, 2008). 
Political and Legal Steering of Experiments
In order to successfully develop and realise experiments, 
the first step should be the choosing of certain low­carbon 
transformation action fields and their associated problems 
with regard to the tranformation. In order to minimise wrong 
decisions on the part of the state and secure the support of 
central actors from the outset, this selection process should 
take place in cooperation with the relevant stakeholders. In 
the Netherlands, for example, the government established 
‘transition platforms’ in 2001, providing representatives of 
companies, the government and NGOs, as well as scientists, 
with a space to discuss not only policies, the barriers blocking 
innovations, and demonstration projects, but also to jointly 
decide on the development of experiments, and the potential 
options for their diffusion (Rotmans et al., 2001). 
The second step should be the development of goals 
and visions, possible paths to achieve these goals must be 
highlighted, and specific room for experimentation outlined. 
Experiments can then be realised. Depending on the action 
field chosen (energy system, urbanisation, land use), there 
could be experiments with regard to new technologies, inno­
vative production processes, new types of housing and living, 
or new business models. Policy­making establishes a frame­
work for this, and the relevant actors develop alternatives 
(Chapter 8). The British National Endowment for  Science, 
Technology and the Arts, for instance, has suggested experi­
ments in the form of special innovation zones. These are spe­
cific geographical units, such as a city district, a community, 
a power plant network or a business park. By means of the 
respective policy­making, they are afforded a certain scope 
by innovative political framework conditions and given gen­
erous financial support. In return, they must meet an ambi­
tious greenhouse gas reduction target as a result, or their 
further funding depends on achieving this goal (Willis et al., 
2007). 
Once their relevance has been assessed, existing experi­
ments started on the initiative of companies or the civil 
society should also be given the same level of support as 
completely new ideas (Chapter 6). The fundamental prin­
ciple is that policy­makers should establish a framework, 
provide funding, initiate dialogues, facilitate processes, and 
document the results. In this way, experiments enjoy politi­
cal backing, and learning processes are supported. Learning 
objectives include the extent to which experiments actually 
contribute to the transformation, and under which conditions 
the solution assessed during the course of the experiment 
can be repeated and diffused. Costs, markets, and social, 
infrastructural, legal and cultural requirements for further 
diffusion are issues to be addressed with regard to innova­
tions. Learning processes can be supported through dialogue 
between the parties involved, the establishment of networks, 
and accompanying research (Chapter 8). If progress becomes 
apparent with regard to alternatives, learning processes can 
be intensified through niche creation, which also increases 
the chances of a further diffusion of the innovation. Niche 
establishment requires the repetition of experiments in vari­
ous contexts, linking experiments to various problematic situ­
ations (national and international), and the integration and 
broad communication of the experience made. 
Through niche establishment, innovations can also 
increase their social relevance (Chapters 3, 6), which on the 
one hand means that the alternatives gain greater political 
and economic significance through increased publicity, incen­
tives for network and interest­based organisation establish­
ment, and increasing funding. On the other hand, however, 
it also means that innovations must adapt more to require­
ments beyond the niche, for example through cost reductions 
or adaptation to the preferences of a broader demand. The 
promotion of a range of variants allows selection of the best 
solution. 
In legal terms, incentives for innovations can be created 
in different ways, some of which can be seen as spaces for 
experimentation. These include:
 > Easing the legal admission requirements for research 
projects, or dispensing with them altogether. For example, 
plants serving the development or testing of new products 
or processes do not require approval under air pollution 
control law.
 > Establishing explicit research laws that apply only for a lim­
ited period of time, again also to allow research projects 
to go ahead under less stringent conditions. A law such as 
this was endorsed, for example, for CCS technology (Hell­
riegel, 2008).
 > Formulating dynamic technical standards: this is generally 
achieved through the use of vague legal terms in so­called 
technical clauses, for instance ‘Best Available Technology’. 
These abstract legal concepts are then usually met with ref­
erences to statutory instruments and administrative reg­
ulations, or complemented by extra­judicial standards 
which have been developed by private­law organisations. 
Both methods of reference are accompanied by constitu­
tional concerns: with respect to the standards created by 
private­law organisations, for example the German Insti­
tute for Standardization (DIN), there is the issue of how 
democratically legitimised the enacted law­making author­
ity is. Referring to regulations established by the govern­
ment turns out to be problematic in the light of the consti­
tutional principle of legal certainty, if this takes place not in 
the sense of a static reference to a specific technical stand­
ard, but rather to the latest version of the technical stand­
ard (so­called dynamic reference) (Erbguth and Schlacke, 
2009). However, these constitutional legal deficits can 
be offset through reinforcement of reporting obligations 
towards citizens, and the citizens’ statutory right to infor­
mation, as well as public participation and legal protection.
If innovations have essentially proved themselves to be a 
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The usual form of democratic participation in elite 
and negotiation democracies is the subsequent evalu­
ation of government action, reflected in the bestowing 
(or denial) of political advance credits for the next leg­
islative term. This mechanism of latent direct partici­
pation is obviously impaired at present; there is a lack 
of particular confidence in the effectiveness of govern­
ment action both with regard to specific legislative mat­
ters, and the credibility of the politico­administrative 
system and its representatives in general. Over the past 
three decades, the classic instruments of democratic 
participation and control have been embraced to a sig­
nificantly lesser degree by the majority of the popu­
lation in virtually all OECD countries. This reflects an 
encroachment on one of the central mechanisms of rec­
ognition of rule by the ruled. Not only has the respect 
for (party) political elites diminished in the established 
democracies of Europe and America, but the general 
acceptance of the democratic process and system also 
appears to be gradually waning; in fact, there is a risk 
of its complete erosion.
In Germany, the most recent lesson on the lack of 
legitimacy of government decisions (despite the legal­
ity of both project and process) is to be learned from 
the intensive dispute surrounding the reconstruction of 
the main railway station in Baden­Württemberg’s state 
capital Stuttgart (‘Stuttgart 21’ project) in 2010 (Box 
5.4­2), which had a nationwide impact. It shows that 
where (major) infrastructure projects are concerned, 
the parliamentary political process is evidently no 
longer capable of raising the required level of credibil­
ity in order to realise large­scale construction projects, 
even though they have been decided on entirely above 
board and with a large parliamentary majority. As soon 
as the reconstruction commenced, i. e. became visible, 
the non­parliamentary protest expressed for a number 
of years escalated. Concurrently, the longstanding 
resistance to the transport of nuclear waste into tem­
porary storage facilities at Gorleben in Lower Saxony 
became topical once again. Taken together, these events 
gave the impression of a growing, widespread legitimi­
sation crisis across the (apostrophised!) ‘anti­republic’ 
confirmed by spokespeople for the political decision­
making elite (Bartsch et al., 2010). 
In conjunction, various opinion polls and studies on 
‘disaffection from politics’ (‘Politikverdrossenheit’) do 
not really reflect a general legitimisation crisis, but they 
do indicate a growing disappointment with the effec­
tiveness and accountability of democratic systems. The 
misgivings triggered by unresolved issues such as the 
labour market (structural mass unemployment since 
the mid 1970s with a growing shortage of skilled work­
ers), demographic change (exploding healthcare costs, 
uncertainties regarding old­age pension provision) and 
the consequences of financial market volatility (accom­
panied by a growing fiscal crisis in the ‘taxation nation’) 
are now increasingly joined by concerns regarding the 
risks arising from anthropogenic climate change and 
other environmental burdens. 
The colossal challenge with regard to the modernisa­
tion of representative democracies now lies in institu­
tionalising more formal opportunities for participation 
in order to gain additional legitimacy whilst also linking 
these to a value consensus regarding a policy­making 
that focuses on sustainability to ensure that the ‘more’ 
in participation does not result in a ‘less’ with regards to 
sustainability issues. Because (both legal, and in prin­
ciple legitimate) political protest would fall short of the 
normative foundations of sustainability and the ethics 
of ecological responsibility if there were only a ‘general 
mood against’ any form of large­scale technology, and 
if the benchmark for infrastructure projects designed to 
explicitly secure a sustainable future were also solely 
the level of disruption they cause in local contexts.
Resolving this dilemma is like squaring the cir­
cle, yet it must be the central task in any democratic 
potential solution for a particular problem in the experimen­
tation phase, policy­making should also in many cases sup­
port their further diffusion (scaling up; Chapter 3). Additional 
political measures are necessary as niche innovations may still 
prove to be incompatible with the structures and demands of 
the established socio­technical regime despite initial develop­
ment in a niche environment (Chapter 3). 
Many innovations cannot establish themselves because 
they are incompatible with the existing political and econom­
ic framework conditions (Chapter 4). They require changes 
in established perceptions, thought patterns and routines 
(Chapters 2, 3, 6). This applies, for instance, to alternative 
means of transport in comparison with fast, big, fossil­fuelled 
cars and their status symbol function (Chapter 4). In order 
to also advance changes in these areas, respective policy­
making can involve central actors with sufficient authority to 
act in the discussion on experiment results, and initiate social 
debates on a broad level. The aim is to change the interpreta­
tion frameworks of established actors, gain political and social 
majorities, and highlight the benefits of the greater diffusion 
of innovations by discussing ‘narratives’. 
Further diffusion can be promoted by supporting transfor­
mation­friendly actors, and creating framework conditions 
that are conducive to transformation (Section 5.2, Chapter 6). 
These include investors willing to take risks, innovative com­
panies, cultural norms and values and a legal framework, as 
well as scientific and technological capacities (Chapters 2, 8, 
Sections 4.5, 5.4). 
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and civil society actor self­modernisation process. In 
order to achieve effectiveness, these actors can on no 
account do without intermediate organisations such as 
political parties and organised special interest groups, 
which consolidate political interests in mass democra­
cies (aggregation), escalate them programmatically, and 
integrate groups that are drifting apart. Because it is 
in this so­called pre­political sphere that the positions 
which can result in the formation of a consensus must 
be established and developed. The waning respect for 
‘intermediary organisations’ such as parties, organised 
special interest groups and citizens initiatives, and their 
diminishing importance should be counteracted, as 
they do indeed have a significant mediating and aggre­
gating function when there are tensions between state 
institutions and society. Apart from serving the artic­
ulation of interests, particularly political parties have 
so far undertaken the aggregation of political interests 
and the integration of various social groups (Schultze, 
2010). And, not least, it is in the context of party polit­
ical programmes that more comprehensive, long­term 
focused visions about the way we live together beyond 
short­term political events are developed. In the past, 
they have therefore contributed considerably to the 
formation of opinions and political will.
As a result of the growing disaffection with the way 
career and party politics are run, the population has 
become increasingly willing to take grassroots’ action 
(Chapter 6). What is lacking is a ‘citizenation’ (Tully, 
2009) of this commitment, i. e. its adequate consoli­
dation and representation at a parliamentary level, or 
in other arenas, to allow the productive input of this 
action on the part of the citizens. A democracy with 
future sustainability must therefore not only accelerate 
Box 5.4-2
New Forms of Direct Democracy: Insights from 
the ‘Stuttgart 21’ Mediation Process
In 2010, the long­planned conversion of Stuttgart’s main rail­
way station from a terminus to an underground through sta­
tion (‘Stuttgart 21’) finally got under way. Once construction 
work started, resistance against this major project developed 
into a mass protest also joined by the urban middle classes. 
In order to de­escalate this social conflict, public arbitration 
talks were held in the autumn of 2010. According to arbitra­
tor and former German federal minister Heiner Geißler, this 
mediation process was a ‘democracy experiment’, showing 
how future forms of direct democracy can be structured in 
Germany (Geißler, 2010, all comments quoted ad­hoc transla­
tions by the WBGU). In his November 2010 arbitral verdict, 
Geißler outlined essential elements of new forms of direct 
democracy, elaborated in the following.
Transparency and Involvement from the Outset
Once major projects are being planned, a civil democratic pro­
cess should commence, including the discussion of alterna­
tives. It is important here that equal consideration is given to 
the critics and the proponents of a project, for example 
through the public financing of expert’s reports and assess­
ments, also those commissioned by the opponents. It is of 
fundamental importance that not only some selected aspects 
are communicated to the public in the context of political 
opinions, but that the ‘provenance of all arguments’ and the 
‘overall technical narrative’ are revealed to everyone involved. 
A comprehensive public presentation on the internal context 
of major projects – if applicable with media involvement to a 
public of millions – can furnish transparency and counteract 
the growing mistrust citizens feel towards policy­makers and 
the economy (‘modern enlightenment’; Geißler, 2010).
In Heiner Geißler’s view, planning approval procedures are 
the ‘most bureaucratic form of democracy’; citizens can only 
object to the plan once it has been submitted. ‘They can do 
that even in a dictatorship,’ Geißler continued in the Süd­
deutsche Zeitung newspaper (SZ, 2010). Although, according 
to §3 of the German federal construction law code, the pub­
lic must be informed at an early stage of plans and alterna­
tives,’...this proviso is made only on paper, but not actually 
observed, or interpreted too narrowly. However, what should 
be the case is that alternatives are considered and assessed 
officially’ (Geißler, 2010). ‘The completely outdated building 
law needs renovation; above all, it must be accelerated’ (Die 
Welt Online, 2010).
Increasing Direct Democracy
Considering the present media democracy, where tens of 
thousands can be reached and mobilised online at a mouse 
click, decision processes in representative democracies can no 
longer work the way they did in the 20th century; ‘the age 
of full­stop politics is over’ (Geißler, 2010). Even parliamen­
tary decisions were now questioned, particularly if they took 
years to implement. In this day and age, such decisions would 
need to be repeatedly justified and elaborated. The deadlines 
between planning and realisation were also far too long.
Geißler calls for a ‘reinforcement of direct democracy’. 
Admittedly, the Swiss model could not work in Germany, but 
‘the Swiss participation procedures should be adopted, at 
least for major projects.’ To achieve this, he proposes divid­
ing the execution of major projects into three participative 
planning segments. In the first phase, the objective should 
be formulated (for example construction of a base tunnel 
through the Gotthard), then the project should be voted on. 
In the second phase, the plans should then be developed, if 
applicable also including alternatives. Then there should be 
another vote. The project is realised in the third phase, with 
accompanying justification and information. 
‘For as long as a participation procedure such as this is not 
possible with regard to decisions made by the German federal 
government and the regional states, the Stuttgart model 
should serve as a prototype for institutionalised citizen par­
ticipation that is on par with planning authority’s’, Geißler 
continues. Arbitration should remain the exception once all 
democratic and legal processes have been completed. In 
future, new forms of early citizen participation could help to 
prevent an escalation such as the one seen in Stuttgart. 
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its procedures, it must above all expand the basis for its 
legitimisation. As the appeal of a long­lasting commit­
ment to parties and interest groups and the respect for 
these have severely declined in the last three decades 
under pressure of social individualisation and individual 
benefit calculations, they must be supported by more 
flexible networks and focused alliances that respect 
the autonomy demands of individuals, and encourage 
change agents’ own initiatives whilst also providing 
them with stability and continuity (Box 5.4­1; Chap­
ter 6). Interestingly, the intermediating organisations 
must also show themselves to be more responsive and 
yet decisive, not unlike the enabling state. Once par­
ties have largely handed over agenda setting to the 
(electronic) media (or rather, share it with these), sub­
sequently fulfilling virtually no further programmatic 
orientation functions, they are able to concentrate on 
service and coordination functions whilst rebuilding 
their reputability through programmatic clarity. Parties 
could therefore become essential actors in the ‘triangu­
lation’ between active civil society citizens (Chapter 6), 
the proactive state and actors from the economy. Par­
ties and organised interest groups, which are now per­
ceived much less as actors with a focus on the common 
good than in the past, must appear modest and avoid 
the impression of wanting to usurp and channel citizen 
commitment.
A proactive state with extended participation 
opportunities in a multilevel system of global coopera­
tion therefore conveys two aspects frequently thought 
of as separate or contradicting: on the one hand, the 
empowerment of a state which actively determines 
priorities and underlines them with clear signals (for 
example bonus/malus solutions) whilst providing citi­
zens with more extensive opportunities to have a voice, 
to get more involved in decision­making processes, and 
to take on a more active role in politics. A powerful 
(eco­)state is often thought of as restricting the auton­
omy of ‘the man in the street’, whilst at the same time, 
any meddling on the part of precisely these ‘ordinary 
citizens’ is viewed with misgivings as a disturbance fac­
tor to political­administrative rationality and routines. 
Precondition for a successful transformation policy, 
however, is the simultaneous empowerment of state 
and citizens with regard to the common goal of sustain­
able policy objectives. The proactive state is therefore 
firmly anchored in the tradition of a liberal and consti­
tutional democracy, but it develops this democracy fur­
ther with a view to achieving a sustainable democratic 
polity and free civil societies. Whereas climate protec­
tion  measures are often regarded as imposing limita­
tions and requiring unreasonable levels of self­depri­
vation, the aspects of a proactive and enabling form of 
government elaborated in the following relate to a gov­
ernance that is explicitly tasked with preserving and 
extending available choices and the room to manoeuvre 
for future generations.
A successful transformation policy should be pur­
sued on four interconnected levels: (1) constitutionally, 
by setting climate protection as a respective national 
objective, (2) materially/legally, by embedding climate 
protection targets in climate protection legislation, (3) 
procedurally, be extending the opportunities available 
to citizens and non­governmental organisations for 
participation and improving access to information and 
legal recourse, and (4) institutionally through govern­
ment institution climate policy mainstreaming. All of 
the measures elaborated in the following express and 
concretise the national objective of climate protection, 
forcing legislators, executives and the judiciary to act. 
5.4.2 
Proactive Options at National Level
5.4.2.1 
Constitutional and Legal Climate Policy 
 Self-Commitment on the Part of the State
The general climate political responsibility of the state 
and its proactive and enabling role in the transfor­
mation must be firmly established by law. To empha­
sise the state’s extensive self­imposed commitment, it 
should be embedded in constitutional and administra­
tive law.
Increased Protection by a New National Objective: 
Climate Protection
In constitutional law, the state’s responsibility for cli­
mate policy can be highlighted and thus strength­
ened by an explicit reference to climate protection in 
the constitution. A national objective of ‘climate pro­
tection’ could conceivably be included in the German 
constitution as a supplement to Article 20a. Although 
the national objective of ‘environmental protection’ 
formulated here already defines natural resources as 
protected, thereby including the climate (Groß, 2009; 
Maunz and Dürig, 2010), the explicit inclusion of cli­
mate protection in Article 20a of the German consti­
tution would nevertheless emphasise its outstanding 
importance, and the commitment on the part of the 
state. A national ‘climate protection’ objective would 
emphasise the common goods character of climate, 
i. e. take into account the fact that it is a supra­indi­
vidual, protected property. By contrast, anchoring cli­
mate protection in the constitution as a basic right is 
not advisable as basic rights are primarily subjective, 
defensive rights protecting citizens (‘negative liberty‘). 
They therefore serve the protection of the individual 
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sphere but cannot afford the supra­individual protec­
tion required in the case of climate protection (Maunz 
and Dürig, 2010). 
National objectives provide basic principles and 
guidelines for state action. They contain a commitment 
to certain values, decisions made by government bodies 
must in fact update and concretise these (Maunz and 
Dürig, 2010). A national ‘climate protection’ objective 
would therefore oblige the state and its institutions to 
pursue an active and appropriate climate protection 
policy whilst retaining a broad decision­making scope. 
Concrete action on the part of the state can therefore 
not be demanded on the basis of a national objective, 
it is rather a case of the legislature being initially and 
primarily required to effectively implement the setting 
of a national objective. The requisite decision­making 
process must take climate protection into account (so­
called mandatory consideration; Groß, 2009). Execu­
tive and judiciary fulfil their constitutional respon­
sibility for environmental protection by interpreting 
the existing regulations created by the legislative as a 
concretisation of the national objective in a climate­
friendly way, thereby particularly using their scope of 
discretion and scope for judgment evaluation to imple­
ment low­carbon solutions (Groß, 2009). 
Introduction of Climate Protection Legislation
At the administrative level, the national objective ‘cli­
mate protection’ should be concretised in the form of 
climate protection legislation. The core element of a 
climate protection law is the establishment of legally 
binding mitigation targets. Beyond these, targets should 
also be set for the share of renewable energies in pri­
mary energy consumption, energy consumption reduc­
tion, and energy efficiency increase rates (UBA, 2011). 
Furthermore, the climate protection law should include 
an obligation to preserve terrestrial carbon stores, and 
measures for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from 
agriculture. The reduction of emissions of climate­dam­
aging industrial gases should also be obligatory.
The WBGU’s budget approach (WBGU, 2009) could 
serve as an orientation for the quantitative aspects of 
the mandatory targets to be set in the climate protec­
tion law (Section 7.3.9). It must be differentiated here 
between Germany’s overall responsibilities on the basis 
of international fairness considerations, and the emis­
sion reductions to be achieved nationally. A climate 
protection law should include Germany’s binding com­
mitment to the complete decarbonisation of its energy 
systems by 2050, equalling a 100 % reduction of CO2 
emissions from fossil energy sources. Some flexibility 
can be afforded by emissions trading schemes, although 
the WBGU advises against credits from offset­schemes 
such as the CDM (Sections 4.5, 5.2, 7.3.8, 7.3.9). Even 
with the stated reduction, Germany would still exceed 
its CO2 budget as per the WBGU budget approach. 
However, as the WBGU believes that the government 
should focus on general fairness considerations, addi­
tional reliable payments would have to be made in the 
context of international climate financing in order to 
support the developing countries in their transforma­
tion, these would need also to be established by law 
(Sections 4.5, 7.3.9). 
As such a climate protection law only contains the 
general obligation of all government bodies to imple­
ment climate protection measures, further­reaching 
legal regulations are necessary to specify concrete 
measures for achieving the respective interim targets. 
In addition, a regular reporting duty on compliance 
with the interim targets should be introduced in the 
climate protection law to transparently and verifiably 
prove road map compliance. Furthermore, the climate 
protection law must include (sanction) mechanisms to 
prevent target shortfall and, if necessary, take correc­
tive action. With regard to the latter aspects, the British 
Climate Change Act (2008; CCA) could serve as a model 
for a German climate protection law: above and beyond 
long and medium­term climate protection targets (the 
so­called carbon budget) already mentioned, it also 
stipulates the establishment of an important institu­
tion for climate protection in the form of the Commit­
tee on Climate Change. This committee plays an impor­
tant role not only in establishing climate protection 
targets; it also publishes annual progress reports with 
an assessment of adherence to climate protection tar­
gets to which the government must respond. The Brit­
ish Committee on Climate Change is therefore a neu­
tral regulatory body monitoring the government. The 
act stipulates that in the event of target shortfall, the 
responsible minister must inform the British parliament 
of the reasons for this shortfall, and make proposals 
for offsetting the excess emissions during the follow­
ing period.
5.4.2.2 
Extend Opportunities for Information, 
 Participation and Legal Protection
A transformation process is condemned to failure if 
policy­makers make decisions which force citizens to 
accept the corresponding measures subsequently. Pol­
icies that rely on the early and active consultation and 
participation of those concerned to legitimise political­
administrative measures are more successful than any 
attempts to obtain acceptance after the event.
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 Extended Participation Opportunities in the 
Administrative Process
The implementation of large infrastructure projects, 
for instance the expansion of the high voltage grids, 
could fail – even though it appears to present no prob­
lem in terms of legality – due to a lack of participa­
tion and acceptance on the part of the population. As 
defined in the second pillar of the Aarhus Convention, 
involvement of the public is the central instrument for 
promoting participation in official infrastructure plan­
ning decisions, and for their acceptance. It makes the 
administrative and planning process more transparent 
and contributes to structuring it democratically (Fisahn, 
2004; Schlacke et al., 2010). However, this requires 
the public become involved at an early stage, as citi­
zens only have a realistic chance of influencing admin­
istrative decision­making with their arguments when 
all options are still open (Fisahn, 2004). Involving the 
public at an early stage can make the decision process 
more effective, as unwelcome projects are identified as 
such much sooner, thus avoiding expensive conflicts. 
Not least, relying on the specific expertise of partic­
ipating environmental protection associations can 
improve the overall quality of the decision (von Dan­
witz, 2004). This kind of ‘legal remedy in advance’ can 
prevent infringements on any rights from the outset, 
therefore also contributing to easing the burden on the 
courts (von Danwitz, 2004).
In Germany, the present planning and approval pro­
cedures, for example, so far hardly meet these require­
ments (Walk, 2008; SRU, 2010). The public does not 
become involved, for instance, until after an agreement 
between the respective authorities and those respon­
sible for financing public projects has already been 
reached. At that point in time, there is no longer room 
for alternatives. It is also doubtful whether the legally 
required public announcement regarding a planned 
project, and the way in which notice of a planned 
project is in actual fact given to the public, serve to 
motivate citizens to participate in the decision­making 
process. Often, the pros and cons of the planned project 
are not adequately explained, as prescribed by law – 
although in part, this may also be due to the accelerated 
legislation (‘Beschleunigungsgesetze’) in recent years. 
The present procedure’s deficiencies were described in 
detail, for example, in CDU politician Heiner Geißler’s 
arbitral verdict on the disputed ‘Stuttgart 21’ railway 
station project in November 2010 (Box 5.4­2). Key task 
for a proactive and enabling state is the establishment 
of structures that allow effective participation, and to 
organise a ‘constructive communication process’ just as 
required by the Aarhus Convention. 
The preconditions for successful citizen and local 
participation in decision­making processes, particu­
larly where large­scale projects are concerned, are: (1) 
extensive and continuous public and local involvement 
from the earliest possible stage, including the unbi­
ased examination of alternative concepts; (2) great­
est possible process transparency, for example through 
increased use of radio and television broadcasting, the 
new media, or additional information campaigns/plat­
forms; (3) the involvement of independent parties in 
cases of conflict. Government agencies must be given 
more scope for mediation efforts. 
Financial involvement is also an important driver of 
participation. Projects such as wind farms, for exam­
ple, are more likely to win approval if they are jointly 
organised and run as cooperative societies, i. e. if citi­
zens participate in the planning process and reap some 
of the profits (Section 4.5). In certain cases, compensa­
tion payments can generate acceptance of unavoidable 
impositions. Financial involvement creates a ‘win­win’ 
situation in the form of enjoyment of tangible benefits 
(‘everyone must be a transformation winner’; Section 
2.4).
Extending the Scope of Collective European Legal 
Action
Collective legal action means the right to appeal to 
the courts as a group, for example in the form of an 
officially recognised association, i. e. legal remedy 
can be sought without the infringement of any sub­
jective rights (supra­individual collective legal action; 
Schlacke, 2008). In Germany, this option is availa­
ble in only a few areas of public and civil law. How­
ever, specifically in the area of environmental law, 
and there particularly in nature conservation law, law­
makers have empowered collectives, such as inter­
est­based organisations, to exercise and legally assert 
rights for the protection of the general public or indi­
viduals. Essentially, only individual people concerned 
(such as neighbours) can bring legal action against the 
approval of environmentally hazardous industrial facil­
ities in Germany. Interest­based organisations that view 
themselves as advocates for the environment cannot. 
The right to file collective European legal action – for­
merly dealt with at German individual state (Länder) 
level – has been bindingly regulated in the Federal Ger­
man Nature Conservation Act (BNatSchG) since 2002. 
Environmental protection associations which have reg­
istered with the German Federal Environment Agency 
(UBA) or the responsible local German state authorities 
may seek legal remedy, i. e. they are permitted to file an 
appeal against official decisions by government bod­
ies with the administrative court, for instance. At the 
end of 2006, the Environmental Appeals Act came into 
force, providing environmental interest­based organi­
sations with more scope to file collective European legal 
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action (Schlacke, 2007). They now have the option of 
initiating legal proceedings against certain approval 
decisions for industrial plants and infrastructure meas­
ures under environmental law, for instance if an envi­
ronmental impact assessment has not been carried out. 
This is an implementation of EU Directive 2003/35/EC, 
which in turn served the implementation of the Aarhus 
Convention (UN/ECE Convention on access to informa­
tion, public participation in decision­making processes 
and enforcement of environmental laws). However, any 
interest­based organisations with the right to lodge an 
appeal under the Environmental Appeals Act can only 
include the same content that a subjectively concerned 
individual could include in their appeal. Climate pro­
tection aspects cannot be included, for instance, not 
even in the case of a project proposal, such as the con­
struction of a new coal­fuelled power station. This cir­
cumstance has increasingly attracted criticism (Genth, 
2008), as the aim of the Aarhus Convention, and there­
fore also of the EU directive implementing the same, 
was the mobilisation of citizens, and of organisations 
that represent citizen interests, to encourage them to 
campaign more intensively for environmental protec­
tion, thereby countering enforcement deficiencies par­
ticularly in this area. Extending the right to file collec­
tive action in this direction could encourage the respon­
sible authorities to actually respect climate protection 
as a national objective.
Using Ombudspersons
The use of expert ombudspersons with monitoring 
authority and the right to launch legal action with the 
judiciary complements can improve the existing infor­
mation, participation and monitoring rights of the pub­
lic and interest­based associations. In a broader sense, 
legal protection – apart from the judicial right to bring 
legal action – also includes extra­judicial, alternative 
monitoring procedures. These can serve the assertion 
of supra­individual interests such as climate protec­
tion whilst also providing a means of monitoring gov­
ernment agencies. Apart from mediation procedures in 
areas governed by public law, particularly in environ­
mental matters (Hellriegel, 2002; Sünderhauf, 1997), 
and the petition procedure, this also includes the insti­
tution of an ombudsperson (Schomerus, 1989), a con­
cept originally conceived in Sweden. Ever since the 
Treaty of Maastricht, the European Union also employs 
an ombudsperson: the European Ombudsman (Article 
24, Subsection 3 in conjunction with Article 228 TFEU; 
Magliveras, 1995; Cadeddu, 2004). The institution of 
ombudspersons primarily aims at extra­judicial arbitra­
tion under administrative law conditions, thereby com­
plementing the system of administrative courts as it 
serves the observance of legal order.
A Societal Discourse Initiative for the Great 
Transformation
The transformation towards a low­carbon society is 
only achievable if it can gain the support of a wide 
spectrum of social and political majorities. Only then 
can the changes that are the basis for the transforma­
tion be initiated and developed both at a legislative 
level and in the civil society. This requires an extremely 
broad coalition far beyond a simple majority, possibly 
a new ‘social movement’ (Nullmeier and Dietz, 2009). 
According to Giddens (2009), sufficient support from 
the social stratas considered as central will result in a 
‘depoliticisation’ of climate policy to the extent that it 
is lifted out of the usual right­left context. On the other 
hand, developments that are often viewed as merely 
natural hazards, such as biodiversity loss and climate 
change, will thereby become the subject of eminent 
political debate.
An awareness of the necessity of a profound trans­
formation to safeguard future prospects and fair glo­
bal burden sharing should permeate all areas of society. 
A fundamental societal mood of taking the issue seri­
ously should be strived for, and inertia or a ‘business as 
usual’ attitude must increasingly be viewed as socially 
not acceptable. The more pronounced the discourse 
 hegemony on the interpretation pattern ‘the transfor­
mation towards a low­carbon society is necessary and 
achievable, transformation safeguards our welfare’ the 
more likely it will be that the potential social resistance, 
and powerful veto players, can be overcome in the 
political arena, and that political and economic elites 
can be convinced to act (Nullmeier and Dietz, 2009; 
Hajer, 1995). The requisite course can be set only on 
the strength of this deliberative discourse.
Policy­makers should now be tasked with the initia­
tion of such a wide­reaching social dialogue. Article 6 
of the Framework Convention on Climate Change also 
refers to the role of government institutions in raising 
public awareness with respect to climate change (Walk, 
2008). The issues of climate change, lifestyles, decar­
bonisation and transformation should be presented and 
discussed in public at the widest possible range of lev­
els (global, national, regional, local) and by a variety 
of means (conferences, campaigns, education opportu­
nities etc). This process of wide­ranging participation 
by all influential actors from the areas of policy­mak­
ing, science, the economy, interest­based organisations 
and groups, the media, etc. can create the opportuni­
ties needed for a scientific and social debate that con­
tains all facets, perspectives and assessments, and leads 
to the cooperative development of solution options 
or channels. To avoid addressing sustainability issues 
merely symbolically, or the danger of missing the point 
through inter­party squabbling, a carefully moderated 
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debate under the patronage (and with active participa­
tion) of the German Federal President and the above 
mentioned ombudspersons, with involvement of the 
‘future chambers’ elaborated in the following, should 
be instigated in Germany, using mainly digital informa­
tion and communication media.
Deliberative Participation Processes
Peter Dienel (1978, 2002), James S. Fishkin (1991, 
1995, 2009) and a range of other social scientists have 
conducted experiments and pilot studies they described 
as ‘planning cells’ or ‘deliberative opinion polls’. A com­
prehensive overview is provided by Buchstein (2009, 
2010) and Buchstein and Hein (2009). They follow the 
same basic pattern: first, a representative group of cit­
izens from a region (or country) is invited to meet for 
several days. They are paid expense allowances in order 
to consult on a specific current political issue, research 
the different available options in detail, and develop a 
decision recommendation on the basis of their discus­
sion and the information they have gathered. To date, 
pilot studies have been conducted on issues related to 
family affairs (USA), fiscal policy (England), the intro­
duction of the Euro (Denmark), the abolition of the 
monarchy (Australia), and the distribution of extra fis­
cal revenue at local level (China). The term ‘delibera­
tive opinion poll’ was chosen to distinguish these stud­
ies from the classic opinion poll. 
In classic opinion polls, for the most part uninformed 
citizens are interviewed on issues in which they had 
no prior interest in. They are confronted with a set of 
predefined response options, and the social scientists 
conducting the study present the poll result arrived at 
on the basis of the responses as ‘expressing authentic 
citizen preferences’. Such poll findings are not a genu­
ine expression of political volitions, they merely repre­
sent social scientific artefacts. As ‘pseudo­opinions in 
the echo­chamber’ they have no true bearing on politi­
cal decision­making – in contrast to everyday political 
practice, which relies heavily on polls. 
Proposals for greater participation of ordinary citi­
zens are often countered with claims that ordinary citi­
zens are poorly informed and easily manipulated, and 
that, in crisis situations, the majority would even sup­
port serious violations of basic rights. By contrast, the 
initiators of the deliberative opinion poll want to deter­
mine the political volition of citizens once they have 
had the chance of gathering detailed information on 
the issue in question, and deliberating on it. In prac­
tice, this requires two factors: on the one hand, the 
 representative selection of these citizens under con­
sideration of local social statistics (in this respect, the 
deliberative opinion poll does not differ from the con­
ventional opinion poll), and, on the other hand, a delib­
erative process quality that actually leads to gains on 
the basis of information and reflection. 
The requirement of representative selection under 
consideration of local social statistics is met directly by 
resorting to random sampling by drawing lots. All of 
the studies conducted to date selected potential par­
ticipants with the aid of computerised randomisation. 
They were then contacted by telephone and invited 
to take part. The second requirement for providing a 
deliberation setting that is as constructive as possible 
is met by intensive content preparation and discursive 
choreography of the meetings. Random sampling by 
drawing lots is again employed for this. The national 
level pilot studies conducted by Fishkin and his team 
assemble 300 to 500 participants for a long weekend at 
a specific location. The number of participants should 
be large enough to obtain a certain statistical represent­
ativity but small enough to be able to organise discur­
sive processes in small groups and plenary assemblies 
with the support of professional facilitators. Experience 
to date demonstrates that random sampling by drawing 
lots is a reasonably accurate method for achieving the 
intended social statistical representativity. Although 
numbers vary between the various studies, the over­
all social statistical distribution ratio was still above 
that of conventional opinion polls before their subse­
quent ‘adjustment’. Even if the assembled groups did 
not exactly match the social statistical cross­section, 
they nevertheless did have a significantly higher level 
of social heterogeneity than all of the institutions of the 
regular political establishment.
One robust empirical finding in the ‘deliberative 
opinion polls’ held to date is that there were significant 
changes in participants’ opinions in consequence of 
their deliberations at aggregate data level. These indi­
vidual opinion changes were a ‘political learning’ pro­
cess with cognitively matured, new positions. They are 
based on increased factual knowledge, are more coher­
ent in terms of logic, take the complexity of the prob­
lem into account, and are also consistent with respect to 
the participants’ own value basis. This is a finding with 
positive significance for the suitability of a ‘House of 
Lots’ – a kind of deliberative chamber for decisions con­
cerning the future (Section 5.4.2.4) – for recommenda­
tion, consultation or even decision­making on climate 
policy issues.
5.4.2.3 
Climate Policy Mainstreaming in Government and 
Parliament
The low­carbon transformation requires the commit­
ment and participation of many actors (state, civil soci­
ety, private economic sector, etc.). As a state actor, the 
German federal government has the opportunity of 
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improving the framework conditions through institu­
tional reforms in such a way that transformation issues 
are accorded high priority, and are firmly anchored in 
government and parliament. Decarbonisation would 
need to be ‘mainstreamed’ to achieve this. ‘Main­
streaming’ refers to an organisational principle target­
ing the consideration of a specific aspect in all deci­
sions – with respect to products, public image, human 
resources, organisation, etc. A kind of climate policy 
mainstreaming that is not unlike gender political main­
streaming would be conceivable, i. e. all government 
departments and all legislative proposals take decar­
bonisation issues into account.
Obligatory Climate Impact Assessment Scheme
A climate impact assessment scheme can ensure that 
measures presented for decision­making do not jeop­
ardise the achievability of climate protection targets. 
Austria already plans to introduce such a climate impact 
assessment scheme in order to determine whether spe­
cific proposed regulations are relevant in terms of cli­
mate protection target achievement. In any case, the 
respectively more climate­friendly alternative must be 
chosen to meet the regulation objective. Assessing the 
consequences of laws is generally not a new concept, 
also in Germany. For the past few years, for example, 
it has been mandatory to include an ex­ante admin­
istrative burden assessment involved in each draft bill 
prior to its being laid before the Bundestag. In the con­
text of the so­called sustainability assessment, a man­
datory requirement since May 2009, all draft bills and 
regulations presented by the German federal govern­
ment have first been assessed by independent advi­
sory councils with respect to the costs of the compa­
nies’ duty to inform, as stipulated by the sustainabil­
ity assessment (= bureaucracy costs), and with respect 
to compatibility with the national sustainability strat­
egy. However, this procedure has the disadvantage that 
subsequent amendments to the draft are not included 
in the assessment. Moreover, it should also be taken 
into account that the climate impact assessment must 
be distinctly separate from the sustainability assess­
ment with regard to its area of application in order to 
avoid duplication: even though climate protection is 
an element of sustainable development and a national 
sustainability strategy goal. However, the sustainability 
assessment includes numerous other aspects of inter­
generational fairness, for example social and demo­
graphic changes and the use of resources in general. 
It is therefore not an instrument that is used solely to 
determine the climate compatibility of legislative meas­
ures in the sense described above.
Other measures are already in place besides the cli­
mate impact assessment of proposed legislative meas­
ures, such as the environmental impact assessment for 
specific planned projects and the strategic environ­
mental assessment for proposals and programmes to 
assess their climate­relevant impact. However, between 
the climate impact assessment of proposed legislative 
measures on the one hand and the environmental 
impact assessment for planned projects and the stra­
tegic environmental assessment for proposals and pro­
grammes on the other, duplicate assessments must be 
avoided. This can be achieved by tiering, i. e. aspects 
which have been adequately analysed during the pre­
vious stage of the assessment do not need to be reas­
sessed at the next stage.
Empowering Executive and Legislative for the 
Transformation
To ensure that all political departments in Germany 
address the low­carbon transformation, and to improve 
harmonisation of interdepartmental policies, the issues 
of energy systems decarbonisation, land­use related 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions and climate­
friendly urbanisation should become a priority focus 
for the Federal Committee of State Secretaries for Sus­
tainable Development. This committee’s role should 
also be stronger defined as an independent panel. All 
German federal ministries should develop strategies for 
the low­carbon transformation. These should systemat­
ically establish the state’s climate political responsibil­
ity in administrative organisation and procedure. 
To emphasise the transformation issue in German 
foreign policy, the creation of the post of foreign office 
state minister for global sustainability issues, energy 
systems decarbonisation and raw materials strategy 
could be an expedient measure. 
Climate protection, biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable urban planning are now addressed and 
taken into consideration by government agencies to a 
far greater degree than they were in the early stages 
of environmental policy­making. In the WBGU’s view, 
however, the current departmental architecture pre­
vents these issues from reaching the status they should 
have, not least with respect to shaping a post­industrial 
future and establishing a sustainable economy. There­
fore, in the long term, the partial modification of the 
current departmental architecture should be consid­
ered, for example by establishing a ministry for envi­
ronment, climate and energy.
Increasing awareness of the global contexts of pol­
icy­making can represent another form of executive 
climate policy mainstreaming. Means to the end of 
‘global education’ can be the ‘internationalisation’ of 
ministerial departments, for example by staffing them 
with 10–15 % of staff hailing from other OECD nations, 
developing, and newly industrialising countries whilst 
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also supporting and intensifying the adequate capacity 
building in these. In this way, national interests and per­
spectives could be brought into line with international 
perspectives and discourses from the outset, accelerat­
ing interactive learning processes and generating multi­
lateral trust. A concrete step in this direction would for 
example be the establishment of exchange programmes 
for departmental specialists, comparable to the present 
DAAD German Academic Exchange Service. 
In addition to the existing administrative assessment 
of the impact of legislative measures on sustainability, 
options for strengthening the role of parliament should 
be considered. Turning the Parliamentary Advisory 
Council on Sustainable Development (Box 5.4­3) into 
a permanent committee within the German parliament 
(Bundestag) would place the council in a far better 
position to act and assert its objectives in parliament, 
thereby strengthening its climate political role. The fol­
lowing elaborates and gives reasons for the institution 
of ‘future quorums’, or a ‘future chamber’ to improve 
citizen representation.
5.4.2.4 
Improve Representation of Future Interests: 
 Electoral Law Reform and House of Lots
One open question that needs to be re­examined from 
both democracy theory and constitutional policy per­
spectives is whether, in a proactive state with extended 
participation, citizen representation should be permit­
ted to change, and indeed should change, by estab­
lishing ‘future quorums’. This examination involves all 
instruments that anticipate the assumed interests of 
future generations (implicit: in greater sustainability 
of present­day politics) in the current decision­making 
process in consultative panels or additional chambers 
to give future generations a (virtual or vicarian) voice.
This touches on the fundamental concept of repre­
sentativity, a core issue in European political­adminis­
trative architectures since the Middle Ages: beyond a 
polis or urban community that is workable in terms of 
its number and its susceptibility to problems, how can 
a collectivity of people (the entire population) be rep­
resented fairly and appropriately by an assembly com­
prising members that are either appointed, drawn by 
lot, or, preferably, have been elected by means of uni­
versal, equal and fair processes? 
The present standard type of representative democ­
racy contains a wide range of answer variants to this 
question that come close to this ideal, yet never quite 
achieve it – representation is ‘not necessarily true’ 
(Sartori, 1992), and ‘under any system … biased’ (de 
Grazia, 1951). Distortions particularly stem from the 
fact that the political elite does not represent a cross­
section of the social architecture. They are also the 
result of electoral processes, or lie in the lack of bal­
ance between the autonomy of the people’s representa­
tives – who take the mandate of their voters on trust 
and may interpret it as they wish – and the delegation 
of the will of the people by means of election. Further­
more there are aspects such as party political discipline 
in parliamentary chambers, ‘perquisites of power’ as a 
result of frequent re­election, and suchlike.
With respect to the future interests outlined in this 
report, ‘surrogate representation’ (Mansbridge, 2003) 
is a particularly interesting concept. It describes the 
representation of electorates which reside outside the 
usual constituencies of the representatives both in 
terms of time and space. It concerns people who do not 
belong to the respective nation state but are affected by 
its actions, and those who are currently not yet eligible 
to vote or have not even been born yet, but whose liv­
ing conditions will be influenced by decisions made or 
refrained from at the present time (Section 5.3).
Particularly two political experiments are designed 
to get a measure of how the latter assertion of volitions, 
paraphrased as ‘future interests’, can be anticipated: 
1. The direct or indirect representation of children and 
adolescents in electoral processes;
2. House of Lots.
Box 5.4-3
Parliamentary Support for the Transformation
One of the most important advocacy tasks’ of the German 
Bundestag’s Parliamentary Advisory Council on Sustainable 
Development is the evaluation of the sustainability assess­
ment in parliamentary legislative procedure. The Parliamen­
tary Advisory Council on Sustainable Development was con­
stituted on 21 January 2010, after the Bundestag had decided 
its establishment on 17 December 2009 (Bundestag printed 
matter 17/245). The Advisory Council has 22 members: nine 
from the Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union 
(CDU/CSU), five from the Social Democratic Party (SPD), 
three each from the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and The Left 
(Die Linke), and two from the Alliance 90 / The Greens. It is 
chaired by Andreas Jung (CDU/CSU), deputy chair is Gabriele 
Lösekrug­Möller (SPD). The Advisory Council is tasked with 
accompanying German federal government’s national and the 
European sustainability strategies, and submitting recom­
mendations.
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Voting Rights for Children, Families, and Demeny 
Voting
In order to take both the actual and the presumed pref­
erences of children and adolescents into account in the 
political process, or ensure their parliamentary repre­
sentation, three reform options are under discussion: (1) 
the introduction of an original child voting right (i. e. a 
reduction in the voting age or, in the most radical form, 
a voting right from birth); (2) the introduction of an 
original parental voting right (also family voting right) 
and; (3) the introduction of a Demeny (vicarian) paren­
tal voting right, according to which parents exercise the 
voting rights of their children on trust until these have 
reached voting age (Grözinger, 1993; Goerres and Tie­
mann, 2009). The Demeny parental voting right is also 
under discussion as a form of child voting right, or as 
a compromise between an original child and a parental 
voting right, and dominates the current German debate 
(Goerres and Tiemann, 2009). It presumes that par­
ents will consider their children’s interests with regard 
to sustainability policy­making when placing the votes 
they hold in trust (Steffani, 1999).
In Germany, the introduction of a Demeny parental 
voting right is supported by a heterogeneous social and 
political spectrum, including prominent advocates such 
as Rainer Eppelmann, Olaf Henkel, Roman Herzog, 
Paul Kirchhof, Cardinal Karl Lehmann, Werner Schulz, 
Wolfgang Thierse and Antje Vollmer (Westle, 2006). 
In recent years, the Bundestag has also repeatedly 
addressed cross­party motions calling for the intro­
duction of the child voting right (German Parliament, 
2003, 2008; printed matter 15/1544 and 16/9868). 
The ‘Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations’ 
(SRzG) calls for a voting right by registration, whereby 
every national should be entitled to vote, irrespective 
of age, as soon as he or she communicates a correspond­
ing desire to do so to the government body responsible 
(SRzG, 2009).
Assessments regarding the level of impact this pro­
posal might have on the constitutional order and the 
right to vote differ. Both the introduction of a child 
voting right and the introduction of a Demeny paren­
tal voting right would necessitate an amendment to 
the German federal constitution (Grundgesetz, GG) 
and various German state constitutions. According to 
Article 38 Section 2 of the German federal constitution 
(GG), anyone ‘over the age of eighteen’ is eligible to 
vote in Germany. The introduction of a Demeny paren­
tal voting right would be contrary to the principles of 
equality and directness of elections established by Arti­
cle 38 Section 1 of the federal constitution, and in the 
German state constitutions. In constitutional appeals 
with respect to the electoral participation of adoles­
cents, the German Federal Constitutional Court has so 
far always reached a negative decision, citing the argu­
ment that the current voting age were ‘historically sub­
stantiated’ (BVerGE 36, 139, 141), and concluding that 
the introduction of a minimum age did not infringe on 
the principles of democracy and the universal right to 
vote (BVerGE 42, 312, 340). Whilst Schreiber (2006), 
for example, argues that a constitutional amendment 
would infringe the principle of democracy and the con­
stitution’s ‘eternity clause’ (Article 79, Section 3 GG), 
former German Federal Constitutional Court judges 
such as Roman Herzog and Paul Kirchhof consider the 
introduction of a family voting right that complies with 
the respective formal constitutional requirements pos­
sible in constitutional legal terms (Deutscher Familien­
verband, 2003). 
In addition to objections citing national and consti­
tutional legalities, there are serious empirical arguments 
against the possible political­material consequences of 
introducing a Demeny parental voting right, whether 
presumed or possibly sought intentionally. So far, it is 
only a hypothesis that parents’ voting decisions would 
be genuinely motivated by an increased consideration 
of future interests, which, incidentally, feature a high 
level of uncertainty and ambivalence when it comes to 
concrete decision alternatives. 
Critics primarily argue that the vicarian parental vot­
ing right might not be used to promote long­term sus­
tainability policies but rather to effectively assert the 
parents’ own, short­term interests (example: a signifi­
cant increase in child benefit and parental allowances 
financed through additional state borrowing). Likewise, 
the assumption that non­parents or older voters will 
focus less on altruistic interests in their voting deci­
sions can also be viewed as extremely questionable, 
from a sociological perspective (Szydlik, 2000). Fur­
thermore, empirically well­founded simulations show 
that, despite a number of systematic differences in the 
voting behaviour of parents and non­parents, the over­
all results would have differed only slightly if a Demeny 
parental voting right had been introduced for the Bun­
destag elections between 1994 and 2005 (Goerres and 
Tiemann, 2009).
One variant of the vicarian child voting right is a 
reduction of the age of majority in terms of entitlement 
to vote, or thematically specific agreements on ‘matu­
rity’ (analogue to the religious age of majority at 14). 
From a normative perspective, the current legal provi­
sion is problematic for two reasons. For one, it is dif­
ficult to cite convincing reasons for a very specific age 
limit over any other. The differing perspectives with 
respect to this issue have already been illustrated by 
the trend of a secular reduction of the voting age since 
the 19th century. In 1814, the voting age in France was 
30. In 19th century Germany, it ranged between 30 and 
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23. In some German regional states, citizens are today 
eligible to vote in local elections once they are 16 years 
old, scientists are calling for a further reduction to 14 in 
the near future (Hurrelmann, 1997). Ultimately, an age 
regulation is plausible only if a specific minimum quali­
fication to appreciate civil rights is assumed and this 
is linked to an age­dependent maturing and education 
process. And indeed, this is where the question arises 
of whether reducing the age at which young people 
are permitted general or partial decision participation 
rights might not improve the parameters and quality 
of these decisions, particularly in the area of sustain­
ability policy.
House of Lots
Deliberative policy­making stands for, on the one hand, 
making knowledge society findings more accessible 
through consultation mechanisms, and on the other, 
giving citizens responsibility through  participation in 
future decisions, and by taking them seriously. Deliber­
ative ‘future chambers’ could be conceived for this pur­
pose. This concept draws on an idea that is not new in 
the history of democracy, yet it has always tended to 
be marginal in contemporary representative democracy. 
This ‘future chamber’ is an institution whose members 
have been selected on a random basis. It is given polit­
ical proposal, consultation or decision­making compe­
tencies (Buchstein, 2009, 2010; Hein and Buchstein, 
2009). Already practised in antiquity, the approach was 
revived by US American political scientist and lead­
ing democracy theorist Robert A. Dahl. With a view to 
the positive experiences made with employing a lot­
tery­style system of randomised jury selection for US 
American jury trials, introduced in the late 1960s, he 
suggested restoring the ‘democratic device of the lot’ 
(Dahl, 1970). ‘Advisory councils’, randomly chosen 
by drawing lots and financially reimbursed for their 
efforts, should be set up to support important polit­
ical offices in modern democracies, from the mayors’ 
offices of large cities through to the US congress, and 
even the White House. These councils should meet 
every few weeks at regular intervals to discuss issues 
important to them with the respectively responsible 
politician in office, to confront the politicians with the 
council’s perception of a specific problem, to ask ques­
tions, and to give advice. These councils should be of a 
consultative nature and complement the representative 
system by ‘improving the development conditions of an 
(everyday) political practice that is essentially delibera­
tive’ (Schmalz­Bruns, 1995, own ad­hoc translation by 
the WBGU). 
Dahl developed this idea further into a ‘minipopulus’ 
(Dahl, 1987, 1992). A ‘minipopulus’ would, for exam­
ple, consist of a thousand citizens of a country, selected 
by computerised randomisation. They are tasked with 
in­depth consultation on a specific issue, determined 
by parliament (or another responsible institution), over 
a longer period of time to develop various decision 
options. The members can meet face to face or com­
municate with each other electronically. Conceivable is 
a network of several minipopuli debating various top­
ics at the same time and at different government levels. 
The outcome of the consultation process should be a 
‘policy recommendation’ for the legislative.
The intention behind this is that the political system 
as a whole gains from the fact that career politicians 
are confronted with votes by well­informed citizens, 
accompanied by the hope that the legitimisation chain 
between citizens and career politicians is strengthened 
to counter political (politician) disaffection. Although 
the experiences at individual state level in Germany 
with regard to participatively­ and deliberatively­
structured technology assessments in the 1990s did 
not turn out particularly encouraging, this can prima­
rily be traced back to precisely the fact that they were 
not decision­making, but exclusively recommendation­
based processes, and that the recipients – predomi­
nantly official authorities – were very hesitant in tak­
ing these recommendations on board. Among the mem­
bers of deliberative bodies, there is clearly a manifest 
problem with regard to motivation if the entire event 
bears little reference to decision­making, or this refer­
ence is not easily identifiable for the participants.
In view of this, it would be interesting to know what 
happens if randomly chosen panels drawn by lot are 
brought on a par with the other political actors on the 
power circuit of modern democracies. However, to date, 
there is an extensive lack of practical experience with 
regard to panels with binding political weight chosen 
by the drawing of lots. Because all of these examples 
in politics differ in one essential point from the judici­
ary’s classic trial by jury method: even if called by par­
liamentary committees or other government agencies, 
their conclusions do not lead to a votum that would 
be equivalent to a decision with binding consequences. 
They merely give recommendations to elected hold­
ers of office and mandated representatives, effectively 
functioning as a method for political elites to attempt 
to determine the will of well­informed citizens. At best, 
all of the projects to date have moved in a kind of grey 
area between directly impacting political decisions and 
indirectly providing feedback which is fed into the 
political process through communication by the public. 
Since the 1990s, there have been experiments with 
new forms of political consultation, such as ‘consensus 
conferences’ or ‘scenario workshops’ comprising rep­
resentatively compiled groups of citizens, for example, 
particularly in some European countries. Evaluations 
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have shown that in Denmark, consensus conference 
recommendations have impacted considerably on pol­
icy decisions in that country. In other countries, how­
ever, similar models have not shown any real practical 
impact. On the contrary, political actors emphasised the 
recommendations when they saw fit to support their 
own positions or – in the opposite case – ignored them 
completely. Their more substantial impact in Denmark 
is explained by the quasi­official status of the consen­
sus conferences under the aegis of the Danish Ministry 
of Science, Technology and Innovation.
Current plans and projects with randomly generated 
panels therefore need further revision in order to be able 
to become a promising reform option. What is needed 
above all is the clear establishment of binding assign­
ments of competence within the scope of the politi­
cal system of modern democracies. Otherwise, there 
would be an almost unavoidable risk of the appoint­
ment of randomly generated advisory councils becom­
ing an instrument to be used by a government or the 
opposition – depending on the general political situa­
tion and ad­hoc requirements – to add legitimacy to its 
parliamentary policies. Also requisite is a clear defini­
tion of the constitutive conditions and sectoral compe­
tencies of panels randomly chosen by drawing lots, as 
consultation matters can otherwise be fragmented into 
so many issue aspects that councils meeting concur­
rently would impede each other. In the case of regional 
or thematically focused councils, a further requirement 
would be the definition of the basic population sample 
to be entered in the random selection process. There are 
no general answers to questions such as the latter ones; 
they can only be answered in the course of concrete 
reform proposals. 
The establishment of a ‘House of Lots’ as an insti­
tutional response to the problems of political program­
ming in the area of climate policy is one element of 
a proposal for ‘democratic innovations’ (Smith, 2009). 
In terms of the particular suitability or otherwise of a 
‘House of Lots’ as an innovative political institution 
that could have some input in future climate policy 
decisions, the following theses can be formulated with 
regard to the current status quo:
 > ‘House of Lots’ consultations are fundamentally 
appropriate for issues with a high level of intergen­
erational relevance, as past research attests not only 
considerable cognitive changes on the part of the 
participants but also a certain ‘force of universalism’ 
with regard to cited arguments, as the actors selected 
by randomly drawing lots have less strategic incen­
tives for arguing purely on the basis of interests than 
political actors who are firmly embedded in political 
networks. Empirical research over the past few years 
has shown that representatives selected by drawing 
lots (‘LotReps’) exhibit a high focus on the common 
good (although this does not solve all of the prob­
lems, it does reduce their number). 
 > A ‘House of Lots’ should be strictly separated from 
elected bodies, as actors from elected institutions 
(have to) follow a different operational logic than 
representatives selected by lot. As a minority in an 
elected chamber, they would also be susceptible to 
party political classification and constraints.
 > Compared with the current model projects, the 
development potential for randomly generated 
councils ultimately hinges on deciding between two 
options: one is to pursue this recently established 
route by carrying on with the experiments and 
projects described, and their frequently non­binding 
status. This would support the commendable inten­
tion of teaching more democracy. Such projects 
would, however, tend to remain a purely ornamental 
embellishment of the political system’s routines in 
which participants would expect the exertion of a 
very low degree of real influence evoking the moti­
vational problems described. The alternative route 
would be a randomly generated, empowered cham­
ber as a new political institution with limited but real 
opportunities for influencing policy­making. A 
reform policy in this direction would ultimately lead 
to the incorporation of a ‘House of Lots’ into the 
existing institutional arrangement with a clearly 
assigned and binding competence profile. This can 
range from an obligatory requirement to give an 
advisory opinion through to having the authority to 
call a moratorium, or having certain veto functions, 
and would need to be carefully structured according 
to governance level (local, regional, national, EU, 
worldwide). 
5.4.3 
Proactive Options at EU Level 
As a supranational institution, the EU has a decisive 
(pioneering) role to play in the transformation: on 
the one hand, it can initiate transformation­promot­
ing measures in its member states through ambitious 
legal and political requirements. And on the other, the 
EU can aid the diffusion of advanced developments 
beyond its member state area through cooperation with 
non­member states. 
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5.4.3.1 
Possible Courses for Action in the Member States
Emphasising Climate Protection in EU Treaties
In order to ensure the comprehensive consideration of 
climate protection in the establishment and implemen­
tation of all Union policies and measures, this objective 
must first be established in European primary law, i.e. 
anchored in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). Currently, climate protection is listed only as 
one of several EU environmental policy objectives in 
Article 191 Section 1 No. 4 TFEU. Although the cur­
rent horizontal clause in Article 6 TFEU, calling for the 
general consideration of environmental protection as 
per Article 191 TFEU in all Union measures, indirectly 
implies an obligation to protect the climate, it is not 
explicit (Calliess and Ruffert, 2007; Schwarze, 2009), 
and should be amended to ensure further protection, 
as should Article 3 TEU.
EU Climate Policy Mainstreaming: Anchoring the 
Transformation Institutionally
Inspired by the symbolic, constitutional anchoring of 
climate protection at Union law level, climate protec­
tion matters and the resultant transformation issues 
must also be taken into account when structuring insti­
tutional architectures. Climate policy mainstreaming 
should therefore also be introduced at Union law level, 
in line with the options available at national level (Sec­
tion 5.4.2.3), to ensure highly prioritised anchoring 
of climate protection and transformation issues in all 
government departments and planned legislative pro­
cesses. In the Directorate­General for Energy, this kind 
of transformation­oriented climate policy mainstream­
ing can already be observed in the form of a trans­
formative energy policy: based on the ‘Europe 2020’ 
strategy (EU COM, 2010f), the Directorate­General is 
developing a European energy policy with the partic­
ular goals of promotion of sustainable energy produc­
tion, sustainable energy transport and consumption, 
and innovative energy services (EU COM, 2011e). This 
facilitates technological innovations in the energy sec­
tor and ensures compliance with the energy and climate 
objectives, particularly in the area of energy efficiency 
and renewable energies. Successful implementation of 
the climate protection objective at Union level never­
theless needs a stronger commitment to transforma­
tive policies across all organisational units, i.e. a main­
streaming of climate policies.
Common Energy Policy as a Chance for Europe
One core element of the transformation is the decar­
bonisation of the energy system. Fossil energy carriers 
and nuclear power currently still dominate the energy 
mix in the EU member states. The EU contributes almost 
15 % of worldwide CO2 emissions (excluding land­use 
changes). Moreover, there is a high dependency on 
imported fossil energy carriers, particularly oil and gas. 
As an important element of the transformation, devel­
oping the sustainable potential of renewable energies 
by the middle of the century can credibly substantiate 
the EU’s self­proclaimed leadership position in terms of 
energy and climate policy (Chapter 4). 
The formation of a future, functioning common 
internal energy market can have an integrative effect 
as strong as that of the European Monetary Union, 
thereby deepening identification with Europe on the 
part of the citizens. The EU currently needs a new 
project to convince, motivate and inspire its citizens. 
The general mood is one of euroscepticism and, in part, 
euro­apathy. Developing and implementing the vision 
of a common European energy policy could lead the 
way into a new era in terms of energy supply, and prove 
to the world the feasibility of a continent­wide, sus­
tainable energy supply. No other actor could achieve 
this much.
The WBGU believes that the development of a com­
mon internal energy market should include the follow­
ing elements: the regulation of grid access, targets for 
the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, the expan­
sion of grids and storage facilities, and, with regard to 
this, the appropriate EU foreign policy competence to 
enter into agreements with non­member countries. 
Important directional changes are currently taking place 
with respect to the further development of the Euro­
pean energy market and, in particular, regulation of 
grid access and expansion of energy infrastructure. The 
EU Commission has proposed important steps towards 
decarbonisation of the energy supply by announcing 
its energy infrastructure priorities (EU COM, 2010e), 
the ‘Energy 2020’ strategy for competitive, sustain­
able and secure energy (EU COM, 2010f), the Road­
map for moving to a competitive low­carbon economy 
in 2050 (EU COM, 2011a), and the Energy Efficiency 
Plan 2011 (EU COM, 2011b). However, the Roadmap 
2050 assumes goals that are far less ambitious than the 
actual opportunities for renewable energy expansion, 
and nuclear energy continues to occupy a dominant 
position. As shown in Chapter 4, more ambitious objec­
tives for the energy mix can be pursued here without 
the forced acceptance of the inevitable risks of nuclear 
power. Based on these political proposals, legally bind­
ing measures should then be taken to advance the 
expansion of renewable energies. 
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Expansion of EU Competency
Transformative action on the part of the EU in the area 
of energy policy demands the granting of the respec­
tively necessary competences. In accordance with the 
principle of conferral of power, Article 7 TFEU, the 
EU can take action only to the extent to which it has 
been conferred its member states’ sovereignty rights 
as a supranational institution. As it can take action for 
environmental protection under Article 191 TFEU, in 
which it is also tasked with realising climate protection 
targets, it already has the requisite competency bun­
dle at its disposal. However, the implementation of the 
Great Transformation requires additional competences 
not yet conferred on the EU. This also and in particu­
lar applies to the area of energy policy, which is now 
explicitly included in the EU competences (Article 194 
TFEU). Nonetheless, its authority does not extend to the 
right to determine the legal framework for the member 
states’ energy mix, for instance. To a large extent, this 
legal framework effectively controls the member states’ 
decisions with regard to their choice of energy carriers 
per se, i. e. not with regard to renewable energy carriers 
only. Equally, it does not include the authority to oblige 
member states to establish energy grids, and to enforce 
grid expansion plans in cooperation with non­member 
states (Kahl, 2009; Calliess, 2010; Nettesheim, 2010).
If the EU were granted these competences, it would 
subsequently be in a position to regulate climate pro­
tection measures and energy policy in its member states 
at delegated legislation level. It could issue a climate 
protection and energy directive to this effect. In terms 
of procedure, this would have the advantage that the 
member states would retain their own scope for deci­
sion, as directives are binding only with respect to the 
result to be achieved, leaving to the national authori­
ties the choice of form and method required to achieve 
the stated objective (Article 288 TFEU). In terms of 
content, such a directive could include energy strategy 
requirements and requirements for the expansion of 
electricity supply and distribution grids.
Despite the present competency situation, the EU 
Commission has presented various proposals for a com­
petitive, sustainable and secure energy policy. How­
ever, these are initially only political proposals which 
do not yet have a legislative form, they are therefore 
also not yet mandatory. 
EU Promotion of Accelerated Renewable Energies 
Expansion
At present, there are de facto 27 different energy mixes 
and 27 different import dependency structures within 
the EU. In view of the different geographical and eco­
nomic factors for the production and storage of renew­
able energies, e. g. suitable locations for wind or solar 
power generation or cropland for bioenergy produc­
tion, the EU member states’ expansion requirements 
differ widely. 
However, the long­term rebuilding of the European 
energy supply to renewable energies is hardly achieva­
ble within national boundaries. The EU should continue 
to provide incentives and set targets so that renewable 
energies are promoted and expanded whilst the use of 
fossil energy carriers is gradually phased out. In order 
to be able to do so, the EU needs to be given the option 
of prescribing the member states’ legal framework for 
their energy mix. Although its present environmental 
competences allow the EU to govern the promotion of 
renewable energies, provided it is ecologically moti­
vated, neither this competence, nor the energy com­
petence explicitly applicable since the Treaty of Lisbon 
came into effect (Article 194 TFEU) give the EU the 
right to determine the legal framework for the Union­
wide energy mix. This area remains solely a matter of 
member state sovereignty. The EU’s competence must 
therefore be expanded in this respect. 
Moreover, the present EU approaches for the promo­
tion of renewable energies (Renewable Energy Direc­
tive) are inadequate: instead of a restriction to (overall) 
targets to be achieved by 2020, ambitious goals up to 
2050 are needed. Interim targets subject to reassess­
ment under consideration of new scientific and tech­
nological findings should be established. 
Non­compliance with these targets should be sub­
ject to sanctions. These should not only take the form 
of treaty infringement proceedings brought by the 
Commission, but also of collective European legal 
action – as yet not included in the EU Treaty – before 
the European Court of Justice. In addition, the incen­
tives should be structured in a way that encourages 
investments to be made where they are profitable on 
the basis of local geographical conditions. The WBGU 
recommends the introduction of a standard EU feed­in 
tariff (Box 5.4­4). To increase the effectiveness of this 
financial promotion of renewable energy carriers, the 
subsidies for fossil and nuclear power fuelled energy 
generation should be phased out. Moreover, the further 
development of the European climate protection tar­
gets also represents an important frame of reference for 
the dynamics of renewable energies expansion. Finally, 
accompanying and binding energy efficiency targets 
should be established. The EU already has the compe­
tence to do so under Article 194 Section 1 TFEU. 
Construction of Continent-Wide Energy Grids
The cost­effective expansion of renewable energies 
demands a continent­wide production, consumption 
and storage network. This requires the expansion and 
rebuilding of transnational infrastructures. A trans­
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continental high performance electricity supergrid 
should be created in Europe to allow the pan­European 
exchange of electricity. The grid should also be linked 
to neighbouring countries that produce power or store 
it, for example connections to Norway’s power plant 
storage capacities, to offshore wind farms, or to solar 
thermal plants in Africa. Apart from offsetting regional 
and temporal energy supply fluctuations, this contrib­
utes to the efficiency and improvement of the strategic 
supply situation, as it allows optimum use of locations 
particularly well suited to the respective resource, and 
compensation in the event of import shortfalls. Such 
division of labour would be more cost­effective than 
respective individual national decarbonisation strate­
gies with a need for self­supply. 
The EU’s Third Internal Energy Market Legislative 
Package creates a new legal framework for the cross­
border management of grid operation, unlike previ­
ous EU liberalisation steps, and focuses on the prob­
lematic issue of grid planning. One aspect is that net­
work operators are obliged to produce regional and 
EU­wide10­year grid development plans. There is no 
obligation to expand the supply networks, and there 
are no substantive criteria or procedural specifications. 
In order to guarantee the timely construction of new 
grids and ensure the promotion of electricity feed­in 
from renewable sources, the EU’s legally relevant acts 
(for instance the Electricity Directive) must be updated 
as soon as possible to include obligations with regard to 
not only grid planning, but also grid construction and 
expansion, accompanied by the substantive objectives 
Box 5.4-4
Europe-Wide Harmonisation of Renewable 
Energies Promotion
In recent years, the proposal of a Europe­wide alignment of 
renewable energy promotion schemes has been discussed 
repeatedly, although it has not been introduced as yet (SRU, 
2011). This harmonisation could be realised with standard 
feed­in tariffs, a quota system (renewable portfolio stand­
ards) and tradable certificates (renewable/green energy cer­
tificates), and with competitive tendering, although it must 
be considered that the choice of promotion scheme would 
impact the various renewable energy technologies’ expansion 
rates (Box 5.2­4; IEA, 2008a). A standard EU renewable ener­
gy promotion scheme would ensure that renewable energy 
generation would take place at those locations within the EU 
that provide the most favourable conditions for the different 
renewable energy technologies. In theory, harmonised pro­
motion could unlock efficiency potentials within the EU, due 
to the different conditions of various geographical locations, 
and the varying potentials for renewable energy generation. 
The proposal of harmonising European promotion schemes 
was most recently addressed in the European Commission’s 
‘Energy 2020’ energy strategy in November 2010 (EU COM, 
2010f). The German Advisory Council on the Environment 
(SRU) has also discussed the full harmonisation of promo­
tion schemes across the EU in its latest report (SRU, 2011). 
In this report, the theoretically existent efficiency benefits 
of a Europe­wide harmonisation of promotion schemes are 
contrasted with the practical disadvantages. In the case of a 
decision in favour of standard feed­in tariffs across Europe, 
there is a conflict of objectives between exploiting the cost 
saving potentials, i. e. focusing on optimum locations with 
correspondingly low subsidy rates, and a promotion policy 
that also encourages investments in countries where the 
geographical situation is less favourable. However, the latter 
would require higher feed­in tariffs, which in turn – assuming 
standard rates – could result in freerider effects in the more 
favourably placed regions. Furthermore, during the transi­
tion from national systems to a European scheme, a period 
of investment uncertainty could ensue. The report also high­
lights possible acceptance issues on the part of politicians 
and society if the promotion were concentrated on just a few 
selected locations. The SRU ultimately recommends that the 
introduction of a pan­European standard range of promotion 
instruments should not be considered earlier than 2020, due 
to the still non­existent network and storage facility infra­
structure (SRU, 2011). 
The WBGU shares these concerns with respect to the 
present technical, political and social barriers against the har­
monisation of the nevertheless appropriate promotion instru­
ment of feed­in tariffs, whilst also suggesting the deliberate 
pursuit of a pan­European feed­in tariff as of 2020, and to 
have European energy policy adjusted accordingly by 2020 
(Section 7.3.4). Essential precondition for a standard feed­
in tariff is a stepped­up grid expansion and increased trans­
mission capacities between the EU member states, as well as 
the availability of new infrastructures to manage fluctuation 
(including storage capacities, load management systems). An 
immediate, pan­European standardised feed­in tariff would 
conceivably slow down the expansion of renewable energies 
in some regions, particularly in Germany, without the abil­
ity to import sufficient electricity from renewable sources. 
Without the respective infrastructure, it seems probable that 
recourse would again be taken to less sustainable forms of 
energy. A European common electricity market with unham­
pered grid access is a further precondition which has to be 
given.
Another consideration once these prerequisites are ful­
filled is the inclusion of North Africa in a standard European 
feed­in tariff system. The requisite (external) competency the 
EU would need for a binding integration of North Africa into 
a European feed­in tariff system, from a legal perspective, has 
already been granted (Section 5.4.3). The (internal) compe­
tency for ecologically motivated funding of renewable ener­
gies, Article 191 TFEU, also gives rise to the corresponding – 
although not explicitly stated – authority to bindingly act for 
the member states in external relations, i. e. towards third 
countries (so­called AETR ECJ judgement, judgement 22/70, 
decision dated 31/03/1971, Court of Justice Reports 1971, 
p. 263). However, this would also require further network 
expansion in the form of a transcontinental power grid, which 
is probably not going to be realised before 2030. 
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of renewable energies promotion. In procedural terms, 
the Union’s citizens must be involved and participate in 
the EU­wide planning process at the earliest opportu­
nity. A later participation in the planning of individual 
grid sections only is too late and distorts the overall 
planning perspective.
However, in terms of competency, the EU is still not 
authorised to accelerate its grid expansion promotion: 
since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the EU has 
been given the authority for energy policy decisions 
and, within this context, it also has the option of pro­
moting the interconnection of energy networks (Article 
194 Section 1 (d) TFEU). In the absence of a limitation 
to this authority, the EU can initiate its own projects 
based on this, and oblige its member states also with 
respect to the ‘whether’ with regard to implementation. 
Alone in terms of the mode of implementation (‘how’), 
for example with respect to specific power cable rout­
ing, it is currently unable to act due to its lack of plan­
ning competency. The competency therefore rests with 
the member states. As the EU­wide expansion of the 
energy grids requires extensive commitment on the 
part of the member states, this EU competency should 
also be extended. As per the European Court ruling on 
the European Agreement on Road Transport (AETR), 
this would also simultaneously grant the EU the com­
petency it needs to push ahead with grid expansion 
beyond EU borders. 
Despite the current competency situation, the 
EU Commission has already presented a concept for 
an integrated European energy grid. It proposes the 
identification of energy infrastructure priorities, and 
measures for their prompt implementation  (EU COM, 
2010e). This must fundamentally be viewed as posi­
tive. However, effective implementation still requires 
legal obligation.
Grid expansion also requires substantial investments, 
particularly in regions which are unable to attract pri­
vate investors. These regions therefore require public 
aid. The requisite funds should also be made available 
at European level. In addition, government incentives 
are called for (for example the offer of low­interest 
loans) and, possibly, the introduction of a legal obliga­
tion to expand the grids, assuming this is economically 
feasible. 
EU-Wide Grid Access
A continent­wide, sustainable energy supply requires 
the creation of a functioning European internal energy 
market. The WBGU supports the liberalisation of the 
member state energy markets under Union law, char­
acterised by a regulated network access model which 
essentially requires the establishment of an appropri­
ate regulatory authority. 
The liberalisation of the Union­wide energy market 
must be stabilised and advanced further. For the pur­
pose of decarbonisation, the legal framework conditions 
should be structured in a way that allows the internali­
sation of externalised costs, for example those caused 
by greenhouse gas emissions (Section 5.2). Applying 
the ‘polluter pays’ principle, these costs must be cov­
ered by the energy supply companies to prevent the 
continued support of existing climate­damaging struc­
tures through progressive liberalisation (Section  5.2). 
The EU should therefore use its existing competences 
to realise a low­carbon internal energy market, and for­
mulate the appropriate framework regulations. 
In the absence of adequate implementation of the 
measures envisaged in the Third Internal Energy Mar­
ket Legislative Package, the European internal energy 
market has as yet not been sufficiently liberalised to 
allow demerging, unlimited grid access and transna­
tional trade. It continues to be dominated by the estab­
lished energy supply companies. In order to open up 
opportunities for new energy market actors and remove 
the existing legal and actual barriers to European energy 
network access, member states must ensure implemen­
tation of the Third Internal Energy Market Legislative 
Package’s already extensive demerger regulations. Fur­
thermore, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) established by the Third Internal 
Energy Market Legislative Package, the European Net­
work of Transmission System Operators for Electric­
ity (ENTSO­E), and the European Network of Trans­
mission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO­G) must be 
supported, not least to facilitate coordinated EU­wide 
energy grid expansion. 
5.4.3.2 
Possible Course of International EU Action
Expansion of External EU Competency
The promotion of renewable energies, construction and 
expansion of grid infrastructures, and decarbonisation 
of the EU­wide energy system by 2050 all require the 
involvement of countries bordering on Europe. In the 
WBGU’s view, the EU should therefore exploit its exist­
ing external competences with regard to the agreement 
of international law treaties fully, and be granted fur­
ther external competences beyond those it currently 
has. In addition to its explicit external competences, 
the EU also has an implicit authority to agree treaties 
that runs parallel to its internal competencies, accord­
ing to settled European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law, 
now established in Article 216 TFEU. As Article 191 et 
seq., 194 TFEU authorises the EU to promote renewa­
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ble energies internally, and Article 194 TFEU confers 
the authority for grid infrastructure construction and 
expansion, the EU does have the respective external 
competencies. However, the EU­wide decarbonisation 
of the energy system requires competency for setting 
an EU­wide energy strategy (particularly with respect 
to choice of energy carriers and transnational grid 
expansion). In this respect, the EU does not have the 
necessary internal authority. The agreement of respec­
tive treaties under international law therefore requires 
a currently not existing, corresponding internal com­
petency.
Promote Cooperation with Neighbouring Countries
The decarbonisation of the EU­wide energy system by 
2050 can be achieved more cost­effectively if Europe 
cooperates with its neighbouring countries. Core ele­
ment would be the initiation of broadly impacting 
energy partnerships between the EU and North Africa 
(analogue to the EU partnerships with major newly 
industrialising countries), in order to utilise the favour­
able local conditions for renewable energies (wind and 
solar power) (WBGU, 2009, 2010b). European­Afri­
can energy partnerships should firstly contribute to the 
European energy supply, and secondly help to estab­
lish sustainable energy supply infrastructures in Africa 
to effectively combat energy poverty (Section 7.3.5). 
A future project such as this could also put any coop­
eration between Europe and Africa on a completely 
new footing on the basis of common interests. Devel­
opment, energy and stability policies would be bun­
dled. An African­European energy alliance could be a 
central element in the transformation to a low­carbon 
global economy. Africa would thus gain entirely new, 
long­term development opportunities. Overall, EU 
development policy should consistently combine the 
poverty reduction target system (Millennium Develop­
ment Goals) with decarbonisation strategies. European 
development policy should take on a pioneering role 
with regard to this kind of strategy change, not least in 
order to gain credibility on the international stage (Sec­
tions 7.3.9, 7.3.10).
5.4.4 
Global Governance through International 
 Cooperation
Although many of the elementary action fields for a 
transformation towards a low­carbon society, such as 
transformation of the energy systems or urban plan­
ning and land­use issues, above all require local and 
national solutions, a successful transformation is almost 
inconceivable without genuinely global action. A high 
level of international cooperation and global govern­
ance is therefore an important premise for the success 
of the transformation advocated by the WBGU. With­
out close harmonisation and international policy coor­
dination in the policy areas that are essential to the 
transformation, the requisite trend reversal in global 
development dynamics will be impossible.
However, the complex challenges of climate change, 
the now tight planetary guard rails of the fossil age, 
and the multipolar restructuring of the international 
community of states appear almost unmanageable with 
the established means of multilateral politics. In view of 
the snail’s pace of the current negotiation round of the 
World Trade Organisation, the stagnant state of inter­
national climate negotiations, or the G20’s new activi­
ties, there are numerous claims that multilateralism is 
in a crisis, including postulations that its end is nigh 
(Section 5.3.5). At the same time, transnational coop­
eration remains essential for managing global problems, 
not least one of the reasons for the WBGU’s demand 
for an ‘international cooperation revolution’ (WBGU, 
2009, 2010b). To name but one concrete example, deci­
sion processes based on the majority principle should 
be allowed in the context of the UN Framework Con­
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in order to over­
come the crippling consensus formation at lowest com­
mon denominator level (WBGU, 2010b).
A transformative cooperation revolution for the 
purpose of effective and legitimate global governance 
must have a broader spectrum, and a more profound 
effect than merely overcoming the established consen­
sus principle of multilateral negotiation processes. The 
International Human Dimensions Programme on Global 
Environmental Change advocates the need for ‘Earth 
System Governance’, developing conventional notions 
of global governance further and transcending them 
with a dedicated consideration of global environmen­
tal change (Biermann, 2007, 2008). Irrespective of this 
it is still difficult to imagine that the necessary level of 
universal cooperation can be achieved in the present 
international system outside of the established insti­
tutional structures of international law and the United 
Nations (Section 5.3.5). 
This does not mean that the United Nations should 
be turned into a global super­government hierar­
chically superordinate to the sovereign nation state 
world. However, as a multilateral platform for action 
which links international organisations and transna­
tional actors from civil society and the private sec­
tor and reduces the complexity of international and 
regional political processes at the global level, thereby 
improving the framework conditions for intergovern­
mental cooperation, it remains indispensable. It will not 
effortlessly evolve into an integrated, multilateral world 
5 Transformation Governance
224
order, but represents a foundation for the global society 
to legitimately pursue aspirations of global governance.
In this context, a number of sometimes contradictory 
myths regarding the nature of multilateralism must be 
dispelled, as these have to date prevented the ‘coopera­
tion revolution’. Multilateralism is, for example, often 
described as the ‘soft’ option in comparison to unilat­
eral foreign policy and bilateral cooperation, subscribed 
to by states only in ‘good times’, when there are only 
‘moderate’ coordination and cooperation problems. 
However, it did not just take climate change to show 
that the global interdependencies already observed in 
the 1970s, making the distinction between ‘high poli­
tics’ and ‘low politics’ seem increasingly artificial, are 
real (Held et al., 1999; Keohane and Nye, 2001; WBGU, 
2008). 
Another myth is the assumption that multilateral­
ism could virtually replace ‘leadership’ in global prob­
lem management as the pressure is shared by so many. 
This curtate perception of international cooperation 
fails to recognise that multilateral politics become 
effective above all when one or several of the coop­
erating partners have the power to act, taking over 
the leadership and showing a serious commitment to 
resolving the problem concerned (Lake, 1993; Under­
dal, 1998; Brzezinski, 2004; Lindenthal, 2009). A third 
myth, frequently cited as an argument against entering 
into multilateral obligations, is the fear of giving up too 
much sovereignty, thereby encouraging the formation 
of supranational bureaucracies with decision­making 
power but without democratic legitimacy – ‘institu­
tional Frankensteins terrorising the global countryside’ 
(Hawkins et al., 2006). Despite international organisa­
tions’ pursuit of autonomy and rational­legal authority, 
this is ultimately prevented by the national sovereignty 
of their member states, as in practice, their conflicts of 
interest tend to be moderated, rather than overlooked 
(Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Vaubel, 2006; Biermann 
and Siebenhüner, 2009).
Not only do myths such as these, inhibiting coopera­
tion, need to be dispelled, but further and ongoing clar­
ification is needed concerning the global system risks 
resulting from ecological, technological and socio­eco­
nomic megatrends now faced by the global community 
(Chapter 1; Beck, 2007; Messner et al., 2009). Granted, 
the fundamental problem awareness, particularly with 
regard to the ecological risks, has risen worldwide con­
tinuously since the beginnings of the ‘green movement’ 
in the 1970s, augmented by the climate policy debate 
in recent years (Chapter 2; Sommer, 2011). Neverthe­
less, there is still little awareness of the fact that today’s 
evident juncture between technological and economic 
change represents a civilisation threshold rivalling the 
Industrial Revolution, and of the resultant needs for 
political transformation (Chapter 3). This is proved by 
the parallelism between rapid technological and social 
innovations in transformation­friendly niches and a 
conventional society dedicated to the fossil age and a 
logic of constant growth (Chapter 3). It can safely be 
assumed that this is also the catch when it comes to the 
transition from a ‘world of possibilities’ to a ‘world of 
necessity’ (Ostrom, 2003).
This does by no means suggest that the global trans­
formation represents a primarily technocratic challenge 
which could easily be implemented solely with power 
politics and financial efforts (Messner, 2011). On the 
contrary, it is a profoundly social challenge. It demands 
long­term focused action from political and economic 
decision­makers, based on sound scientific insights, 
i. e. not merely action in response to events that have 
already occurred, such as the 2007 to 2009 global 
financial market crisis or the serious nuclear disaster in 
Fukushima, Japan, in 2011. It implies profound social 
innovations, starting with the prevalent ‘mental maps’ 
in politics, economy, and society (Leggewie and Welzer, 
2009; Messner, 2011). An international policy failure 
with regard to the transformation, and particularly with 
regard to the prevention of unabated climate change, 
would inevitably result in a radical change of the global 
economy, and consequently a change of global politics 
– so the global community is facing some form of glo­
bal upheaval in any case (WBGU, 2008; Leggewie and 
Welzer, 2009; Messner and Rahmstorf, 2009).
If the international political protagonists continue to 
cling to primarily asserting their unilateral interests, the 
global transformation will fail altogether, and there will 
be other impediments besides unabated progressive 
climate change preventing an international cooperation 
that is based on trust (Figure 5.3­1). In all probabil­
ity, global environmental changes could then increas­
ingly become a security­relevant matter, completely 
bypassing the underlying problems. Conversely, a com­
prehensive and credible international decarbonisation 
policy could not least serve as a confidence­building 
measure between the superpowers, and become one of 
the important pillars of a completely remodelled mul­
tilateralism in the coming years and decades (Bauer, 
2009). Essentially, the global decarbonisation would 
become the disarmament diplomacy of the future (Fig­
ure 5.3­1).
The WBGU believes that there are four key start­
ing points for progressing towards a global coopera­
tion revolution despite the adverse global political 
conditions: overcoming the emerging power vacuum 
in international relations (Section 5.4.4.1); setting 
transformation­friendly priorities at the highest politi­
cal level (Section 5.4.4.2); approaching the overriding 
objective of global fairness by establishing credibility, 
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particularly on the part of the affluent industrialised 
countries (Section 5.4.4.3); and redesigning the insti­
tutional framework for multilateral political processes 
(Section 5.4.4.4).
5.4.4.1 
Managing the International Power Vacuum
The international power vacuum associated with the 
trend towards the multipolar restructuring of global 
politics and the resultant barriers preventing inter­
governmental cooperation must be overcome (Sec­
tion 5.3.5). Geopolitical alliances, coupled with strong 
political leadership, can take on a defining role in this 
respect to progress towards the international policy 
quadrant of cooperative global governance in a decar­
bonised global economy (Figure 5.3­1).
The WBGU believes that a geopolitical strategy, 
using climate policy decidedly as the groundbreaking 
vehicle for establishing mutual trust between the glo­
bal superpowers, and for the constructive development 
of global interdependence, serves best here (WBGU 
2009b, 2010; Bauer, 2009; Messner, 2010). Subglo­
bal alliances that display influential pioneering spirit 
in the relevant policy areas – such as forest policy or 
emissions trading – in the context of privileged geo­
political partnerships could become confident drivers 
of a sophisticated, cooperative multilateralism. In line 
with the model of the six core countries of the Euro­
pean Community, such alliances could gradually expand 
(Messner, 2010; WBGU, 2010b).
An approach such as this would particularly provide 
ambitious states willing to cooperate with the opportu­
nity of reaching a pole position in the transformative 
innovation race beyond the G2 (China, USA), which 
take turns in blocking each other. Current research on 
common pool resources as the subject of international 
regimes and based on the example of climate policy 
reveals that at least four potentially advantageous situ­
ations can be construed from this at international level 
for the cooperating states (Keohane and Victor, 2010): 
(1) ‘first­mover advantage’ situation; (2) common 
pool resources co­benefits situation; (3) common pool 
resources benefits exclusion situation; and (4) small 
group reciprocity situation. Various different strategies 
are appropriate here, depending on incentive structure, 
to establish certain cooperation situations and action 
alliances (Bauer and Sommer, 2011).
The need for rapid global transformation means that 
the global community cannot sit back idly and wait until 
the USA and China have ‘got it together’ in a multipo­
lar world order, so the European Union should seize the 
chance to form ambitious transformation alliances with 
key countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Egypt or South Korea. As the WBGU has already dem­
onstrated in the context of international climate pol­
icy, deforestation and its prevention, the modernisation 
of transformation­relevant systemic infrastructures in 
the energy and mobility sectors, and the expansion of 
the European Emissions Trading Scheme are all suitable 
issues to serve as a basis (WBGU, 2010b).
5.4.4.2 
Transformative Prioritisation
The inertia of multilateral negotiation processes associ­
ated with the blockades described above must be over­
come by accelerating global decision­making processes. 
The international community’s reaction capability in 
response to the global financial crisis of 2008, and the 
impulses given by the G20 in this context are signals 
allowing a cautiously optimistic view where this is con­
cerned (Berensmann et al., 2011). In the short term, 
the pressure to act in response to ecological and socio­
economic megatrends (Chapter 1) must be translated 
into political decisions with specific strategies for their 
implementation in the long­term. This needs clearly 
defined policy­based targets, an explicit timeframe, 
corresponding innovation efforts and prioritisation 
(Messner, 2010). However, this nevertheless assumes 
that these priorities are taken seriously, and not coun­
teracted by diffidence in the light of supposed competi­
tive disadvantages or other considerations with a short­
term orientation.
In the ‘Palais­Royal Initiative’, eminent figures 
active in international finance and economic policy 
recently spoke out clearly in favour of such prioriti­
sation on the part of heads of state and government, 
issuing a forceful reminder of the need to give the ‘glo­
bal interest’ its own authoritative voice beyond paro­
chial national interests (Camdessus et al., 2011; Köhler, 
2011). Although this specific initiative may be limited 
to issues of international financial and monetary policy, 
the underlying logic of putting global system risks for­
ward as an argument can still be generalised for global 
public goods: these urgently need legitimate and effec­
tive decision­making structures to provide a framework 
for ‘global interest’ advocates to be able to identify pri­
orities for international action (Messner, et al., 2009; 
Camdessus, et al., 2011).
5.4.4.3 
Credible Pursuit of Fairness
Overcoming the international power vacuum coopera­
tively and setting transformative priorities will be con­
siderably easier to achieve if particularly the indus­
trialised countries, as the main consumers of plane­
tary resources to date, credibly fulfil their obligation 
towards the developing countries in this respect to 
allow fair burden sharing for the purpose of sustain­
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able development (Section 7.3.9). In a world of extreme 
inequality, goods distribution is a central aspect of fair­
ness; accordingly, the distribution of global goods is an 
integral element of the international discourse on the 
establishment of global fairness (Parks and Roberts, 
2006; Roberts and Parks, 2007; Müller, 2008).
In the context of international climate policy, the 
WBGU developed its own proposal to combine politi­
cal pragmatism with global fairness by means of emis­
sion rights trading (2009b). Assuming a global emis­
sions budget, national emissions budgets can be allo­
cated on a per capita basis (Box 1.1­1). Countries with 
high greenhouse gas emissions could therefore extend 
their remaining national emissions budgets by buying 
emission rights, whilst countries with low emissions 
would obtain financial resources and technologies for 
low­carbon development by selling some of their rights. 
This proposal rewards greenhouse gas efficiency and 
the establishment of low­carbon energy structures and 
infrastructures in developing countries (WBGU, 2009). 
The WBGU views this as an excellent opportunity for a 
fundamental restructuring of the cooperation relation­
ships between industrialised and developing countries, 
particularly as the newly industrialising and developing 
countries also need to decarbonise their economic sys­
tems in the long term with respect to the global trans­
formation towards sustainability (WBGU, 2009). The 
common vision agreed by the community of states in 
Cancún focuses on the principle of equitable access to 
sustainable development instead (UNFCCC, 2010).
Apart from the urgent demand to promptly trans­
late such a vision into concrete action, the fulfilment of 
commitments already voiced – particularly on the part 
of the industrialised countries, for instance in the con­
text of the Kyoto Protocol or the CBD – is an absolute 
imperative for the preservation, or restoration, of cred­
ibility. The rise of large newly industrialising countries 
such as China, India or Brazil is associated with sub­
stantial resource consumption. On the one hand, this 
demands continued differentiation in the discussion on 
distribution in the sense of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’, which must extend beyond a subcom­
plex North­South dichotomy (Bauer and Richerzhagen, 
2007). On the other hand, the fundamental obligation 
the industrialised countries hold towards the develop­
ing countries cannot legitimately be questioned in the 
context of global environmental change and global fair­
ness.
The principle of credible burden sharing should 
accordingly also be applied to other policy areas, and 
should be accompanied by an appropriately generous 
transfer of financial resources or technologies to prove 
its credibility (Section 7.3). The breakthroughs in the 
long deadlocked multilateral negotiations on climate 
and biodiversity in 2010 show that this could well be 
one of the keys to success. 
5.4.4.4 
Improving International Cooperation Institutional 
Framework Conditions
In order to sustainably improve the preconditions for 
international cooperation for the purpose of global gov­
ernance, it appears inevitable that substantial institu­
tional changes must be made. For future global govern­
ance to be effective in terms of the transformation into 
a sustainable world society, the international commu­
nity of states will need to take the planetary guard rails 
seriously, as they are the long­term parameters for mul­
tilateral cooperation across all sectors.
In spite of all its institutional deficiencies, the United 
Nations continue to provide an action framework that is 
fundamentally suitable for this, as the striving for a glo­
bal transformation must include all countries, at least 
in the medium term. Exclusive alternative models such 
as the G20, for example, inevitably face restrictions 
in terms of achievability. Any country can potentially 
shift the significant parameters for global environmen­
tal change towards the planetary guard rails, and no 
superpower has the authority to prevent this (Bauer, 
2009). The unlimited exploitation of atmospheric space 
through the emission of greenhouse gases is only the 
most prominent, but certainly not the only example of 
this (Chapter 1). In the long term, exclusivity would be 
as self­damaging as deliberate non­compliance – for 
example with regard to deforestation issues. 
The extent to which the present hodgepodge of 
established and new multilateral processes and struc­
tures can have a catalytic effect on global consensus 
formation remains to be seen – it could transpire that 
G20 or transnational actor network models serve to 
accelerate decision­making processes within the UN, 
and inspire it with more unconventional ideas. Con­
versely, however, the formation of parallel structures 
could increase transaction costs, promote competitive­
ness and encourage institutional fragmentation, coun­
teracting global political objectives. Evidently, it must 
be understood that in view of the realities of frag­
mented regime complexes, coordination must not be an 
end to its own means, to be used to enforce multiply 
attested ‘synergies’ or greater effectiveness by use of 
an organigram (Oberthür and Gehring, 2005; Biermann 
et al., 2009; Keohane and Victor, 2010; Zelli et al., 
2010). Viewed from the perspective of a transforma­
tion logic, it is far more essential that the individual ele­
ments of complex governance regimes do not have an 
impeding effect on cooperation; ideally, they can rein­
force each other for the purpose of ‘polycentric’ gov­
ernance (Ostrom, 2010).
A New Statehood within the Multilevel System   5.4
227
Particularly the further developments in interna­
tional climate policy have the potential to become both 
a testing ground and a gauge for global politics in com­
ing years and decades. Initially only a hypothesis, glo­
bal multipolarity has long become a reality in this con­
text: without the cooperation of the USA, the EU, China 
and India, it will not be possible to restrict global warm­
ing to a level that is – just about – manageable. Numer­
ous other countries – particularly the forest­rich devel­
oping countries in Latin America, Central Africa and 
Southern Asia – could also endanger the 2 °C guard rail 
by refusing to cooperate. Sooner rather than later, even 
poor developing countries must choose a low­carbon 
development path (Bauer, 2009; WBGU, 2009).
Analyses by the consultancy firm McKinsey (2009) 
also show that a 2 °C scenario can realistically be 
achieved only by means of global cooperation: of the 
climate policy scenarios summarised in Figure 5.4­1, 
only ‘Green World’ (1) and ‘Global Action’ (2) can still 
stop dangerous climate change – although they differ­
entiate between industrialised and developing coun­
tries with regard to the relative importance of meas­
ures, they both require universal participation.
In international environmental policy, an elaborate, 
multilateral consultation process with the aim of insti­
tutional reforms is already in full swing. This momen­
tum was triggered by the realisation, proven by the 
recurrent respective declarations of intent on the part 
of the member states, that the United Nations’ capa­
bilities for action are evidently not commensurate 
with those needed to solve obvious regional and glo­
bal environmental problems, although the current pro­
cess is closely linked to previous discussions on the ifs 
and buts of a more forceful international environmen­
tal governance (WBGU, 2001b; Bauer and Biermann, 
2005).
Although the Cartagena Package agreed by the 
UNEP Governing Council in 2002 and the Bali Strategic 
Plan passed in 2005 represent considerable progress, 
also functioning as a benchmark to prove the serious­
ness of current reform efforts (Bauer, 2008; Simon, 
2010), they still represent the incrementalism that 
characterises the United Nations. This incrementalism 
does not seem to be suitable for bringing about the 
profound institutional and procedural adjustments in 
the international environmental architecture needed to 
actually lend greater weight to international environ­
mental policy actors in the complex web of interests 
that is global politics.
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– Developed world starts in 2010, others in 2015
"Developed world in the lead" 
– Developed world captures 90% of 
   technical levers <€ 60 per t CO2eq from 2010 
– Developing world captures 50% of technical
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Figure 5.4-1
Integrated realisation scenarios 2010­2030. Only the scenarios ‘Green World’ and ‘Global Action’ would achieve emission 
paths with a high probability of compliance with the 2 °C guard rail as a consequence of drastic measures by industrialised and 
developing countries.
Source: McKinsey, 2009
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Since the Global Ministerial Environment Forum in 
2010, it is a generally accepted fact that in the area of 
environmental policy, the United Nations must speak 
up in unison far more than they have done so far, their 
voice must carry political weight and be backed up by 
credible expert authority. United Nations activities at 
the interface of environment and development must be 
better coordinated, and more financial resources must 
be provided for environmental policy goals (Beisheim 
and Simon, 2010; IEG, 2010; IISD, 2010).
Moreover, in this context, the industrialised coun­
tries fundamentally accept that more needs to be done 
to establish environmental policy capacities in develop­
ing countries if internationally agreed measures are to 
be implemented effectively at national and local level. 
As well as additional financial and technical capaci­
ties, this primarily requires a range of instruments that 
allows a sensible coordination of the strongly frag­
mented international environmental policy architec­
ture, both internally and with regard to interaction with 
other policy areas. One form this improved coordina­
tion could and should take is the targeted reduction of 
the ‘multilateral travelling circus’ (Munoz et al., 2009). 
The countless Conferences of the Parties, and the asso­
ciated preparatory and working group meetings, not 
only overtax many developing countries in terms of 
human resources, they are consequently also de facto 
disadvantaged in concrete negotiation situations.
A corresponding reform of international environ­
mental policy should pursue the replacement of the 
UN Environment Programme (UNEP) with a dedicated, 
newly to be established UN Specialised Agency for 
the environment with far­reaching competencies, or 
the transformation of the UNEP itself, for instance its 
expansion and upgrading to a key global organisation 
along the lines of the World Health Organisation (Sec­
tion 7.3.10; Biermann, 2005). In the past, corresponding 
initiatives have regularly fizzled out, although they did 
ultimately not only succeed in gaining increased politi­
cal attention, the debate also became more focused on 
the seriousness of the situation, and won the support of 
central actors such as the EU and Brazil (Simon, 2010). 
This becomes apparent not least through the particular 
emphasis on the development policy dimension of any 
potential environmental policy institutional reform.
As it is particularly the point where international 
environmental and development policy meet that high­
light the difficulties of potential organisational reforms. 
On the one hand, these lie in the restructuring of the 
relationships between the proposed dedicated UN Spe­
cialized Agency for the environment and existing envi­
ronmental policy institutions. They each have their 
own particular foundations under international law, 
particularly the Global Environment Facility (GEF), 
the various multilateral environmental treaty regimes 
with their own respective Conferences of the Parties 
and bureaucracies, or the Commission for Sustainable 
Development (CSD) established as a result of the 1992 
Rio Summit. On the other hand, a balance would also 
have to be found in the relationship between a new 
global organisation and the international actors com­
peting both normatively and operationally, rather 
than pouring old wine into new wineskins. The struc­
tural issues encountered by, for example, the UNEP 
ever since its inception cannot be overcome by formal 
upgrading alone (Najam, 2005). Therefore, in order to 
ensure that the establishment of a dedicated UN Spe­
cialized Agency for the environment amounts to more 
than merely symbolic ‘actionism’, and that it can actu­
ally develop greater political weight and legitimisation 
than the weak UNEP, it is essential that it is supported 
by the international community of states with a broad 
consensus (Simon, 2010).
This also applies more or less to the United Nations 
Development Group reform debate, which has also 
become bogged down by detailed incrementalism 
(Weinlich, 2011). Although the expansion of efficient 
and result­driven management approaches combined 
with UN­wide harmonised procedures along the lines 
of the ‘Delivering As One’ initiative do offer some inter­
esting starting points, they cannot meet global govern­
ance requirements. Indeed, many donor countries seem 
to regard the United Nations as nothing more than a 
service provider for multilateral development coopera­
tion (Weinlich, 2011).
The UN Conference on Sustainable Development 
(UNCSD, Rio+20 Conference) called for 2012 provides 
the United Nations with an excellent and timely oppor­
tunity to overcome the typical reform incrementalism 
in favour of radical institutional reforms. The thematic 
focus on the two key aspects of ‘Green Economy in 
the Context of Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Eradication’ and ‘Institutional Framework for Sustain­
able Development’ unanimously agreed by the interna­
tional community suggests not least a desire for better 
programmatic and operational dovetailing of the United 
Nations’ environmental and development policy activi­
ties (Section 7.3.10). If this were to succeed, the Con­
ference could become an important milestone on the 
road to a comprehensive cooperative global governance 
architecture, without which the global transformation 
to sustainability cannot succeed.
A New Statehood within the Multilevel System   5.4
229
5.4.5 
Transformative Governance in the Three 
 Transformation Fields
The transformation process in the transformation fields 
analysed, namely energy, urbanisation and land use, 
must be designed within the multilevel system. To date, 
any political decision­making has at best taken place 
at national and local level. It lacks the necessary polit­
ical attention at international level, although a dis­
tinction must be drawn here between OECD and non­
OECD countries. It appears to be the case in all three 
transformation fields that the necessary technolo­
gies, techniques and political instruments are already 
known; however, an international coordination process 
is required for the three fundamental infrastructures 
identified for a low­carbon world economy. To date, no 
global governance mechanisms exist for the establish­
ment and rebuilding of these fundamental infrastruc­
tures to allow a course change towards a low­carbon 
economy and society by 2020. In all three transforma­
tion fields, international cooperation and coordination 
is called for in order to agree goals/targets, generate an 
enforcement of rules, and prevent freeriding. Through 
international cooperation, positive incentives could be 
provided in developing and newly industrialising coun­
tries to ensure that these are also in a position to imple­
ment a transformation policy.
5.4.5.1 
Transformative Governance of the Energy System
Access to safe, clean and affordable energy for all peo­
ple worldwide whilst also achieving decarbonisation are 
the global energy system of the 21st century’s key chal­
lenges. Currently, more than 80 % of global energy use 
continues to rely on environment and climate damaging 
fossil energy carriers. Almost 3 billion people still have 
no access to the basic necessities afforded by essen­
tial modern energy services. In order to transfer exist­
ing energy systems and meet the increasing energy 
demand in developing and newly industrialising coun­
tries, technological development paths must be funda­
mentally changed. Increasing energy efficiency sub­
stantially is vital, as is a massive expansion of renewa­
ble energies (Chapter 4).
Energy system tranformation towards low­carbon 
has gained in importance all over the world. For a long 
time, supply security and low prices (operative effi­
ciency) were the foremost objectives of energy policy. 
This has changed in the light of dwindling oil resources 
(peak oil) and in the context of the global climate 
discourse (Prugh et al., 2005; Homer­Dixon, 2009; 
Sterner, 2010). There is now a global awareness that 
climate protection is one of the greatest challenges of 
energy policy (Scrace and MacKerron, 2009).
Nevertheless, there are still great barriers on the 
road to the transformation. The fossil energy carri­
ers still available in large quantities, for example coal, 
which is also relatively cheap, make alternative energy 
paths seem expensive in comparison. High investment 
requirements impede the establishment of a sustainable 
energy infrastructure, particularly in newly industrial­
ising and developing countries. As long as carbon diox­
ide does not have a sufficiently high price, there are 
few incentives to invest in relatively expensive zero­
carbon technologies (Section 5.2). Multi­billion subsi­
dies and interests established over decades also sup­
port the fossil­fuelled system (Sections 4.5, 5.3.1.2). 
Altering incentive systems to permit the establishment 
of a low­carbon, sustainable energy system therefore 
becomes one of the most important governance tasks 
for the transformation.
As elaborated in Chapter 4, there are basically suf­
ficient sustainable renewable energy potentials to pro­
vide the whole world with energy (Section 4.1.5). From 
a technological point of view, a radical expansion of 
renewable energies could unlock sufficient renew­
able energy sources to cover the entire global energy 
demand by the middle of the century. Extensive decar­
bonisation of the energy systems is possible with vari­
ous technology mixes, and it is achievable in a period 
that allows compliance with the 2 °C guard rail with a 
probability of around 50 %. So there is nothing much 
to prevent a radical energy turnaround, from a techni­
cal perspective. 
As illustrated in Section 5.2, the political instru­
ments for implementation and acceleration are also 
already known. A CO2 emissions trading scheme 
is already established in the EU, it could easily be 
expanded. Around the world, more than 50 countries, 
including numerous developing and newly industrialis­
ing countries, have already introduced feed­in tariffs 
for renewable energies (Box 5.2­4). There are also other 
established, proven instruments available, such as 
administrative command­and­control, taxation, trad­
able permits, and planning and market regulations to 
facilitate the introduction of a transformation process 
and its acceleration. The rapid and concurrent use of 
various different instruments can initiate the systemic 
and fundamental changes in the economy, and in soci­
ety, towards transformation. 
Energy Governance in a Globalised Multilevel 
System
In a globalised multilevel system, energy system gov­
ernance involves many private sector actors, from indi­
vidual energy consumers to powerful energy com­
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panies, and it is impacted in turn by complex market 
dynamics and geopolitical interests (Scrace and Mac­
Kerron, 2009). Whether and how the transforma­
tion can succeed does therefore not depend solely on 
energy policy. In the past, energy policy was perceived 
primarily as a task for nation states, not least because of 
the energy sector’s strategic significance. The liberalisa­
tion of the energy sector, economic and technical inter­
relations between the states, the transnational conse­
quences of energy use and, not least, the climate and 
development issue have led to a pronounced interna­
tionalisation of energy policy (WBGU, 2004). 
However, the nation state remains a central politi­
cal action level (Reiche, 2005; Giddens, 2009). National 
policies for the expansion of renewable energies and 
decarbonisation have been implemented in various 
countries, although they differ in weight. Certain newly 
industrialising countries, for example China and South 
Africa, are pursuing the expansion of renewable ener­
gies with great ambition (REN21, 2010; IEA, 2010c). 
However, with the exception of a few countries, for 
instance states with a high level of hydropower poten­
tial, the proportion of sustainable energy forms in the 
energy mix remains very low overall. Fossil portfolios 
continue to dominate. Whereas in essence, the finan­
cial and technical means for the transformation would 
actually be available to the industrialised countries, 
most developing and newly industrialising countries 
require financial and technical support in order to be 
able to sustainably establish or modernise their energy 
systems (Section 4.5). Such global cooperation is also 
needed to achieve international climate protection as 
cost­efficiently as possible (IEA, 2010c; World Bank, 
2010b).
Regional approaches may act as a bridge between 
national and global solutions, and can facilitate the 
implementation of the global transformation and offer 
successful solutions for other (groups of) states. The EU 
could be a model for such regional cooperation to create 
a sustainable European energy market if it succeeds in 
deferring national interests for the benefit of an ambi­
tious, common climate and energy strategy (Section 
5.4.3).
Governance Deficit at Global Level
Climate protection and the establishment and trans­
formation of energy systems can be successfully 
advanced only on the basis of effective cooperation 
(Section 7.3.9). Particularly in the energy sector, how­
ever, there are evidently blatant deficits with regard to 
governance at global level. There is a lack of the legal 
and institutional foundations required for an effec­
tive international energy policy for the transformation 
(WBGU, 2004; Steiner et al., 2006; Scrace and MacK­
erron, 2009). In contrast to international climate pol­
icy, where a central regime with rules and instruments 
(for instance the CDM) has slowly evolved and is now 
in place, global energy policy institutions are severely 
fragmented. Numerous UN organisations, multilat­
eral financing institutions and other processes, mech­
anisms and treaties deal either directly or indirectly 
with the issue of energy, even though energy policy is 
not an actual key issue addressed by either the UN or 
a similarly comprehensive international organisation. 
The Commission for Sustainable Development’s (CSD) 
Energy cycle (2006/2007) or UN­Energy, as the UN 
system’s coordinating mechanism for energy, have so 
far succeeded only moderately in increasing the energy 
policy focus. It remains far removed from systematic 
institutionalisation (UN­Energy, 2010). An excep­
tion here is the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), as an energy­related institution within the 
United Nations system with the mandate to promote 
the peaceful use of atomic energy. 
At a global level, the link between energy and 
development policies has also long been neglected. 
With the establishment of the Advisory Group on 
Energy and Climate Change (AGECC) in 2009, a high 
level UN expert commission is finally focusing on the 
link between decarbonisation and the future provi­
sion of access to energy services in developing coun­
tries (AGECC, 2010). The Commission’s recommenda­
tions, and an institutional upgrading of UN­Energy can 
contribute to strengthening the UN system’s sustain­
able energy policy, and ranking the issue higher on the 
global agenda. Overall, a systematic linking of climate, 
energy and development agendas is urgently required 
(UNDP, 2007; Bauer, 2008; WBGU, 2010a).
An influential international energy institution does 
exist in the form of the International Energy Agency 
(IEA). However, membership, role and energy policy 
objectives leading towards sustainable energy have so 
far been restricted. As an OECD institution, it is per­
ceived as an organisation that focuses on the interests 
of the industrialised countries – along the lines of OPEC, 
a group representing the interests of crude oil export­
ing countries. For many developing and newly industri­
alising countries, it is therefore a rather difficult partner 
to consider. Over the years, however, the organisation 
has built up relevance and credibility in global energy 
policy and with regard to the issue of decarbonisation, 
and has slowly become more open towards non­OECD 
countries (Lesage et al., 2010). This has led to the estab­
lishment of the ‘Low Carbon Energy Technology Global 
Platform’ in 2009, with the intention of strengthening 
global cooperation for the development of low­carbon 
technologies. The WBGU believes that this process of 
change and increased accessibility should be pursued 
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further, and intensified. 
The growing significance of renewable energies 
worldwide is reflected in the expansion of interna­
tional initiatives in the UN context, within the frame­
work of conferences (e. g. the Renewables series), net­
work building (e. g. REN 21) and so on (Oberthür and 
Gehring, 2005; Sterner, 2010). With the founding of 
the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) 
in 2009, a new international organisation was estab­
lished, tasked with advising and supporting both 
industrialised and developing countries with regard 
to renewable energies introduction. Of the 149 sig­
nature states to date (including the EU), 65 have now 
ratified the founding treaty (as at March 2011). How­
ever, countries which are as central to global energy 
demand as China and Brazil are not among these. In 
future, once the initial problems have been overcome, 
IRENA can play an important role in the promotion 
and diffusion of renewable energies and the respec­
tive industries (Section 7.3.9). IRENA could then take 
on the important role of ‘transition coach’, particularly 
for the developing countries (Najam, 2010). Still, due 
to the current restrictions in terms of its mandate, the 
organisation is hardly in a position to advance a global 
transformation of energy systems. This would require 
an organisation which includes all energy systems and 
low­carbon energy options, as well as issues of energy 
efficiency on the demand side and systemic solutions, 
in the reform process. In the long term IRENA could 
nevertheless gradually develop into an international 
sustainable energy agency, as previously suggested by 
the WBGU (2003). 
Important Role of Subglobal Alliances
Subglobal alliances increasingly play a leading role in 
the present multipolar system of global energy and cli­
mate governance (Lesage et al., 2009, 2010; Section 
5.4.4). In terms of content, particularly the (extended) 
G8 have recently begun to intensively address the issue 
of energy and climate. In Gleneagles, under British 
presidency in 2005, and in 2006 under Russian presi­
dency, a global debate on energy started that has since 
continued, also in the context of the G8 and the G5 
dialogue process (Heiligendamm process; Lesage et al., 
2009, 2010). Consequently, the Heiligendamm summit 
in 2007 became an important step on the way to inter­
national recognition of the 2 °C target (WBGU, 2007b), 
ultimately confirmed by the leading economic powers 
in 2009 in L’Aquila (Major Economies Forum on Energy 
and Climate, of which the G8 are also members; WBGU, 
2009). The founding of the Global Bioenergy Partner­
ship (GBEP) in 2005 to promote the use of bioenergy 
was also initiated by the G8. This was followed in 2008 
by the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency 
Cooperation (IPEEC), which is open to non­OECD coun­
tries, despite its institutional affiliation with the IEA. 
The G20 states also decided the reform of fossil sub­
sidies in 2009 in Pittsburgh (IEA et al., 2010a; Sec­
tion 4.5).
The IEA, as the G8’s preferred partner on energy 
issues besides the World Bank, has undergone a politi­
cal upgrading. The G8 have so far not campaigned for 
a strengthening of the United Nations when it comes 
to energy issues, the promotion of renewable ener­
gies, or the expansion of the energy debate to include 
issues of sufficiency and lifestyles (Lesage et al., 2010). 
In the context of the G8, G8+5 and G20, progress has 
nevertheless certainly been made with regard to glo­
bal energy governance. Because of its economic and 
international political weight as well as its relevance 
for global climate protection (the G20 are responsible 
for approx. 80 % of global greenhouse gas emissions), 
this alliance continues to play a major role as a driver 
for sustainable climate and energy policy (Lesage et al., 
2010; Lindenthal, 2010). 
5.4.5.2 
Transformative Urbanisation Governance
In countries with rapid economic growth, particularly 
in Asia, a dynamic urbanisation trend can currently be 
observed (Chapter 1), with investments in non­sus­
tainable infrastructures leading to lock­in effects. This 
can undermine the transformation towards a low­car­
bon society. This urbanisation trend is frequently mar­
ket­driven through land and real estate speculation, it 
is very rarely governed (UNEP, 2011). In many cases, 
the energy supply is based on fossil fuels and prior­
ity is given to private transport, even though alterna­
tive technologies and, for example, low­carbon options 
for mobility would be available. This undesirable devel­
opment can be counteracted only with various, already 
well­known political measures, particularly at local 
government level (Section 5.2). In many OECD coun­
tries, but also in Latin America, the low­carbon rebuild­
ing of cities is required, calling for integrated and con­
trolled urban development. 
The UN defines urban governance as the sum of all 
possible measures by governmental and non­govern­
mental actors to plan and manage the public affairs 
of a city (UN Habitat, 2002). Urban planning is the 
main instrument. It is at various development stages 
in industrialised, newly industrialising, and developing 
countries. Formal urban planning, which has tradition­
ally pursued a top down approach, increasingly adopts 
more participative approaches (UN Habitat, 2009). 
Many cities, especially in the industrialised world, use 
management and formal planning systems to shape 
urbanisation. These need to be reorganised in order to 
5 Transformation Governance
232
reduce urban energy and material flows, and to ensure 
that further urbanisation takes the required transfor­
mation into account. Urban planning systems have 
also been developed in numerous transition and newly 
industrialising countries. The most obvious example is 
China, where the state is currently planning a number 
of new cities and districts. Low­carbon aspects, how­
ever, continue to play a minor role. Nevertheless, the 
Chinese government has started to recognise the impor­
tance of the issue, initiating a range of climate­friendly 
urbanisation programmes and projects (UN Habitat, 
2010b). 
In many developing countries, formal planning 
hardly exists. In such countries, planning capacities 
must first be built; and transformation aspects must 
be considered right from the outset. The planning 
processes must avoid path dependencies and lock­in 
effects, as these would block the low­carbon develop­
ment of cities for decades. This applies particularly to 
infrastructure investments in the areas of energy gen­
eration and distribution, waste disposal, and mobil­
ity. In a range of cities in developing countries, climate 
protection measures – often embedded in the context 
of sustainable development – are already an issue in 
urban planning (UN Habitat, 2009). However, the vast 
majority of cities are still much further away from cli­
mate policy mainstreaming than cities in industrialised 
countries are. 
The challenges in developing countries are a differ­
ent set of problems; for a start, many urban adminis­
trations lack the finances, human resources and insti­
tutions required on all levels of government to success­
fully shaping urbanisation. The stronger integration of 
climate protection would therefore need to run parallel 
to the building of institutional capacities. Urbanisation 
in developing countries is characterised by the increas­
ing migration from rural areas into cities (Africa has the 
world’s highest rate of urbanisation), by a high popula­
tion growth with a high proportion of adolescents and 
young adults, by a concentration of urban growth in 
peri­urban areas (just beyond the limits of local gov­
ernment planning competence), the extreme impor­
tance of informal urban economic sectors, and explod­
ing land prices, as well as extensive social inequality, 
marginalisation, and the rapid growth of shanty towns 
(slums, favelas, bidonvilles). This is exacerbated by a 
lack of qualified urban planners and a civil society that 
has few options for action, and lacks the organisation 
often so important in planning issues. With respect to 
climate protection, there are frequently no local educa­
tional and administrative capacities with experience in 
these issues, or there are no climate protection strate­
gies in place, or they are not being implemented (UN 
Habitat, 2009). 
Planning as a Key Instrument
Two types of municipal level planning are relevant 
for climate protection: firstly, the development of cli­
mate protection concepts and strategies, and the use of 
urban planning as a superordinate management instru­
ment (Masterplan; UN Habitat, 2009). Urban planning 
provides opportunities for climate protection by means 
of compact settlement structures, the careful selec­
tion of settlement locations, requirements for buildings 
and structures and the use of energy­saving construc­
tion methods, and traffic avoidance (EU COM, 2010a). 
Overall concepts of urban planning for low­carbon 
urban living can be developed, for example cities that 
are particularly compact, with short distances between 
home, work and leisure venues, to allow inner­city 
mobility largely by public transport (BMVBS, 2010a). 
The development of overall concepts must take partici­
pation and communication into account (Sections 5.4.1, 
5.4.2, Chapter 6) to find acceptance, and convince par­
ticularly private actors and city dwellers (UN Habitat, 
2009). Urban planning which integrates climate pro­
tection measures also requires cities to cooperate with 
their surrounding communities at a regional level. In 
many countries, however, there is still little evidence 
of cooperation between different municipalities. There 
is often no procedural framework for cooperation, and 
the interests of the individual communities or munic­
ipalities oppose each other. In Germany, the regions, 
or the administrative districts, are not in a particularly 
strong position, compared to the local authorities. In 
countries with the relevant legislation, however, inter­
municipal planning takes place (for example Denmark; 
BMVBS, 2009a, b; EU COM, 2010a).
In Germany, the climate, as a protected public good, 
is already taken into account in the context of urban 
land­use planning in form of the environmental impact 
assessment. Climate protection has also been assigned 
increased importance in urban planning legislation 
(BMVBS, 2010a; BMVBS and Difu, 2010). The intro­
duction of low­carbon urban development, the climate­
friendly improvement of existing buildings, or low­car­
bon urban land use could be regulated here in future. 
Moreover, particularly in Germany, building regulations 
or the building law (Bauordnungsrecht) are an impor­
tant instrument in urban planning legislation, as they 
contain concrete requirements for individual construc­
tion projects. 
Embedding of Low-Carbon Urban Development in 
National and European Climate Protection Policy
In Europe, the implementation of local climate protec­
tion measures is generally legally embedded in national 
or, within the EU, in supranational law. One the one 
hand, this limits such measures, on the other, however, 
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this circumstance supports them (Corfee­Morlot et al., 
2009). In many cases, significant emission reductions 
decided at nation state or EU level can be achieved 
only through their implementation in cities, and local 
administration. It is also helpful for local authorities if 
there is a national climate policy in place, with set emis­
sion reduction targets for guidance. A national climate 
policy frequently also includes financial support for 
municipal low­carbon development objectives, or pro­
vides the space needed for experimenting with differ­
ent strategies for a low­carbon city from which other 
cities can learn (Chapters 3, 6, Box 5.4­1). 
However, it appears that to date, neither climate pro­
tection nor the integrated planning processes required 
for it are considered in urban planning processes to the 
extent they should be (Alber and Kern, 2008). Climate 
protection activities are primarily limited to member­
ship of city networks, the adoption of objectives and 
the initiation of demonstration projects and informa­
tion campaigns. 
If integrated planning processes are implemented in 
Germany, they rarely relate to climate protection, and 
are usually linked to nationwide support measures. 
Similar conditions are indicated for other European cit­
ies, despite different legal premises (BMVBS, 2009a, 
b). National and international actors should fundamen­
tally take into account that climate protection measures 
must largely be realised at the local level, but cannot be 
achieved with local capacities alone. 
Urban Climate Protection in Practice
The issue of climate protection in cities is gaining in 
importance at a global level, as not least expressed by 
numerous city partnerships, local government projects, 
the formulation of city­specific climate protection tar­
gets, and city networks. Around the world, there are 
many cities with a commitment to specific climate pro­
tection targets, such as the goal of general reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions (Hamburg, Kitakyushu), the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions per capita, the 
aim of carbon neutrality (Austin, Vancouver), the tar­
get of using exclusively non­fossil fuels (Växjö, Stock­
holm), or the general goal of sustainable development 
(Freiburg im Breisgau, Dubai; IEA and OECD, 2009).
In addition to general climate targets, many cities 
have also set themselves sectoral targets for the pro­
motion of renewable energies, for example the goal of 
achieving a certain proportion of renewable electricity 
(Adelaide, Taipei) or the target of generating a certain 
proportion of thermal heat or cooling on a renewable 
basis (Beijing, Tokyo). Other sectoral targets include, 
for instance, increasing the proportion of biofuels in 
the transport sector (Betim, Stockholm) or the propor­
tion of electric vehicles (Oslo). Such energy targets are 
also set for public buildings (such as government build­
ings: Leicester, Toronto; IEA and OECD, 2009).
Further Governance Mechanisms
The remit of cities and communities (local authorities) 
generally includes self­government and the carrying 
out of delegated state functions. Self­government can 
generally be divided into compulsory and voluntary 
matters, although local authorities are in principle sub­
ject to the general laws. 
With respect to the transformation process towards 
a low­carbon society, there are also other concrete 
action fields at city­level besides low­carbon urban 
planning: (1) energy management and investments in 
energy efficiency; (2) investments in renewable energy 
sources and in combined heat and power; (3) environ­
mentally friendly transport development; (4) climate­
friendly buildings; (5) inter­municipal cooperation, 
environmentally friendly local procurement practices 
and waste avoidance; (6) public relations and advice. 
Four different types of policy can be resorted to for 
these action fields (IEA and OECD, 2009): (1) govern­
ing by leadership – whereby cities or local authorities 
voluntarily set themselves climate protection targets 
and develop climate protection strategies; (2) self­
governance – a local authority decides to supply pub­
lic buildings with electricity from renewable energies, 
it forms voluntary agreements with private companies 
for low­carbon investment projects; (3) governance 
through enabling – promotion of low­carbon technolo­
gies through public procurement, e. g. in the transport 
sector, support of private sector actors, reviving local 
Agenda 21 processes; (4) governing by provision – this 
includes financial incentive systems at the local level, 
such as tax allowances to encourage low­carbon invest­
ments, or city centre parking charges to facilitate traffic 
management; (4) governing through authority – clas­
sical administrative command­and­control and regula­
tions (Table 5.2­1). 
Low-Carbon Urban Development and Global 
Discourse
The global urbanisation trend is also increasingly the 
subject of international debate, promoting aware­
ness of the need for a sustainable global development. 
Important foundations and guidelines for concept and 
planning procedures are established on the one hand 
through the international debate in a United Nations 
context (UN Habitat, Human Settlement Conference 
Habitat II 1996), and in a relevant professional associa­
tions context (such as the International Society of City 
and Regional Planners) and on the other hand in the 
context of the Sustainable Buildings Network, which 
is supported by the G8 and newly industrialising coun­
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tries to promote sustainable construction, and through 
the production of global assessment reports dealing 
with urbanisation (such as ‘Cities and Climate Change’; 
OECD, 2010d). Overall, however, the issue of urbani­
sation has not yet reached a level of importance in the 
international climate and transformation debate that 
would be commensurate with its significance for cli­
mate protection. The urbanisation issue must therefore 
urgently be upgraded in the global governance system. 
Efforts should be made here to develop the UN Habi­
tat programme further into a new organisation for sus­
tainable urban development. Moreover, the founding 
of a ‘World Commission on Low­Carbon Urban Plan­
ning’ would lay the foundations for a sustainable glo­
bal urbanisation process. At the same time, cities and 
local authorities should establish networks and part­
nerships to exchange information at an international 
level in order to learn from each other, and to develop 
specific solutions (Section 7.3.6).
5.4.5.3 
Transformative Land-Use Governance
The transformation towards a low­carbon society also 
demands a radical change in land use and land­use sys­
tems, as almost a quarter of worldwide greenhouse gas 
emissions are a direct result of agriculture and land­
use changes, particularly deforestation in the tropics 
(Section 4.1.7). However, land­use systems can never 
become completely zero­carbon, neither technologi­
cally nor through changes in behaviour. Moreover, in 
this transformation field, the ultimate goal of becoming 
a low­carbon society is superseded by other political 
goals – such as, in particular, guaranteeing food secur­
ity, rural development, conservation of biodiversity 
and ecosystem services. A policy which addresses cli­
mate protection only would therefore fall short of these 
goals (WBGU, 2010a). 
Land use has so far been internationally driven 
by the various sectoral markets (forestry, agriculture, 
energy and commodity markets) and national policies 
(WBGU, 2010a; UNEP, 2011). Competition exists – 
from a national and a global perspective – between the 
various uses, such as forests, agriculture, urbanisation, 
mining, infrastructures (e. g. energy, transport) and 
nature conservation (EEA, 2010b). In forested areas, 
competing land uses are deforestation of primary for­
ests for agricultural production or forest plantations, 
as well as mining, or exploration of abiotic resources, 
timber exploitation and the conservation of ecosystem 
services. In the agricultural sector, competition exists 
between the cultivation of foodstuffs and feeds, energy 
and industrial plants, and pasture land. Land­use com­
petition within this sector is also increasingly affected 
by a rising global population, growing wealth and the 
changes in eating habits and lifestyles associated with 
it, and changes in the energy basis. The land­use com­
petition outlined here will intensify as a result of the 
effects of climate change once the local and global usa­
ble land diminishes, and the productivity of the land 
farmed declines (Section 1.2.5).
The transformation towards a low­carbon society 
could also intensify this land­use competition in future. 
The current technologies for generating bioenergy, or 
for energy generation by means of photovoltaics or 
wind power, and their associated infrastructures such 
as networks and storage facilities, for example, require 
additional land if selected fossil fuels are to be replaced 
with renewable energies. Even if deforestation were 
also stopped, and reforestation were promoted in cer­
tain locations, and agricultural production methods did 
become more climate­friendly, land­use conflicts could 
still continue (WBGU, 2010a; UNEP, 2011).
Current Trends
This transformation field and its multi­faceted conflict­
ing aims have so far not been adequately addressed in 
all their complexity at either national or European, or 
indeed global level. This is a consequence of both the 
fragmentation of the different policy areas such as cli­
mate, agriculture and forestry, development, energy 
or environment at national and European level, and 
the institutional fragmentation at international level, 
where those tasked with addressing land­use issues 
include the FAO, UNEP, the World Bank, the UNFCCC, 
CBD and the UNCCD (UNEP, 2011). Moreover, the 
growing global challenge of sustainable land use has so 
far not been addressed in the international governance 
processes organised by these institutions. For this rea­
son alone, cooperation on global land­use issues at the 
points where the respective organisations overlap must 
be increased, especially in the three Rio Conventions 
(Chapter 1, Section 7.3). 
In the two major land uses forest and agriculture, 
the issues of climate protection and the transforma­
tion of land­use systems are accorded different lev­
els of importance on the international agenda. Where 
climate protection is concerned, there are instruments 
and mechanisms to initiate and support the transforma­
tion in forest management at both national and inter­
national level. The greatest problem often lies in the 
lack of political and institutional capacities, and the 
inadequate enforcement of a sustainable forest policy 
(IUFRO, 2010). The transformation towards climate­
friendlyness is only gradually gaining focus in the agri­
cultural sector (UNEP, 2011; GO Science, 2011).
In principle, both the technologies and the tech­
niques, as well as the political instruments, needed 
for the transformation towards climate­friendly land 
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use are known with respect to all of the various land 
uses. However, they are not applied to their full extent 
because, quite apart from different governance struc­
tures, the political priorities in industrialised and devel­
oping countries also differ considerably. The agriculture 
and forestry sectors contribute 25 % and more to the 
gross domestic product in the developing countries, and 
a mere 1 % in the industrial countries (UNEP, 2011). 
Governance for Land-Use Competition 
In most industrialised countries, the instrument of spa­
tial and land­use planning has been developed in order 
to balance land­use competition and take conflicting 
political objectives into account (Section 5.2). Spatial 
planning aims to coordinate political measures and eco­
nomic activities related to land use in a specific region 
affecting its spatial development or function (i. e. meas­
ures relevant to spatial planning). For this purpose, a 
comprehensive plan is developed, taking into account 
the various different land uses and coordinating them 
with each other, balancing potential conflicts and 
ensuring that future uses allow, for example, the con­
sideration of alternative locations and uses (Koch and 
Hendler, 2009). 
The advantage of spatial planning over the approval 
of individual projects is that an amount of space is 
examined as a whole, with all its functions and uses, 
which also allows a long­term perspective with regard 
to regional development objectives, establishing these 
firmly and aiding the preparation of their implemen­
tation. Spatial planning can therefore guarantee the 
development and securing of an entire region even 
before specific projects are planned and realised, 
thereby ensuring sustainable land use at an early stage. 
The climate protection targets stipulated by a climate 
protection act, for example, can also simultaneously 
serve as regional planning objectives, thereby becom­
ing an issue to be taken into account at administra­
tive planning level (draft for a climate protection act, 
German state government of North Rhine­Westphalia, 
22/02/2011, and draft of a first act for implementation 
of the climate protection act, German state government 
of North Rhine­Westphalia, 22/02/2011). For meas­
ures relevant to spatial planning, such as coal­fuelled 
power stations, approval would not be given due to the 
objective of climate protection. 
Moreover, where there is an increased focus on cli­
mate protection issues and its associated risks, regional 
planning has proved itself to be a suitable instrument 
for dealing with the impacts of climate change, avoiding 
and mitigating climate change, and establishing cost­
effective adaptation measures (EU COM, 2008d; Haber 
et al., 2010). Spatial planning could therefore also 
include measures to secure carbon storage and sinks, as 
well as low­carbon settlement development and adap­
tation measures for disaster prevention (Haber et al., 
2010). An obligation to consider administrative plans 
at different levels prevents one­sided regional plan­
ning from one perspective only, as the different admin­
istrative levels have to be coordinated. In Germany, this 
obligation to consider results from the so­called princi­
ple of countervailing influence (§1 Section 3 Regional 
Planning Act), which, as an established element of 
regional planning law, regulates the mutually interde­
pendent relationship between spatial planning for an 
entire area, and local planning for parts of this area 
(Spannowsky et al., 2010).
The instrument of spatial planning to allow the man­
agement of sustainable land use is increasingly also 
being discussed at an international level, as it allows 
the systemic and targeted linking of measures from 
various sectors (forestry, agriculture, energy, etc.). The 
aim is more efficient and sustainable land­use man­
agement through harmonisation of the various usage 
 entitlements, but also through multi­faceted use to 
maintain multiple spatial services (Green et al., 2005). 
The WBGU therefore reaffirms its previous recom­
mendation of establishing a new ‘Global Commission 
for Sustainable Land Use’ in order to identify the most 
important challenges of the range of issues related to 
global land use. It should determine the current state 
of scientific knowledge regarding global land use, and 
develop the foundations, mechanisms and guidelines 
needed for global land­use management. It should also 
examine how the instrument of spatial planning could 
be developed further for developing countries, and how 
it could be used at a European and global level for land­
use management (WBGU, 2010a; Section 7.3.7). 
Transformative Forest Governance
In the forest management sector, there is a consensus 
on the necessity of stopping emissions from deforesta­
tion and destructive forest use. The focus is here on the 
strategic expansion and maintenance of forests as car­
bon stores and sinks. However, the action fields for the 
transformative governance process go beyond the nar­
row focus of climate­friendly forest use. They include: 
(1) protecting the last primeval forests; (2) stopping 
deforestation and destructive forest use; (3) promot­
ing sustainable forest management; (4) reforestation 
in certain locations; (5) protecting peatlands and wet­
lands; (6) agroforestry; (7) a certification scheme for 
forest management and forest products; (8) intelligent 
timber use. 
The governance capacities, investment resources 
and technologies for the implementation of the rele­
vant political measures are often lacking in these action 
fields, particularly in countries with rain forests. Exist­
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ing national incentive structures need to be reviewed 
to create incentives for forest protection and sustain­
able, multifunctional forest management. These include 
the removal of distorting subsidies and export support­
ing strategies for timber and other agricultural prod­
ucts as well as payment for ecosystem services, for­
estry standards and a certification scheme, and land 
reforms to give incentives for sustainable management 
through property rights. The expansion and monitoring 
of conservation areas and the labelling of timber prod­
ucts also play an important role. Such a policy must be 
embedded in other land­use policies, particularly those 
pertaining to agriculture (UNEP, 2011).
The concept of payments for ecosystem services 
compensates the providers of certain ecosystem serv­
ices, such as carbon sequestration, water cycle regula­
tion, soil formation or primary production and creates 
economic incentives for ensuring their long­term pro­
vision (Section 5.2.3; Wunder, 2005). One such pro­
gramme, for example, is Pagos por Servicios Ambien­
tales, established in Costa Rica in 1997, whereby land­
owners receive payments for the provision of forest 
ecosystem services. The remarkable aspect of this sys­
tem is that private beneficiaries of these services also 
make direct, voluntary payments. Beneficiaries are, 
for example, hydroelectric power stations, which are 
dependent on the regulation of the water cycle in their 
catchment areas. The system therefore goes beyond 
pure public subsidies for the provision of ecosystem 
services. Both the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
and the TEEB study use the concept of payments for 
environmental services to assess the value people 
attach to ecosystems, in order to develop price signals 
which will, in the long term, give incentives for sustain­
able development (MA, 2005a, b, c; TEBB, 2010).
In the forestry sector, the development and intro­
duction of an instrument for forest protection in devel­
oping countries (REDD­plus) is being advanced at an 
international level as an element of UNFCCC negotia­
tions. Specific aim is the establishment of policies and 
incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation and 
destructive forest use. This also includes the action 
fields of forest conservation, sustainable forest man­
agement, and the strategic expansion of carbon stocks 
in forests, as well as reforestation in certain locations. 
In addition, various other sustainability and devel­
opment dimensions must be taken into account, such 
as the conservation of natural forests and biodiversity, 
involving local and indigenous peoples, and respect­
ing their rights. Vital is the development of a long­term 
international financing mechanism under the UNFCCC 
for the various political measures (Section 7.3.7). In the 
meantime, all signatory states are being encouraged to 
step up their current CO2 emission reduction efforts, 
and to take or co­finance preparatory measures for a 
future REDD­plus regime, for example the collection of 
data, the establishment of monitoring systems, carry­
ing out pilot projects, and the development of minimum 
social and ecological standards. 
Transformative Agriculture Governance
The issue of climate protection in agriculture is becom­
ing increasingly important around the world, a fact con­
firmed by its discussion both under UNFCCC, FAO and 
UNEP and within the EU, and through processes such 
as the IAASTD (EU COM, 2007c; IAASTD, 2009; UNEP, 
2011). Global agriculture must meet the expected rapid 
growth in demand for food, bioenergy and biomass for 
industrial use in a sustainable manner, and at the same 
time significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
without making new land available through deforest­
ation. As yet, there is no broad scientific or political 
consensus on which strategies are best suited to solv­
ing this global challenge (Section 7.3.7). 
Around half of global greenhouse gas emissions 
from agriculture can be avoided by improved carbon 
sequestration in the soil, and a reduction of CH4 and 
N2O emissions from agriculture. The techniques and 
technologies required on the production side, and the 
necessary changes in behaviour on the consumer side, 
are known, but as yet they do not represent a political 
consensus. 
The existing incentive structures with regard to the 
international trade in agricultural products and the sub­
sidising of export products or agriculture in the indus­
trialised countries must be reformed as soon as possible 
to create incentive structures for sustainable, climate­
friendly agriculture (SRU, 2008). This also includes 
land reforms in developing countries in order to cre­
ate incentives for both sustainable land management 
and investments in new agricultural techniques and 
technologies through property rights (UNEP, 2011). A 
rural, agrarian infrastructure must be established, par­
ticularly in developing countries, including the promo­
tion of market access (UNEP, 2011; GO Science, 2011). 
Investments such as these can be supported by official 
development assistance through the organisations FAO, 
IFAD and the World Bank, but also bilaterally; Germany 
and the EU should take the initiative here.
However, particularly the increased use of bioenergy 
in the course of the transformation is also accompanied 
by significant risks with regard to various sustainabil­
ity dimensions (WBGU, 2010a; Box 4.1­4). The estab­
lishment of an international regulatory framework for 
sustainable bioenergy use is an urgent requirement in 
order to have some control over the direct and indi­
rect impacts of bioenergy on land­use competition. 
This regulatory framework should encompass minimum 
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standards for sustainable bioenergy production and an 
international bioenergy strategy.
As in the forestry sector, it would make sense to pay 
for ecosystem services and climate protection measures 
in the agricultural sector (Section 5.2.3). The present 
EU subsidies in the agricultural sector should therefore 
be carried over into a system of payments for ecosystem 
services (SRU, 2008; Section 7.3.7). Concurrently, the 
conclusion of the Doha Round in the context of WTO 
negotiations on the liberalisation of the global agricul­
tural trade needs to be accelerated. The industrialised 
countries would then need to reduce their import bar­
riers for agricultural products, and phase out their own 
export subsidies (SRU, 2008; WBGU, 2010a). 
To encourage changes on the demand side, it is 
important to promote climate­friendly eating habits. 
Increasing global wealth is accompanied by a rising 
demand for animal products. This is counterproductive 
in two respects: firstly, the expansion of livestock keep­
ing exacerbates land­use competition in the agricultural 
sector and secondly, it leads to increasing greenhouse 
gas emissions. At the same time, eating a low­meat diet 
is sensible under the primacy of healthy nutrition (Sec­
tion 7.3.7). Product labelling, information campaigns 
and government procurement policies can generate 
important impulses for changes in behaviour in this 
respect (Section 5.2.3). Taxation of foodstuffs accord­
ing to emissions intensity may also provide an addi­
tional incentive to change behaviours (Section 7.3.7).
International Cooperation
The challenges in the transformation field land use 
must be met primarily with the aid of local, regional 
and national policy­making. As this transformation 
field is closed linked to economic development, above 
all in developing and newly industrialising countries, 
international coordination and cooperation is required 
to develop and finance the necessary governance struc­
tures (Sections 7.3.7, 7.3.10). A ‚Global Commission for 
Sustainable Land Use’ should be established, but the 
present relevant international organisations, such as 
particularly the FAO, should also be mandated accord­
ingly. The FAO, for example, should develop a suita­
ble range of instruments to ensure the climate­friendli­
ness of national and global land­use paths. At the same 
time, land­use relevant decision processes, specifically 
those contained in the three Rio conventions UNFCCC, 
CBD and UNCCD, should be better linked. In addition, 
UNEP should be strengthened in order to systemati­
cally advance a sustainable and integrated land­use 
approach under the United Nations (Section 7.3.10).
5.4.5.4 
Global Governance for Infrastructure 
 Development 
Low­carbon development processes must be accel­
erated globally in numerous economic sectors. Three 
fundamental infrastructures are central here (Section 
7.1.1): energy systems, urbanisation and land­use sys­
tems. Compliance with the 2  °C guard rail is only pos­
sible if the course is changed towards low­carbon in 
all three of these fundamental structures of the global 
economy by 2020 (Section 7.3.10). 
This is a completely new challenge for the interna­
tional community. So far, the development of infra­
structure systems in the three transformation fields 
of energy, urbanisation and land use has been viewed 
almost exclusively as a national political task, sup­
ported by international development policy only in the 
case of developing countries. Accordingly, the global 
governance mechanisms that do exist are not adequate 
enough to adjust these infrastructures at a global level, 
and accelerate the transformation towards low­carbon. 
As compliance with the 2  °C guard rail allows only a 
limited time window for the transformation, i. e. the 
crux of the matter is accelerated change, and a transfor­
mation which must take place at the same time all over 
the world in order to make it at all possible to achieve 
the required reduction in the volume of greenhouse gas 
emissions (WBGU, 2009). Global agreement processes 
and coordination mechanisms are essential. 
The 2010 euro crisis showed that a common cur­
rency also requires the close coordination of the EU 
member states’ economic policies, i. e. mechanisms for 
reciprocal adjustment, control and binding rules (‘eco­
nomic government’) in order to avoid any freeriding 
behaviour on the part of individual nation states. Simi­
larly, a rapid decarbonisation of the global economy’s 
key infrastructures is also not likely to succeed without 
international coordination processes. There is nothing 
to indicate that the sum of the uncoordinated transfor­
mation efforts in the nation states in the three fields 
requiring action will, more or less by default, result in 
the decarbonisation level that is needed to avoid dan­
gerous climate change. This is not a plea for global infra­
structure planning. On the contrary, concrete future 
infrastructure development will continue to take place 
in the nation states (or regionally, for instance within 
the EU), but it must happen within a guard rail system 
that is compatible with the 2  °C guard rail. In all three 
transformation fields, the focus should now be on:
 > The establishment of global transformation goals;
 > The development of verifiable national and interna­
tional transformation roadmaps;
 > The definition of indicators to serve as a basis for 
monitoring development progress;
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 > The establishment of reporting and monitoring pro­
cesses; 
 > And the creation of positive incentives for goal 
achievement (for example technology transfer). 
These kind of global governance mechanisms can only 
be implemented by effective international organisa­
tions. The WTO, for instance, is a strong international 
organisation for the protection and further develop­
ment of the global trade system. Based on the expe­
riences made during the global financial crisis (2007–
2009), the International Monetary Fund should be 
expanded into a risk management centre for the global 
financial market. All three transformation fields lack 
such strong organisations. 
In the transformation field energy, there is no legit­
imised and internationally effective global energy 
organisation that could become a driver of the transfor­
mation towards low­carbon. The IEA is an organisation 
by OECD countries. It needs to focus more intensively 
on the goal of a sustainable energy system, and it must 
be opened up to developing and newly industrialising 
countries. IRENA is an organisation which will hope­
fully contribute to the diffusion of renewable energies, 
but it is still under development, and its role would need 
to be strengthened if it is to make an effective contribu­
tion to the transformation. Within the United Nations 
architecture, UN­Energy has only limited capacity for 
action. The global governance capacities in the area of 
energy are therefore fragmented, and as yet not in a 
position to become the drivers of the transformation of 
the worldwide energy systems (Section 7.3.9). 
A similar picture emerges with regard to land use. In 
the coming years, foodstuffs and feed production and 
the production of biomass for the energy and industrial 
sectors will need to be significantly increased, whilst 
the emissions from land use (agriculture, deforesta­
tion) must be reduced. Again, the global governance 
structures required to achieve this are non­existent. 
Although the FAO does carry out important funda­
mental work on possible options for increasing global 
agricultural production, and the data it provides rep­
resents an indispensable contribution to the analysis 
of global land­use trends, the organisation’s activities 
and spectrum of activities are not sufficient to signifi­
cantly advance the global transformation towards cli­
mate­friendly, sustainable land use. The situation is 
similar in international forest protection: forest pro­
tection efforts by the CBD and the UNFCCC exist, but 
again, there are no recognisable sweeping successes. 
The WBGU has therefore also identified an urgent need 
for institutional improvement in this global policy field, 
for example – as already recommended by the WBGU 
(2009a) – the establishment of a ‘Global Commission 
for Sustainable Land Use’ (Section 7.3.7.1). It should 
develop new strategies for climate­friendly, sustainable 
land use. On the strength of this assessment by such a 
‘Global Commission for Sustainable Land Use’, the FAO 
should ultimately develop a suitable range of instru­
ments to ensure that national and global land­use paths 
are climate­friendly. 
The institutional capacities in the transformation 
field urbanisation are even fewer, by comparison. The 
UN Habitat programme enjoys very limited visibility 
and importance in international politics. Moreover, 
UN Habitat views urbanisation from the (still relevant) 
perspective of how to deal with the slums that are the 
result of rural flight. The huge challenge a low­carbon 
development of the coming decades’ urbanisation wave 
represents, on the other hand, is hardly addressed. The 
urbanisation issue must therefore urgently be upgraded 
in the global governance system. Efforts should be made 
here to incorporate the UN Habitat programme, which 
is not adequately equipped to deal with this acute prob­
lem, in a new specialised agency (Section 7.3.6). The 
WBGU therefore recommends the foundation of an 
ambitiously mandated specialised agency for sustain­
able urbanisation. If this is not possible in the short 
term, an attempt should initially be made to strengthen 
UN Habitat’s standard setting role, and to increase the 
programme’s focus on sustainability and climate pro­
tection. In the transformation field urbanisation, the 
establishment of a ‘World Commission on Climate­
Friendly Urban Planning’ would again lay the founda­
tions for guiding global urbanisation processes towards 
sustainability (Section 7.3.6). 
Both commissions (Land use and Urbanisation) 
could, for example, be set up and mandated on the 
occasion of the Rio+20 conference. They should then 
proceed to present comprehensive reports by 2015, 
taking the corresponding complexity of their respec­
tive transformation fields into account (Section 7.3.10). 
5.5
Conclusion
This chapter has made it clear that the required trans­
formation process towards a low­carbon society repre­
sents a huge political challenge, even though the indi­
vidual political instruments for the systematic transfor­
mation of economy and society are known, and some 
have been tried and tested. In this respect, the WBGU 
mainly views CO2 pricing, the phasing out of subsidies 
for fossil fuels, and the worldwide diffusion of feed­
in tariffs as central elements of a transformation pol­
icy. However, the analysis has also shown that polit­
ical, institutional and economic path dependencies, 
interest structures and veto players impede the transi­
Conclusion  5.5
239
tion towards sustainability­focused policy­making. The 
issue is therefore not primarily a lack of instruments, 
concepts and ideas; the transformation is held back 
through the political process itself. The central ques­
tion is therefore: how can these difficult reforms be ini­
tiated, in view of interest­driven blockades, in part also 
self­imposed by democratic procedure? 
The WBGU concludes that the key to the transfor­
mation lies in a new form of statehood. Central ele­
ment is a proactive and enabling state which actively 
sets priorities whilst also offering its citizens increased 
opportunities for participation, and affords the econ­
omy choices with regard to acting with sustainability 
in mind. New problematic situations call for a differ­
ent kind of policy­making which takes on the chal­
lenge of the transformation through greater political 
self­commitment in the form of strict rules. It must cre­
ate a new regulation framework, which society and the 
economy could and should adhere to. This set of rules 
encompasses a national climate protection objective, a 
stringent climate protection law that takes a long­term 
perspective, and climate policy mainstreaming of gov­
ernment institutions; it underlines the credibility of 
political agendas, establishes the scope for action (or 
for interpretation), reduces the influence of particu­
lar interests, and creates long­term planning horizons, 
thereby accelerating the transformation process.
This increased action capacity on part of the state 
must be inextricably linked to active citizenship. The 
civil society must help to shape the transformation 
process, as it sets the transformation in motion and 
gives it the requisite legitimacy (Chapter 6). By means 
of improved opportunities for information, participa­
tion and legal protection, such as the labelling of prod­
ucts, reformed approval procedures, extended collec­
tive legal action, the use of ombudspersons, the exten­
sion of deliberative processes into a ‘future chamber’ to 
complement the legislative, an open and participative 
transformation process should be achieved (for citizens 
and citizen consumers). The WBGU therefore concludes 
that the transformation needs more, rather than less, 
democracy.
National – and in part also sub­national – statehood 
continues to play a central role in the development of 
a transformation policy, in the reorganisation of the 
(energy) markets, the support of new technologies, and 
the restructuring of cities. However, this chapter also 
illustrates that global problems require a global policy, 
and therefore supra­ and transnational solutions. As a 
bridge between national and global solutions, the EU is 
a model for this which should be developed further. The 
EU and similar regional alliances of states can, however, 
not replace the degree of global cooperation and coor­
dination that is needed for a global transformation. In 
this respect, the analysis shows that there are still great 
deficits, particularly on the level of global policy­mak­
ing, which need to be addressed as a matter of urgency. 
This applies in particular to the key transformation 
fields energy, urbanisation and land use. The issue 
here is that these policy areas need to be accorded far 
more weight at a global level; new institutions for glo­
bal infrastructure development need to be developed, 
and a multilateralism that takes into account the new, 
multipolar world in order to develop and enforce trans­
formative policies, from the level of subglobal change 
agent alliances to the entire international community 
of states. 
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6.1
From Awareness to Action? – From Action to 
Awareness! 
A consensus that ’something must be done’ to pre­
vent dangerous climate change, the loss of biodiver­
sity, or the collapse of the global financial markets, is 
reached quickly, both at world climate conferences and 
during dinner table conversations. ‘We’ have a fairly 
good idea of what should be done; at least some of ‘us’ 
would also be prepared to give up ‘our’ habitual life­
styles. ‘We’ do have efficient technologies available to 
us, and ‘we’ have issued global declarations on prevent­
ing dangerous climate change and conserving biological 
diversity in international framework agreements, and 
passed policies at supranational, national and regional 
level. And still ‘we’ will fail, if this is as far as it goes. 
The difficulties lie in turning awareness into action, as 
path dependencies, barriers to innovation, and institu­
tional routines (Section 2.4) stand in the way of the 
insights already gained, and paralyse the impulse to act.
At first glance, the transformation into a low­car­
bon society is one of those Herculean tasks which seem 
unsolvable at the outset: targets which are too ambi­
tious, too few actors to achieve them, in too short a 
timescale. Perceptions such as these, and problematic 
global framework conditions, frequently lead to resig­
nation and apathy. So the crux of the matter is defining 
concrete targets and interim targets for solving these 
global problems, to implement the realisation of these 
targets sensibly and to share the workload fairly, and 
to set priorities and draw up realistic timetables. The 
tight window for the avoidance of dangerous climate 
change (Chapter 1) must be met with prioritisation and 
acceleration. To succeed, the currently existing mental 
‘willingness’ (Chapter 2) must be stimulated, themati­
cally charged, and turned into action through the estab­
lishment of a network of actors – by a proactive state 
(Section 5.4.1). A historical review of great upheavals 
(Chapter 3) shows that time and again, there have been 
historical situations in which individuals or small groups 
have rebelled against the ‘terrible fatalism of history’ 
(Georg Büchner), to achieve that which seemed almost 
impossible, thus becoming change agents. The history 
of civil enlightenment and revolutions is as much proof 
of this as the colonies’ fight for independence, symbol­
ised by the peaceful resistance practised by Mahatma 
Gandhi and Nelson Mandela, and the Velvet Revolu­
tion in the Eastern European countries and the GDR, 
brought about by people like Lech Walesa and Bärbel 
Bohley, not forgetting Willy Brandt and Mikhail Gor­
bachev.
The above mentioned, diffuse ‘we’ must therefore 
be concretised, and shaped into local and supra­local 
task forces with the ability to communicate recom­
mendations for action efficiently, and to secure them 
in effective identity structures (‘we­feelings’). What 
is lacking both at a global and a national level is an 
awareness of the self­efficacy, and the realisation of 
the power that actors such as these have; people who 
are already, whether consciously or unconsciously, par­
ticipators in the transformation. Governmental and 
non­governmental organisations must not only extend 
their scope for action (Chapter 5); they must above all 
create structures and networks that allow the swift and 
permanent mobilisation of actors who are committed to 
transformative objectives. 
The structural preconditions for the conversion of 
such dispositions into action were elaborated in Chap­
ter 3 on the basis of historical examples. The follow­
ing chapter deals with how, and by which actors, a 
process such as this – difficult to predict and difficult 
to plan – can be initiated, shaped and supported. In 
the WBGU’s view, turning awareness into requisite 
action cannot succeed through knowledge transfer, 
but also includes participative dimensions and feed­
back. Knowledge is nothing without those who know, 
and knowledge is disseminated only through actors: a 
transformation process is bound to fail if the ‘experts’ 
rely on the self­evidence of the reasonableness of their 
suggestions, arrived at after much theoretical debate, 
and then (hope to) motivate ‘laymen’ with information 
campaigns and incentive systems to accept the relevant 
6Agents of Transformation: How Innovations Can Spread (Faster)
6 Agents of Transformation: How Innovations Can Spread (Faster)
242
measures after the event. As far as climate protection 
and adaptation, and ‘even’, ultimately, the creation of 
acceptance are concerned, it is probable that, accord­
ing to participation and innovation research findings, 
policies and social movements that rely on early con­
sultation (deliberation) of those concerned, and their 
active participation, to legitimise political­administra­
tive measures (Walk, 2007; Schaal and Ritzi, 2009; 
Kristof, 2010) would be more successful than any 
attempts by political­administrative institutions. Tech­
nological innovations and political­legal steering must 
find a mobilised citizenship to fully develop their prob­
lem solving potential; this applies in ‘normal’ times, but 
even more so in escalating crisis situations, and in view 
of the time pressure due to the crisis of Earth system. 
This is the challenge for 21st century democratic poli­
cies (Leggewie, 2010).
There are plenty of examples of rapid cultural and 
social innovations, including changes to lifestyles, value 
systems and knowledge preferences. This includes the 
proliferation of Cistercian monasteries in the 12th cen­
tury (Grübler, 1997), as well as the remarkable extent 
and qualities of the civil rights movements at the end 
of the 20th century (Evers and Zimmer, 2010). This 
will be examined in more detail later. These and other 
examples show that frequently, individual and collec­
tive innovation processes are triggered less by existing 
cognitive knowledge, and more by a need for reforms 
and change motivated by the immediate environment, 
communicated and/or implemented exploratively and 
experimentally (Epstein, 1994). A prime example to 
demonstrate this shift from experimental­explorative 
action to cognitive realisation is the worldwide wom­
en’s movement post­1945. Its agenda (unlike that of 
the previous women’s movements in the 19th and early 
20th century) was initially ‘tried and tested’ by small, 
manageable groups in social niches whose words and 
actions defied convention. Political organisation on a 
grander scale took place only afterwards. The result of 
these explorations and experiments has been a change 
of collective practices within modern societies, reach­
ing from equal opportunity laws and gender­neutral 
language to the integration of women in traditionally 
male domains like the military, major corporations, and 
political leadership. 
The same applies to the environmental conservation 
movement. Through decentralised citizen’s initiatives 
and demonstrations, it has defined and changed the face 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, Western Europe as 
a whole, and other OECD countries for good in terms of 
environmental consciousness and policies. Apart from 
the sudden, shocking realisation that the ‘blue planet’ is 
in danger, the impulse to change has gained momentum 
through personal experience of environmental dam­
age locally (such as the pollution of rivers), although 
more abstract accounts, such as The Limits to Growth 
 (Meadows et al., 1972), that deal with ‘the bigger pic­
ture’ have also managed to trigger impulses to change, 
albeit indirectly. Knowledge regimes such as these have 
been able to make a major contribution to the concreti­
sation of ecological ‘discomfort’ (Hünenmörder, 2004).
For the implementation of a complex and modular 
measure bundle which adequately meets the challenges 
of the (re)stabilisation of our earth system, existing 
regulations, routines and role models i. e. the ‘mind 
maps in our heads’ (Wilke, 1998) must be questioned. 
Organisation theory teaches us that usually, actors 
initially respond to new challenges and uncertainty 
defensively through reinforcing the established action 
orientations, or with selective perception, i. e. by tak­
ing new exigencies on board only if they can be linked 
to established knowledge, interpretive and regulatory 
systems. For the most part, complex learning processes 
and comprehensive innovations are not initiated based 
on the  quality of the various crisis diagnoses and cause 
analyses, but only through the establishment of con­
vincing new orientation offers and action concepts 
(Wiesenthal, 1995), and the opening up of experimen­
tal platforms which allow the familiar to be rearranged 
into something new (Johnson, 2010).
6.2
The Concept of Change Agents: Definition, 
 Typology and Roles
Transition research results (Grin et al., 2010) suggest 
that individual actors can play a far larger role in the 
transformation of social (sub­)systems than the one 
that has been accorded to them for quite some time, 
during which academic interest has usually focused on 
boundaries for action and the effects of systemic emer­
gence. Thus the analysis of historical examples (Chap­
ter 3) shows that social change is characterised not only 
by the emergence of new technologies and new major 
economic industries, but above all also by changes in 
mentalities and institutions driven by aspiring social 
classes. Identifiable actor constellations with suffi­
cient power, resources and creativity, prepared to wel­
come innovations and reforms in order to overcome the 
established obstructive powers, emerge as the drivers 
of change. The speed of a transformation (or whether 
it can succeed at all) depends largely on the involved 
actors availing themselves of the existing opportunity 
structures. 
However, examining contemporary and histori­
cal transition or transformation processes also clearly 
shows that actors cannot only profit from the windows 
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of opportunity that open, but that frequently, they are 
also actively involved in the opening (Grin et al., 2010). 
Strategic groups and alliances function as role models 
and trendsetters during this process; in this way, they 
provide isolated innovation impulses with a ‘cultural 
hegemony’. We know from diffusion and transition 
research that change agents – a term used to define 
strategic actors who are (sometimes unconscious) pio­
neers of social change, spreading an awareness of the 
chances it offers – play a key role when new technolo­
gies and ideas are introduced (Rogers, 2003; Grin et al., 
2010; Kristof, 2010). The role of these change agents in 
the initiation and shaping of change processes has been 
examined in various disciplines dealing with diffusion 
and innovation processes (including business studies, 
sociology and psychology). The concept this approach 
is based on can be summarised as follows: ‘Change 
agents have a convincing idea for change, and an ini­
tial concept for its realisation. They network and gain 
important fellow campaigners, in this way managing 
to win the critical mass over for change. Subsequently, 
they gradually develop the idea further together. The 
changing of routines and framework conditions, the 
establishment of new institutions, and a paradigm shift, 
conclude the process’ (Kristof, 2010).
Change agents support certain changes, actively 
driving them ahead. Initially, change agents are, for 
the most part, single individuals and small groups 
(Kristof, 2010). They propagate innovations by ques­
tioning ‘business as usual’ policies and creating alter­
native practices, thereby challenging the established 
world views and paths, attitudinal and behavioural 
patterns, as well as providing others who think as they 
do (followers, early adopters) with a constant motiva­
tion for a self­sustaining change. This process typi­
cally includes long­term orientation and the overcom­
ing of loss and risk aversions. Change agents therefore 
not only effect changes selectively, i. e. within their 
own sphere of experience, but also nudge comparably 
widespread transformation processes at local level and 
‘from below’. They find emulators and animate others 
to change their behavioural practices. 
Schematically, a blockade situation that is governed 
by ‘business as usual’ policies can therefore be coun­
tered with an innovation scenario (Table 6.2.1). Change 
agents would replace veto players at the individual 
interest level, acting as previously elaborated. At the 
level of attitudes and dispositions, a pioneering spirit 
would be prevalent, rather than one of loss aversion. 
At a higher symbolic or framing level, the tone would 
be set by a culture of innovation, rather than cultural 
barriers. 
The following identifies those change agents, not 
just individuals, but also organisations and groups who 
could support and transport the transformation out­
lined in this report. Based on precedents and synthe­
ses, the focus will particularly be on change agents who 
accelerate conversion processes, substantiating and 
shaping ongoing socio­technological changes, legisla­
tive processes and market development as consumers, 
entrepreneurs and investors, as citizens, administrators 
and politicians. The conclusions that can be reached are 
necessarily interim and tentative. These can refer to 
findings from diffusion and transition research. On the 
basis of change management and organisation devel­
opment studies (Reiß, 1997; Hauschildt, 1997; Bach, 
2000), Kristof developed a ‘promoter model’ (2010) 
that summarises change agents’ roles, competencies 
and main tasks (Table 6.2­2).
With reference to diffusion research, which has 
defined cycles of innovation and cycles of production, 
various functions can be differentiated here, and an 
analytical distinction can be made between types of 
change agents (Figure 6.2­1). In a cycle of innovation, 
change agents act by defining open questions and chal­
lenges and putting them on the agenda, by facilitating 
problem solutions as catalysts, by mediating between 
conflicting groups, or by freeing blocked decision­mak­
ing processes within groups, by integrating disparate 
innovation requirements, or by nudging the institu­
tional innovations which are required to solve a prob­
lem from ‘below’, or in the role of decision­making elite 
from ‘above’. In the production cycle, change agents are 
active as the inventors, investors, entrepreneurs, devel­
opers or distributors of new concepts, products and 
services, but also as ‘enlightened consumers’ through 
demanding new products, and letting them circulate. 
Initially, this is an analytical distinction. Naturally, 
Table 6.2-1
Innovation dynamics and diffusion on three levels. 
Source: WBGU
Social Level Business as Usual Innovation Analysis Level
Micro Veto Players Change Agents Interests
Meso Loss Aversion Pioneer Spirit Emotions, Dispositions
Macro Cultural Barriers Innovation Cultures Symbolic Level, Framework
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change agents can also fulfil several of these functions 
simultaneously.
In the face of the challenges to be overcome 
 (Chapter 1), the significance of actors and actor constel­
lations must be highlighted as a political core of ‘abil­
ity awareness’ (Meier, 1978) in a republican commu­
nity: ‘What makes man a political being is his faculty of 
action; it enables him to get together with his peers, to 
act in concert, and to reach out for goals and enterprises 
that would never enter his mind, let alone the desires of 
his heart had he not been given this gift – to embark on 
something new’ (Arendt, 1970). 
The analysis of various examples shows that, as far 
as the genesis and efficacy of change agents is con­
cerned, there are usually four decisive elements: a 
certain social outsider position, the linking of several 
knowledge areas, the integration into a supportive net­
work, and the respective era’s favourable opportunity 
structures. Exemplary here is the history of Leonardo 
da Vinci (1452–1519), who managed to have a great 
impact on Renaissance Europe as painter and sculp­
tor, inventor, architect and engineer, natural philoso­
pher and author. Neither Leonardo da Vinci’s genius, 
nor the claim that as a Renaissance man, he was ‘a child 
of his times’, offers sufficient explanation. All of the 
four elements typical for change agents come together 
in him: a personality developed from social marginal­
ity, a Zeitgeist focusing on change and innovation, an 
interdisciplinary knowledge organisation, and favour­
able political opportunity structures. As an illegitimate 
child and a homosexual, Leonardo da Vinci had to fight 
for recognition, and was predestined to grow up a her­
etic who distanced himself from the Church. Leon­
ardo da Vinci found patrons, initially the city states of 
Milan and Florence, later the Vatican and the French 
court, without giving up his intellectual autonomy. In 
the second half of the 15th century, when letterpress 
printing accelerated the absorption and diffusion of the 
discoveries made by scientists and explorers, weaken­
ing the Church’s authority, a receptiveness for actively 
steered change emerged. These opportunity structures 
(Leonardo da Vinci frequently emphasised the role of 
the seminal, transitory moment) were reflected and 
turned into processes in Leonardo da Vinci’s generalist 
yet equally associative mindset, and as an ‘apparatore’, 
he was also well­received in his contemporary courtly 
society. Leonardo da Vinci understood painting as a 
‘mirror of the universe’; he was interested in the laws 
of godly nature, which he attempted to understand in 
associative links and various literary forms. Artistic, 
scientific and technical works fell together to create a 
universal programme, liberating numerous inventions. 
Table 6.2-2
The promoter model: change agent roles promoting success. 
Source: based on Kristof, 2010
Promoter role Skills Main task
Expert promoters Professional expertise and object-
specific expert knowledge
Initiation, identification of 
 alternatives, problem solving, 
 implementation
Process promoters Combination of professional 
 expertise and leadership skills
Problem definition, process design, 
communication
Power promoters Leadership skills, hierarchic 
 potential, (finanical) resources  
at their disposal
Initiation of change processes and 
promotion of their success
Relationship promoters Relationship skills, network 
 knowledge, interaction potential, 
conflict management
Supporting the process promoters in 
interaction processes
Figure 6.2-1
Typology of change agents. 
Source: WBGU
Innovation cycle
Agenda setter
Catalyst
Facilitator
Mediator
Synthesiser
Institutionaliser
Policy maker
Production cycle
Inventor
Investor
Entrepreneur
Developer
Optimiser
Distributor
Informed consumer
Change agents
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In the Italian city states, innovation came about 
not so much through individual geniuses and a speedy 
 orientation in terms of (market) application, as through 
the associative and experimental linking of ‘good ideas’ 
in the compact, yet also flexible, sounding board of the 
region, at that time the most urbanised in Europe (and 
the world), allowing a dramatic increase in the rate of 
innovation (Johnson, 2010). A similar speed of innova­
tion was achieved in the course of the Industrial Revo­
lution; as it progressed, one of the key issues became 
the improvement of the food situation as people were 
moving from agriculture to industrial manufacture, and 
from the country into the cities. 
One prominent example of a change agent from that 
era is the chemist Justus Liebig, born in 1803 in Darm­
stadt. He is the recognised founder of organic chem­
istry, agricultural chemistry and nutrition physiology, 
and therefore one of the great scientific personalities 
of the 19th century (Leggewie, 2003). Playing different 
roles, he contributed to the transition into the indus­
trial  society by linking theory, pure research, applied 
research and product development. Liebig mainly 
worked on the improvement of agricultural produc­
tivity, not least because he had actually experienced 
a terrible famine himself in 1816, the ‘year without 
a summer’. The practical result of his research was 
‘superphosphate’, which is still the world’s most used 
phosphate fertiliser. This fertiliser allowed significant 
increases in yield and food supply during the second 
half of the 19th century. It would not have been pos­
sible to feed the population of contemporary industrial 
societies without the knowledge of Liebig’s principles of 
agricultural chemistry. Liebig summarised his scientific 
research in two works, ‘Organic Chemistry in its Appli­
cation to Agriculture and Physiology’ (in short: ‘Agri­
cultural Chemistry’), and ‘Animal Chemistry or Organic 
Chemistry in its Application to Physiology and Pathol­
ogy’. His books attracted a great deal of attention both 
inside and outside scientific circles, and were translated 
into numerous languages (Liebig, 1840, 1842). Liebig 
was also an active entrepreneur, and co­founder of the 
Bayerische Aktiengesellschaft für chemische und land­
wirtschaftlich­chemische Fabrikate (BAG), a joint stock 
company for chemical and agricultural chemical prod­
ucts which still exists today under another name.
Social science research suggests that profound 
social and cultural changes often go hand in hand 
with generational changes (Mannheim, 1964; Bude, 
1987;  Leggewie, 1995; Jureit, 2006; Inglehart, 2008). 
Effectively, when major changes such as these occur, 
something happens at the social macro­level: younger 
groups show more openness towards innovations, and 
are in many cases early adopters of new technologies. 
This has been extensively documented in market and 
diffusion research. At the same time, historical research 
shows that cognitive and emotional discrepancies 
between peer groups, in part expressed as generational 
conflict, can mobilise social movements (Elias, 1994).
One important question is whether actors have suf­
ficient strategic competence, or whether they can join 
forces with other change agents, in order to initiate or 
accelerate transformation processes (Grin et al., 2010). 
This means that not only the roles of technical experts, 
political­administrative decision­making elites, mana­
gers, entrepreneurs and so on must be examined, but 
also the roles of other key groups such as consumers, 
smaller communal initiatives and informal networks. 
Change agents can therefore be individuals who gain 
trust and repute at micro­level as leaders and role 
models, and who then work together at meso­level in 
manageable groups (for example in study and working 
groups, as members of a society, in interest groups, pro­
fessional associations, in voluntary teams). And finally, 
they can also be major organisations like corporations, 
political­administrative units from local to supra­ and 
transnational level, and other cooperatives (includ­
ing certain professional groups or patrons). Besides a 
capacity for innovation and public spiritedness, the 
decisive criterion is the ability to communicate ‘new­
ness’, and to engender feelings of identity and power 
awareness in their respective spheres of communica­
tion. These spheres of communication stretch from 
direct interpersonal communication to the cross­border 
virtual communication platforms of social and scien­
tific networks. Change management and organisation 
development teach us that so­called ‘soft factors’, like 
social behaviour and the qualification to manage pro­
cesses well are key to the success of change processes 
(Kristof, 2010).
The significance of ‘niche markets’ for economic 
development has already been noted in evolutionary 
economics (Saviotti, 1996; Levinthal, 1998; Frenken et 
al., 1999). Transition research (Grin et al., 2010) also 
assumes that, for the most part, transformation pro­
cesses commence in niches, where they are initially 
confined and almost invisible. This marginality (Park, 
1928) may have led to a significant (self­)underesti­
mation of their impact; however, the decisive question 
is how isolated innovative impulses, often initiated by 
minorities and alleged outsiders viewed as ‘mad’ by the 
majority, manage to be accorded cultural hegemony 
and succeed. One aspect is that contemporary change 
agents in local and supra­regional initiatives, non­
governmental organisations and so on typically create 
role models, turn attitude and behaviour patterns into 
action patterns, and are capable of motivating others. 
Examples of this are the ‘contagious’ proliferation 
of the concept of Perestroika, and the ‘Velvet Revo­
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lution’ in Eastern Central Europe which started in the 
mid­1980s. They have led to the biggest political and 
cultural revolution in recent history, and to the opening 
up of the apparently unliftable Iron Curtain. They were 
always reliant on the social action of individual groups 
of change agents and charismatic individual personali­
ties.
Considering the growing significance of strate­
gic and/or sustainable consumerism, the influence of 
smaller communal movements (so­called grass roots 
initiatives) is also under discussion. Initiatives such 
as these exist in various forms of loose associations, 
from charitable associations to ‘social enterprises’. 
Local actors have the advantage of being able to refer 
to context­bound knowledge, and can appreciate what 
will work under specific local conditions, and what 
will not. This corresponds with the often documented 
 cognisance that change processes initiated top­down 
frequently fail precisely because they do not take 
local knowledge into account. However, taking local 
 knowledge on board is a precondition for success in a 
specific cultural and social environment (Scott, 1998).
6.3
Where and how Change Agents are already 
 Shaping the Transformation Today
6.3.1 
Change Agents at Different Levels and in Various 
Fields
The change agents described so far must now be aug­
mented by actors from the relevant climate and sus­
tainability policy fields. The focus should stay on the 
paradigms, as there are also change agent careers that 
go through several transformation areas, moving, for 
example, from peace building, integration or develop­
ment cooperation into ecological fields. One example 
of this is the Islamische Forum Penzberg, an Islamic 
forum in Upper Bavaria, initially viewed as exemplary 
in terms of integration into a multicultural community. 
By installing solar collectors on the minaret, however, 
it also took on a second role as an ecological pioneer 
in religious architecture (Merkur­Online, 08.07.2009). 
Also referred to are examples of change agents who are 
active in ‘meta­fields’ of (global) living environments 
for a higher level of conviviality (Illich, 1975), i. e. for 
a higher level of equality in terms of technological 
progress, and, from this perspective, are open for sus­
tainability aspects and could be mobilisable. Exemplary 
here are movements which call for a ‘decelerated’ time 
management (Slow Food: deceleration through slow 
and pleasurable eating; Section  6.3.2.4) and propa­
gate ‘voluntary simplicity’ (Küstenmacher and Seiwert, 
2004). Impulses for the preservation and promotion of 
cultural diversity (for example religions and genera­
tions) and social entrepreneurship in the areas of edu­
cation, development and poverty reduction, and the 
protection of human rights also number among these.
Change agents can be found at all social levels and 
in various fields of activity: for example in themati­
cally focused environmental and citizen’s initiatives 
and social protest movements, in governmental and 
non­governmental organisations (including churches 
and foundations), or they can be scientists, engineers, 
town planners and architects. Change agents can also 
be found in professional associations who make their 
members swear a ‘Hippocratic Oath’ (metaphorically 
speaking), from development cooperation to care for 
the elderly and other aspects of voluntary and private 
sector entrepreneurial activities. In accordance with the 
above described classifications, the exemplary change 
agents highlighted by the WBGU in the following are 
individuals, groups, organisations and both public and 
private networks who have developed sustainable ini­
tiatives in the needs categories described in Chapter 4. 
The following is therefore a monothematic channelling 
on the part of the WBGU, restricted to initiatives which 
are active in the areas of energy supply, mobility, urban 
development and land use (food production and forest 
protection). These are just some national and interna­
tional sample initiatives; their inclusion neither signifies 
any special kind of seal of approval, nor, particularly 
in the case of private sector enterprises, is it intended 
as an express recommendation. Some sample change 
agents are introduced in the following sections in the 
form of brief portraits. So­called bifurcations have 
been incorporated in the fields of energy supply and 
mobility. They represent forked paths in dynamic sys­
tems: one fork continuing on the current growth path 
based on energy efficient and renewable technologies, 
i. e., for example, private transport, currently reliant on 
combustion engines, should principally be continued 
on the basis of electric mobility; the other fork leading 
to alternative mobility paths including, for example, the 
avoidance of private transport. This illustration serves 
only heuristic purposes; in reality, the likelihood will be 
mixed individual strategies and hybrid collective solu­
tions. In individual cases, recourse might also be taken 
to historical change agents which have already made 
a major contribution to the desired transformation in 
the past.
In the areas of urbanisation and land use, these brief 
portraits are incorporated into a narrative relating to the 
above mentioned innovation or production cycle (Sec­
tion 6.2). They serve to illustrate the history  (Nünning 
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and Nünning, 2002; Fuchs, 2009; Thier, 2010), from 
an early, at first usually marginal, innovative idea to 
initial realisation and collectivisation (Weber, 1984), to 
general habitualisation (Bourdieu, 1987; Elias, 1987; 
Veblen, 2007). Not all of the ‘roles’ in the innovation 
and production cycle have been cast in the narratives 
pertaining to the areas ‘urban development’ and ‘land 
use’, respectively; however, the concrete examples are 
consolidated, and the synopsis is shown in Figure  6.3­1.
6.3.2 
Sample Successful Local Climate and 
 Sustainability Initiatives (Supply Side)
6.3.2.1 
Energy Supply 
The Black Forest ‘electricity rebels’ from Schönau (Ger­
many) represent the, at first glance unlikely seeming, 
case of an originally private sector, local initiative of 
electric power producers starting to produce energy 
themselves, using wind and solar energy, and later 
cogeneration and biomass, before the liberalisation of 
the German energy market in 1998. Over the past few 
years, the number of customers has multiplied, and 
by now, the Elektrizitätswerke Schönau (EWS) sup­
ply electric power to more than 100,000 private house­
holds, companies and industrial enterprises all over 
Germany, making them one of Germany’s leading green 
energy suppliers. The EWS invest their profits into the 
development of a sustainable energy supply. They also 
subsidise small­scale electric power generating plants – 
i. e. combined heat & power heating systems or biogas 
plants, on application. The required funds are raised by 
being included in the price they charge for their elec­
tricity as an extra, the so­called ’sun cent’. This has 
made it possible to install more than 3,000 small­scale 
eco­power stations to date. Through these directly sub­
sidised power stations alone, more than 10,000 t CO2 
are saved annually. Within a short period of time, a 
small, local initiative numbering just a few people grew 
into a successful business with impressive social and 
energy­political dynamics. Joined by a growing number 
of actors, it provided an incentive to change and soon 
grew in scope in terms of effect (Leggewie and Welzer, 
2009).
Solarcomplex AG in Singen (Germany), whose ambi­
tion is the conversion of the Lake Constance region’s 
energy supply to rely exclusively on renewable ener­
gies by 2030, operates in a similar fashion. Founded as 
recently as 2000 by around 20 local citizens, Solarcom­
plex AG started with the installation of a few individ­
ual solar energy plants in 2001. The AG has over 1,000 
shareholders by now, and a prominent advisory council 
which includes climate and energy researchers; it also 
operates a range of power stations. 
The Staudinger Gesamtschule school in Freiburg 
im Breisgau (Germany) commenced the energy­effi­
cient refurbishment of its school building in 1999. The 
requisite funds were raised by means of a contracting 
system: external investors invest with a view to the 
future cost savings achieved through increased energy 
efficiency, and these savings then, in subsequent years, 
earn interest on the invested capital, which is paid back 
to the investors in this way. This practice has not only 
found many followers, leading to a diffusion of the 
socio­technological innovation of ‘energy contract­
ing’; it has also resulted in alternative role models and 
changed educational concepts in everyday school life 
(Leggewie and Welzer, 2009). 
Such initiatives for change have the effect that (a) 
the actors, following the success of their measures, do 
not stay at entry level, but that they immediately start 
to look for further fields to which they can apply the 
experiences which they have gathered. The tangible 
experience that the immediate life­world is change able 
provides a motive, or reinforces the motivation, to con­
tinue to change this life­world. Simultaneously (b), the 
experiencing of ’self­efficacy’ (Bandura, 1977) has a 
paradigm­forming effect, and provides examples to be 
followed, therefore serving the diffusion of transfor­
mation impulses. This is achieved through (c) utilisation 
of the communication density of existing work, learn­
ing, and leisure time communities; ordinary commu­
nication (about work, learning or leisure activities) is 
episodically ‘charged’ for the common good. This leads 
to (d) a development of loose networks with a collec­
tive identity, with the establishment of internal shared 
habits (‘this is the way we do it’), and creates addi­
tional, extrovert distinctions (‘we don’t do things like 
that (anymore)’).
The initiatives by change agents for the establish­
ment and development of a low­carbon energy supply 
described here were usually only made possible, or only 
gained pace, through changes in the regulatory frame­
work. This exemplifies the role of the proactive state 
(Chapter 5) in the transformation process. The German 
Feed­in Law, or Stromeinspeisegesetz (StrEG), came 
into force in 1991, opening the electric power market 
for private generators of renewable power. Under the 
StrEG, the energy suppliers are legally obliged to buy 
the power generated from renewable energy sources 
in their supply region, and to pay at least 90 % of the 
average profits from the sale of this electricity for it. 
Power from renewable energy sources, previously 
viewed as not financially viable (such as power gener­
ated by wind parks) was thereby made profitable. The 
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monetary effects of this law were not financed by the 
public purse, but were met by the electricity suppliers 
and their customers (Ohlhorst, 2009). One peculiarity 
of the StrEG is that it had been initiated by a coalition 
consisting of members of all parliamentary parties, i. e. 
it was initiated directly by the parliament. A small group 
of Bundestag members, many of whom belonged to the 
Committee for Research and Technology,  succeeded in 
putting the advantages of renewable energies on the 
political agenda – actively supported by the recently 
established German Renewable Energy Federation. The 
group included the speaker of the ‘green party’, the 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, on research policy, Wolfgang 
Daniels, who hoped that this initiative would accel­
erate the nuclear phase­out; the Bundestag member 
Matthias Engelsberger (CDU/CSU), who also operates 
a hydropower plant, and two members from northern 
Germany, Erich Maaß and Harry Peter Carstensen (also 
CDU/CSU), in whose constituencies wind turbines were 
being tested (Ohlhorst, 2009). Various applications by 
the group were supported by around 80 members from 
all of the parties represented in the Bundestag. The law 
was passed by the Bundestag on 7 December 1990 with 
a large majority (Ohlhorst, 2009). 
In 2000, the law on renewable energies, Erneuer­
bare­Energien­Gesetz (EEG), developed the StrEG fur­
ther. Instead of being linked to the average electri­
city price, long­term fixed prices for feed­in electric­
ity from renewable energies were set, and remunera­
tion was differentiated according to sector. Now, the 
fixed remuneration amount not only applies for as long 
as the law is valid, but is guaranteed for 20 years. The 
law has thus introduced strong incentives to invest in 
 renewable energies. The energy supply companies had 
to commit themselves to buying the regeneratively 
generated power. For wind and photovoltaic energy 
plant operators, this means a high level of investment 
and planning security.
Examples of a locally initiated energy turnaround 
can also be found outside of Germany, of course: in 
1997, the Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy ran 
a competition for choosing a test region to assess the 
potential of renewable energies. The aim was to make 
the test region completely carbon­neutral within 10 
years with available technologies, and without any 
additional state subsidies. The island of Samsoe won 
the competition. An engineer from the mainland had 
submitted an application, suggesting the island. He 
had analysed the island’s electric power  and oil con­
sumption, assessed how much biomass is grown on the 
island each year, how strongly the wind blows, and how 
long the sun shines for. The project’s success was in no 
way predictable, as the island is a poor, rural region 
whose inhabitants had relatively little interest in cli­
mate protection. An organisation was established to 
realise the project; its speaker Sören Hermansen was 
voted as Time Magazine’s 2008 ‘Hero of the Environ­
ment’. He convinced 450 of the island’s 4,000 inhab­
itants to participate in the project. The climate project 
works on the basis of island inhabitants financing wind 
turbines and straw­powered heating systems through 
(significant) own investments. Ten offshore and eleven 
onshore wind parks were built, three central straw­
powered district heating systems (operated only with 
straw from the island), and one solar/wood powered 
district heating system. As these systems are not owned 
by major corporations, but by the islanders themselves, 
creating new employment and investment opportuni­
ties, the income and profits generated remain on Sam­
soe. Hermansen said the secret of the project’s suc­
cess was that ‘you mustn’t do anything from the top 
down. Everything must belong to the people, it has to 
become their project’. Before the climate project, ships 
brought heating oil to the island, and electricity came 
via cable. CO2 emissions were eleven tonnes per capita 
every year. After only eight years, energy production 
exceeded local consumption, so the island even turned 
into an energy exporter. The island’s car traffic is the 
only CO2 emitter these days, and the ferry to the main­
land, which consumes 9,000 litres of diesel every day. 
However, arithmetically, Samsoe’s energy production is 
zero­carbon, as electricity exports exceed oil imports. 
There are plans to link electric cars with the wind tur­
bine electricity generation, so that the car batteries can 
charge when the wind blows, and discharge electricity 
in a lull.
The co­founder of Indian photovoltaic power com­
pany Selco India, Harish Hande, is an example of an 
entrepreneurially active change agent. Selco India sells 
small­scale photovoltaic units to households in India’s 
rural regions. The company is outstanding because it 
sells its products without any subsidies from the Indian 
government’s photovoltaic programme, and because 
it also provides a maintenance service. Independence 
from Indian government subsidies is possible because 
Hande links the sale of solar power units with the 
option of financing the purchase through a microloan. 
To date, Selco has supplied over 85,000 households in 
India with photovoltaic­based lighting. Hande was the 
first person to introduce and successfully establish this 
business model in India. By now, his concept receives 
financial support from various multilateral organisa­
tions (UNEP, GEF), and has also found a host of imita­
tors in India, although these were less successful than 
he has been. The Selco company has shown that the 
electrification of rural regions does not necessarily 
have to happen through direct government subsidies 
and programmes. This initiative has set the global dis­
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cussion on various approaches for rural development in 
motion. Hande has won several awards for his activi­
ties, including the Indian Nand & Jeet Khemka Founda­
tion’s ’social Entrepreneur of the Year 2007’.
The project ‘Desertec’ (solar energy from the Sahara) 
is an international project which could become a cen­
tral element in converting Europe’s energy supply to 
renewable energy carriers. Desertec intends to build 
solar thermal power plants with minimal resource con­
sumption and a high efficiency factor in sparsely inhab­
ited desert regions with particularly high insolation. 
The electricity thus generated is to be used locally for 
development and modernisation, and the surplus is to 
be exported. High voltage direct current transmission 
is to ensure minimal transmission losses. The concept 
will be developed further by a cooperative of countries 
bordering the Mediterranean, both north and south; 
the solar power will be fed into the European super­
smartgrid, and combined with electricity from other 
renewable energy sources. This project could create 
employment opportunities and generate income, and, 
in the long term, allow zero­carbon sea water desalina­
tion and improve industrial, traffic and transport infra­
structures in the mostly little developed North African 
producer countries, but also in countries south of the 
Sahara. The concept was conceived by approximately 
60 private individuals, some from the Club of Rome 
circle. In 2003, they founded the Trans­Mediterranean 
Renewable Energy Cooperation. This turned into the 
Desertec Foundation in 2008; in 2009, the Desertec 
Industrial Initiative (DII GmbH) was founded, a con­
sortium of industrial and service provider companies 
now running feasibility studies. The DII GmbH’s found­
ing members include, besides the Münchener Rück, the 
Deutsche Bank, Siemens, ABB, E.ON, RWE, Abengoa 
Solar, Cevital, HSH Nordbank, M+W Zander Holding, 
MAN Solar Millennium and Schott Solar. Function­
ing pilot plants are in operation in Spain, with addi­
tional plants planned for Morocco, Algeria and Egypt. 
Although the project has also attracted some heavy 
criticism, for example with regard to the risk of sup­
ply insecurity in the case of a potential cartelisation, or 
the dangers of changing political constellations in the 
Maghreb states, and although private sector change 
agents might well play an ambivalent role in transfor­
mation processes (Box 6.3­1), the realisation would 
without a doubt be a key stepping stone on the way 
to fully supplying Europe (and possibly also parts of 
Africa) with renewable energies.
6.3.2.2 
Mobility
In the view of the WBGU, establishing a sustainable 
and low­carbon transport and mobility system can be 
accomplished in various ways, in which individual ele­
ments – such as the promotion of electromobility or 
the further development of public transport systems – 
can be significant to varying degrees (Section 6.3.1). In 
addition, concepts for sustainable mobility must take 
existing infrastructures and local habits into account, 
Box 6.3-1
Private Sector Change Agents: Companies and 
Investors
Stakeholders from the private sector – particularly manu­
facturers of climate­friendly technologies – have a key role 
to play in the transformation towards a low­carbon society. 
Change agents from the private sector promote and develop 
commercial innovations to increase market shares with better 
and new products for profit. In doing so, this type of change 
agent fulfils various functions: 
 > research and development and knowledge generation;
 > provision of financial and human resources;
 > initiation of self­reliant market processes;
 > hinge function between research and application 
(diffusion);
 > taking on Corporate Social Responsibility, CSR.
Stakeholders from different areas of the private sector can act 
as change agents: engineers and technicians in different com­
panies across a wide range of industries (particularly in the 
renewable energies, energy efficiency and electromobility 
sectors) play a pivotal role in the development of new tech­
nologies. The insurance industry has also become involved in 
the area of climate change mitigation quite early on – not 
least because it expects global warming to lead to increasing 
financial pressure (Brunnengräber, 2009). Reinsurance com­
panies such as Swiss Re communicate knowledge about cli­
mate change and its consequences, and the climate change 
mitigation that is required, and become active as investors in 
the establishment of a renewable energy system: the Munich 
Re reinsurance company, for instance, is one of the driving 
forces behind Desertec. Banks, insurance, and investment 
companies have joint the UNEP Finance Initiative. Consul­
tancy firms such as McKinsey also actively raise awareness in 
the private sector, and develop solutions for the adaptation of 
individual corporations and companies to embrace climate 
protection (McKinsey, 2010). However, meta­studies  (Rogers, 
2003) have also shown that private sector change agents, due 
to their profit­oriented nature, do not enjoy the same level of 
credibility as other stakeholders. A mixing of private econom­
ic and common welfare interests can result in cognitive dis­
crepancies and dissonances. Nevertheless, private sector 
stakeholders can still be included as change agents if the pur­
suit of their interests clearly shows awareness of common 
welfare responsibilities, and results in sufficient material 
impact for a sustainable way of operating. 
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as these can also vary greatly from country to country, 
and region to region. However, change agents aiming 
for a more climate­friendly, sustainable development 
are already at work in the different mobility areas, or 
on the various means of transport or vehicle types. 
The foundations for developing electromobility fur­
ther were laid as early as the 19th century. The Eng­
lish physicist Michael Faraday (1791–1867) discov­
ered electromagnetic rotation in 1821, i. e. a process for 
transforming electric energy into mechanical energy. 
French engineer Gustave Trouvé presented the first 
drivable electric car at the International Exposition of 
Electricity in 1881 in Paris. Over the next few years, 
electric cars had their heyday, as they were superior to 
vehicles with combustion engines in terms of efficiency. 
In 1900, Ferdinand Porsche presented an electric vehi­
cle on the Exposition Universelle world fair in Paris; at 
that time, 38 % of the ‘automobiles’ in the USA were 
electric powered vehicles (compared to 40 % steam 
powered, and 22 % fuelled by gasoline). In New York, 
the share of electric vehicles among ‘automobiles’ was 
even as high as 50 %. In 1912, twenty manufacturers 
built 33,842 electric cars worldwide (Möser, 2002). 
However, with the invention of electric starter motors 
for combustion engines, and due to the cheap availabil­
ity of oil, combustion engine powered vehicles gradu­
ally overtook their electric rivals. The key advantage 
they had over the electric vehicles, with their heavy 
batteries and long charging times, was that they were 
also suitable for long distances. Since the 1940s, elec­
tric cars had therefore been used only in certain trans­
port sector niches. Golf buggies were the first mass­pro­
duced electric vehicles for consumers. Since the 1990s, 
electric vehicles are undergoing a renaissance, triggered 
by the oil crisis and the great fluctuations in oil prices 
due to tensions and conflicts in the Middle East, and by 
the general public’s growing environmental awareness. 
This development has been supported by the progress 
in power accumulation technology. Since then, we have 
again seen an upsurge in research efforts in the area of 
electromobility. Apart from scientists, a great number 
of car manufacturers have shown particular commit­
ment. In 2009 and 2010 alone, more than ten different 
models by different manufacturers have been launched 
on the market in various countries. The series produced 
roadster manufactured by the Californian company 
‘Tesla Motors’ is currently one of the most advanced 
models in technical terms: the roadster has a range of 
around 320 km, and the batteries only need the com­
paratively short time of 3.5 hours to recharge. 
Despite these successes, and the extensive media 
attention paid to this issue, the current market for elec­
tric cars still remains quite small. Only 162 of the 3.8 
million new cars registered in Germany in 2009 were 
electric. In Germany, a total of 1,588 of these vehicles 
are licensed for road use (KBA, 2010). It is therefore 
important that policy­making actively promotes a con­
version, and supports it financially. The German federal 
government’s budget for this purpose between 2005 
and 2013 totals € 700 million. The federal govern­
ment’s ‘Nationaler Entwicklungsplan Elektro mobilität’, 
a national development plan for electromobility, plans 
to get 1 million electric vehicles on the national roads 
by 2020. Research and development will receive fund­
ing (energy storage, vehicle technology and grid inte­
gration), framework conditions will be improved (rele­
vant qualification of human resources), and support 
will be given during market launches in order to achieve 
this goal. 
Besides electromobility, one of the key elements of 
future mobility concepts is car sharing. The German 
national railway Deutsche Bahn is currently working 
on a concept which includes both elements. According 
to this concept, 10 % of their hire cars will be electric by 
2011. The comparatively low range of electromobiles is 
not an issue in the Deutsche Bahn concept, as the vehi­
cles are intended to be used only for extended journeys 
into metropolitan areas. Customers should take the 
train to travel longer distances. This trend is supported 
by a decline in car ownership among young people liv­
ing in the major cities, and the growing willingness to 
restrict car use for climate protection reasons (Albert 
et al., 2010). Short­term car hire is currently still a 
niche market in Germany, with less than 170,000 users 
(Financial Times Deutschland, 17.08.2010). According 
to analyses by consultancy firm Frost & Sullivan, how­
ever, the number of car sharing users will probably rise 
sevenfold to almost 1.1 million users by 2016. The con­
sultancy firm has calculated that, with greater politi­
cal support, the number of users might even grow to 
2.1 million within the next five years. Europe­wide, the 
management consultancy assumes that by 2016, 5.5 
million users will share around 77,000 vehicles (Frost 
& Sullivan, 2010). In Europe, outstanding commitment 
is shown by France; there, the government supports the 
extension of car sharing schemes, with reference to the 
success of the Parisian car sharing initiative Autolib. 
Particular attention is paid to the inclusion of electric 
cars. Currently, over 270 German cities also offer car 
sharing schemes. The Daimler corporation, for example, 
is currently testing a car sharing model named Car2Go 
in Ulm: in handy locations all over the city, vehicles 
of the Smart make are available for use by registered 
users. Just under 20,000 of Ulm’s 170,000 inhabit­
ants have already joined the scheme (Financial Times 
Deutsch land, 17.08.2010). Deutsche Bahn is also active 
as a major provider of car sharing schemes in other 
countries (Switzerland, the Netherlands). Under the 
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Call a Bike scheme, they also hire out a total of 6,000 
bicycles Germany­wide. In 2010, the Deutsche Bahn’s 
car and bike sharing offer won the Bavarian state prize 
for electromobility in the category ’sustainable mobil­
ity concepts’.
Apart from the development of integrated traffic 
concepts with the inclusion of electromobility, the pub­
lic transport system is central for the development of 
sustainable mobility concepts, particularly in the area 
of metropolitan mobility. According to German Federal 
Environment Agency calculations, 2.5 million t of CO2 
emissions per year could be avoided if public transport 
use in Germany were to double by 2020, and the use 
of cars were reduced in its favour (UBA, 2010). This is 
achievable only if the public transport system becomes 
more attractive for large parts of the population. Jour­
ney frequencies would have to be increased, fares 
decreased, and a safe and clean infrastructure would 
have to be provided. The efforts of the Belgian city 
of Hasselt can be considered as particularly success­
ful. As early as 1996, Hasselt introduced a free public 
transport system on the initiative of town mayor Steve 
Stevaert (van Goeverden et al., 2006). To realise this 
concept, the local bus network was extended, traffic 
was banned from shopping areas, parking spaces were 
abolished, and car parking charges were introduced or 
increased. Since then, the number of public transport 
users in Hasselt has risen tenfold (from slightly more 
than 300,000 in 1996 to more than 4 million in 2006). 
There are also reports that this has had a positive effect 
on other aspects of city life (local business has picked 
up, for example). Traffic management professionals and 
urban planners are familiar with the Hasselt project, 
which has been copied by an as yet still small number 
of cities providing zero­tariff public transport services, 
although their numbers are growing worldwide (for 
example Aubagne/France, Hawaii/USA, Lübben and 
Templin/Germany, Manises/Spain, Vero Beach/USA). 
In Germany, half of all journeys made by car are 
shorter than five kilometres, leading to CO2 emissions 
of more than 14 million t in 2005. According to Ger­
man Federal Environment Agency calculations, 5.8 mil­
lion t of CO2 emissions per year could be avoided if half 
of these journeys were made on foot or by  bicycle by 
2020 (UBA, 2010). In the past few years, cities, uni­
versities and non­governmental organisations have 
started to offer or fund free­of­charge bicycle mainte­
nance services to motivate people to use their bicycles, 
and to increase road safety for cyclists. The German 
Cyclists’ Federation Allgemeiner Deutscher Fahrrad­
Club (ADFC), for example, provides a so­called ‘autumn 
check’ at several locations in Berlin. Major faults are 
listed, and cyclists are told how to repair them, or given 
the details of local bike repair shops. This campaign was 
supported by Berlin’s Department for Urban Develop­
ment and Traffic Management, the Senatsverwaltung 
für Stadtentwicklung und Verkehrslenkung Berlin 
(ADFC, 2010). Besides this practical measure to pro­
mote cycling, the ADFC’s main function is the cham­
pioning of cyclists’ interests in politics and administra­
tion, and lobbying for the improvement of framework 
conditions for ‘mobility by bicycle’ in Germany. In cities 
like San Francisco and Vienna, cyclists can repair their 
bikes in so­called ‘Bike Kitchens’ at no charge. These 
are self­help maintenance shops that provide tools and 
materials, and a helping hand during repairs. In addi­
tion, Vienna’s ‘Bike Kitchen’ is outstanding because it 
specifically targets immigrants and socially disadvan­
taged groups with what it has to offer, and links politi­
cal lobbying (such as the promotion of cycling culture) 
with the provision of services. 
Whilst it is relatively easy to find low­carbon alter­
natives for short journeys, there is currently no tech­
nical replacement for air traffic. The international air 
transport association IATA, which represents 230 air­
lines and 93% of international air traffic, has never­
theless set itself the ambitious target of zero­carbon 
growth as from 2020, and to reduce emissions to half 
of the 2005 values by 2050, despite its tremendous 
growth (Tagesspiegel, 30.11.2010). Biofuels play a key 
role in the realisation of this plan. The German airline 
Lufthansa is the first airline in the world to test the 
use of low­carbon biofuels in a long­term experiment 
on their regular Hamburg to Frankfurt route. The test 
begins in April 2011, and is scheduled to last six months 
in order to examine the potential impact on the engine. 
The Hamburg­Harburg and Munich technical universi­
ties are supporting the project. The German Aerospace 
Centre believes that significantly lower volumes of soot 
particles will be generated during combustion. Biofuel 
is also lighter than kerosene. This project could save up 
to 1,500 t CO2.
In terms of renewable fuels fully replacing fossil 
fuels, the main problem is still the sourcing of suffi­
cient amounts. Even if the fuel is won from non­edible 
plants, the risk of competition in terms of land use for 
cultivation areas remains (WBGU, 2010a). One poten­
tial alternative that is being considered for interconti­
nental air traffic is the use of magnetic levitation in a 
vacuum tunnel. If air were pumped out, the aerody­
namic resistance would be reduced, and a vehicle mov­
ing along in such a tunnel could reach higher speeds 
with the same energy input. Rand Cooperation engi­
neer Robert F. Salter already developed a transport con­
cept for high speed trains in vacuum tunnels, so­called 
Vactrains, in the 1970s. One current project, named 
‘swissmetro’, is hoping to use magnetic levitation trains 
in a vacuum tunnel for intercity traffic in Switzerland. 
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The journey time from Berne to Zurich, approximately 
100 kilometres, could be reduced to 12 minutes. Since 
2004, several testing phases related to this project have 
been carried out at the École Polytechnique Fédérale 
de Lausanne and the Numexia foundation. The search 
is also on for industry partners for a syndicate that will 
devise the Swissmetro transport system, and realise a 
first test route.
The mobility sector case studies included here inten­
tionally cover a wide range of change agents: from 
internationally operating, profit­oriented corporations 
like the Deutsche Bahn to communities like Hasselt, or 
local, action­oriented associations like Bike Kitchen. We 
could have chosen differently, and the list could easily 
go on, as particularly in the area of mobility, a number 
of very diverse actors are working on establishing low­
carbon and sustainable methods of mobility. Offers like 
those provided by the EMBARQ network, which pro­
vides information on sustainable transport systems on 
behalf of the World Resources Institute (WRI), are key 
in terms of orientation here.
6.3.2.3 
Urban Development: Change Agents for 
 Sustainable Urbanisation
As per the typology described above (Section 6.2), 
change agents can fulfil various functions in the trans­
formation process. This is illustrated by examples from 
the fields of urbanisation, or sustainable building and 
habitation. Again it should be noted that individual 
agents can occupy several analytically diverse roles 
simultaneously.
The vision of a sustainable city was significantly 
influenced in the 20th century by the architect, 
designer, engineer, developer and author Buckminster 
Fuller (1895–1983). He came from a well­to­do mer­
chant family, began his studies at Harvard in 1912, was 
thrown out of university, became a marine soldier, and 
then a ‘failed existence’. 1927 brought a biographical 
turnaround: Fuller wanted to experiment to find out 
what an individual person can contribute to change the 
world for the greater good, and documented this self­
awareness process over 50 years in a diary. Fuller was 
interested in global and cosmic perspectives (‘Operating 
Manual for Spaceship Earth’) and the ‘integral function 
of humans in the universe’. Fuller was not only pio­
neering in the formulation of the concept of sustain­
able urbanisation, he was also active as an inventor and 
developer: in order to avert ‘cosmic bankruptcy’, he 
wanted to provide tools and techniques for sustainable 
development. As an architect, he found fame for his 
new types of building concepts, which were patented 
and marketed under the name of Dymaxion (Dymaxion 
Globe). Fuller’s trademarks were the geodesic domes; 
the best­known is the ‘Biosphere’, the United States’ 
exhibition pavilion at the 1967 Montreal World’s Fair. 
The construction of the domes is based on a further 
development of simple basic geometric shapes (tetra­
hedrons as 3­simplex, octahedrons, and very densely 
packed spheres); these are extremely robust and can be 
manufactured using small amounts of materials. Fuller’s 
works inspire architects, urban planners and artists to 
this day.
A number of engineers and architects all over the 
world are currently working on the development of 
technologies and materials for sustainable building, or 
sustainable urban development. One example is the Plus 
Energy House, developed by students in collaboration 
with engineer Manfred Hegger, Technical University of 
Darmstadt, as part of the German Federal Ministry of 
Transport, Building and Urban Development’s research 
initiative ‘Zukunft Bau’ (‘Future Building’) in coopera­
tion with the US­based Solar Decathlon programme. A 
Plus Energy House generates more energy than it needs 
for cooling and heating. The excess is used, for exam­
ple, to operate household appliances or an electric car, 
or it is fed into the power grid. The house combines the 
fundamental pillars of sustainable building and living, 
like energy and material efficiency (through the use 
of renewable building materials, recycling, etc.) with 
comfort and aesthetic design. Between 2009 and 2011, 
a prototype Energy Plus House is part of a travelling 
exhibition through Germany’s major cities, on show to 
the German public as a practical and informative exam­
ple of the various aspects of energy saving and sus­
tainable building. This house was developed as a conse­
quence of the research initiative  ‘Zukunft Bau’.
Transformative changes triggered by those with a 
vision, like Buckminster Fuller, or pioneering engineers 
like Manfred Hegger and his team, can reach a wider 
audience through initiatives like the climate manifesto 
‘Common Sense for the World’. This  ‘Manifesto for sus­
tainable architecture and civil engineering issues by 
architects, engineers and town planners in Germany’ 
was drawn up in 2009 (DAI, 2009). The manifesto’s 
preamble states: ‘The contribution we can make in the 
form of sustainable architecture and civil engineering is 
essential to bring about the changes needed in the use 
of our natural resources.’ There are to be regular pub­
lic reports on the implementation of this climate mani­
festo. It is one of the most comprehensive self­imposed 
voluntary undertakings by a professional group ever 
to be presented to political decision­makers. Archi­
tects, town planners and civil engineers make clear that 
they do not just design and create individual build­
ings, but that the energy­related design of each house, 
each office building and each factory hall decides the 
level of greenhouse gases that are emitted. The loca­
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tion of buildings also determines how mobile people 
and goods have to be, or whether the need for mobil­
ity can be reduced. Moreover, construction waste rep­
resents around two­thirds of all waste. Therefore, if a 
major part of the climate problem is caused by archi­
tecture and urban construction work, the manifesto 
argues, this field also offers a considerable potential for 
avoidance. This paradigm shift is followed by practical 
improvements in the provision of lighting and shade, 
cooling, heating and insulating, in building materials, 
room allocation and much more. Construction sustain­
ability is taken into account in training and further 
education, star architects are turned into global green 
building role models. The manifesto hopes that laws 
and certifications will encourage energy efficient and 
low­carbon architecture to move out of the eco­niche 
and into the mainstream.
To realise the principles and projects suggested in 
the climate manifesto needs companies like the long­
established Bavarian company Baufritz, which con­
structs zero­carbon houses using bio­based construc­
tion materials. In doing so, the construction company 
proves that sustainable building is already possible, 
and contributes to changing social practices. In 2009, 
Baufritz built around 200 blocks of flats and detached 
homes which, according to their own data, bind more 
than 10,000 t CO2, as well as whole estates, nursery 
schools, schools, hotel complexes, holiday villages and 
commercial buildings. As a pioneer, the company helps 
to implement the transformation in practical terms, and 
proves its achievability. Baufritz was awarded the Ger­
man sustainability prize in 2009. 
The first zero­carbon supermarket was built by the 
Tengelmann group. It is generally viewed as a light­
house project in the German food retailing industry, as 
it demonstrates quite clearly that a modern supermar­
ket concept can be zero­carbon, and operate with 50 % 
less energy. For this pilot project, an energy efficiency 
concept was conceived that combines a great number 
of separate individual measures; in part, completely 
new solutions had to be specially developed. Some of 
these have already been on the market for years, but 
 others were innovations, or had to be improved for this 
project. 
A pilot project of completely different dimensions 
is the construction (from scratch) of zero­carbon cit­
ies, planned wholly on the drawing board, such as 
Masdar City or the Chinese cities Dongtan and Ling­
lang. The realisation of such initiatives requires pow­
erful investors. The realisation allows development, 
testing and diffusion of sustainability solutions for 
urban  development, civil engineering, residential con­
struction and mobility. Masdar City is being built by 
the Emirate of Abu Dhabi in anticipation of the time 
when local crude oil and natural gas reserves will be 
exhausted. Construction of Masdar City, which will also 
house the offices of the new International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA), started in 2008, with com­
pletion planned for 2020. The Arabic word ‘Masdar’ 
means ‘starting point’, ‘source’, and is also used for 
‘energy source’. Around 40,000 inhabitants and almost 
1,500 companies and ecological and sustainability 
industry organisations are to settle in an area covering 
six square kilometres. The ‘zero­carbon Science City’ 
Masdar’s energy supply is to be 100 % regenerative: 
besides the planned solar­thermal power plants, wind 
farms will be used to drive pumps which will pump the 
cooler air found below the ground into the houses. The 
water supply is to be secured through solar­powered 
desalination plants. In terms of transport, only electric 
vehicles are planned for Masdar City, and, by following 
a strict recycling regime, the city hopes to be almost 
entirely waste­free. 
In Germany’s Ruhr region, over 60 leading, mainly 
long­established and energy intensive major companies 
have joined up to found the initiative ‘InnovationCity 
Ruhr’ (ICR), to turn the formerly highly industrialised 
Ruhr region into a future ecological model region by 
investing in renewable energy and energy saving tech­
nologies. Under the motto ‘Blue Skies, Green City’, 
an entire city district with more than 50,000 inhabit­
ants is to be converted into an exemplary low­carbon 
city. By 2020, CO2 emissions in the pilot area are to be 
reduced to half of those in 2010. To achieve this, all of 
the existing buildings will have to be almost completely 
refurbished. New buildings to passive and plus energy 
standard have to be built. Innovative technologies such 
as heat pumps and solar plants will have to be used, and 
new kinds of transport systems like electric cars and 
buses for environmentally­friendly mobility to improve 
the quality of urban life must be ready to use. In 2010, 
a competition was held for ‘climate city of the future’. 
Of the 16 applicants, five of which (Bochum,  Bottrop, 
Essen, Mülheim an der Ruhr and Gelsenkirchen/
Herten) reached the final round, the city of Bottrop 
won, convincing with a concept for energy­conscious 
urban reconstruction and a high level of citizen­mobi­
lisation. As other cities developed similar concepts 
for the competition, and are planning to drive ahead 
with these under their own steam, despite their limited 
funds, the Ruhr region could become a model for cli­
mate change mitigation and energy turnaround for the 
whole of Germany and Europe. InnovationCity Ruhr 
views itself as a ‘lighthouse project, yet also as a trigger 
for innovation’, hoping to inspire the founding of yet 
more energy efficient companies in the other commu­
nities in the Ruhr region. So far, the project is under­
financed, and has won hardly any public attention, it 
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is therefore more of a pledge than a master plan; nev­
ertheless, its significance is not to be underestimated, 
for it makes a huge difference whether a national 
and European energy transition concept also includes 
regions like the Ruhrgebiet, which both factually and 
symbolically represents a typical, heavily industrialised 
area, or whether it is applied only to pioneering, pleas­
ant ‘green’ cities like Tübingen or Freiburg. What makes 
this project so outstanding, compared to other climate 
and sustainability initiatives, is the fact of its realisation 
in one of Europe’s oldest coal mining regions, an area 
which has lived for centuries from coal extraction with 
continued industry substance, and a transport system 
that is heavily reliant on automobility. A transforma­
tion towards sustainability in a medium­sized univer­
sity town with a large number of cyclists, or on the 
drawing board with plenty of investment capital (see 
Masdar City) is not just comparatively easy, but also, it 
can hardly serve as a model for other industrial regions. 
InnovationCity Ruhr also represents a true reindustri­
alisation concept, as it accepts a quite radical transfor­
mation with huge consequences for lifestyles, working 
environments and production processes, towards a sus­
tainable metropolitan economy and society (Engel et 
al., 2011).
It needs more than pilot projects and individual suc­
cessful examples for the transformation into a low­car­
bon society to succeed. In the medium term, it will be 
necessary to institutionally anchor sustainable social 
practices. In this respect, the university town of Mar­
burg has set an example: in 2008, the town passed a 
’solar by­law’, obliging anyone building new homes, or 
extending or converting buildings that require heating, 
to install and operate solar­thermal units for this pur­
pose. The objective of this by­law was the protection 
of natural life­support systems, particularly climate and 
resources, for the common good, through locally imple­
mented and locally impacting measures for the efficient 
use of energy, particularly that provided by insolation. 
This is what made Marburg’s by­law unique in Germany. 
Nevertheless, in 2010, the Gießen administrative court 
decided this by­law was illegal, as, on the one hand, 
the German federal legal standards for new buildings 
as stated in the law on renewable energies and heat­
ing had not been accorded precedence, so the town in 
fact had no authority to impose the use of solar power. 
On the other hand, the terms of some of the individ­
ual regulations contained in the by­law were criticised, 
such as the lack of interim periods to allow adjust­
ments, and the non­consideration of the fundamental 
constitutional trust and relativity law with regard to the 
inclusion of some buildings. In principle, however, the 
administrative court appreciated the town of Marburg’s 
endeavours to make a contribution to climate change 
mitigation. As the administrative court also emphasised 
the fact that in principle, under Hessian regional build­
ing law, communities do have the authority to pass such 
‘solar by­laws’, one can safely assume that a by­law 
that considered the above mentioned criticised points 
would indeed be legal. 
Mayors and administrative leaders of cities from 
all global regions have come together in different net­
works to jointly lobby for the mitigation of greenhouse 
gases and sustainable urbanisation. The World May­
ors Council on Climate Change, founded by the mayor 
of the Japanese city of Kyoto, Yorikane Masumoto, in 
2005 shortly after the Kyoto Protocol came into force, 
currently has over 50 members. The aim of the net­
work is to improve the international cooperation of cit­
ies in their climate change mitigation endeavours, and 
to lobby for ambitious climate protection targets at dif­
ferent political levels. Apart from political advocacy 
activities, for example at international climate confer­
ences, members also introduce climate and sustainabil­
ity initiatives to the public on a broader level. The C40 
Cities Climate Leadership Group was also established 
in 2005, and since 2006, the foundation has enjoyed 
the financial support of former US president Bill Clin­
ton’s Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) foundation. The 
CCI offers the C40 cities financial support for projects 
aimed at reducing energy consumption and greenhouse 
gas emissions. In urban planning, issues like build­
ings, lighting, waste, transport, etc., examples for ‘best 
practice’ are extensively documented and exchanged. 
Much broader in terms of issues addressed, and also in 
terms of numbers, is the ICLEI – Local Governments for 
Sustainability network, which represents over 1,200 
city and community administrations globally in more 
than 70 countries, and therefore more than half a bil­
lion  people. ICLEI’s general aim is supporting cities and 
communities in the implementation of sustainability 
measures. In this respect, the network offers technical 
advice and practical training, and acts as an information 
service provider. Based on these three networks – the 
World Mayors Council on Climate Change, the C40 cit­
ies and ICLEI – the ‘World Mayors and Local Govern­
ments Climate Protection Agreement’ was agreed at the 
Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Con­
vention on Climate Change in 2007. This agreement has 
so far been signed by over 100 cities, to prove their 
commitment to, amongst other things, the immediate 
and significant reduction of their greenhouse gas emis­
sions, to measuring and reporting this annual green­
house gas mitigation, and to continuing their efforts 
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. The aim is 
the achievement of 60 % or 80 % mitigation of glo­
bal greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, compared with 
1990 levels.
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6.3.2.4 
Land Use: Change Agents in the Areas of Food 
 Production and Forest Protection
Food production
One of the major actors who contributed to the suc­
cess of the ‘Green Revolution’, i. e. the exceptional 
increase in agricultural productivity in the developing 
countries during the second half of the 20th century 
(Section 3.5.2), was the Consultative Group on Inter­
national Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The Interna­
tional Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in Manila was the 
first of 15 ‘Future Harvest Centers’ which together con­
stitute the CGIAR network, established in 1971. It is 
included here to represent all of the CGIAR’s 15 pio­
neering institutes, which also deal with maize or wheat 
(International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, 
 CIMMYT,  Mexico), potatoes (International Potato 
Center, CIP, Peru) or tropical agriculture (International 
Center for Tropical Agriculture, CIAT, Colombia). The 
IRRI has made vital contributions to the breeding of 
new rice varieties. The development of a particularly 
resistant, short­stemmed variety of rice (IR­8) in the 
early 1960s is today viewed as the beginning of the 
‘Green Revolution’ (Section 3.5.2) in rice cultivation, 
and the foundation for the Asian economic boom. 
The new, more resistant rice varieties led to increased 
yields, allowing prices to fall. However, this develop­
ment also had negative impacts, such as causing major 
environmental problems (WBGU, 1999: ‘Green­Revo­
lution Syndrome’). Although the IRRI is the acknowl­
edged inventor and developer, and a public face in the 
Green  Revolution, it could not have started its work 
without the support of other change agents, in the 
role of investors: the IRRI was founded in 1960 by 
the Ford and Rockefeller Foundation in cooperation 
with the  Philippine government. Today, the institute 
works on better education and training for rice farm­
ers, and develops new sustainable cultivation methods, 
intended to bring maximum yields using as few pesti­
cides or fertilisers, and as little water as possible. 
Despite the undisputed successes, 20th century 
industrial agriculture and food production has attracted 
much criticism; there have also been counter­move­
ments by those who felt that the new production 
methods did not adequately consider aspects of con­
servation, quality and health. However, whilst in the 
20th century these were for a long time restricted to 
social groups in the margins of society – such as the 
Life Reform Movement in the 1920s, or the ecologi­
cally conscious alternative subcultures of the 1960s 
and ‘70s – sustainable forms of food production and 
ecological agriculture have rapidly expanded in almost 
all regions of the world since the 1990s (Willer et al., 
2008). The international Slow Food movement is exem­
plary of the general social trend to attach more value 
to organic and traditional cultivation methods; how­
ever, it also wants to put the enjoyment factor back 
into eating. Slow Food’s objective is the preservation of 
regional specialities and traditional production meth­
ods. Founder and international chairman Carlo Petrini 
defined the benchmark and basic principles of this ‘new 
gastronomy’: buono, pulito e giusto – good, clean and 
fair (Petrini, 2007). Slow Food’s forerunner organisa­
tion, Arcigola, was founded by Carlo Petrini in Italy in 
1986. Petrini was born in 1949 in Bra, still Slow Food’s 
headquarters today. After studying sociology in Trient, 
Petrini became politically active; at one point, he was 
Bra’s appointed town councillor. He also wrote arti­
cles about food and drink for Italian magazines, and 
was involved in the founding of the magazine ‘Gam­
bero Rosso’, initially a monthly supplement of the daily 
newspaper ‘Il Manifesto’. He later became a columnist 
for Italy’s third­largest daily newspaper, ‘La Stampa’. 
Petrini says that the key experience which motivated 
him to found Arcigola was a day trip to Montalcino 
in Tuscany with friends, where the group of travel­
lers was served a disgusting soup, and, instead of the 
Brunello di Montalcino for which the region is famed, 
a watered down table wine. On the return journey, 
Petrini drafted his manifesto on the ‘human right to the 
pleasures of good food’, to the applause of his fellow 
travellers (Slow Food International, 1989). Contem­
porary events also leading to the foundation of Slow 
Food were the 1985/1986 methanol scandal (several 
people died after drinking Italian wine that had been 
adulterated with methanol), and the rising number of 
fast food restaurants and food chains in the mid­1980s. 
Since 1991/1992, Slow Food also has a branch in Ger­
many. Today, the Slow Food movement has more than 
100,000 members in over 132 countries. It aims to sup­
port regional food trade, lobbies for organic agriculture, 
and promotes awareness for good quality food. Moreo­
ver, the organisation is building up seed banks, hoping 
to contribute to biodiversity preservation, under the 
project name ‘Ark of Taste’. Each member pays € 5 per 
year to a foundation for biodiversity. Slow Food holds a 
biennial international trade fair for regional and organic 
food, the ‘salone del Gusto’, in Lingotto, the former Fiat 
works in Turin. Since 2004, the ‘Terra Madre’, a gather­
ing of farmers, producers, cooks and scientists from all 
over the world is held at the same time. 
Apart from the fact that the Slow Food movement 
spread very quickly across many countries, the long­
ing for ecologically compatible and better quality food 
has also directly led to social innovations. In almost all 
major cities in Germany, for example, so­called Green 
Box services have become established since the mid­
6 Agents of Transformation: How Innovations Can Spread (Faster)
256
1990s, whereby a box of organically grown food is 
delivered directly to homes or workplaces. So­called 
‘urban gardening’ has also gaining in popularity over 
the past few years in the metropolitan areas of many 
western industrialised states. The movement originated 
in 1970s New York: herbs and other useful plants were 
grown in ‘community gardens’, often formerly fallow 
areas, which were then harvested by those who estab­
lished the garden, and/or those in need. 
However, change agents have already impacted 
social practices not only by raising awareness of, and 
focusing on, an ecologically more compatible and 
healthier diet, moving the issue into the mainstream. 
There is also the remarkable success story of Bionade, 
a soft drink invented in 1995 by the privately­owned 
Peter brewery in Ostheim vor der Rhön (Germany). 
Bionade is a lemonade that is made from controlled, 
organically­grown raw materials. Inclusion in the range 
of a Hamburg drinks wholesaler in 1997 initially turned 
Bionade into a drink consumed in trendy restaurants 
and pubs. From there, the lemonade went increasingly 
further afield: by now, Bionade is not only stocked in 
most organic food shops, but also in most mainstream 
supermarkets, it is available in the dining cars of the 
Deutsche Bahn, and on the drinks menu in the restau­
rants of the McDonalds subsidiary company McCafé. 
Since 2007, Bionade has also been available in various 
other European countries; it has even conquered the 
USA recently. The success of this organic soft drink has 
led to the introduction of a number of copycat products 
by various producers.
Alongside the development of organic food, tech­
nical innovations also play a major role in the estab­
lishment of sustainable eating habits. One striking 
example of this is the invention of the CFC­free refrig­
erator. CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons) were long used as 
refrigerants in refrigerators, even though they impact 
strongly on ozone depletion. Moreover, CFC was also 
the blowing agent for the polyurethane foam used for 
insulation. The world’s first modern CFC­free refrig­
erator was manufactured in 1992 by the Saxony­
based company ‘dkk Scharfenstein’ (later ‘Foron’). The 
development was suggested by Greenpeace and the 
Hygiene­Institut Dortmund, led by Harry Rosin. The 
first CFC­free refrigerator of this type was converted 
by Lare GmbH to be used as laboratory equipment at 
the Hygiene­Institut Dortmund. At that time, refriger­
ator manufacturers showed no interest whatsoever in 
introducing this technology. Since 2000, the number of 
household and commercial refrigerators with alterna­
tive  refrigerants which neither damage the ozone layer 
further, nor increase the greenhouse gas effect, on the 
market has greatly increased. The electric refrigerator 
is also an example of how technical innovations them­
selves can evoke social change. Prior to the invention 
of refrigerators and freezers, food could only be stored 
for a very limited amount of time, and over longer peri­
ods only with relatively elaborate preservation meth­
ods. With the invention and mass diffusion of electric 
refrigerators and freezers, this has radically changed, 
leading to the development of frozen food – industri­
ally produced, deep­frozen foodstuffs which, because 
of their packaging, cooling and transport requirements, 
carry a much higher negative environmental bal­
ance than fresh foods. The use of refrigeration tech­
nology creates a particularly high energy demand. In 
1998, Europe introduced the energy label, showing 
the energy consumption of electric appliances to help 
consumers with their purchase decision. In 2003, the 
classes A+ and A++ were introduced for particularly 
energy­saving refrigerators and freezers, i. e. those that 
exceed even energy efficiency class A, indicating a very 
low energy consumption. Most of the household appli­
ances available today are already class A according to 
the originally defined efficiency classes, or even better. 
In May 2010, the European parliament therefore rede­
fined the household appliance energy classes. Direc­
tive 2010/30/EU, featuring the new additional class 
A+++, is in force as of 2011. This example shows how 
important it is that change agents accompany social 
change institutionally to support it. Over the past few 
years, projects calculating the carbon footprint of vari­
ous products (i. e. the CO2 equivalents created over the 
entire life cycle of a product, from resource extraction 
to disposal) have started in various European countries. 
Outstanding commitment in this area has been shown 
by the British supermarket chain Tesco, the Swiss store 
chain Migros, or the Casino chain in France; vari­
ous Swedish food product suppliers have also become 
change agents by starting to label food according to its 
carbon footprint in 2009, to inform consumers about 
the impact their consumption has on climate.
Forest Protection
Forests cover around a third of the Earth’s surface, and 
ensure the survival of human societies through a vari­
ety of ecosystem services. Forests are also one of the 
Earth’s largest carbon stores, storing up to 650 Gt of CO2, 
286 GT CO2 of this in the form of biomass alone. For the 
past 10 years, global forested areas are being reduced 
by approx. 13 million hectares per year, an area roughly 
four times the size of Belgium. The deforestation rate is 
primarily determined by the conversion of tropical for­
ests into agriculturally used land, and destructive for­
est use. The reduction rate of carbon storage in forests 
is currently estimated to have amounted to 0.5 Gt C 
(1.8 Gt CO2) per year between 2000 and 2010, total­
ling 5 Gt C (18 Gt CO2) for the decade (FAO, 2010a). It 
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is therefore vital to stop deforestation, and manage for­
ests sustainably, in order to bind and store more CO2 to 
avoid dangerous climate change. 
Hans Carl von Carlowitz (1645–1714) is gener­
ally acknowledged as the father of sustainable for­
estry. The son of a master forester in the Electorate of 
Saxony, he studied law and public administration. His 
interest in natural science and mining led to his rise to 
head mining administrator at the Electorate of Saxo­
ny’s court in Freiberg. His responsibilities there also 
included  forest management, particularly with regard 
to supplies for mining. Confronted by heavily overused 
forests, he wrote the first comprehensive work on for­
est management, the ‘sylvicultura oeconomica’ (1713). 
In it, he summarised the forestry management knowl­
edge which had for the most part been lost during the 
Thirty Years’ War (Europe, 1618–1648), and added his 
own experiences. Although the focus is still clearly on 
securing a reliable supply of timber, i. e. on the eco­
nomic aspect, Carlowitz also already recognised the 
ethical and aesthetical values of forests. His work also 
reflects the ecology of forests, and the responsibility 
for sustaining an ecosystem whose lifecycles often go 
past the horizon of individual human lifespans. Carlow­
itz is therefore generally viewed as one of the pioneers 
of the principle of sustainability in forest management. 
The concept of sustainable forest management has 
since been developed further, and is now realised by 
many change agents in numerous initiatives all over the 
world. An example is the promotion of environmentally 
friendly, socially beneficial, and economically viable for­
est management that forms the focus of the work of the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). The FSC was founded 
in 1993 as an independent, charitable non­governmen­
tal organisation as the result of the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. The 
FSC certifies timber or paper products from responsible 
forestry. It also ensures that the products are not mixed 
with non­certified timber or paper along the process­
ing and supply chain to the consumer. Products carry­
ing the FSC label contribute towards safeguarding the 
use of forests in accordance with the social, economic 
and ecological needs of current and future generations, 
and towards providing consumer information. The Ken­
yan Wangari Maathai is active as a pioneer of change 
not just in one, but in several concurrent functions. In 
1977, she founded the grass roots organisation Green 
Belt Movement, which has the aim of stopping defor­
estation and soil erosion. With her unique reforestation 
project, the professional biologist managed to unite and 
motivate many different people. By now, over 40 mil­
lion trees have been planted all over Africa. The project 
also lobbies for women’s rights, promotes democracy, 
and the self­confidence of whole communities. The 
organisation is now active in 13 African countries, 
and is planning to plant one billion trees worldwide. 
 Wangari Maathai received the ‘alternative Nobel prize’, 
the Right Livelihood Award, in 1984 for her work with 
the Green Belt Movement. Exactly 20 years later, she 
was the first African woman to be awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize for her commitment to ‘sustainable devel­
opment, peace and democracy’.
Figure 6.3­1 shows a summary of the change agents 
mentioned above, categorised according to the areas of 
‘urban development’ and ‘land use’ (food production 
and forest protection) in the order of their respective 
roles in the innovation and production cycle. 
6.3.3 
The Consumers’ Role (Demand Side)
Climate and environmental protection require resolute 
action at nation­state and supranational level, yet suc­
cessful climate policy will only be possible once the 
populations of the main polluting countries come to 
see that they themselves are responsible, both actu­
ally and historically, and participate in changes, or even 
initiate them. Roughly speaking, research on sustain­
able consumerism or the role of consumers currently 
pursues three different directions: (1) Socio­ecologi­
cal research (Sozial­ökologische Forschung, SÖF) and 
recently especially behavioural economics (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008; Reisch and Oehler, 2009) have revealed 
psychological as well as structural barriers to sustain­
able consumption, alongside situational influences on 
purchase decisions, and discuss various regulatory or 
market­based measures, and the ‘smart’ influencing of 
choice options (‘nudging’, Chapters 3, 5), in order to 
promote sustainable purchasing behaviour. (2) Repre­
sentatives of a so­called post­growth economy assume 
that consumption, at least at the current level in indus­
trialised countries, as such cannot be sustainable, as 
the absolute delinkage of economic performance and 
resource consumption from CO2 emissions is not feasi­
ble. The actual sustainability achievement must there­
fore lie in a reduction or a mitigation of consumption 
(Jackson, 2009; Paech, 2009a, b). (3) Another category 
of relevant literature (Lamla and Neckel, 2006; Baring­
horst et al., 2007) focuses on the potential of politi­
cising consumption, integrating the consumer associa­
tions. In this context, the growing group of so­called 
‘strategic consumers’ is seen as particularly important. 
These are people who not only seek to purchase organ­
ically grown or climate­friendly products, and consider 
ecological aspects when it comes to mobility, building 
and heating, but also question consumption patterns as 
such through their behaviour, and change them in line 
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with sustainability considerations (Lamla and Neckel, 
2006). 
It has indeed been observed that in recent years, a 
growing number of consumers have become interested 
in the social and ecological conditions surrounding the 
production of the products they consume. Ecologically 
sound or fair trade products are showing significant 
growth rates. Particularly among social trendsetters, 
there appears to be a growing willingness to buy envi­
ronmentally friendly products, even if they are more 
expensive. In terms of environmentally friendly shop­
ping behaviour, such as a preference for energy effi­
cient appliances with a long lifecycle, for purchasing 
regional products, and taking the environmental label 
‘Blue Angel’ into account, the upper and upper middle 
social grades of the so­called ‘sinus­Milieus’ (the name 
refers to the originator of this grading concept, Sinus­
Sociovision GmbH) show significantly higher ratings 
than the average population (Wipperman et al., 2009).
Data supplied by the manufacturers also shows 
that in the past few years, the European market for 
organic products has frequently shown two­digit 
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Change Agents: synopsis of 
case studies from the areas 
of ‘urban development’ and 
‘land use’ (food production 
and forest protection). The 
illustration’s categories 
are elaborated in Sections 
6.3.2.3 and 6.3.2.4.
Source: WBGU
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growth  figures, with 2009 turnover figures amounting 
to almost € 18 billion (BÖLW, 2010). Around € 5.8 bil­
lion of this annual turnover is generated in Germany; 
in 2000, the German market was worth only € 2.1 bil­
lion. The market for fair trade products reveals similarly 
dynamic growth figures in recent years (Krier, 2008). 
In 2004, the potential market of so­called LOHAS, the 
consumer group which pursues a ‘lifestyle of health and 
sustainability’, was estimated to be worth more than 
US$ 200 billion in Germany alone (Kreeb et al., 2008). 
This change in consumer behaviour is primarily 
based on changing cultural norms (Chapter 2), accord­
ing to which sustainability is increasingly becoming the 
new general orientation of a viable society. The con­
sumption of goods is no longer led only by pure benefit 
considerations, but has also gained an ‘ethical added 
value’, which in the sum of individual consumer deci­
sions can nudge sustainable long­term change. How­
ever, the process of participation in this community 
project, in a broader sense, also has an additional ben­
efit beyond this result: the (self­)awareness of doing 
something useful and good for the environment and 
future generations, and of being appreciated by oth­
ers for this (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). In this case, an 
individual’s ‘rational choice’ gains aspects of collective 
identity and intervention. Such ethics­based meta­
preferences can be powerful enough to supersede cost 
aspects: ‘Anyone buying fair trade coffee or biodegrad­
able T­shirts also buys a piece of ethical quality that 
has nothing to do with the useful function of the prod­
ucts, but contributes to questioning goods and services 
in terms of their social value.’ (Heidbrink and Schmidt, 
2009). The result of this development is growing pres­
sure on companies and producers: in recent years, pro­
test actions and high­profile campaigns like the Clean 
Clothes Campaign, which highlights the deplorable 
conditions in subcontracted Latin American and Asian 
manufacturing companies, have led to growing num­
bers of corporations confronting the issue of social 
and ecological standards at their suppliers’ locations. 
Changing values on the part of the consumers have 
resulted in  producers also having to deal with the social 
consequences of their business strategies. Goods and 
services which offer ‘ethical added value’ (Heidbrink 
and Schmidt, 2009) therefore represent an important 
market factor, and over the past few years, a growing 
number of companies has started to modify production 
and ranges accordingly (Centre for Corporate Citizen­
ship, 2007). The internet platform ‘Utopia’ can be seen 
as the ‘virtual home’ of sustainable and strategic con­
sumerism in Germany. According to data supplied by 
Utopia, the website currently counts more than two 
million visitors annually, and has 70,000 registered 
members (Langer, 2011). Utopia.de features informa­
tion on low­carbon consumerism, products are intro­
duced and rated, there are contributions and blogs 
where climate­political issues are discussed. Users also 
have the opportunity to network and exchange infor­
mation. Every year, the Utopia Award is given to role 
models, ideas, products, companies and organisations, 
but ‘preventers’ are also highlighted. The Good Maga­
zine fulfils a similar function on an international level. 
The magazine, founded in 2006 in the USA, has a circu­
lation of around 25,000 issues. It reports quarterly on 
stakeholders and companies which lobby for improve­
ments in the areas of environment, urban planning, 
food or health. 
Nonetheless, the growing willingness on the part 
of consumers to consume sustainably is held back by 
obstacles and barriers: apart from certain consumers’ 
lack of material resources, these are above all cognitive 
and motivational reasons. Many consumers feel over­
taxed by the flood of offers and labels. They therefore 
tend to choose the ordinary, familiar products, even 
though sustainable alternatives would be available. 
Moreover, paradoxically, despite this flood of labels, 
the most important data consumers need to enable 
them to make a more conscious choice is missing: is it, 
for example, better to buy locally grown apples which 
have been stored over the winter, or fresh apples from 
distant regions? Also, corporate marketing and adver­
tising can sometimes be distinctly misleading: products 
whose production conditions, or consumption, or usage 
is everything but sustainable are sometimes given a 
green image to make them attractive to ecologically­
oriented consumer groups (so­called ‘greenwashing’). 
Consumers’ uncertainty as a consequence of confus­
ing, missing or misleading information can represent an 
additional barrier for sustainable consumption. 
However, this serves to highlight areas where law 
makers and official bodies have the chance to contrib­
ute to supporting consumers, thereby further promot­
ing this willingness for sustainable consumption, or 
rather, to ensure that existing dispositions, apparent in 
surveys on the environmental attitudes of the popu­
lation (Chapter 2; Kuckartz et al., 2008), are actually 
translated into an environmentally and socially com­
patible style of consumerism. Although decisions by 
consumers – which, these days, can even become so­
called ‘prosumers’, i. e. consumers and producers rolled 
into one (for example through the feed­in of privately 
generated energy into the public power grid) – can cer­
tainly exert some influence over the market, this on its 
own is not enough to realise ambitious climate protec­
tion programmes. The abstract contrasting of markets, 
state or ‘third sector’ (service provider sector) as the 
respective main or monopoly actors for social and polit­
ical change is outdated. Rather, room for opportunities 
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to develop must be created, whereby market incentives 
and state control by way of imperative and prohibi­
tion can be combined with the social capital generated 
in the ‘third sector’. Citizens are not just citizens who 
can change majorities through their voting decisions, 
and consumers are not just consumers who influence 
purchase decisions. On the contrary, the ‘citizen con­
sumer’ is a case­by­case amalgamation of the two actor 
identities ‘voice’ (Hirschman) and ‘choice’ (LeGrand). In 
many hitherto public spheres, private consumers have 
long since started to be addressed as co­producers (for 
example where health is concerned, by prevention or 
choosing the right medical services, but also in terms of 
safety through increased public awareness) and impact 
indirectly on political decisions both as clients (for 
example for care services) and as private individuals 
from home (for example through internet use). Similar 
hybrid constellations are conceivable where the con­
sumption of energy services is concerned, if their sup­
ply were to be designed so as to be even more transpar­
ent and market­based through legal measures. In recent 
years, the opportunities offered by consumer protec­
tion and the participation of consumers and citizens in 
the supply of public services (for example the electric 
energy supply, water management and rail traffic) has 
therefore also been increasingly discussed (Lell, 2010). 
Not least, sociological research shows that confer­
ring responsibility impacts upon action structuring 
(Gerhards et al., 2007). For the current problem field, 
this means that consumers also consider sustainability 
aspects less in their purchasing decisions if their respon­
sibility is played down by ‘public opinion  leaders’. Vice 
versa, the emphasising of consumer responsibility can 
promote sustainable consumption.
6.3.4 
Non-Governmental Organisations as 
 International Policy Pioneers
For over three decades, civil society organisations 
and initiatives, and non­governmental organisations 
(NGOs), have been actively involved in the shaping 
of national and international political processes, par­
ticularly in the areas of environmental protection and 
human rights. As far as the areas of environmental 
protection and conservation are concerned, this can be 
explained not least by the fact that a great number of 
environmental problems require international meas­
ures, which lie beyond the direct political sphere of 
influence of states (Najam, 2005). The particular signif­
icance and legitimacy of civil society organisations rests 
less on their representativeness – to which specialised 
interest groups, inherently, can only lay a  limited claim 
– but also on the expertise they generate, and their 
ability to develop new (solution) concepts in an experi­
mental political arena. In this way, numerous non­gov­
ernmental organisations act as policy entrepreneurs, at 
least partially filling on a global level the political vac­
uum created by the lack of global governance (Banuri 
and Najam, 2002). In recent years, civil society organ­
isations have played a central role as agenda setters, as 
knowledge providers for international negotiations, in 
the mobilisation of public opinion, and in the imple­
mentation and monitoring of agreed measures. In the 
area of multilateral environmental agreements, they 
have not least been closely involved in the drawing up 
of a number of conventions (such as the UNECE Con­
vention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision­making and Access to Justice in Environ­
mental Matters (Aarhus Convention), the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, or the UN Convention to Combat Desertifi­
cation). Civil society organisations and initiatives can 
fulfil the following key functions (Muñoz and Najam, 
2010):
1. Organisations like the World Resources Institute 
or the International Union on the Conservation 
of Nature function as recognised knowledge pro­
viders, and contribute through the supply of up­
to­date data to dealing with global environmental 
problems. The Global Environmental Outlook pub­
lished by the United Nations Environment Pro­
gramme is an example of the formalised coopera­
tion between international and civil society organi­
sations in this area.
2. In the past, NGOs have repeatedly effected the cre­
ation of international agreements through cam­
paigns, education, training and public relations 
work. The International Campaign to Ban Land­
mines, for example, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 1997, had a major influence on the creation of 
the Ottawa Treaty ‘Anti­Personnel Mine Ban Con­
vention’, and the signing and ratification of the con­
vention by numerous states.
3. Non­governmental organisations play a central 
role in the implementation of environmental and 
development measures, particularly in develop­
ing and newly industrialising countries, where the 
relevant state capacities are absent or insufficient. 
For example, in Chennai (India), non­governmen­
tal ‘Civic Exnora’ groups manage waste disposal for 
more than half a million people. Civil society stake­
holders have also gained a reputation for imple­
menting and monitoring the measures decided on 
under Agenda 21.
They can play various roles in the influencing of polit­
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ical processes (Muñoz and Najam, 2010): interced­
ing where certain issues are concerned, NGOs and 
other civil society stakeholders actively lobby against 
opposed interest groups (for instance taking on the 
arms industry in the case of the landmine campaign), 
through extensive media campaigns, or the targeted dif­
fusion of information (for example negotiator briefing). 
As ‘watchdog’, they monitor the extent of actual imple­
mentation of government measures pledged or decided 
on. Civil society organisations also have a long history 
of pursuing innovative policy approaches. By way of 
the United Nations, women’s equal opportunity meas­
ures (such as the anchoring of demands for equality in 
all political areas) are now included in the regulations 
and legal practices of more than 100 states, thanks to 
feminist initiatives and networks (True and Mintrom, 
2001). Not least, NGOs function as service providers 
for governments, administrations and companies. They 
offer expertise as much as material resources in the var­
ious stages of political processes (agenda setting, pol­
icy development, implementation). Particularly the role 
civil society and non­governmental organisations play 
in the implementation of agreed measures should be 
highlighted here, because ultimately, even international 
agreements – such as a global climate treaty – must 
also be implemented at a national and a local level. Civil 
society organisations play a vital role here: even in the 
stage of initial consultations, they can ensure that the 
voices of local groups are heard, to prevent agreements 
being decided on that might fundamentally hurt their 
interests. In turn, in the implementation phase, they 
significantly contribute to spreading relevant knowl­
edge locally, in this way creating the ideal premises for 
successful implementation (Muñoz and Najam, 2010). 
One great strength of civil society organisations lies 
in the fact that they contribute a number of regional 
and cultural perspectives, as well as local experience, 
to negotiations and policy making processes, thereby 
helping to create early awareness of the complexity and 
extent of the respective challenges. Within the scope of 
the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), 
NGOs already have been accorded institutionalised par­
ticipation rights, being permitted, for example, to hold 
plenary meetings with state representatives within the 
scope of the Conference of the Parties. Some UNCCD 
delegations, particularly those from the industrialised 
countries, admit NGOs officially to their governmen­
tal delegations in an advisory capacity. Other conven­
tions – such as the CBD or the UNFCCC – provide sim­
ilar participation opportunities. However, in recent 
years, there has also been a tendency towards iso­
lating civil society groups, which has become appar­
ent in the course of the stronger anti­globalisation 
movements within the scope of international summits 
(Najam, 2005). The diversity of civil society stakehold­
ers, some of whose positions and solution suggestions 
are frequently perceived as rather extreme, should not, 
however, be viewed as a source of irritation by policy­
makers and negotiators, but, for the above mentioned 
reasons, explicitly  recognised as a resource. Therefore, 
additional paths and opportunities for formally involv­
ing civil society organisations more in negotiation pro­
cesses should be considered, rather than just allowing 
them to participate in important international negoti­
ations on issue of climate protection and sustainable 
development in the form of side events. The interplay 
of the proponents of a global ‘Green New Deal’, or a 
global transformation towards a low­carbon society, 
from various spheres of society can lead to the creation 
of a new, positive culture of participation, articulated at 
all levels of political commitment: be it through voting, 
through membership in clubs, associations and parties, 
through participation in non­governmental organisa­
tions, or through involvement in extra­parliamentary 
campaigns and activities for climate change mitigation, 
energy system transformation and sustainability. Not 
least, civil society initiatives, political movements and 
NGOs – as exemplified particularly by the environmen­
tal movement – can provide useful feedback for state 
and supranational institutions, in this way initiating 
additional transformation processes.
6.4
Conclusion: Promote and Multiply Change Agents 
to Achieve a Rapid Transformation
This chapter has introduced different change agents 
from selected fields of sustainability politics, who voice 
their doubts regarding the status quo of the high­car­
bon regime in practical terms in important positions, 
thereby nudging considerable sectoral and cross­sec­
toral changes. How can these insular individual actors 
become the ‘critical mass’ required, pushing impor­
tant levers for the transformation with the emphasis 
required to set the course? And how can individual 
actors achieve a shared feeling of collective self­effi­
cacy, and come together in a widespread social move­
ment? Or, to put it another way: how can the self­pow­
ering co­evolution in various social sub­systems (Grin 
et al., 2010), or the important ‘concurrences of multi­
ple change’ (Osterhammel, 2009; Chapter 3) which are 
required to cause the imminent and already occurring 
change processes to densify into the ‘great transforma­
tion’ that is needed to stabilise the Earth system, and in 
particular the climate system, be brought about? 
Figure 6.4­1 illustrates the paths change agents tend 
to follow, frequently from the margins of society where 
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unorthodox thinkers and outsiders are at home, out of 
the so­called niches, the birth place of visions of alter­
native development, through the stages of social com­
munication (agenda setting, objection, opinion leader 
echo, mass medialisation) into wider innovation net­
works, then into the social and political mainstream, up 
to and including the habitualisation of initially marginal 
attitude patterns and behaviours.
A bottom­up transformation has far more chance 
of succeeding if change agents in their respective pro­
moter roles (Table 6.2­2) manage to convince the broad 
majority of the plausibility of low­carbon life practices 
in everyday life, of their self­evidence, in fact, and to 
anchor them as the standard option. The synopsis of 
surveys and studies on changing values (Chapter 2), on 
the level of political awareness, on participative citi­
zenship, and on the appeal of non­profit intermediary 
organisations (associations, or even parties) revealed 
roughly three (differently sized) segments of the popu­
lation in wealthy industrial countries (such as Ger­
many) who might be appropriate for an inclusive trans­
formation strategy as pioneers, advocates and partners:
 > a broad potential of people who, according to repre­
sentative surveys, would in principle be willing to 
embrace low­carbon changes with regard to their 
own lifestyles, but who have not (as yet) taken any, 
or few, practical steps to do so (latency);
 > a narrow band of dedicated and active citizens who 
more or less consistently follow this aim systemati­
cally in their daily practices (activism);
 > a medium segment of people who are more or less 
actively involved at a civil and voluntary level in 
other areas of life (sports and leisure activities, 
humanitarian and technical aid organisations, cul­
ture and art, education and care of the elderly, cor­
porate activities, voluntary services, etc.), as well as 
more informally by way of self­help groups or local 
neighbourhood schemes, in this way – mostly during 
critical biographical passages (starting a family, 
school enrolment and self­reliance of children, par­
ents going into retirement, care, etc.) – addressing 
the aim of a ‘good life’ in taking on responsibility for 
others (or feel the lack of this aim). 
The hypothetical path (and, if necessary, the concrete 
task at hand) for achieving a broad civil commitment 
to ‘climate protection and sustainability’ is therefore 
(a) to stimulate the latent willingness to act through 
pragmatic (if at all possible not moralising) input, (b) 
to communicate the actions of activists in the form of 
action patterns and standard options on a wider basis, 
and, in doing so, (c) to make sustainability aims plausi­
ble to a larger part of the citizenship. This can succeed 
even better if the familiar core arenas of civil commit­
ment (such as social security, education, nature con­
servation and consumer protection, cultural life, sports, 
religious life, etc.) absorb aspects of sustainability, so 
that no ‘additional (time consuming) aims’, apart from 
the respectively preferred activities, are introduced; 
touching instead on central issues relating to services 
of general interest (and subjective life satisfaction), to 
enable the various levels of civil commitment to meet 
synergistically to create a collective identity (commu­
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Phases of social diffusion of ideas and behaviours, and the roles of change agents in the transformation process.
Source: WBGU
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nity building). This is vital to broaden the transforma­
tion agenda, and for the actors’ self­efficacy (Bandura, 
1977).
Sustainability commitment is expandable, thereby 
becoming ‘habitual’, through real and virtual com­
munication communities which, initially, may very 
well have little or no relation at all to climate and sus­
tainability policies, but where their requirements and 
modalities can be tangibly communicated and ingrained 
in social life­worlds. As already indicated, this includes 
sports clubs and voluntary groups, school classes and 
teaching staff, self­employed and pensioners, as well 
as social media online communities, working groups 
and professional associations. Such apparently apoliti­
cal actors are effective at grass roots level, and help to 
advance incremental reforms in many areas. The major­
ity of their activities are not related to ecological issues 
in the narrower sense, but rather on the improvement 
of working lives, educational practices, care of the eld­
erly and so on. They are about neighbours helping each 
other in everyday and emergency situations which 
highlight possible aims of a good life (or which serve to 
emphasise their lack). 
The change agents’ articulation and organisation 
skills are decisive. By and large, they are not organised 
in larger associations, and do not have long­term hori­
zons; however, they do have political interests beyond 
the ‘policy­making by politicians, for politicians’ that 
is usually the subject of the media, which constantly 
makes an issue out of something, and makes demands, 
but in actual fact does and achieves too little, in the 
public perception. Any ecological policy­making hop­
ing to achieve more than media presence and agree­
ment in opinion polls must find these change agents 
within the spontaneous social networks, meet them 
at eye level, and win them over as respected network 
partners. 
The exemplary outlined sustainable policy action 
fields can also become issues for these networks, gen­
erally through occasions which may well seem trivial:
 > The refurbishment of a school building thanks to an 
economic programme, and the considerations with 
regard to energy in this respect, can turn into some­
thing more than ordinary (inconvenient) building 
works if teachers, school classes and parents take 
the occasion as an opportunity for pedagogical con­
siderations that go beyond the mundane.
 > Day nurseries and all­day schools introduce menus 
which are not just affordable and tasty, but which 
systematically integrate aspects of healthy eating, 
fair trade and a low­carbon diet, and ensure that 
‘incidentally’, these also become the subject of les­
sons and school communication.
 > Local working groups which hold regular meetings 
and have to travel long distances by train or car to do 
so change to suitable telecommunications media for 
these exchanges; this could in turn nudge profound 
changes in corporate policies and logistics, govern­
ment administrative bodies, research and cultural 
institutions.
Not least, this affords the possibility of linking eco­
logical commitment with usually employment­related 
forms of participation, for example in the form of vol­
untary activities on the part of companies and gov­
ernment bodies beyond their usual profit­generating 
or paid activities, or through a closer involvement of 
the unemployed in ecological activities in the form of 
appropriate voluntary social work. Generally, the task 
of mobilising voluntary, but also remunerated commit­
ment to sustainability is to bring it in line with changed 
situations (Evers and Zimmer, 2010): 
 > with a working world that has been destandardised 
in many respects (working hours, temporary con­
tracts, projects, career changes); 
 > with the various forms of a voluntary social year 
(already undergoing a review);
 > with the integration of ‘suitable’ commitment phases 
in curricula vitae and life histories.
There are, however, numerous companies which have 
consolidated sustainable production, volunteering 
and social­progressive activities, and turned this into 
their business model. One such pioneering company 
is  Patagonia Inc., based in Ventura (California), men­
tioned here just briefly by way of example as it bundles 
so many aspects of this chapter. 
Patagonia manufactures leisure (sports) wear, 
and was founded in 1972 by the mountaineer Yvon 
 Chouinard. The company mainly produces recyclable 
materials, including organically grown cotton. It regu­
larly donates 1 % of its turnover, or 10 % of its profit, 
to environmental organisations, and is a co­founder 
of ‘Alliance 1 % for the Planet’, where a number of 
companies have joined forces to do exactly what the 
name says. Some outlets and service centres have been 
awarded silver or gold LEED certificates (the United 
States Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy 
and Environmental Design certification) for ecological 
building. Staff and customers can actively participate 
in this environmental orientation. Since 1993, staff can 
take a paid holiday to engage in voluntary work for an 
environmental organisation. Customers can follow the 
entire lifecycle of a Patagonia product on the Footprint 
Chronicles website, from production to recycling, and 
are invited to suggest improvements. Here, a producer­
consumer network is in the process of being created 
that allows a company to react directly to its customers’ 
sustainability orientation. 
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The outlined self­organisation of change agents 
relies desperately on the consolidation and represen­
tation of their ideas and suggestions at a political­par­
liamentary level, in order to encourage feelings of self­
efficacy at this level, too. Law makers should utilise 
these dynamics, and should integrate the various ‘bot­
tom­up’ approaches in a comprehensive innovation sce­
nario where well­founded imperative and prohibition, 
sensible market incentives and alternative technolo­
gies support citizens’ expectations and hopes (Sections 
5.4, 7.3.1). If transformative technologies are available, 
and they appear to be financeable, and if concurrently, 
there is a broad social consensus that many things will 
have to change, then one cannot help but wonder at 
the political elites’ deficits in dealing with the growing 
willingness to protest and the urgent need for reform.
The will forming and interest aggregation of par­
ties and organisations usually rests on their paying 
membership, private and/or state party financing, and 
mass­media communication. Local policy is usually also 
structured in this way, and guided by the local clientele. 
So far, professional politicians have shown little sense 
for, and grasp of, empowering the civil society. Exam­
ples of this are the mass demonstrations against ‘Stutt­
gart 21’ (the extension of a main railway station and 
its consequences), and the 2010 referendum on edu­
cational policy in Hamburg. The potential objections 
to wind farms and power cables are also examples of 
the integration tasks that lie before parties and organi­
sations in order to create the room to develop and to 
experiment needed by the nuclei and clusters of sus­
tainable everyday life, particularly prevalent, for exam­
ple, in traffic and education projects. A formalisation of 
these informal networks, which very rarely tend to end 
in permanent, paying memberships, thereby mirroring 
the selective and episodic participation behaviour seen 
in contemporary democracies, would ensure the crea­
tion of a political space for the proactive state to moti­
vate (Sections 5.4, 7.3.1), where the various operat­
ing modes and timespans with regard to the gaining of 
political power, the scientific search for solutions, tech­
nical innovation and application cycles, and economic 
and internal corporate cycles become easier to synchro­
nise and, with a view to superior norms, to coordinate. 
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7.1
Challenge Low-Carbon Transformation
In the WBGU’s opinion, the transformation towards a 
low­carbon economy and society in order to overcome 
the worsening environmental and development crisis 
and secure humankind’s natural life­support systems 
and future prospects is an urgent requirement. Over the 
past few years, avoiding anthropogenic climate change 
has become a topic at the centre of social discourse. 
A global political consensus has been reached; global 
warming must be limited to no more than 2 °C above 
pre­industrial levels in order to avoid dangerous, irre­
versible and hardly manageable risks for nature and 
society (Section 1.1.1; WBGU, 2009). This cannot be 
achieved without drastically reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. Between 2011 and 2050, cumulative CO2 
emissions from fossil sources must not exceed 750 
Gt CO2 (Box 1.1­1). This global carbon budget would 
already be exhausted in around 25 years’ time if emis­
sions were frozen at current levels. Fast, transformative 
counteraction is therefore urgently required. Central to 
the transformation is the decarbonisation of energy 
systems (Section 4.6; Box 7.3­1). The transformation 
cannot succeed if the rapid urbanisation is not redi­
rected to follow low­carbon development paths (Sec­
tion 7.3.6). It is also essential to mitigate greenhouse 
gas emissions from land use, and to stop deforestation 
(Section 7.3.7). 
All over the world, the fossil­fuel based economic 
system has been in a process of radical change for some 
time. The WBGU views this structural transition as the 
start of a ‘Great Trans formation’ into a sustainable soci­
ety (Chapter 3). The extent of the imminent transition 
can hardly be overestimated. Justifiably, it is identified 
as a great challenge for humankind. In terms of pro­
found impact, it is comparable to the two fundamental 
trans formations in world history: the Neolithic Revolu­
tion, i. e. the invention and diffusion of agriculture and 
animal husbandry, and the Industrial Revolution, i. e. 
the transition from agricultural to industrial ised society. 
Contrary to these two historic transitions, the transfor­
mation into a low­carbon society must proceed within 
the planetary guard rails of sustainability (Box 1­1); 
it also has to happen significantly faster. It is also by 
no means a given, but must be driven by understand­
ing, caution and providence if it is to succeed within 
the remaining, tight timeframe. This is unique in his­
tory, as the world’s past great transformations were 
the result of gradual evolutionary change. Long­term 
studies show that an ever­increasing number of peo­
ple worldwide desire this move towards sustainability 
(Chapter  2). Moreover, the nuclear disaster in Fuku­
shima makes it clear that we should choose the fast lane 
towards a low­carbon future without nuclear energy.
The objective is clear, and the time pressure immense, 
yet because of inadequate national and international 
political efforts, the huge challenge of this transforma­
tion remains unsolved. This drastic change in direction 
must be accomplished before the end of the current 
decade in order to reduce global greenhouse gas emis­
sions to a minimum by 2050 to maintain the possibility 
of avoiding dangerous climate change. Time is there­
fore of the essence: the later we act, and the bigger the 
volume of cumulative greenhouse gas emissions, the 
more difficult it will become to avoid dangerous climate 
change. 
The urgent political task now is putting a stop to the 
barriers preventing such a transformation, and accel­
erating the change. In the WBGU’s view, this requires 
the development of a long­term oriented regulatory 
framework which ensures that prosperity, democracy 
and security are achieved with the natural boundaries 
of the Earth system in mind. In particular, development 
paths must be chosen that are compatible with the 2 °C 
climate protection guard rail agreed by the global com­
munity at Cancún in 2010. 
The imminent changes go well beyond technologi­
cal and technocratic reforms: societies must switch to 
a new ‘basis for doing business’. In fact, it is all about 
a new social contract for a low­carbon and sustain­
able global economic system (Section 7.2), based on 
the key concept that individuals and the civil society, 
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states and the international community of states, as 
well as business and academia, carry the joint respon­
sibility for the avoidance of dangerous climate change, 
and the aversion of other threats to humankind in its 
role as part of Earth system. The social contract con­
solidates a culture of attentiveness (born of a sense of 
ecological responsibility), a culture of participation (as 
a democratic responsibility), and a culture of obligation 
towards future generations (future responsibility). One 
central element of such a social contract is the proac­
tive state (Chapter 5), which actively sets priorities for 
the transformation, and at the same time increases the 
number of ways in which its citizens can participate, 
whilst offering the companies choices in favour of sus­
tainability (Section 7.3.1). 
By highlighting the technical and economic feasibil­
ity of the transformation, by identifying change agents, 
and barriers ­ and developing political and institutional 
approaches to overcome these ­ the WBGU illustrates 
the ‘conditions of possibility’ (Immanuel Kant) for the 
transition to a low­carbon and sustainable society. In 
doing so, the WBGU wants to encourage policy­makers, 
but also business and social actors, to dare to go ahead 
with this change.
7.1.1 
The WBGU’s Transformation Strategy
The quest for suitable strategies for the transition to a 
low­carbon economy has gained hugely in importance 
for companies, in politics, in science, and in society as 
a whole. A niche issue has very quickly evolved into 
a key future issue in Germany and Europe, but also in 
many other countries around the globe. There are low­
carbon development change agents in all areas of soci­
ety. Many companies acknowledge the fact that in a 
prosperous world with soon­to­be 9 billion people, the 
next global innovation cycle simply has to be resource 
and climate friendly. Long­term investments, partic­
ularly in renewable energy as well as in energy and 
resource efficiency, not only serve atmosphere protec­
tion, but also reduce the numerous dependencies on 
the import of fossil fuels whilst at the same time deter­
mining future innovation centres and the reordering of 
global economic hierarchies. The conversion also opens 
up new perspectives in Europe for societies that are 
strong on innovation.
Those pioneers who argued in favour of sustainable 
development at the Earth Summit in 1992 in Rio de 
Janeiro are viewed as outsiders no more. In many coun­
tries, the positions held by low­carbon development or 
‘green growth’ change agents can claim acceptance by 
the majority nowadays. The German federal govern­
ment, Europe, South Korea, China, Indonesia, India, 
and some US states are actively attempting to delink 
prosperity increase and greenhouse gas emissions. 
They have presented strategies, green growth concepts, 
or conversion plans for their energy sectors. 
Furthermore, many different low­emission technol­
ogies have seen dynamic global develop ment over the 
past few years. Renewable energies have become an 
important economic and employment factor. Many cit­
ies all over the world are already implementing climate­
friendly future concepts, in some major companies, for­
merly small departments for corporate social responsi­
bility have grown into ‘innovation centres for sustain­
able markets’, and in science, research alliances for the 
transformation into a low­carbon society have been 
formed. So the transformation into a low­carbon soci­
ety is already well under way, and things are changing 
in the right direction. Maybe, in twenty years’ time, due 
to the ‘concurrence of multiple changes’ (Osterhammel, 
2009) in terms of climate­friendly innovations, the first 
decade of the 21st century will be known as the deci­
sive transitory stage towards a low­carbon economy – 
assuming the right course is now set in order to channel 
this process (Chapter 3).
However, not least the disappointing results of the 
2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference prove that so 
far, few governments, despite local level searching pro­
cesses for low­carbon solutions, are actually prepared 
to commit to course changes towards a sustainable 
global economy that would be binding under interna­
tional law. And until that is the case, the change agents 
in economy, politics and society must, in the face of 
national and international path dependencies evolved 
during the course of 250 years of fossil­based indus­
trial history, expend enormous efforts on their reform 
endeavours – just like the famous Sisyphus, who had 
to push his rock up a steep slope. Ultimately – despite 
the almost universal triumph of low­carbon reform 
approaches – the greenhouse gas intensity of global 
electric power production has nevertheless been on 
the increase again since the beginning of this decade. 
A transformation strategy must take these positive 
reform dynamics on board and multiply them, and also 
break down the key barriers (Figure 7.1­1). The steep 
slope of reform must be levelled off to allow the trans­
formation to gain the momentum needed to avoid dan­
gerous climate change. 
Nevertheless, there is a very real danger that the 
dynamics between change and dogged insistence on 
the status quo will lead into a lock­in (Figure 7.1­2); 
the transformation into a low­carbon society could also 
fail. For example, the increasing energy efficiency of 
vehicles could be overcompensated by a more rapid 
growth in their number (rebound effect; Box 4.3­2). 
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Or states could, in principle, agree on mitigating their 
greenhouse gas emissions, yet only to a level well below 
the required ambition level. Renewable energies could 
gain in significance, but they might only be an addition 
to the still dominating fossil energy carriers, rather than 
a replacement for them. If the transformation were to 
be implemented in this kind of half­hearted and slow 
manner, it could lead to a ‘3–4 °C world’ with almost 
uncontrollable consequences for nature and society. 
The important thing now is to set the course in such a 
way that this becomes improbable.
7.1.1.1 
Facilitating and Impeding Factors
One positive aspect is that many important alterna­
tive courses of action to facilitate sustainable progress 
already exist (Figure 7.1­1). The respective technol­
ogies are already being used, or under development 
(Chapter 4). Thanks to modern communication tech­
nologies and global knowledge networks, low­carbon 
innovations and learning processes can spread quickly, 
even in countries where this is politically suppressed. 
The respective political and economic steering instru­
ments are also well­known and could, assuming a cor­
responding public willingness to create favourable 
framework conditions, soon be adapted to decarboni­
sation (Section 5.2). 
The financial challenges of the transformation are 
significant, but manageable (Section 4.5). Globally, the 
additional investments required by the transforma­
tion into a low­carbon society, compared to the cost 
of ‘business as usual’, probably lie somewhere in the 
region of at least 200 to up to 1,000 billion US dollars 
per year by 2030, significantly exceeding this amount 
between 2030 and 2050. These investments will be off­
set by later financial savings of similar dimensions, and 
the avoidance of the immense costs of dangerous cli­
mate change. Through innovative business models and 
financing concepts, it is indeed possible to resolve these 
issues. 
Not least, one positive fact, in the WBGU’s view, is 
that an ever­growing part of the global population is 
developing value systems which incorporate focusing 
on the protection of the natural environment (Chap­
ter 2). There is a relatively broad, cross­cultural con­
sensus to transform the predominant economic strat­
egy so that it becomes embedded in sustainable envi­
ronmental management. Political options that pick up 
on post­materialist values and sustainability­oriented 
attitudes are therefore not antitheses to the majority 
view in industrialised societies. They are also popular 
amongst opinion leaders in the industrialising countries 
counting on catch­up development. This makes it eas­
ier for policy­makers to make the intended transition 
agreeable to the vast majority (acceptance), to obtain 
their consent (legitimation), and to invite cooperation 
(participation). They should clearly show significantly 
more courage when it comes to making pro­climate pro­
tection decisions: the public is already far more willing 
to tackle this issue than generally thought.
However, this positive development is hindered by 
factors which impede a transformation. Political, insti­
tutional and economic path dependencies, structures of 
interests and veto players make the transition into a 
sustainable society more difficult. The worldwide sub­
sidies for fossil energy carriers are one example of this. 
Over the past few years, according to various estimates, 
annual consumption subsidies for fossil­based energies 
range between 300 to over 500 billion US$ worldwide 
(Section 4.5). However, this is not just about a lot of 
money and the corresponding interests of the estab­
lished high­carbon sectors of the economy. The eco­
nomic model of the past 250 years, with its rules and 
regulations, research environments, training and quali­
fication systems and social role models, and its  foreign, 
security, development, transport, economic and inno­
vation policies, has almost without exception been 
geared towards the use of fossil energy carriers. This 
complex system must now be fundamentally modified, 
with a view to a decarbonisation of the energy systems, 
and radical increases in energy efficiency. John May­
nard Keynes put it in a nutshell when describing one of 
the key challenges of these kinds of profound system 
changes: ‘The difficulty lies not so much in developing 
new ideas as in escaping from old ones.’
Moreover, the transformation must also be achieved 
within a very tight timeframe, which, for complex soci­
eties, particularly in the context of international nego­
tiation systems, poses a significant challenge. At the 
same time, our societies must be willing to act in an 
anticipatory manner, on the basis of scientific findings. 
To facilitate this, politics, economy and society must 
wholeheartedly embrace a long­term orientation.
The urbanisation waves in the developing regions, a 
significant proportion of which are due to high­ carbon 
based economic growth, are a further huge challenge 
for the transformation process, but also a great oppor­
tunity. Particularly in the rapidly growing newly indus­
trialising countries, the transformation into low­carbon 
cities must be effected within a very short period of 
time. On the one hand, this means asking a lot of those 
countries in terms of their transformation and learn­
ing capacities. On the other hand, the prevailing tenet 
there tends to be that climate change has primarily 
been caused, and continues to be caused, by the OECD 
countries, and that therefore, the presumably costly 
investments into climate protection measures must, for 
the most part, be made in the established industrialised 
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countries. This issue has so far not been resolved by a 
global burden sharing agreement. The situation is made 
more difficult by the ready availability of cheap coal in 
many of the newly industrialising countries. 
The WBGU analysis also shows that current global 
governance institutions are not very well equipped to 
deal with the transformation. This applies in particular 
to the three key transformation fields energy, urbani­
sation and land use. Furthermore, currently, no truly 
assertive climate pioneer alliances exist to accelerate 
the establishment of post­fossil, transnational system 
structures.
Overall, though, the WBGU’s central message is that 
the transformation into a low­carbon global society is 
necessary, and achievable. In some sectors, regions and 
countries, it has already begun. First and foremost, we 
must stop impeding the transformation, and instead 
forge ahead with initiatives that serve its acceleration. 
7.1.1.2 
Climate Protection in Three Key Transformation 
Fields
The transition policies towards a low­carbon, sus­
tainable society should primarily address the follow­
ing three main pillars of contemporary world society 
 (Section  5.4.5): firstly, the energy systems, including 
the transport sector, which the whole economy depends 
on and which currently, due to the rapid development 
dynamics in the newly industrialising countries, are 
facing yet another wave of growth. The energy sector 
causes around two­thirds of today’s long­lived green­
house gas emissions. Secondly, the urban areas, cur­
rently responsible for three­quarters of global final 
energy demand, and whose population will double to 
6 billion by 2050. Thirdly, the land­use systems (agri­
culture and forestry, including deforestation), which 
are currently responsible for almost a quarter of glo­
bal greenhouse gas emissions. Agriculture does not 
just have to provide enough food for a world popula­
tion that continues to grow, and to become ever more 
demanding; it also has to cover the growth in demand 
due to the increasing use of bioenergy and bio­based 
raw materials. 
In all three fields, the world is still a long way 
from setting a clear course towards sustainability. The 
pledges for mitigation actions announced by the major­
ity of governments within the scope of the interna­
tional climate negotiations so far will certainly not 
be enough to comply with the 2 °C guard rail. Never­
theless, the incipient dynamics of the transformation 
Figure 7.1-1
Topography of the transformation: the first step towards turning the global society’s status quo into low­carbon (complete 
 decarbonisation) is the overcoming of obstacles, shown here as an increase in social costs. This increase is currently intensified 
through barriers (red): the social costs of the status quo appear to be lower than appropriate, due to, for example, misguided 
 incentives such as subsidies for fossil energy carriers, or environmental costs that are not internalised. At the same time, the 
barriers to be overcome appear to be higher than they actually are: although overcoming various barriers requires a high degree 
of effort, for example, the costly overcoming of path dependencies, this is compensated by favourable factors: many low­carbon 
technologies are already available, and their deployment is financially viable. Aided by the favourable factors, barriers can be 
diminished to pave the way for the transformation. Once the decisive barriers have been overcome, the move towards low­
carbon can be expected to develop its own dynamics.
Source: WBGU
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should not be underestimated. The debate on the lim­
its to growth, ongoing since the 1970s, and the quest 
for low­carbon development paths are now taking cen­
tral stage in our societies. This opens up opportunities 
for extending the low­carbon experi ments, industries, 
niches and efficiency islands that already exist in many 
countries, and gives us the chance to speed up the tran­
sition from dependence on the use of fossil energy car­
riers to a low­carbon way of doing business. Measures 
which, each taken on their own, do not appear to be 
particularly ambitious can, in such a dynamic transition 
period, develop significant impact as a whole, and trig­
ger tipping points of development. The tran sition to a 
low­carbon society in all three fields is nevertheless a 
great challenge.
Transformation Field Energy
The transformation field ‘energy’ is so significant 
because the world is still continuing down a ‘high­car­
bon growth path’ with rapidly increasing CO2 emis­
sions. If the 2  °C guard rail is to be observed, though, 
the global emissions trend must be reversed by 2020 
at the latest, as the drastic emissions reduction rates 
which would otherwise be necessary later would over­
tax societies. A global transformation towards sustain­
able energy systems that also takes global development 
dynamics into account is needed. More than 80 % of 
the worldwide energy supply is still based on environ­
ment and climate damaging fossil energy carriers, whilst 
around 3 billion people still have no access to the essen­
tial basic supplies provided by modern energy services. 
The challenge lies in giving these people access to mod­
ern energy services as soon as possible, whilst at the 
same time significantly reducing global CO2 emissions 
from the use of fossil energy carriers. This can only 
succeed if energy efficiency is drastically increased and 
lifestyle changes are triggered, leading to a limitation 
of the overall energy demand. The requisite decarbon­
isation of energy systems means that the pressure is 
on to act, not just in the indust rialised countries, but 
also in the dynamically growing newly industrialising 
and developing countries. Even the poorer developing 
countries must veer towards a low­emission develop­
ment path in the medium term. The era of fossil energy 
carrier reliant economic growth must be brought to an 
end. At the centre of any decarbonisation strategy must 
be the substantial extension of renewable energies, and 
the infrastructure they need. 
In the WBGU’s view, ambitious global climate pro­
tection without the use of nuclear energy is possible. A 
number of countries are currently planning to increase 
their use of nuclear energy. The WBGU urgently advises 
against this, above all because of the risks accompany­
ing cases of serious damage, the still unresolved issues 
concerning final storage, and the danger of uncon­
trolled proliferation. Existing plants should be replaced 
by sustainable energy tech nologies as soon as possible, 
and, in the case of evi dent safety deficiencies, be closed 
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Figure 7.1-2
The transformation’s temporal dynamics and action levels. The goal of the transformation is a low­carbon society. Central to the 
transformation is the decarbonisation of energy systems. Left: The proactive state and the change agents are the key players. 
As far as the change agents are concerned, they must move away from a marginalised existence and increase their impact 
through widespread inclusion in social routines. Right: Decisive action for a change of course towards transformation must be 
taken within the next decade if the conversion is to succeed within the next 30 years. The sustainable path (green) manages 
the transition from high­carbon to low­carbon society in time. Overcompensation for decarbonisation advances (for example 
through rebound effects) could lead to rendering climate protection measures ineffective, so that the transformation fails 
(yellow).  Moderate endeavours only carry the risk of path dependencies that will lead to a global climate crisis (red). 
Source: WBGU, modified acc. to Grin et al., 2010
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down immediately. However, in the advisory council’s 
view, the phase­out of nuclear energy must not be 
compensated by renewed or intensified brown or black 
coal based energy generation. 
Transformation Field Urbanisation
The transformation field ‘urbanisation’ is so signifi­
cant because the urbanisation process is a major driv­
ing force behind energy demand. Urban expansion cre­
ates new, long­lived infrastructures that are going to 
impact on the energy demand for a long time to come. 
Currently, already around half of the world’s popula­
tion lives in cities. In Asia, the urban population will 
double to almost 3 billion people within the next cou­
ple of decades. It is likely that by 2050, as many people 
will be living in cities as there are on Earth today. The 
current urbanisation wave must therefore be redirected 
towards low­carbon urban development very quickly 
indeed – and that in a situation where we do not have 
one single, functioning, low­carbon model city that we 
might learn from. The modification of existing urban 
structures is also very important; it is time­consuming 
and therefore requires a determined approach. 
Transformation Field Land Use
In the transformation field ‘land use’, the conversion 
of natural ecosystems (forests, grasslands, wetlands) 
into agriculturally used land is one of the major sources 
of greenhouse gas emissions. Deforestation and forest 
degradation must therefore be stopped as quickly as 
possible. Worldwide, forest areas are currently being 
reduced at a rate of about 13 million hectares per year. 
According to projections by the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), global food 
output must increase by up to 70 % by 2050 in order 
to secure the food supply for a growing world popu­
lation. Agriculture’s challenge is covering the strong 
growth in demand for agricultural produce in a sustain­
able way that also incorporates the protection of bio­
diversity, whilst at the same time mitigating emissions 
along the whole of the supply chain, from field to con­
sumer. One particular challenge here is presented by 
the changing eating habits in favour of animal products 
in many regions of the world.
7.1.1.3 
Strategic Perspectives
The challenges in the three transformation fields energy, 
urbanisation and land use demonstrate that the trans­
formation into a low­carbon society means a  paradigm 
shift from fossil to post­fossil society. However, histor­
ical experiences and theoretical analysis from a man­
agement point of view both show that the transforma­
tion that is to be effected will be extremely difficult to 
realise, as widespread institutional and economic oppo­
sition against structural changes of this extent is to be 
expected. The biggest challenge is the overcoming of 
political, institutional and economic path dependen­
cies, currently still the hallmark of high­carbon devel­
opment paths. This may well lead to reasonable doubts 
as to whether such a global process is achievable, in 
terms of politics. As far as the transformation is con­
cerned, Bill Clinton’s rather well­known bon mot could 
easily be made to fit: ‘It’s politics, stupid!’. Still, the 
uncomfortable fact remains: in view of the impending 
effects of unabated climate change, there simply is no 
alternative. Considering the situation, the WBGU sees 
two very different, both promising, political strategies 
to move the transformation along:
1. Polycentric strategy: The current climate protec­
tion endeavours in the different sectors and at dif­
ferent levels are bundled and considerably stepped 
up. The WBGU is convinced that this strategy can 
be implemented soon, and with the existing means, 
and is reasonably realistic. Measures which, taken 
on their own, have little transformative impact can, 
through clever mixing and skilful combination, have 
a far greater impact and generate unexpected move­
ment, far more than a simple addition might lead 
us to believe. Taken in total, a societal tipping point 
can be reached, beyond which resistance to the 
transformation significantly decreases, the requi­
site political willingness grows, and the acceleration 
gains considerable momentum.
2. Focused strategy: Here, the focus is on concentra­
ting on just a few major course changes that can 
have high transformative impact – but which a 
great number of the protagonists currently view as 
unrealistic, because they would need to be pushed 
through in the face of powerful forces insistent on 
preserving the status quo. Some of these major 
course changes are however necessary to achieve 
the scale and speed the transformation into a low­
carbon society needs to reach. 
Both the polycentric and focused transformation strat­
egies are aiming for a ‘Great Transformation’, and there­
fore differ from the incremental policies of short­term 
crisis management and the ever­procrastinating nego­
tiation of compromises.
In this report, the WBGU advocates an intelligent 
combination of both strategies. There are concrete rec­
ommendations for the intensification of current cli mate 
protection endeavours with regards to the three trans­
formation fields of energy, urbanisation and land use. 
The more small­scale measures show results, and the 
more change agents become actively involved, start 
networking, and start to initiate changes on different 
levels, all working towards a transformation, the sooner 
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decision­makers will be encouraged to tackle the major, 
supposedly unpopular course changes. In a societal 
environment as dynamic as this, measures which are 
still viewed as unrealistic today could certainly become 
realisable tomorrow. The WBGU has therefore ranked 
its recommendations according to ambition level, i. e. 
according to their transformative impact and politi­
cal achievability. This provides for explicitly including 
major course changes in our recommendations which 
may still seem unrealistic from today’s point of view, 
but which may well turn out to be inevitable in the long 
term.
In this way, the transformation towards a low­car­
bon society has already progressed in some countries 
or regions. The new narrative or guiding principle is 
already deeply embedded; in many sectors of the econ­
omy and society, change agents are increasingly evolv­
ing into opinion leaders and accelerating the redesign of 
the dominant economic strategy, which is reliant on the 
use of fossil energy carriers. 
Historical analyses show that a ‘concurrence of 
 mul tiple change’ (Osterhammel, 2009) can trigger his­
toric waves and comprehensive transformations (Chap­
ter 3). The social dynamics for a change in the direction 
of climate protection must therefore be created through 
a combination of measures at different levels: 
 > It is knowledge­based, based on a shared vision, and 
guided by the precautionary principle.
 > It relies heavily on the change agents, who can test 
and advance the options for leaving behind an econ­
omy reliant on the use of fossil resources, thus help­
ing to develop new leitmotifs, or new visions, to 
serve as guiding principles for social transition. Ini­
tially, the change agents are involved as marginalised 
protagonists; they could, however, develop into an 
effective force, greatly advancing the transforma­
tion (Figure 7.1­2). 
 > It needs a proactive state to allow the transformation 
process to develop into a certain direction by provid­
ing the relevant framework, by setting the course for 
structural change, and by guaranteeing the imple­
mentation of climate­friendly innovations. The 
proactive state provides change agents leeway, and 
supports them actively (Section 5.4). 
 > It also counts on the cooperation of the international 
community, and the establishment of global govern­
ance structures as the indispensable driving force for 
the intended transformation momentum.
7.1.2 
WBGU Guiding Principle for the Global 
 Transformation into a Low-Carbon Society
A transformation as profound as this one, requiring sig­
nificant changes in economic strategy, social structures, 
political action parameters, and lifestyles, needs a nor­
mative and methodical orientation framework: what 
should such a society look like, and how can that be 
achieved? The WBGU has developed a guiding prin­
ciple for the transformation, intended as the basis for 
social debate. Its function is twofold: on the one hand, 
it serves to illustrate the aim of a low­carbon society, 
and to elaborate the characteristics of such a society. 
On the other hand, it serves to outline the direction 
that the transformation should take in order to comply 
with this intended aim. It includes the following points: 
Sustainability Context
In the Anthropocene Age (Crutzen and Stoermer, 
2000; Chapter 1), humankind must not only take on 
the responsibility for social development, but also for 
the conservation of humanity’s natural life­support 
systems. The identification of planetary boundaries 
or guard rails makes it clear that the current economic 
strategy, accompanied as it is by increasing resource 
consumption and rising greenhouse gas emissions, is 
not sustainable. The Anthropocene requires new, long­
term growth strategies which are accompanied by an 
awareness of the global consequences of local decisions 
and actions. This new narrative demands a renuncia­
tion of the current guiding principles for social and eco­
nomic development. 
In this context, the guiding principles for the trans­
formation into a low­carbon society outlined by the 
WBGU cover the transition into a sustainable world 
only partially, as it also involves, beyond the avoidance 
of greenhouse gas emissions, fundamental ecological, 
social and economic development goals or guard rails 
(Box 1­1). However, climate protection plays a particu­
larly important role, as it is a conditio sine qua non for 
sustainable development. Climate protection alone can­
not guarantee the conservation of humankind’s natural 
life­support systems, though. Yet without effective cli­
mate protection, essential development opportunities 
humankind needs will soon be erased.
Aim of the Transformation
The aim of the transformation analysed in this report 
is a low­carbon society and global economy. The global 
temperature increase must be limited to less than 2 °C 
above pre­industrial levels (Section 1.1.1). The amount 
of cumulative carbon emissions by 2050 will play a 
major role in determining whether this 2 °C guard rail 
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can be adhered to. This requires emissions of no more 
than 750 billion t of CO2 from fossil sources between 
now and 2050, and only very low amounts after that 
(Box 1.1­1; WBGU, 2009). To ensure that this global 
CO2 budget is not exceeded, the energy systems must be 
decarbonised, i. e. for the most part more or less emis­
sions­free, by the middle of the century (Box 7.3­1). At 
the same time, deforestation must be stopped, and the 
emission of other greenhouse gases caused by land use 
(Section 7.3.7) and other sources must be mitigated as 
far as possible. 
It is not really possible to define a desired ‘final sta­
tus’ beyond general preferences and the concrete cli­
mate aim. However, objectives and direction of global 
economic development can take their lead from glo­
bally established and, for the most part, universally 
accepted standards (Human Rights, UN Conventions). 
Widely accepted above all is the imperative that cur­
rent actions should not result in irreparable damages for 
coming generations to deal with, i. e. that we should not 
offer them worse conditions, but, if at all possible, bet­
ter conditions. The global perspective also dictates that 
despite all our differences and unique cultural charac­
teristics, the global societies’ development opportu­
nities should not diverge too much. The principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ set down 
in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) means that the developing and newly indus­
trialising countries are given more leeway in terms of 
climate policy than the industrialised countries. The 
respective scope for action can be shaped in various 
ways, though; each society should – depending on the 
individual country’s specific conditions – develop and 
follow its own transformation path. 
Immediate Action Required 
In order to avoid dangerous climate change, the course 
for the transformation into a low­carbon society must 
be set within the next decade. By the middle of the 
century, the global economy must by and large have 
been decarbonised. Already, in the current decade, the 
reversal of the global greenhouse gas emissions trend 
must be achieved. 
Extend International Cooperation
Climate change is a global problem, climate protection 
will therefore always, inevitably, feature intergovern­
mental components. To achieve the long­term orien­
tation in terms of politics, economy and society that 
is required for climate protection, the framework con­
ditions must be set accordingly. This essentially needs 
much closer international cooperation (Section 7.3.9). 
This applies to the UNFCCC, for a start; all of the coun­
try groups will have to make major concessions. Beyond 
that, the development of a low­carbon global economy 
is only possible if other international political fields 
also keep this aim in mind, for example energy, agri­
cultural, research and development policy making 
( Section 7.3.10). 
Give Low-Carbon Development the Room to Grow
To promote a low­carbon transformation, the state 
must create the required regulatory preconditions, and 
provide the search for low­carbon solutions with room 
to grow (Section 5.4). The fossil­fuel based economic 
system is already changing, and the global finance and 
economic system is at a critical stage. This improves 
the chances for a fast transition to a low­carbon econ­
omy. Whilst the industrialised countries will go through 
a structural change, the developing and newly indus­
trialising countries will need targeted support to leap­
frog past stages of technological growth in order to be 
able to follow a different development path right from 
the outset. Lifestyle changes, particularly in industrial­
ised and newly industrialising countries, are part of this 
 reorientation process.
Mobilise Change Agents at all Levels
The aim of the transformation requires the participa­
tion of all social actors in government and adminis­
tration, politics, companies, the civil society, and con­
sumers (Chapter 6). This should occur across all levels, 
locally, nationally, and internationally. Change agents 
play a very important role here. They should be sup­
ported politically to allow social movements to leave 
their niches and impact more broadly. 
7.1.3 
Criteria for the Efficacy of Transformative 
 Measures 
Measures with great transformative effect are charac­
terised by meeting many of the following criteria:
1. Scale: The extent of the structural changes is cru­
cial. Low­carbon change processes are required in 
almost all sectors of the economy. The point here is 
for the changes to reach the requisite large scale in 
different areas. 
2. Acceleration: The window of opportunity for set­
ting the course to avoid dangerous climate change 
is very narrow. The course towards a low­car­
bon world must be set within the current decade 
if we are yet to avoid dangerous climate change. 
Therefore, measure bundles must be identified in 
order to significantly accelerate the current reform 
 dynamics. 
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3. Initiate Long-Term Directional Changes to Avoid Path 
Dependencies: The large­scale and extensive conver­
sion of energy, mobility and land­use system infra­
structures needs long­term oriented visions, tar­
get systems and ‘road maps’ until 2050 and beyond 
in order to generate reliability in terms of expec­
tations, for climate­compatible system changes to 
overcome existing path dependencies, and for the 
avoidance of new path dependencies.
4. Initiate System Reforms: The measure bundles must 
take into account that the central areas of the low­
carbon transformation require synchronous reforms 
between networked systems. Low­carbon strategies 
to manage the global urbanisation wave depend on, 
amongst other things, interlocked measures in the 
areas of architecture, urban planning, energy and 
mobility. Sustainable land use is not just about for­
est protection, but also about climate­friendly agri­
culture, and about parallel investments in rural 
development, food security and the improvement 
of local governance structures.
5. Global Extent of the Transformation Process: Even 
if the emissions in the OECD countries were radi­
cally reduced, dangerous climate change could not 
be avoided. As the transformation process towards 
a low­carbon global economy is possible only 
through accelerated and closer international coop­
eration, the ‘major reform leverages’ must not only 
be designed and used in the field of climate policy, 
but also in the areas of for example, foreign, energy, 
research, innovation and development policies.
6. Convince People, Activate them, Carry them along 
(Legitimation and Political Feasibility): The climate­
friendly conversion of the industrialised societies 
impacts the lifestyles and consumption habits of 
many people. Legitimation and moral support for 
the transformation can therefore only be created 
if people are convinced of the sensibility of these 
reform processes. At the same time, civil society 
organisations in particular are important drivers of 
low­carbon change. Low­carbon transition measure 
bundles must therefore not only be implemented in 
order to achieve technological breakthroughs and to 
mobilise substantial investment volumes, but also 
in order to bring about the winds of change within 
society, the economy, and politics.
7. Potential for the Overcoming of Barriers and Path 
Dependencies: Some decisions have the power to 
determine certain developments over decades. The 
refurbishment of large parts of a country’s power 
generation network, for example, or its extension, 
determines the energy mix for decades to come. 
The same applies to the building of cities, as urban 
structures are highly persistent and can be changed 
only very slowly. It is therefore vital to influence 
the strategic direction in certain political areas, for 
example with regard to energy or infrastructure 
policies, in such a way that path dependencies are 
avoided, and potential barriers are overcome.
7.1.4 
Ten Measure Bundles with Major Strategic 
 Leverage: Overview
The scale and speed of the current transformation 
endeavours are by far not enough to avoid a danger­
ous climate change. We are still a long way away from 
reaching the tipping point towards a global low­carbon 
economy. In the following, the WBGU therefore out­
lines ten ‘measure bundles with major transformative 
leverage’ to accelerate and diffuse the transformation. 
The WBGU defines these bundles as measures requir­
ing relatively little effort to achieve great transforma­
tive impact. 
In part, the outlined recommendations which prom­
ise particularly effective strategic leverage show marked 
differences in terms of scope, time range of impact, 
and actors’ involvement levels. The analysis in Chap­
ter 3 has indicated that in the past, both the dissemi­
nation of steering activities, shared between distinctly 
different levels and actors, and the simultaneousness 
and synergetic amplifying effect of individual develop­
ments (multilevel, multi­action, co­evolution; Chapter 
3) have been important preconditions for transforma­
tion processes. From the WBGU’s point of view, the fol­
lowing ten measure bundles are of decisive importance 
to accomplish a global transformation towards sustain­
ability within an acceptable time span (Section 7.3):
1. Improve the Proactive State with Extended Partici­
pation Opportunities,
2. Advance Carbon Pricing Globally,
3. Action Field Energy: Promote a common European 
Energy Policy,
4. Action Field Energy: Accelerate Promotion of 
Renewable Energies on a Global Level through 
Feed­In Tariffs,
5. Action Field Energy: Promote Sustainable Energy 
Supply Services in Developing and Newly Industri­
alising Countries,
6. Action Field Urbanisation: Steering the World’s 
Rapid Urbanisation Towards Sustainability,
7. Action Field Land Use: Advance Climate­Friendly 
Land Use,
8. Encourage and Accelerate Investments into a Low­
Carbon Future,
9. Support International Climate and Energy Policy,
10. Pursue a Revolution in International Cooperation.
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The Transformation Rhombus
The key to a successful transformation into a low­car­
bon society lies in the interlocking of invention, inno­
vation and diffusion processes, and their acceleration 
in order to adequately meet the pressure to transform. 
This is not exclusively about new technical solutions, 
but particularly also about social and political innova­
tions.
Analysis of Germany’s Wilhelminian era (‘Grün­
d erzeit’, the years around 1870), around the turn 
of the last century before the first World War, show 
three closely linked key factors which, taken together, 
resulted in a ‘golden triangle’ for innovation pro­
cesses (Box 3.6­1; Figure 3.6­1): (1) the bolstering of 
 scientific­technological capacities in universities and 
research institutes, supported by professional training, 
(2) the emergence of future branches of the economy 
and (3) high net investment quotas facilitating the fast 
diffusion of innovations. Policies played a central role 
as they supported the establishment of research insti­
tutions and created favourable framework conditions 
for economic growth. 
These three elements are also crucial for today’s 
low­carbon transformation. However, the image must 
be extended to serve the illustration of the transfor­
mation: the ‘golden triangle’ is turned into a rhombus 
(Figure 7.1­3). The WBGU views the new social con-
tract (Section 7.2) as pivotal for the transformation; it is 
therefore also to be found at the centre of the rhombus. 
It covers the social appreciation of the urgent necessity, 
and therefore represents legitimacy and acceptance of 
the transformation. The creation of extended participa­
tion opportunities for change agents (Chapters 5, 6) is 
a precondition that is particularly beneficial in terms 
of promoting the diffusion of new technologies, social 
innovations and political reforms within democratic 
societies. 
Beyond this, the image is completed by an additional 
pillar: the proactive state with extended opportunities 
for participation (Section 5.4.1). One precondition for 
a successful transformation policy is the simultaneous 
empowerment of the state (through active prioritisa­
tion) and its citizens (through increased participation) 
with regard to the common goal of sustainable policy 
objectives. 
The state should ensure that the framework condi­
tions for the promotion of the transformation are given. 
As yet, regulatory policies shaped by the use of fossil 
energy carriers are prevalent in Germany, Europe, and 
also on a global level. Although there has been some 
pressure to adapt these, they have, as yet, not been 
fundamentally replaced by a climate­friendly regula­
tory framework and the corresponding incentive sys­
tems (Chapter 5). However, this does not mean that 
the state should be the sole and dominant actor in the 
transformation process. On the contrary, the WBGU 
very much feels that change agents exist at all social 
levels, and that these should be activated and given 
adequate room to grow and to manoeuvre. For the 
transformation, the state should in future extend its 
moderating role. Without a state which plays a proac­
tive and empowering role, change agents’ impact will 
also be limited. This applies to all levels of state action: 
communal, national, at the level of state federations 
like the EU and, not least, to international cooperation, 
for example within the scope of the United Nations. 
What is also new is the global aspect of ‘statehood’. 
A limited, national state perspective in terms of views 
and actions can deliver only less than adequate solu­
tions to global environmental issues and the low­car­
bon transformation; international cooperation is more 
important than ever before in order to address these 
issues. As essential precondition for the transformation, 
international cooperation must be extended to a histor­
ically incomparable degree. It should not only incorpo­
rate climate policies within the scope of the UNFCCC 
and energy policies, but the entire spectrum of sustain­
ability policies. As global governance extends across all 
three transformation areas, the respective recommen­
dations for international cooperation are dealt with at 
the end of the Chapter (Sections 7.3.9, 7.3.10).
To redirect investments, the most important issue to 
be regulated at state level is adequate carbon pricing 
(Section 7.3.2). This is a key course­setting state action 
in favour of the transformation, which in this way can 
be realised, and ‘globalised’, relatively quickly. As long 
as greenhouse gas emissions do not carry a price tag in 
numerous industries and countries, and subsidies in the 
region of three­digit billions continue to be spent on 
high­carbon sectors of the economy at a global level, 
all of the outlined innovations are basically taking place 
with the handbrake engaged. A low­carbon transfor­
mation reliant on market forces must get rid of the 
price distortions that favour fossil­fuelled industries, 
because this then directly links competitiveness with 
climate protection. The introduction of carbon pricing 
can therefore make a significant contribution to the 
decarbonisation of the economy, and accelerate it.
In accordance with the rhombus’ logic, the sequence 
of the other measure bundles with major strategic lever­
age can also be explained. What follows are the future 
branches of the economy, which are not least deter­
mined by the fact that some of the decisive economic 
and social sectors must undergo fundamental changes 
during the course of the transformation. The WBGU 
views the energy system, urbanisation and land use 
as key fields for the transformation into a low­carbon 
society (Section 7.1.1.2). New framework conditions 
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and the price of CO2 serve as a guiding signal, making 
the reorientation required in the three decisive trans­
formation fields easier. Here, the WBGU shows how 
innovative measures with a pilot character can develop 
systemic impact. 
In the transformation field energy (Box 7.3­1), the 
WBGU advocates accelerating the harmonisation of 
energy policies across the EU states, not least in order 
to demonstrate that the transformation is feasible 
( Section 7.3.3). An EU­wide, standardised, ambitious 
feed­in tariff would accelerate the expansion of cli­
mate­friendly energy generation in Europe, and would 
be the most affordable way to establish a decarbonised 
energy system, preferably with a high proportion of 
renewable energies. This would, however, make sense 
at the earliest at some point within the coming decade, 
as the necessary infrastructure would have to be cre­
ated at first. Beyond that, the WBGU is explicitly in 
favour of a global political initiative to subsidise feed­
in tariffs in developing countries (Section 7.3.4). With a 
view to countries where future dynamic growth is to be 
expected, securing of access to sustainable energy serv­
ices in the rural areas of developing and newly industri­
alising countries is one measure with great transforma­
tive leverage (Section 7.3.5). 
The rapid growth of urban areas in Asia’s newly 
industrialising countries is a megatrend of particular 
relevance for the transformation. In the transformation 
field urbanisation, the WBGU therefore recommends a 
whole measure bundle to promote sustainable urban­
isation (Section 7.3.6). Inherently, this action field is 
characterised by pronounced temporal inertia, as urban 
structures are frequently of a persistent nature and 
slow to change. 
In the transformation field land use, for example, as 
far as forest protection is concerned, rapid successes 
can be achieved if the REDD­plus agreements are rig­
orously implemented. Other changes are achievable 
only by adopting a long­term perspective, this particu­
larly applies to the promotion of climate­friendly eating 
habits, but also to the mitigation of emissions globally 
caused by agriculture (Section 7.3.7). 
On the right­hand side of the rhombus, the high 
investment quota can be found as the decisive nudge 
factor for low­carbon transformation. There is enough 
capital available globally to finance the investments 
required for the transformation in the direction of a 
low­carbon society; however, the challenge here is to 
utilise this capital for long­term investments in sustain­
ability by introducing suitable incentives. New business 
models will make it considerably easier to mobilise the 
available capital for the transformation (Section 7.3.8).
And finally, the development of the scientific and 
technological capacities forms the basis of the rhombus, 
dealt with in Chapter 8. 
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Figure 7.1-3
The Transformation Rhombus. This figure is an expansion of the ‘golden triangle’ (Figure 3.2­3) which serves to illustrate 
the innovative wave Germany experienced during the Wilhelminian era. Two elements are added for the transformation: the 
proactive state and the new social contract (Section 7.2) balancing the proactive state through extended citizen participation.
Source: WBGU
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Three Levels of Ambition
The individual recommendations differ in terms of 
ambition level, ranked as either low, medium or high. 
In this sense, the ambition level is mainly understood to 
be the degree of its transformative impact, but also as 
the actual political feasibility. There are links between 
these two categories, pointed out in each recommen­
dation. For example, a measure that might actually be 
very effective in terms of the transformation may not 
be able to develop this efficacy if it is not feasible in 
political terms. However, an evaluation of the political 
realism of its feasibility is always subject to dynamic 
changes. Although some highly ambitious measures 
may seem unrealistic from today’s point of view, past 
experience has shown that in changing circumstances, 
say during the course of the transformation, the polit­
ical willingness to employ measures that, until then, 
were seen as unrealistic and not politically feasible, can 
actually be triggered quite quickly. 
Examples of such political ‘tipping points’ are the 
three months’ moratorium on Germany’s oldest nuclear 
power stations, and the acceleration of the nuclear 
phase­out by the German federal government (2011), 
or Germany’s all­party debate on the introduction of a 
financial transaction tax (2009/10). So, taking these 
facts into account, the WBGU advocates the inclusion 
of (apparently, from today’s point of view) unrealistic, 
highest ambition level recommendations in all politi­
cal considerations, rather than discounting them from 
the start. 
Even the evaluation of the transformative impact 
is not static. Initially, low transformative impact 
 recommendations may not seem particularly appeal­
ing, as these measures have little effect; however, some 
of these measures might prove significant in terms of 
paving the way, and through this have a surprisingly 
wide­reaching effect. 
7.2
A New Global Social Contract
The constellation referred to as the Industrial 
 Revolution’s ‘business basis’ in Chapter 3 could also be 
described as the interaction between entrepreneurs, 
engineers and bankers with an open minded and pro­
gressive administration and a confident citizenship. 
Together, they divested themselves of feudal bonds 
and religious dogmas and, in an unwritten social con­
tract and for mutual benefit, fastened the ‘loose links’ 
between the part systems of state/politics, economy/
technology and civil society that had become autono­
mous as a result. The concept of a social contract devel­
oped from natural law of early modern philosophy 
(mainly by Thomas Hobbes 1651, John Locke 1690, 
Jean­Jacques Rousseau 1762 and Immanuel Kant 
1797). It questions how an agreement based on an 
(imagined) contract between rulers and ruled can guar­
antee orderly cohabitation in a national and social con­
federation. The intention behind the concept was the 
avoidance of an anarchic natural condition which, in its 
most extreme form, ends in a (civil) war of all against 
all. The religious and territorial conflicts during the evo­
lution of the European state order formed the contem­
porary historical background. 
The construction went as follows: free and equal 
individuals surrender their rights to a government, and 
precisely this act of surrender obliges the state to pro­
tect its citizens, which in turn leads to obligations on 
the part of the citizens (for example taxes, national 
service, voluntary work, etc.). In this way, the state 
establishes its power monopoly, which protects the cit­
izens’ fundamental rights to integrity and individual 
personal development, and regulates property own­
ership. In turn, the citizenship must provide the state 
with the requisite resources for this, with the use of 
these resources being monitored by citizens’ represent­
atives elected in the course of developing parliamen­
tary monitoring rights.
In analogy to legal acts, this multilayered agreement 
for mutual benefit lends legitimacy to the ruling organi­
sation, in as far as it, ideally, enjoys the approval of all 
those concerned. The objective of the contract concept 
is not the description or definition of actual processes; 
however, it is an effective norm for the explanation of 
the modern state that is no longer the creation of God 
(or nature), but of sovereign people who – and this is 
only seemingly paradoxical – have voluntarily surren­
dered naturally existing liberties, and relinquished the 
fulfilment of egoistic needs. 
In the classical natural­law doctrines, there are 
marked differences regarding the precise form of the 
social contract – the determination of the necessary cit­
izens’ rights and obligations and the state structure – 
depending on the author. Whilst Hobbes saw the state 
as a ‘leviathan’ equipped with absolute power, Locke 
argues that the states’ power should be limited. This is 
based on differing anthropological assumptions of the 
respective contract theoreticians regarding the human 
condition in the so­called natural condition. Hobbes 
assumed that humankind is characterised by competi­
tiveness, mistrust and a longing for glory. In the natural 
condition, this potentially means a war of ‘all against 
all’ and that ‘man is naturally a wolf to man’. Locke, 
on the other hand, saw humankind as led by reason 
and, based on cognisance, fundamentally able to live 
in peace and harmony. Similarly, the considerations put 
forward here with regard to a rephrasing of the social 
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contract are also led by a concrete image of humankind, 
and the question of whether we should have every con­
fidence that Homo sapiens, being capable of reason, 
will be capable of dealing responsibly with the conse­
quences of this crisis of the Earth system.
Society, politics and the economy have developed 
significantly, and differences are becoming more pro­
nounced. A revised social contract must therefore 
address four major challenges:
1. Because of progressive economic and cultural glo­
balisation, the nation state can no longer be con­
sidered the sole basis for the contractual relation­
ship. Its inhabitants must responsibly take transna­
tional risks and natural dangers, and the legitimate 
interests of ‘third parties’, i. e. other members of the 
world community, into account. 
2. Traditional contract philosophy presupposed the 
fictitious belief that all members of a society are 
equal. Considering the disproportionate distribu­
tion of resources and capabilities in today’s interna­
tional community of states, we must have effective, 
fair glo bal compensation mechanisms in place.
3. The natural environment should be given increased 
consideration when revising the social contract. 
4. The contract has to bring two important new 
 prot agonists into the equation: the self­organ­
ised civil society and the community of scientific 
experts.
The Great Transformation, which requires huge inno­
vations and investments, will face considerable, pow­
erful forces in the societies, insistent on preserving the 
status quo. It therefore initially appears unrealistic to 
expect that the citizens of individual states – not least 
in view of the globally required solidarities – will vol­
untarily accept the innovations expected of them, and 
share their burden. Two examples from recent history, 
however, show the conditions needed to undermine 
this kind of dogged persistence to cling to the familiar 
and to finally do away with it: 
1. The accelerated globalisation since the 1970s has 
placed great demands on societies in terms of 
 flexibility and mobility. In part, these have been 
met voluntarily with a view to concrete expected 
benefits, and in part, as a result of ‘alternative­less’ 
inherent necessity, accompanied by the acceptance 
of a reduction in life satisfaction. 
2. Welfare state arrangements are based on a (ficti­
tious and in part self­referential) intergenerational 
contract that defers or desists the immediate con­
sumption of resources in consideration of the wel­
fare of senior citizens – who are either others (those 
who are old today) or the self (i. e. as the future 
older generation). 
A new social contract (in the sense of a cosmopolitan­
ism inspired by Kant and developed further) is based 
on different assumptions: on the approval of inno­
vation expectations that are normatively linked with 
the sustainability postulate, and on the surrender­
ing of the spontaneous desire to insist on the status 
quo in expectation of the resultant benefits and corre­
sponding participatory rights. As elaborated in Chap­
ter 5, the guarantor in this (again fictitious) contract is 
a strong, proactive and empowering state that involves 
its citizens in future decisions requisite to the agree­
ment of sustainability targets, rather than merely per­
mitting them to furnish their approval after the event. 
This links a culture of attentiveness (born of a sense 
of ecological responsibility) with a culture of participa­
tion (as democratic responsibility) and a culture of obli­
gation towards future generations (future responsibil­
ity). This is no demand for a merely superficial or even 
resigned acceptance on the part of civil society; rather, 
it is acknowledged as an actively involved partner with 
shared responsibility for the success of the transforma­
tion process, and mobilised, thereby entering into the 
contract voluntarily – as assumed by the republican­
liberal variant of the original social contract. The idea 
of a powerful state is therefore indelibly linked with the 
recognition of civil society and the way it has evolved 
since the 19th century, the innovative powers inher­
ent in the economy, and the proactive and pro­innova­
tion forces active in political and administrative elites. 
Today, all of this always applies in the global arena as 
well. 
The Aarhus Convention as an Example for 
Participative Democracy
A good example for the operationalisation and imple­
mentation of the procedural side of this concept is the 
Aarhus Convention, the Economic Commission for 
Europe’s treaty on the access to information, public 
participation in decision­making and access to justice in 
environmental matters (Section 5.4.2.2), with its model 
and pioneering character. The Convention also reflects 
a new take on the concept of participative democracy: 
raising the awareness of citizens and the public with 
regard to environmental protection in order to enable 
them to pressurise national administrations into stricter 
application of environmental laws. Through access to 
information, public participation in decision­making 
processes, and access to justice, citizens are expected 
to contribute to the application and enforcement of 
environmental laws, and also to democratisation – par­
ticularly in the former Eastern bloc countries. There is 
room for improvement in terms of implementation in 
Germany, especially as far as access to justice for envi­
ronmental associations is concerned (Section 7.3.1.2). 
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Beyond that, the Aarhus Convention in its entirety is an 
expression of the communication process of an empow­
ering state, as it aims ‘to mobilise citizens to lobby for 
law enforcement’ (Masing, 1997), and, through this, 
‘strengthen the public’s role in the practical enforce­
ment of environmental law’ (von Danwitz, 2004).
Improve the Dialogue between Scientists and 
Policy-Makers
The community of scientific experts is part of the self­
organised civil society. Government action led by scien­
tific insights is essential in contemporary governance, 
even more so as the world is growing increasingly com­
plex. This particularly applies to the low­carbon trans­
formation as it is distinguished by acting under uncer­
tainty. Scientific advice can make a particularly valuable 
contribution to policy­making if it reviews and presents 
complex facts in a comprehensive way, features inte­
grated illustrations of solution options, and communi­
cates conclusions effectively. Both sides are responsible 
for a functioning communication between politics and 
science. Science has an obligation to inform society, and 
scientific findings should therefore be made accessible 
by being presented in a way that can be understood by 
many, as it is then most useful. Policy­makers should 
seriously consider the scientific advice in the course 
of the decisions that must be made. Against this back­
ground, the structure of the dialogue between scientists 
and politicians should be improved. Generally speaking, 
transformative policy­making must be accompanied by 
systematic scientific advice. This requires a stronger 
accountability in the reception of scientific advice on 
the part of the politicians, as well as improved struc­
tured relations between science, politics and adminis­
tration (Section 5.4.2.1). 
7.3
Ten Measure Bundles with Major Strategic 
 Leverage
7.3.1 
Bundle 1: Improve the Proactive State with 
Extended Participation Opportunities
A central element in a social contract for transforma­
tion is the proactive state with extended participation 
in a multilevel system of global cooperation. This com­
bines two aspects frequently thought of as separate or 
contradicting: on the one hand empowering the state, 
which actively determines priorities and underlines and 
implements them with clear signals (for example using 
a bonus malus system), and on the other hand, provid­
ing citizens with more extensive opportunities to have 
a voice, to get involved in decision­making, and to take 
a more active role in politics. A powerful (eco­)state 
is often thought of as restricting the autonomy of the 
‘man in the street’, whilst at the same time, any med­
dling on the part of the citizen is viewed with misgiv­
ings as a disturbance factor to political­administrative 
rationality and routines. A precondition for a success­
ful transformation policy, though, is the simultaneous 
empowerment of state and citizens with regard to the 
common goal of sustainable policy objectives. 
The proactive state is firmly anchored in the tradi­
tion of a liberal and constitutional democracy, but it 
develops this democracy further with a view towards 
the future sustainability of democratic communities 
and liberal civil societies, and takes into account the 
boundaries imposed on economic and social develop­
ment by a finite planet. Whereas climate protection is 
often regarded as a restriction and unreasonable dep­
rivation, a proactive and enabling form of government 
has the explicit task of preserving available choices and 
the current room to manoeuvre for future generations 
and even, if possible, to extend these.
The WBGU recommends the approach of these goals 
on four interconnected levels: constitutionally, through 
the setting of a respective national objective regard­
ing climate protection, substantive, through provision 
of climate protection targets in climate protection leg­
islation, procedurally, through extending the opportu­
nities for citizens and non­governmental organisations 
for public participation in decision­making, access to 
information and legal protection, and institutionally 
through mainstreaming the climate policies of govern­
ment institutions. The measures elaborated in the fol­
lowing express and concretise the national objective 
regarding climate protection, which forces legislators, 
executives and the judiciary to act. The level of ambi­
tion and therefore the transformative impact of these 
elements, increases through combination and a corre­
sponding definition of content. 
7.3.1.1 
Increase the Climate Political Responsibility  
of the State 
The general climate political responsibility of the state 
and its proactive and empowering role in the transfor­
mation should be regulated by law. The WBGU recom­
mends that the state’s comprehensive self­commitment 
should be made absolutely clear in both constitutional 
and administrative law. 
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Introduction of a National Climate Protection 
Objective
In constitutional law, the state’s climate political 
responsibility should be emphasised and increased by 
explicit reference. The WBGU recommends incorporat­
ing ‘climate protection’ as a national objective in the 
Federal Republic of Germany’s Basic Law, possibly as an 
amendment to Article 20a. A national ‘climate protec­
tion’ objective such as this would emphasise the char­
acter of climate as a global common good, i. e. take into 
account the fact that it is a supra­individual protected 
property. The state and its agencies would be obliged to 
take climate protection into account when making cli­
mate­relevant decisions with the potential to widen the 
room to manoeuvre and consider. As an implied bench­
mark, such a national objective would also serve the 
judiciary’s monitoring duties. 
Introduction of Climate Protection Legislation
At the administrative level, this national objective 
should be concretised through climate protection leg­
islation which stipulates guide values or maximum per­
missible values, or mandatory reductions of emissions. 
The WBGU suggests climate protection legislation with 
ambitious mitigation targets by 2050 as a key measure. 
Additionally, targets should also be set for the share 
of renewable energies in primary energy consump­
tion, for the reduction of energy consumption, and for 
increasing energy efficiency rates. The WBGU’s budget 
approach (WBGU, 2009) could serve as an orientation 
for the quantitative aspects of the mandatory targets 
to be set in this climate protection law. Subsequently, 
Germany should commit to the complete decarbonisa­
tion of its energy systems by 2050. This equals a 100 % 
reduction of the CO2 emitted from fossil energy sources 
in Germany by 2050. Although flexibility in terms of 
achieving interim targets within the scope of emissions 
trading schemes with stringent caps should be retained, 
the WBGU advises against the offsetting of reduc­
tions achieved in countries without emissions restric­
tions (CDM). Assuming the stated reduction (100 % by 
2050), Germany would exceed its CO2 budget, as per 
the WBGU budget approach. Germany should therefore 
make additional payments within the scope of inter­
national climate financing (Section 7.3.10.1), and also 
stipulate these by law. Since a law such as this only 
contains the general commitment to climate protec­
tion measures, further­reaching legal regulations are 
necessary to specify concrete measures for achieving 
the respective interim targets, and mechanisms in the 
event of target shortfall. A climate protection commit­
tee along the lines of the British Committee on Climate 
Change could be tasked with a scientific advisory and 
monitoring function. 
7.3.1.2 
Extend Opportunities for Information, 
 Participation and Legal Protection
Enhancing the state’s proactive role can only claim 
legitimacy if the citizens participate in the decisions to 
be made. Extended opportunities for information, par­
ticipation and legal protection for citizens and non­gov­
ernmental organisations are the proactive state’s coun­
terpart. The public should be informed about projects 
that have a major impact on climate protection and the 
transition to sustainable energy systems at a point in 
time at which all the available options are still open, and 
become actively involved in the planning and approval 
process. Further avenues for legal remedy in the form 
of supra­individual collective actions should be opened 
up in favour of officially recognised non­governmen­
tal organisations, in addition to the existing legal rem­
edies, to allow judicial examination of planning and 
approval decisions. The use of ombudspersons with a 
‘right to remonstrance’ and a ‘right to monitor’, as well 
as prompt, iterative deliberation proceedings with the 
corresponding inclusion of scientific expert knowledge 
and non­professional expertise would, in the WBGU’s 
view, complete the procedural system for climate pro­
tection relevant decisions by administrative and legis­
lative authorities. 
Planning and Approval Procedure Review
In the WBGU’s view, one key task for a proactive and 
empowering state is the establishment of structures 
that allow effective participation, and to organise a 
‘constructive communication process’, just as required 
by the Aarhus Convention. It obliges its member 
states to advise their citizens of environment­ relevant 
projects, and provides them with ways in which to par­
ticipate, obtain information, and have access to justice. 
The preconditions allowing the successful participation 
of citizens and those concerned in decision­making 
processes, particularly where major projects are con­
cerned, are: 
1. extensive and continuous public and local partic­
ipation at the earliest opportunity, including the 
 unbiased examination of alternative designs, 
2. maximise process transparency, for example through 
increased use of radio and television broadcasting, 
new media or additional information platforms, or 
staging dedicated information events, as well as
3. asking independent third parties to intervene in 
conflict situations. Government agencies must be 
given more scope for mediation, although arbitra­
tion should remain an exception.
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Extend the Scope of Collective Legal Action
Collective legal action means the right to appeal to the 
courts as a group, for example in the form of an offi­
cially recognised association, i. e. legal remedy can be 
sought without the infringement of any subjective 
rights (supra­individual collective legal action). Due to 
the legal system in Germany, which requires an impair­
ment of subjective rights collective legal action would 
require new legislation. Collective European legal 
action is found above all in environmental and nature 
conservation law, but also in civil law. In nature con­
servation law, the concept of collective European legal 
action makes it possible to enforce legal rules that prove 
to bear relation to nature protection. The Environmen­
tal Appeals Act 2006 provided environmental associa­
tions with more scope to file collective European legal 
action in cases of infringements. The Environmental 
Appeals Act is the implementation of the EU directive 
2003/35/EC, which in its part implements the Aarhus 
Convention. However, the revised environmental law 
does not allow associations to file legal action because 
of infringements of climate protection regulations, 
even in the case of major projects such as the construc­
tion of a coal­fuelled power station. Nevertheless, the 
exclusion to file the impairment of climate protection 
rules by the Environmental Appeals Act impairs EU law. 
It is to be expected that the European Court of Jus­
tice will soon decide that this implementation is against 
European law in proceedings which are currently pend­
ing. If climate protection provision infringements were 
enforceable by means of collective action, this could 
help to ensure that national climate protection objec­
tives are actually taken seriously by the authorities 
responsible.
Appoint Ombudspersons 
In a broader sense, legal protection also includes – 
apart from the judicial right to launch legal action – 
extra­judicial, alternative monitoring methods, which 
can also serve the assertion of supra­individual inter­
ests, such as climate protection, whilst also providing 
a means of monitoring the climate protection relevant 
activities of government agencies. Apart from arbitra­
tion and the right of petition (Article 24, subsection 2 
in conjunction with Article 227 of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union) this includes the 
institution of ombudspersons, originally a Scandina­
vian concept. Ever since the Treaty of Maastricht, the 
European Union also employs ombudspersons: the 
European Ombudsman (Article 24, subsection 3 in con­
junction with Article 228 of the Treaty on the func­
tioning of the European Union). The initial purpose of 
instituting ombudspersons is extra­judicial arbitration 
under administrative law conditions, and monitoring of 
the national or EU government bodies. The ombudsper­
sons’ monitoring rights serve as an extension to juris­
diction, and the protection of the legal order. In this 
way, the use of ombudspersons with monitoring rights, 
and the right to lodge judicial complaint, complements 
and improves the existing information, participation 
and monitoring rights of associations and the public. 
Initiate Deliberative Discourse and Proceedings 
under Inclusion of Public and Science
Awareness of the necessity and achievability of a pro­
found transformation should permeate all areas of soci­
ety. A fundamental societal mood of taking issues of 
sustainable living and economic activities seriously 
should be strived for, and a ‘business as usual’ attitude 
must increasingly be seen as not socially acceptable. 
The requisite course changes can only be made through 
deliberative policy­making which takes the arguments 
and perspectives of all citizens, including scientists, 
on board and accepts them as advice. Politics should 
be tasked with initiating such a wide­reaching social 
dialogue. The issues of climate change, decarbonisa­
tion of energy systems, lifestyles and the transforma­
tion should be publicly debated, and elaborated with 
concrete transformation scenarios. To avoid addressing 
sustainability issues merely symbolically, or the danger 
of missing the point through inter­party squabbling, a 
carefully moderated debate under the patronage (and 
with active participation) of the German Federal Pres­
ident and the above mentioned ombudspersons, and 
with involvement of the future chambers elaborated in 
the following, should be instigated, using mainly digital 
information and communication media. 
7.3.1.3 
Institutionalise Climate Policy Mainstreaming 
The German government, as a state actor, has the oppor­
tunity of improving the framework conditions through 
institutional reforms in such a way that transforma­
tion issues are accorded high priority, and are firmly 
anchored in government and parliament. The German 
federal administrative bodies should undergo a climate 
policy mainstreaming at federal, state and local level. 
In the WBGU’s view, this should include the following 
elements:
Introduce Obligatory Climate Impact Assessment 
Scheme
In Germany, a comprehensive, obligatory climate impact 
assessment scheme for any legislative proposal should 
be institutionalised. It should determine whether indi­
vidual planned regulations are relevant to the achieving 
of climate protection objectives. In any case, the respec­
tively more climate­friendly alternative to meet the 
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regulation objective would have to be chosen. Assess­
ing the impacts of laws in such a way is generally not 
a new concept in Germany. For example, for the past 
few years, an ex­ante administrative burden assess­
ment has been mandatory. Since May 2009, a so­called 
sustainability impact assessment must be carried out 
additionally. Regarding the areas of its application, it 
should be considered here that a climate impact assess­
ment must be distinctly separate from a project’s sus­
tainability and the environmental impact assessments, 
and also from the strategic environmental assessment 
for plans and projects, in order to avoid repetition. This 
can be achieved through a tiered system, i. e. aspects 
which have been adequately analysed during the pre­
vious stage of the assessment do not need reassessing 
in the next stage.
Recommendations for the Executive Authority
To ensure that all political departments address the 
transformation towards a low­carbon society, and to 
improve harmonisation of interdepartmental policies, 
the issues of energy system decarbonisation, land­
use related greenhouse gas emissions reduction and 
climate­friendly urbanisation should become priority 
themes for the Federal Committee of State Secretaries 
for Sustainable Development. Its role as an independ­
ent panel should also be strengthened.
To emphasise the transformation issue in German 
foreign policy, the WBGU recommends the creation of 
the post of a Minister of State for global sustainability 
issues, energy system decarbonisation and raw materi­
als strategy in the Federal Foreign Office.
Nowadays, climate protection, nature conservation 
and sustainable regional planning tend to be addressed 
and taken into consideration by administrative bodies 
far more than they were in the early stages of envi­
ronmental policy­making. However, what has so far 
not changed is the institutional marginalisation of the 
responsible departments in relation to political areas 
that are dedicated to the historical core problems of 
industrial and welfare societies, namely the finance, 
infrastructure and social departments. In the WBGU’s 
view, the current departmental architecture prevents 
climate protection, nature conservation and regional 
planning from reaching the status they should have in 
the shaping of a post­fossil future, and the building of 
a sustainable economy. Therefore, in the long term, a 
partial modification of the current departmental archi­
tecture should be considered, for example by establish­
ing a ministry for the environment, climate and energy.
One means of achieving the purpose of ‘global edu­
cation’, and a very real recommendation for the federal 
government to consider, is an internationalisation of the 
ministerial departments, for example by staffing them 
with 10–15 % of staff hailing from other OECD nations, 
developing and newly industrialising countries. In turn, 
German personnel could in exchange help to build up 
the required capacities, particularly in the develop­
ing and newly industrialising countries. In this way, 
national interests and perspectives could be brought 
into line with international perspectives and discourses 
right from the start, learning processes would be accel­
erated on both sides, and multilateral trust would be 
generated. A concrete step in this direction would be, 
for example, the setting up of exchange programmes 
for departmental staff, comparable to the German Aca­
demic Exchange Service (DAAD) for scientists.
Recommendations for the Legislative Authority
In addition to the climate impact assessment, the 
WBGU suggests a look at the various options of how 
parliament could take on a more effective role. If, for 
instance, the Parliamentary Advisory Council on Sus­
tainable Development were to be turned into a perma­
nent committee within the German Bundestag, it would 
be in a far better position to act and assert its objec­
tives.
National policies have reached their limits, both in 
terms of time and scope. We must therefore discuss 
how the (supposed) interests of future generations can 
be taken into account in contemporary elections and 
polls, and how people beyond national borders can be 
included, in accordance with transnational democracy. 
The indirect ‘children’s right to vote’ (by proxy, the 
parents’ casting the vote) being discussed throws up 
major constitutional and practical problems. In order 
to provide an institutional anchor for future­oriented 
interests, the WBGU therefore proposes an extension 
to parliamentary legislative procedure in the form of a 
deliberative ‘future chamber’, to be referred to by the 
relevant political agendas, and with a right to put up a 
deferring veto if necessary. To avoid interest and party 
political interference, chamber membership should be 
decided by drawing lots.
7.3.1.4 
Strengthen the Proactive State in a Multilevel 
System of Global Cooperation
Statehood transcends national borders and sovereign­
ties, particularly as far as climate, energy and the envi­
ronment are concerned; this aspect also requires new 
supra­ and transnational institutions. One prime exam­
ple for such improvement, in the opinion of the WBGU, 
is the European Union’s network of institutions, as 
the EU, after all, will also benefit from impulses for 
a deepening of its integration through joint, citizen­
friendly climate, environment and energy policies 
(Section 7.3.3). On an international level, central are­
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nas for global governance of energy, urbanisation and 
land use would have to be established for the transfor­
mation (Section 7.3.10). The Aarhus Convention, so far 
limited to Europe, is exemplary for activating the glo­
bal society.
Empower Newly Industrialising Countries to 
become Proactive States
For the global transformation to succeed, particularly 
the newly industrialising countries must become active 
agents in the low­carbon reorganisation. If Germany 
and Europe intend to nudge newly industrialising coun­
tries towards the low­carbon transformation, or build 
on any existing reform tendencies, they must take into 
account the differing initial conditions ( Section 5.3.3). 
China, for example, could become a driving force for 
climate­friendly development. This is supported by the 
fact that the challenges of climate change have under­
gone a recoding, from environmental to economic and 
innovation issue, in China over the past few years. Cer­
tain approaches in the Chinese government’s new five­
year­plan, published in 2011, also offer proof of this. 
Today, China already possesses the largest capacities 
worldwide for the manufacture of solar modules, and 
has some ambitious extension targets for renewable 
energies. Parts of the Chinese elite view ‘green’ devel­
opment as a chance to improve China’s national welfare 
as well as its reputation with regard to foreign affairs. 
In view of this, starting points for transformation alli­
ances with China would be broadly impacting innova­
tion and technology partnerships, particularly in the 
transformation fields energy and urbanisation, where, 
from a Chinese perspective, Germany and Europe are 
outstanding in terms of technological competence. 
Brazil also has the potential to develop into a low­
carbon pioneer economy, particularly because its 
 natural environment and the initial political conditions 
(democracy, institutional capacities, high government 
legitimation) are favourable for the use of renewable 
energies, and there is a global willingness to protect the 
rain forests. Contrasting this is a social majority rooted 
in a traditional modernisation agenda. Brazil should be 
won as an important strategic partner for sustainable 
development, because the country, apart from its for­
ests and agricultural resources, also has a significant 
amount of technical experience with regards to renew­
able energies to offer. Climate partnerships with Brazil 
should therefore focus primarily on cooperation in the 
energy and transport sector, as well as forest protec­
tion.
Alliances for climate­friendly growth should also be 
forged with India. Contrary to China, the country still 
has a chance of designing its modernisation process 
without taking the ‘fossil detour’, and to rely from an 
early stage on a low­carbon development path. In India, 
the public debate on low­carbon development is over­
shadowed by the discussion on economic capability 
and poverty reduction, even though the government 
has put the issues of energy efficiency and emissions 
control on the agenda. Here, it is above all important 
to demonstrate, through showcase alliances, for exam­
ple in the area of renewable energies and infrastructure 
expansion, how the fight against poverty can go hand 
in hand with economic growth. 
Overall, it can generally be said that only proving 
that climate protection, competitiveness and growth 
can be successfully combined will make you interest­
ing as a partner for cooperation, thus establishing a 
credible basis for it. Above all, transformation towards 
a low­carbon economy must therefore be resolutely 
advanced by the highly developed economies.
7.3.2 
Bundle 2: Advance Carbon Pricing Globally
The WBGU believes that carbon pricing is the most 
important political measure for energy system decar­
bonisation, and a necessary element of any regula­
tory framework for the transformation into a climate­
friendly society. A CO2 price signal can in principle be 
given through the introduction of a CO2 tax (price con­
trol), or an emissions trading system (quantity control; 
Section 5.2.2). Provided that the institutional condi­
tions for this are given, in the WBGU’s opinion emis­
sions trading systems are generally the more promis­
ing concept for carbon pricing in order to achieve a tar­
geted emissions restriction. However, emissions trading 
can only guarantee an adequately high carbon price and 
long­term reliability of expectations through very strict 
capping in order to develop transformative impact. 
Where the requisite institutional opportunities are not 
given, a CO2 tax at a corresponding level represents 
an alternative instrument for effective, transforma­
tive governance. As a guide value, from today’s point 
of view, the 2020 carbon price in the OECD countries 
would have to be at least around 40–50 US$ per t CO2 
in order to have the transformative effect required by 
the 2°C guard rail (estimates based on IEA model calcu­
lations and the scenarios elaborated in Chapters 4.2.4 
and 5.2.2). For carbon pricing to achieve maximum 
impact, the subsidies for fossil fuels which still exist in 
many countries should also be phased out at the earli­
est opportunity.
The aim of German and European efforts should be 
the establishment of a global emissions trade at corpo­
rate level in order to fully tap this instrument’s poten­
tial in terms of environmental and efficiency benefits. 
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It must be said, though, that a comprehensive and bind­
ing climate protection treaty, which could include a glo­
bal emissions trade at corporate level, does not appear 
to be realisable in the short or the medium term, even 
after the UN Conference at Cancún. Short­term national 
interests still block prompt and effective global climate 
protection agreements. 
The WBGU suggests several paths with differing 
levels of transformative impact as interim solutions 
to aid the creation of a global carbon market. A first 
step is the further development and strengthening of 
the European emissions trading system, accompanied 
by endeavours to convince the most significant emit­
ters to commit to CO2 pricing. In addition, sub­global 
emissions trading systems, assuming a suitable design, 
could increase the willingness of countries to contrib­
ute to global emissions restriction. Ultimately, joint 
emissions restrictions complied with by all high­carbon 
countries could pave the way for a global carbon mar­
ket. To be kept in mind: the higher the transformative 
impact of the paths described here, and the more coun­
tries subscribe to a carbon pricing system, the higher 
the demands for the state to act. 
7.3.2.1 
Low Ambition Level: Develop the European 
 Emissions Trading System further, and Reach  a 
G20 Agreement on Carbon Pricing
Supranational emissions trading systems such as the 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) are 
important steps on the way to extensive CO2 restric­
tions. The EU ETS should be continued and developed 
further. In particular, its administration should be made 
less complex in order to facilitate a future linking with 
a sustainable global emissions trading system at corpo­
rate level. Also important are more ambitious caps on 
emissions. The rather moderate emissions caps of past 
trading periods led to a relatively weak and volatile 
carbon price signal which did not adequately support 
many of the investments and changes on the demand 
side required for the transformation. The EU­wide goal 
for emissions reduction should be increased to at least 
30% below 1990 levels by 2020 (WBGU, 2010b), and 
EU ETS emissions cap should be adjusted accordingly. 
In addition, a readjustment of the amount of allow­
ances during auctioning, or, respectively, the trading 
period, should be considered. For example, the amount 
of allowances available during auctions could also be 
reduced to avoid a too low price on the carbon mar­
ket. Apart from that, CO2 pricing should be extended 
within the EU to include all fossil CO2 sources. This 
could be effected by shifting the emissions trade to the 
first commercial level of the supply chain (upstream), 
i. e. on production or import of fossil energy carriers, or 
through the introduction of carbon taxation for so far 
not included, diffuse emission sources (transportation, 
for example), which are difficult to integrate into the 
current emissions trading system.
In the form described here, the EU ETS could 
develop significant transformation impulses within the 
European Union, and accelerate the reorganisation pro­
cess towards a climate­friendly, resource efficient eco­
nomic system. At the same time, the EU would serve as 
a showcase, and therefore role model, for other coun­
tries or country groups to move towards a low­carbon 
society. As the individual member states are respon­
sible for the implementation of the above mentioned 
measures, this would require no further cooperation 
demands at international level, a favourable aspect for 
effective realisation. 
Increasing its own reduction targets within a further 
developed emissions trading system is, in the WBGU’s 
opinion, the minimum requirement to ensure that the 
EU regains its credibility with regard to international 
climate policy, and becomes a driving force in the glo­
bal transformation towards a low­carbon society. This, 
however, can only be one element of its commitment, 
and must be complemented by further bi­ and multilat­
eral agreements and contributions on the part of the EU. 
Germany and the EU should, for instance, lobby for the 
introduction of policies leading to an adequately high 
carbon price in as many countries as possible. A joint 
commitment of all G20 states to the necessity of the 
introduction of carbon pricing in their countries could 
be an initial step. Such a commitment would be impor­
tant in order to increase the states’ credibility concern­
ing the implementation of the unilateral pledges made 
within the scope of UNFCCC. For companies and inves­
tors, this would signalise that the G20 states are willing 
to create binding framework conditions for a decarbon­
isation of their energy systems. 
7.3.2.2 
Medium Ambition Level: Pursue Linking Emissions 
Trading Systems
Parallel to developing the EU ETS further within Europe, 
and all high­carbon countries subscribing to the intro­
duction of carbon pricing, precise links for interna­
tional cooperation during carbon pricing introduction 
and design should be sought. 
One possibility is the linking of existing emissions 
trading schemes, which could be effected in several 
stages up to the definition of a joint, cross­national 
emissions cap. The linking of national emissions trading 
schemes can contribute to increased efficiency in terms 
of reaching the pledged mitigation targets, as more 
cost­efficient mitigation options can be fully tapped. 
Apart from that, this is also a further step towards the 
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overall objective of a global carbon market. Probably 
even more important, though, is the political signal that 
linking existing emissions trading schemes would give 
with regard to international climate policy. The more 
countries participate, the higher the chances that other 
countries will follow their example, not least because 
they have more faith in a cooperative solution. The 
EU should therefore emphatically explore possibilities 
for cooperation with the linking of existing emissions 
trading schemes in mind. Moderate border adjustment 
measures could help to reduce distortions of competi­
tion for companies in pioneering countries, and to lower 
the incentives for free­rider.
However, the USA’s failure to adopt a national cli­
mate protection law represents a serious setback for 
endeavours to establish a linked transatlantic carbon 
market. China, on the other hand, has announced that 
it intends to test carbon pricing and emissions trading 
within the scope of the 12th five­year­plan, initially 
regionally limited. An active partnership of Germany 
and the EU with China for the design of an appropriate 
system, particularly also with regard to the experiences 
made during the introductory phase of European emis­
sions trading and its further structural development 
could possibly make a later linking to the EU ETS less 
difficult. Potentially, these steps could smooth the way 
for a geographically even more extensive system and 
the inclusion of further partners.
Sectoral approaches in emissions trading aim in 
a similar direction. Countries which so far have not 
introduced any national emissions restrictions could, 
initially with a sectoral or tiered approach, partici­
pate in extended European emissions trading (WBGU, 
2010b). Initially, apart from binding caps, relative tar­
gets (i. e. efficiency targets) are also an option in order 
to achieve at least a minimum steering effect, and to 
create the structures for later, more demanding reduc­
tions with absolute capping. In light of the global emis­
sion reductions demanded by the 2°C guard rail, secto­
ral approaches should take into account the inclusion of 
potential, gradually increasing future reduction pledges 
right from the start. 
Complementary to geographically extended emis­
sions trading, the introduction of a CO2 tax would be a 
reasonable measure in countries that are currently una­
ble to introduce emissions trading systems due to a lack 
of institutional capacity. In the interim, these coun­
tries’ decarbonisation efforts should be accompanied 
by financial transfers, for example within the scope of 
other measures of international climate policy (Sections 
7.3.8, 7.3.9). The financial transfers should be linked 
to the generation of strategies for low­carbon develop­
ment, or roadmaps, elaborated by the newly industri­
alising and developing countries themselves. Germany 
should lobby for the inclusion of the issue of carbon 
pricing as a framework condition in the low­carbon 
development strategies and roadmaps of these coun­
tries. The UN should offer advice and capacities for the 
implementation of these strategies, for example within 
the scope of the UN Conference on Sustainable Devel­
opment 2012 (UNCSD, or Rio+20 Conference). Beyond 
this, financial transfers within the scope of the UNFCCC 
for mitigation in newly industrialising countries that 
have as yet not introduced carbon pricing should be 
linked to the condition of presentation of a draft strat­
egy for ambitious carbon pricing.
7.3.2.3 
High Ambition Level: Establish an Emissions 
 Trading Scheme that is as global as possible, with 
joint Emissions Restrictions
The rapid and extensive integration of all high­car­
bon countries should be addressed, preferably paral­
lel to the above described activities. This integration 
would ensure that significant global emissions reduc­
tion is achieved. Within the scope of common ambi­
tious emission restrictions for the economies con­
cerned, this would generate a strong, price signal with 
a broad impact. In this way, the requisite acceleration of 
the transformation could be achieved, and it would be 
an important step towards a global carbon market. This 
politically ambitious strategy seems called for if global 
emissions are to reach their peak in the current dec­
ade in order to retain an acceptably high probability of 
complying with the 2 °C guard rail. However, this would 
require a huge political effort significantly beyond cur­
rent cooperation attempts in emissions trading. 
The EU should therefore strive for extensive cross­
national emissions restrictions as soon as possible. Con­
sidering the particularly heavy emission increases in 
the larger developing and newly industrialising coun­
tries, these nations should be included in cross­national 
capping at the earliest opportunity, as well as the major 
emitters in the industrialised countries. To facilitate 
this, actors from the industrialised countries willing 
to cooperate and BASIC countries could, for instance, 
negotiate the allocation of emissions rights whilst con­
currently introducing efficient trading mechanisms 
within this coalition. However, the expansion of emis­
sions restrictions to also include developing and newly 
industrialising countries can only succeed if the alloca­
tion is effected on a fair basis, and the respective agree­
ments go hand in hand with the relevant technology 
transfers. The WBGU budget approach (2009b) pro­
vides an international compass for the determination 
of the emissions volumes still acceptable from an envi­
ronmental point of view, and assumes the equal distri­
bution of emissions rights on a per capita basis. These 
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principles are also relevant for an implementation strat­
egy within the scope of a sub­global emissions trad­
ing scheme at corporate level: a pioneer coalition’s joint 
cap should be determined by taking the still admissible 
global emissions volume into account, and the result­
ant transformation pressure. A fair sharing of the bur­
den of decarbonisation efforts can be ensured if the 
involved nations benefit from the auction revenues of 
a joint emissions trading scheme at corporate level on a 
per capita basis. To implement such an integrated sys­
tem, structures should be established within the coali­
tion that could serve as the prototype for a future world 
climate bank (WBGU, 2009).
This procedure is recommended to involve larger 
newly industrialising countries more closely in inter­
national negotiations, despite the current veto posi­
tion of some major actors, notably the USA. In these 
rapidly growing economies, path dependencies should 
categorically be avoided, as continuing on a high­car­
bon growth path would lead to decades of excessively 
high global emissions, making the prospects of signifi­
cant emission reductions utterly remote. Furthermore, 
if action were taken at a later date, the cost of global 
energy system decarbonisation would be far more sub­
stantial (Section 4.5.1).
Additional emissions reductions, which could be 
achieved through establishing a pioneer coalition, 
depend on the number of partners, and determining 
the joint emissions caps. A partnership between the 
EU and, for example, Japan, China, India and Brazil, 
would relate to currently around half of all global CO2 
emissions (estimated on the basis of WRI­CAIT, 2011, 
excluding land­use changes). If, however, the USA, 
Russia, Canada and Australia were to be included in a 
cross­national capping, this would cover around three­
quarters of global emissions in 2007. An absolute emis­
sions restriction leading to an effective reduction in the 
coalition’s emissions, or at least to a peaking within the 
current decade, would also have the desired global sig­
nal effect, as the most densely populated and fastest 
growing newly industrialising countries would be tied 
into the system.
Major transformative impact can only be achieved 
with a very high level of international cooperation. To 
bring about global carbon pricing ultimately requires a 
kind of ‘cooperation revolution’, making strategic act­
ing far beyond Europe’s borders a necessity. Without 
global carbon pricing, however, significant emissions 
reductions and the requisite structural changes cannot 
be achieved in the long term.
7.3.3 
Bundle 3: Promote a Common European Energy 
Policy 
7.3.3.1 
A Common Energy Policy as a Chance for Europe
In the face of the challenges of climate change, increas­
ing dependency on imported fossil energy carriers, and 
increasing energy prices, a turnaround is absolutely 
vital for the EU. Goal of a common European energy 
policy should be the decarbonisation of the energy sys­
tems by the middle of the century. To achieve this, the 
WBGU recommends consistent and strong support for 
renewable energies, a coordinated, speedy extension of 
grid infrastructure, grid access, as well as storage facil­
ities and strong foreign and development EU policies 
on energy to promote the integration of neighbour­
ing states in North Africa and (primarily) constitutional 
and institutional changes to ensure that all EU policies 
take climate protection and transformation issues into 
account.
A common European energy policy would have a 
great symbolic effect, and would underscore Europe’s 
commitment to joint action in key future­oriented 
fields, strengthen the Union’s competitiveness, and 
serve as an inspiration to the global economy. Currently, 
the EU is lacking a new project that convinces and moti­
vates its citizens and fills them with enthusiasm. Nowa­
days, energy and industrial policy initiatives in the area 
of renewable energies can kick­start a deepening of the 
European Union, similar to the political identity created 
by the European Coal and Steel Community on the basis 
of fossil­fuelled energies. A common European energy 
policy could lead the way into a new energy era, and 
prove to the world the achievability of a continent­
wide, sustainable energy supply. Important directional 
changes are currently taking place regarding the fur­
ther development of the European energy market and, 
in particular, the regulation of grid access (draft of the 
fourth internal energy market package). These devel­
opments towards decarbonisation of the energy supply 
on the basis of renewable energies must be advanced. 
7.3.3.2 
Low Ambition Level: Strengthening of the 
 Objective ‘Climate Protection’ and elaborating 
 Existing Energy Policy Measures
The EU has already laid the foundation for the decar­
bonisation of the European energy system with its 
existing energy policy approaches. The climate pro­
tection targets defined in the EU climate and energy 
package are an important guideline for the dynamics 
of renewable energy expansion and energy efficiency 
increase. Particularly the 2009 renewable energy direc­
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tive, with targets set for 2020 regarding the share of 
renewable energies in final energy consumption and 
in the transport sector, attempts to step up the use 
of renewable energy carriers to make it possible to 
gradually phase out fossil energy carriers. However, 
the existing, moderate approaches for the promotion 
of renewable energy within the EU, and the member 
states’ individual support programmes, are not enough. 
The EU should therefore, by continuing to update 
already existing energy policy measures, providing fur­
ther incentives, and setting targets: beyond the (over­
all) targets set for 2020 defined in the renewable ener­
gies directive, ambitious targets by 2050 are neces­
sary. Climate protection objectives must be developed 
further, and binding energy efficiency targets must be 
agreed. Medium­term targets allow the monitoring of 
the planned expansion targets and, if applicable, their 
adaptation based on the latest scientific and technolog­
ical findings. These material provisions should be pro­
cedurally accompanied by extending monitoring scope, 
such as, for example, the introduction of collective 
European legal action.
The existing financial support enjoyed by renewable 
energy carriers in many countries also has an acceler­
ating effect in terms of their expansion. However, cur­
rently, there is no standardised, Europe­wide subsidy 
system. Although according to the renewable energies 
directive, cross­national cooperation within the Euro­
pean Union with regard to renewable energy subsidies 
would be possible to ensure target flexibility, it is, how­
ever, not obligatory. The cooperation could therefore 
occur in the form of mutual statistical apportionment, 
joint projects (also with non­EU countries), as well as 
cross­national subsidy mechanisms. The latter would 
lead to a standardisation of subsidy amounts. So far, 
these options have not been explored, due to the high 
transaction costs, and uncertainty as far as the determi­
nation of national targets is concerned. A standardisa­
tion of subsidy systems and amounts, however, would 
reduce support costs Europe­wide, and would be an 
important step towards the full support harmonisation 
under EU law, which in the WBGU’s view should be 
strived for in the medium term (Section 7.3.4). There­
fore, the support measures suggested in the renewable 
energies directive should be implemented.
Constitutional and institutional changes at EU level 
could promote the update of energy policy measures. 
Climate protection already is one of several EU envi­
ronmental policy objectives, and must be taken into 
account in all political departments as part of environ­
mental protection. To increase the measure of consid­
eration enjoyed by climate protection in all political EU 
measures, however, explicit referencing of climate pro­
tection in the list of objectives in Article 3 of the Treaty 
on the European Union (TEU), and in the horizontal 
clause of Article 11 of the Treaty on the functioning 
of the European Union, is required. Symbolic­constitu­
tional anchoring demands and ensures continued sup­
port for energy policy measures. Simultaneously, the 
extensive consideration of climate protection issues 
must also be institutionally anchored. The introduction 
of climate policy mainstreaming can ensure that cli­
mate protection and transformation issues enjoy a high 
priority across all departments, and are duly consid­
ered when drafting potential legislation. Climate policy 
mainstreaming along these lines, focusing on a trans­
formative energy policy, appears to have already begun 
in the Energy Directorate­General. Its energy policy, 
developed on the basis of the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy 
and the ‘Energy 2020’ communication, is aimed at 
ensuring the availability of technological innovations 
in the energy sector, as well as compliance with the 
energy and climate targets. Successful implementation 
of the climate protection objective at Union level nev­
ertheless needs a stronger commitment to transforma­
tive policies across all organisation units, i. e. a main­
streaming of climate policies.
7.3.3.3 
Medium Ambition Level: Realisation of a Single 
European Energy Market
One important step towards decarbonisation of the 
European energy systems, although by no means the 
last one, is the realisation of a single European energy 
market. Only a functioning, single European energy 
market can ensure a continent­wide sustainable energy 
supply: unrestricted grid access and cross­border net­
works are indispensable for the efficient integration of 
renewable energies into existing grids, and to guarantee 
a reliable supply. The EU’s third internal energy mar­
ket package from 2009 forms the basis for cross­border 
organisation of grid operation and market integration, 
so the foundations for a functioning internal energy 
market have already been laid. However, these meas­
ures have as yet not been completely implemented by 
all of the member states. Particularly unrestricted grid 
access should be ensured through the establishment 
of independent network operators, the only way that 
allows the development of a single European market 
for electricity with uniform prices. Hence the WBGU 
suggests that the federal government fully support the 
realisation of a climate­friendly single energy mar­
ket by the EU, as the EU can, on the basis of its com­
petency, ensure the implementation of the measures 
planned within the scope of the internal energy market 
package, and thus accelerate the realisation of a single 
energy market. 
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7.3.3.4 
High Ambition Level: Europe-wide Energy Strategy 
on Union Basis
The most effective way to achieve the decarbonisa­
tion of the European energy systems would be if the 
EU were granted the authority to define a European 
energy strategy. This would accord the EU the right to 
establish a Europe­wide energy policy on union basis, 
which would include choosing the respective energy 
carriers, and the extension and modification of cross­
border infrastructure. The EU could bundle the conti­
nent­wide renewable energy potential, not least owing 
to the competency to define the legal framework for the 
European energy mix, which in turn guides the mem­
ber states’ decisions on the choice of energy carriers. 
Considering the various geographical and economical 
potentials for the production and storage of renewable 
energies, it could drive ahead their cost efficient exten­
sion: wind energy from the Baltic and the North Seas, 
biomass from Eastern Europe, solar power generated in 
southern Europe, and expert knowledge regarding the 
extension of trans­European grids from Germany and 
other countries strong on technology. As the EU cur­
rently does not have the authority to decide the legal 
framework for the European energy mix (environ­
mental and energy policy, Articles 191 and 194 of the 
Treaty on the functioning of the European Union), it 
should be accorded the corresponding legislative com­
petence.
In order to function, such a common energy policy 
requires continent­wide networking of energy produc­
tion, consumption and storage. A prerequisite is that a 
common, barrier­free single energy market exists, and 
that energy grids will be extended to cover the whole of 
Europe. The EU should therefore coordinate grid exten­
sion efforts: a transcontinental electricity supergrid 
should be created in Europe to facilitate the exchange 
of electric power within Europe. The grid should also be 
linked to neighbouring countries that produce power or 
store it, for example to Norway’s storage power plants, 
to offshore wind farms, or, taking this concept one step 
further, to solar thermal plants in Africa. Apart from 
the balancing of regional fluctuations in terms of the 
energy offer, the grid contributes to the efficiency and 
improvement of the strategic security of energy supply. 
The grid expansion requires joint planning in order to 
be implemented, including the securing of the requisite 
investments. Although the third internal energy market 
package creates a new legal framework for the cross­
border management of grid operation, there is no obli­
gation for the expansion of the distribution networks; 
the EU should therefore pass new legal acts regard­
Box 7.3-1
Energy Use Transformation I: Decarbonisation  
of the Energy Systems
The most important starting point for the transformation 
towards a low­carbon society is the reduction of CO2 emis­
sions from the use of fossil energy carriers. Various analyses 
show that the decarbonisation of energy systems on a global 
level is feasible, both from a technical and an economic point 
of view (Chapter 4). Over the long­term, the economic costs 
of such a transformation are just a few percent of global GDP. 
If the transformation is to succeed, a vastly accelerated reduc­
tion of the CO2 intensity of the economic output is vital. To 
follow an emissions path leading to emissions of no more than 
750 billion t CO2 from fossil sources by 2050, at an economic 
growth rate of 2–3 %, the CO2 intensity of the global econom­
ic output over the next few years would have to be decreased 
at least twice as fast as it has done in the past. 
There are marked differences between the analyses in 
terms of the technology portfolio available for the energy 
system decarbonisation. i. e. there is more than one climate­
compatible way to transform the energy systems. The actual 
energy path followed will differ between states and regions, 
depending on political, technological and cultural circum­
stances and preferences, and individual geographical fea­
tures. Particularly the use of nuclear power and the relevance 
of carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) could develop in 
very different directions, both regionally and nationally – pri­
marily through policy decisions. The WBGU advises against 
the use of nuclear energy, above all because of the risk of 
serious damages, the still unresolved issues concerning final 
storage, and the danger of uncontrolled proliferation. CCS, on 
the other hand, is a necessary mitigation option for countries 
which continue to use fossil energies if the 2 °C climate pro­
tection guard rail is to be complied with. In combination with 
the use of bioenergy, CCS could also turn out to play a role 
in the active withdrawal of CO2 from the atmosphere later 
on. In its recommendations, however, the WBGU focuses on 
development paths that accord these two technologies only a 
marginal role. Rather, the WBGU recommends a strategy that 
relies primarily on an accelerated use of renewable energies, 
with the prospective aim of covering 100 % of the demand 
with renewable energies. 
In the WBGU’s opinion, a look at the various transforma­
tive scenarios (Section 4) suggests that the global final energy 
demand should not rise to more than 400–500 EJ per year by 
2050 if the transformation is to succeed. Global final energy 
demand currently runs at approx. 350 EJ per year. Without 
a political change of course, the final energy demand could 
more than dou ble. Limiting final energy demand is therefore 
a major challenge, particularly in the industrialised countries, 
as well as the rapidly growing newly industrialising countries, 
and corresponding strategies are extremely important. 
Apart from decarbonisation, the second major goal of a 
remodelling of the energy systems is overcoming energy 
 poverty (Box 7.3­2). 
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ing grid expansion and construction. This particularly 
requires a Union­wide plan of needs which, somewhat 
like the German transport infrastructure plans, deter­
mines the expansion need and the extension of power 
grids and storage facilities. 
Procedurally, the WBGU recommends a division of 
labour between the EU and its member states: the EU 
provides the legal framework for a Europe­wide energy 
strategy by stipulating the legal framework for the 
energy mix and the exten sion and rebuilding of infra­
structural projects. The actual legal form and the imple­
mentation of planning and application procedures for 
infrastructure­related projects should be the member 
states’ tasks. They must ensure early involvement and 
participation of the Union’s citizens in EU­wide plan­
ning processes. These new measures for grid expansion 
require an extension of EU competencies within the 
scope of the Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union.
Beyond that, expanding the networks also requires 
substantial investments, particularly in regions which 
are unable to attract private investors. These regions 
therefore require public support. The relevant funds 
should also be made available at European level. In 
addition, government incentives are called for (for 
example attractive loan offers) and, possibly, the intro­
duction of a legal obligation to expand the grids, insofar 
as this is economically feasible. 
And finally, the WBGU suggests extending inter­
national cooperation beyond the borders of the Euro­
pean Union, in the medium term. As far as this is con­
cerned, it follows that the EU should be furnished 
with the respective authority to enter into agreements 
under international law. The decarbonisation of the 
EU­wide energy system by 2050 can be achieved more 
cost­effectively if Europe cooperates with its neigh­
bouring nations. A core element would be the initia­
tion of broadly impacting energy partnerships between 
the EU and North Africa (comparable to the EU part­
nerships with major newly industrialising countries), 
in order to utilise the favourable local conditions for 
renewable energies (wind and solar power). European­
African energy partnerships should, on the one hand, 
contribute to the European energy supply and, on the 
other hand, help to establish sustainable energy sup­
ply infrastructures in Africa, and to effectively fight 
energy poverty. A future project such as this could, at 
the same time, establish a new sound basis for coop­
eration between Europe and Africa, based on common 
interests. Development, energy and stability policies 
would be bundled. 
7.3.4 
Bundle 4: Accelerate Expansion of Renewable 
Energies on a Global Level through Feed-In Tariffs 
Until the implementation of global carbon pricing (Sec­
tion 7.3.2), or the realisation of national and regional 
carbon pricing approaches, or until these have reached 
the required price level and reliability, and until we are 
some way further along the renewable energies learn­
ing curve, there is too little incentive for investors in 
most countries to accelerate the expansion of renew­
able energies (Box 5.2­4). However, only the installa­
tion of new energy generation plants from renewable 
sources can lead to lower costs due to learning effects, 
so that the further expansion of renewable energies can 
be achieved faster and more cheaply than it has been 
up to now. The targeted promotion of renewable ener­
gies is therefore an important complementary compo­
nent in any list of transformative measures. The trans­
formation speed needed for the necessary emissions 
reductions can  only be achieved on the basis of the 
fast and increased utilisation of renewable energies. In 
this way, the threatening path dependencies of fossil 
energy technologies could also be limited.
So far, feed­in tariffs have proved to be the most 
effective, and at the same time – particularly in the 
early stages of technology diffusion – the most effi­
cient tool for the promotion of renewable energies. 
They provide investors with long­term planning secur­
ity, thereby helping to overcome investment barriers 
(Section 7.3.8). In addition, technology­specific feed­
in tariffs allow the parallel promotion of different forms 
of renewable energy, thus opening up various ways of 
securing the future energy supply. In the WBGU’s view, 
the increased investment security and the option of 
technology­specific promotion are the main arguments 
for feed­in tariffs, compared to quota­based promo­
tion, or tradable certificates for renewable energies 
(Box 5.2­4). 
The WBGU therefore advises the German federal 
government to strongly support, both at European 
Union and global level, the widespread use of feed­
in tariffs. The most important accompanying measure, 
as it creates the one vital pre­condition an accelerated 
expansion of renewable energies depends on, is exten­
sion of the infrastructure, above all the construction 
of high­capacity transmis sion grids and storage facili­
ties. This should go hand in hand with a political pro­
cess to phase out subsidies for fossil energy carriers, as 
currently, on a global level, governments’ expenditure 
related to fossil energy carrier subsidies is more than 
five times higher than the corresponding expenditure 
for the promotion of renewable energy carriers. This 
ratio should now be reversed as soon as possible.
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7.3.4.1 
Feed-In Tariffs in Europe: Use Efficiency Gains 
through Step by Step Harmonisation
Low Ambition Level: Improved Harmonisation of 
European Feed-In Tariffs
So far, feed­in tariffs or rewards exist in 21 EU member 
states. The German federal government should advo­
cate the use of the instrument of feed­in tariffs in fur­
ther EU member states, and for a better harmonisa­
tion of the existing support systems. To facilitate this, 
the EU should strive for a binding EU­internal agree­
ment for the introduction of feed­in tariffs in all mem­
ber states, and for gradual harmonisation of the var­
ious national feed­in tariffs. It should further aim for 
the coordinated, speedy expansion of the grid infra­
structure, and the expansion of storage capacities. An 
improved harmonisation would reduce the risk of over­
subsidising certain technologies at less favourably situ­
ated locations, and could instead accelerate the promo­
tion in regions in other countries that are the most suit­
able for energy generation.
Currently, there is no standardised, Europe­wide 
support system for renewable energies. Although 
cross­national cooperation within the European Union 
with regard to renewable energies would be possible 
under the 2009 renewable energies directive to ensure 
target flexibility, this option has so far not been utilised 
(Section 7.3.3). Increased harmonisation of support 
systems and amounts, however, would reduce support 
costs Europe­wide, and would be an important step 
towards the full harmonisation of feed­in tariffs under 
EU law, which in the WBGU’s view should be strived for 
in the medium term. This implementation, however, can 
not be realised immediately as the power grid transport 
capacities throughout the European member states are 
as yet far from sufficient (Section 7.3.3). Subsequent to 
the installation of these grids, however, the harmonisa­
tion of feed­in tariffs should be strived for. 
Medium Ambition Level: Advance a Uniform 
European Support System
An EU­wide, uniform feed­in tariff would, in principle, 
increase the efficiency of promoting renewable ener­
gies. Power generation from renewable sources could 
then be effected at the most favourable locations for the 
least cost. The WBGU assumes that an EU­wide feed­
in tariff would significantly accelerate the transforma­
tion towards low­carbon energy generation, as well as 
being overall the most efficient option for achieving the 
goal of covering European energy demand almost com­
pletely with renewable energies by 2050 (Section 4.4). 
The WBGU therefore suggests a conscious striving 
towards the goal of one Europe­wide feed­in tariff by 
2020. European energy policy should be structured 
accordingly (Sections 5.4.3, 7.3.3). An essential pre­
condition for a uniform feed­in tariff is a stepped­up 
grid expansion and increased transmission capacities 
between the EU member states, as well as the avail­
ability of new infrastructures to manage fluctuations 
(Section 7.3.3). An immediate, pan­European, uniform 
feed­in tariff would conceivably slow down the expan­
sion of renewable energies in some regions, particu­
larly in Germany, without the ability to import suffi­
cient electric power from renewable sources. Without 
the respective infrastructure, falling back on less sus­
tainable forms of energy seems probable. 
A speedy, cross­border infrastructure expansion 
requires the harmonisation of planning provisions in 
the EU member states, and the coordination of energy 
sector planning procedures, for example through a 
Union­wide assessment of needs. This calls for a trans­
ferral of the respective law­giving authorities from the 
member states to the EU. Furthermore, unrestricted 
grid access should be ensured through the establish­
ment of independent network operators. The legal pre­
conditions for EU­wide power distribution must also be 
fulfilled (Section 7.3.3). 
In the WBGU’s view, these preconditions can be cre­
ated within a decade. During this time, national feed­
in tariffs should gradually, taking the progressive grid 
expansion into account, be harmonised to the degree 
that the transition to the EU feed­in tariff system does 
not result in disproportionate fractions for certain 
technologies. To avoid a period of investment uncer­
tainty, an interim phase which takes the safeguarding 
of already existing plants into account is needed – this 
is currently the case in Germany: plants built before 
a certain set date must still comply with the national 
regulations, which might continue to apply simultane­
ously during an interim phase. Nevertheless, the goal of 
a harmonised feed­in tariff must, in the WBGU’s view, 
not be misappropriated and used as an argument to cut 
national feed­in tariffs before the preconditions for an 
effective and efficient Union­wide solution are given. 
Another important component in any EU­wide sys­
tem is that renewable energies should be given prefer­
ence in terms of network feed­in. In addition, it would 
have to be examined how to support the most cost­
effective options whilst also ensuring grid stability. In 
the view of the WBGU, careful selection of Europe­wide 
harmonised feed­in tariffs, and their dynamic alignment 
to the progress made in the cost degression of individ­
ual technologies can minimise the risk of over­subsidis­
ing favourable regions. In case of a dynamic alignment 
of the subsidy amount for new plants, favourable loca­
tions would initially be preferred, whilst less suitable 
regions would only follow once their use was economi­
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cally viable due to the progress made in cost degression. 
The remuneration level should be subject to a gradual 
degression which takes into account changing mar­
ket conditions (including initial production costs, CO2 
price) along the line of the German Renewable Energy 
Law (EEG). However, on the basis of the experiences 
regarding the various market dynamics gained there, 
the degression of feed­in tariffs should not be linked 
to a certain date, but rather to the cumulative installed 
output of the respective technology. This would pro­
vide additional cost reduction incentives, and renew­
able energies would be financially viable sooner.
A Europe­wide feed­in tariff should have the goal 
of optimising the increase of renewable energies, and 
reducing their costs even further. These primary objec­
tives must, in the WBGU’s view, take precedence over 
national infrastructure expansion strategies and the 
corresponding industrial policy­related interests. The 
WBGU assumes that the various technologies (solar 
thermal power, photovoltaics, wind power, bioen­
ergy) will generally become competitive, and no longer 
in need of subsidies, once they have reached a global 
capacity of 5,000 TWh per year, so that the EU feed­
in tariff scheme for wind power could be phased out 
as early as 2025, and for solar energy by around the 
 middle of the century. 
High Ambition Level: Examine the Inclusion of 
North Africa into a European Support Scheme
To increase the transformative impact of a uniform 
European energy market with harmonised feed­in tar­
iffs even more, it should be examined at the earliest 
opportunity whether North Africa could be integrated 
into a European feed­in tariff system. The requis­
ite (foreign) authority the EU would need for a bind­
ing integration of North Africa into a European feed­
in tariff system, from a legal perspective, has already 
been granted (Section 5.4.3). Due to North Africa’s geo­
graphical situation, further potentials could be tapped, 
particularly in the wind and solar energy sectors. At 
the same time, this would be a way of supporting the 
energy U­turn in the Maghreb states, and could be the 
first step on the way to improving the power supply 
for the entire African continent (Section 7.3.3). A pre­
condition for this, however, would be a transcontinen­
tal supergrid, something probably not realisable before 
2030. In addition, a trans­African grid would have to 
be constructed in order to also provide the 500 million 
people in the Sub­Saharan region who currently do not 
have access to it with electric power. 
7.3.4.2 
Global Diffusion of Feed-In Tariffs: Initiate 
 Knowledge Exchange, Financial Transfers and 
Country Partnerships
Low Ambition Level: Knowledge Exchange and 
Capacity Building for efficient Support Schemes 
through the International Feed-In Cooperation
As a pioneer in feed­in tariffs (FiT), Germany should 
share its experiences and increase knowledge trans­
fer to optimise the structure of FiT systems. As early 
as 2005, the German federal government founded the 
‘International Feed­in Cooperation’ (IFIC), together 
with Spain and Slovenia, to facilitate knowledge 
exchange between countries with, and countries with­
out, feed­in tariff schemes to encourage the global dif­
fusion of best practices regarding the use of feed­in 
 tariffs. Experiences and suggestions for improvement 
are discussed in workshops, held on a regular basis. The 
IFIC also contributes its expertise to policy­making dis­
cussions regarding the promotion of renewable ener­
gies, particularly at EU level. 
Within the scope of this cooperation, the German 
government should continue to underline its commit­
ment in terms of both financing and human resources, 
thus helping to build up the knowledge and capacities 
needed for the introduction of efficient feed­in tar­
iffs by interested countries, including those beyond 
Europe’s borders. Within the scope of the IFIC, the reg­
ular exchange of experiences between countries with 
feed­in tariffs should also be continued and extended 
in order to increase the efficacy and efficiency of exist­
ing national systems. In this way, the IFIC could become 
a knowledge centre for efficient feed­in tariffs, whose 
expertise would also be in demand on an international 
level.
Medium Ambition Level: Initiate Feed-In Tariffs in 
Developing Countries
The increased use of renewable energies on a global 
level could be accelerated further if as many countries 
as possible were to adopt or expand the use of feed­in 
tariffs, particularly the heavily populated and climate 
politically important BASIC states and the OECD coun­
tries which are not members of the EU. The OECD coun­
tries and India and China will probably cover around 
70 % of global electric power demand by the middle 
of the century, and it is therefore necessary that these 
countries switch to renewable energies as quickly as 
possible. Many countries are already using feed­in tar­
iffs for individual regions or technologies; however, 
these would have to be developed further in order to 
accelerate the global expansion of renewable energies.
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The German federal government should therefore go 
beyond knowledge transfer by suggesting the found­
ing of an initiative to encourage global adoption of the 
feed­in tariff system. This could be done within the 
scope of the Rio+20 Conference. It could take the form 
of a declaration of intent by the participating coun­
tries to introduce feed­in tariffs in their countries, or to 
improve their current feed­in tariff systems. This should 
be accompanied by a commitment to the  phasing out of 
fossil energy carrier subsidies.
To prove the seriousness of their declaration of 
intent, it should include concrete initiatives as the next 
step towards implementing the planned introduction of 
feed­in tariffs. These would have to address the vari­
ous preconditions for the introduction of feed­in tariffs 
in different countries. Through use of the appropriate 
technologies, feed­in tariffs can also be introduced in 
small, local island networks, and are therefore also par­
ticularly important for overcoming energy poverty in 
developing countries. 
Whilst in industrialised countries, it is ultimately the 
final consumers who finance feed­in tariffs through the 
electricity price, many of the consumers in developing 
countries are not in a position to do so. State or other 
subsidies for the feed­in of renewable energies must 
therefore be ensured, as much as the means for capac­
ity building (knowledge transfer, training). 
On the one hand, bilateral partnerships between 
industrialised and developing countries which cover 
support in terms of capacity building and financing 
should be suggested within the scope of the proposed 
initiative. Such partnerships would reduce the financial 
burden on the state and consumers in the least devel­
oped countries, and offer the chance of fully unlocking 
the potential of the individual geographical situations, 
thereby increasing the investment’s cost efficiency. 
On the other hand, an international financing mech­
anism modelled on the Global Energy Transfer Feed­in 
Tariffs (GET Fit) programme should be established (Sec­
tion 5.2.3). This could (co)finance FiT systems in devel­
oping countries. The funding required for the extension 
of the necessary infrastructure, like grids and storage 
facilities, should also be taken into consideration here. 
A financing mechanism such as this would be closely 
linked to the initiatives for the reduction of energy 
poverty (Section 7.3.5). One option would be to posi­
tion this financing mechanism within the scope of the 
UNFCCC’s Green Climate Fund (Section 7.3.8). In as far 
as possible, the financial support for the extension of 
the infrastructures for renewable energies should be 
tied to market economic reforms of the energy mar­
kets (demerging energy generators and grid operating 
companies and the use of independent network super­
visors) in order to stimulate competitiveness and mar­
ket efficiency. Tenders for potential commissions to 
extend transmission grids should be invited globally, 
and orders awarded to suppliers who can guarantee the 
successful extension with the least volume of interna­
tional financial aid.
High Ambition Level: Establish IRENA as a 
Coordination Platform, and for the Diffusion of 
Feed-In Tariffs
The promotion of the sustainable extension of the glo­
bal use of renewable energies requires a coordinated 
and accelerated procedure. The International Renew­
able Energy Agency (IRENA), founded in 2009, has 
the task of advising and supporting both industrial­
ised and developing countries during the introduction 
of renewable energies. IRENA intends to offer practi­
cal and concrete policy advice, to make capacity build­
ing, technology transfer, and financing easier, and to 
promote the exchange of knowledge. What counts now 
is the conclusion of the establishment stage in order to 
commence the actual task. Above all, IRENA’s financing 
must be guaranteed, and a concrete long­ and medium­
term strategy must be decided on. The global diffusion 
of feed­in tariffs should be one of the objectives on the 
organisation’s agenda.
IRENA could function as secretariat and coordina­
tion platform for the Rio+20 initiative for the diffusion 
of feed­in tariffs suggested by the WBGU. In particu­
lar, IRENA could be responsible for collating data on 
potential analyses, support policies and the financing 
of renewable energies, and arrange for capacity build­
ing in developing countries in close cooperation with 
the IFIC. The agency could also pave the way for part­
nerships between countries with joint targets for the 
expansion of renewable energies, which they hope to 
meet through mutual accreditation of new capacities 
and with jointly financed projects – somewhat similar 
to the European­African energy partnership. To allow 
IRENA to serve as the coordination platform for the 
introduction of feed­in tariffs, the German federal gov­
ernment should do all it can to ensure that the agency 
is accorded the highest level of international attention 
and importance regarding energy issues, so IRENA can 
advance the expansion of renewable energies on an 
equal footing and together with existing organisations 
(Section 7.3.9). 
7.3.5 
Bundle 5: Promote Sustainable Energy Supply 
Services in Developing and Newly Industrialising 
Countries
Low­carbon global growth can only succeed if the 
increasing energy demand in the developing and newly 
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industrialising countries is steered towards the path of 
sustainability in time. There simply is no more room 
to manoeuvre left, as far as the pursuit of high­carbon 
growth paths is concerned (WBGU,  2009b). Accord­
ing to the UN Secretary­General’s Advisory Group on 
Energy and Climate Change (AGECC), the first step must 
be to ensure that around 3 billion people have access to 
the basic modern energy supply by 2030, particularly 
for cooking, heating and lighting (AGECC, 2010). The 
modernisation of energy supplies used for production 
(for example for operating machinery) should also be 
considered. Above all, developing and newly industrial­
ising countries need support in overcoming energy pov­
erty, and in the leap­frogging of technological develop­
ment stages (Box 7.3­2). Without credible commitment 
on the part of the industrialised countries in this area, 
there is no legitimation for implementing climate pro­
tection targets in cooperation with developing coun­
tries. 
7.3.5.1 
Low Ambition Level: Adapt Concepts and 
 Strategies
Link Low-Carbon Growth with the Fight against 
Poverty
The overcoming of energy poverty is considered a fun­
damental requirement of successful poverty reduction 
strategies. At a national level, an important instrument 
in poverty reduction strategies for the least developed 
countries (LDC) are the ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers’ (PRSP), drafted by the LDC with the support 
of aid organisations and with the participation of the 
local civil society, and updated regularly. They serve the 
steering of medium­term country development poli­
cies, and as a fundraising basis for the financial support 
required from the international community.
Use Development Banks for the Establishment of 
Low-Carbon Infrastructures
The WBGU reasserts its recommendation that the 
World Bank should increase its support of a low­carbon 
energy infrastructure in developing and newly industri­
alising countries. It should also understand itself to be 
a development bank for the promotion of sustainable 
energy in order to make it easier to leap­frog non­sus­
tainable development stages (WBGU, 2004). Although 
the World Bank has developed a number of activities 
with regard to the  promotion of renewable energies, 
to increasing energy efficiency and overcoming energy 
poverty over the past few years, the required transfor­
mation calls for a substantial upscaling of the extent 
and speed of World Bank programmes – with the aid of 
ambitious financial subsidies on the part of the donor 
countries. The WBGU recommends that the World Bank 
should develop a challenging  strategy for low­carbon 
transforma tion, with the requirements of the 2 °C guard 
rail as the benchmark. Development cooperation should 
set concrete targets in terms of energy policy on this 
basis. Within the scope of its seat on the World Bank 
Board of Directors, the German federal government 
should lobby for this. A move in the right direction is 
the call by the Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (the Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ) for the 
World Bank to set a quota of 40 % each with regard to 
energy investments, or renewable energies, within the 
scope of its new energy strategy.
The role of the regional development banks should 
also be strengthened during the implementation of a 
global energy system decarbonisation strategy. These 
tend to be firmly established in their respective region, 
and usually much more aware of the problematic issues 
encountered locally than the global institutions are. On 
the basis of earlier recommendations (WBGU,  2003), 
the WBGU advocates that Germany, in its role as con­
tributor to regional development banks, and within 
the scope of its EU membership, should call for the 
large­scale promotion of a low­carbon energy supply 
in the least developed countries, for instance through 
the establishment and extension of access to sustain­
able energy service supplies, and energy efficiency 
improvements. 
7.3.5.2 
Medium Ambition Level: Extend the Use of 
Modern Energy in Rural Areas 
Stepping up the use of existing technologies is one way 
to significantly improve the quality of life for many 
hundreds of millions of people, quickly and relatively 
inexpensively. Above all, the challenge lies in the wide­
spread diffusion of modern forms of energy use in the 
rural regions of developing countries. 
According to UN Advisory Group on Energy and Cli­
mate Change estimates, additional funding averaging 
around US$ 35–40 billion per year is required in order 
to secure access to the basic essentials of a modern 
energy supply for all people by 2030, i. e. approx. 5 % 
of the expected total global investment in the energy 
sector for this period (Chapter 4; AGECC, 2010). The 
required funds are made up of grants for investments 
and capacity building in the least developed countries 
amounting to US$ 15 billion, as well as government and 
private sector loans amounting to around US$ 20–25 
billion. In light of this, the WBGU suggests that the Ger­
man federal government should lend its support in par­
ticular to the following measures. 
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Modernise Traditional Bioenergy Use and Mobilise 
Bioenergy Potentials
Efficiency improvements in the area of existing bioen­
ergy use and the switch to modern forms of energy 
such as electric power and gas are an important precon­
dition for overcoming energy poverty and covering the 
basic essential need in developing countries. Initially, 
the issue is the modernisation of the traditional forms 
of use through improving the existing bioenergy use 
by simple and affordable means (WBGU, 2010a), or its 
replacement through other, low­carbon energies. This 
can simultaneously lead to poverty reduction, prevent 
damage to health, and mitigate the utilisation pressure 
on natural ecosystems. Apart from the promotion of 
renewable energies, development cooperation should 
support the formulation and implementation of coun­
try­specific sustainable bioenergy strategies in order to 
mobilise the sustainable bioenergy potential in devel­
oping and newly industrialising countries. 
To suitably prioritise access to energy and the trans­
formation towards low­carbon development as an 
important element of successful poverty reduction, 
the WBGU suggests that climate­friendly develop­
ment strategies should become a systematic constitu­
ent of PRSPs. Germany and the EU should emphatically 
 support this. Along with this, matching small­scale and 
off­grid energy solutions should also be developed and 
supported. 
Direct EU Energy Policy increasingly towards Low-
Carbon Development
60 % of the global investments in international devel­
opment cooperation come from the EU region. The 
WBGU repeats its assessment that EU development 
policy is not suitably coordinated, and the funds are 
not adequately employed for raising the global pro­
file of the new paradigm of low­carbon development 
(WBGU, 2003). 
Beyond the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), 
which primarily focus on poverty reduction, European 
development cooperation should also be guided system­
atically by the goal of low­carbon growth. The Rio+20 
Conference should be used as an opportunity to incor­
porate the themes of low­carbon energy generation and 
the overcoming of energy poverty into the MDG cata­
logue (WBGU, 2004, 2010a). European development 
cooperation can, particularly in the Sub­Saharan least 
developed countries and in Southern Asia, contribute 
to the establishment of low­carbon infrastructures, 
thereby also supporting ‘green growth’ in these coun­
tries. This would deliver concrete examples to demon­
strate that poverty reduction and low­carbon develop­
ment can go hand in hand. An intensified redirection 
of development cooperation in this way would increase 
the trust between industrialised and developing coun­
tries, something that is very much needed during the 
course of further climate negotiations.
7.3.5.3 
High Ambition Level: Start and Accelerate 
 Large-Scale Implementation Soon
Enter into Strategic Decarbonisation Partnerships 
with Developing and Newly Industrialising 
Countries
Strategic partnerships, particularly with developing and 
newly industrialising countries, are ideally suited for 
the extension and modernisation of low­carbon infra­
structures, especially as far as climate­friendly energy 
systems are concerned. The EU should offer the estab­
lishment of partnerships for sustainable energy use 
that go far beyond the existing EU climate cooperations 
(WBGU, 2010). Cooperations such as these are impor­
tant in order to enable individual countries to install 
a low­carbon infrastructure, to make true progress in 
the decarbonisation of the global energy systems, and 
in order to demonstrate that climate protection strat­
egies can successfully combine competitiveness with 
social and ecological development. These kinds of part­
nerships can accelerate the global economy’s U­turn 
towards climate­compatibility. Once a certain dimen­
sion, appeal, economic performance and collective 
innovative power are reached, high­carbon societies 
would increasingly be subjected to adaptation pressure. 
Initiate Lighthouse Model Projects and Strengthen 
Existing Ones
The WBGU recommends the rapid, large­scale further 
development of existing model projects to promote the 
transformation. Such large­scale model projects would 
illustrate how technology leaps and the development 
of focused solutions in the energy supply sector can 
be realised and accelerated. Current model projects 
are lacking the speed and dimensions requisite to the 
transformation. For instance, at 40 TWh, Africa’s total 
 residential electric power consumption (excluding 
South Africa; IEA, 2010c) equals that of New York. A 
delay in expansion would lead to a substantial rise in 
the required investments, as currently, a switch would 
be relatively easy because there are no significant path 
dependencies as yet. According to World Bank esti­
mates, Africa will grow into the leading market for 
solar powered mobile lighting units by 2015 (World 
Bank, 2010b).
In light of this, the WBGU suggests the following to 
the German federal government:
 > to improve the preconditions needed for the upscal­
ing, acceleration and multiplication of such model 
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projects for building up a sustainable energy supply 
within the scope of development cooperation,
 > to actively support and considerably develop the 
objectives agreed in 2010 by the African Union and 
the EU for the realisation of the African­European 
energy partnership, particularly the objective of 
supplying 100 million Africans with sustainable 
energy,
 > the potential southward expansion of Desertec,
 > to significantly increase the dimensions of pro­
grammes for sustainable energy supply in develop­
ing countries along the lines of the German­Dutch 
programme ‘Energising Development’, which has so 
far provided 6.4 million people with access to elec­
tricity and modern cooking fuels. 
The G20’s Signal for the Rio+20 Conference
Accelerating and upscaling lighthouse projects should 
be supported by putting the transformation into a low­
carbon society at the top of the agenda at the next G20 
meetings. The G20 should make the required funds of 
US$ 35–40 billion, according to AGECC estimates, avail­
able to provide the developing countries with access to 
the basic essentials of a modern energy supply (AGECC, 
2010). In the WBGU’s view, the G20 should act as if the 
overcoming of energy poverty were already anchored 
in the MDG; on no account should they wait until 2015. 
Such an initiative by the world’s wealthiest states even 
before the Rio+20 Conference would send out a major 
signal. In addition, mechanisms which contribute to the 
accelerated expansion of a low­carbon energy infra­
structure should be approved. For example, financial 
support in the form of loans for development of the 
energy sector could be tied in with the anchoring of 
sustainability criteria in the countries’ industry sector 
strategies. 
Through the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies, 
the competitiveness of sustainable energy supply 
structures could be increased to release the urgently 
required funds for the fight against energy poverty 
in the developing and newly industrialising coun­
tries. Already, endeavours towards this are being made 
within the G20. Germany should lobby emphatically for 
the speedy phase­out of such damaging subsidies for 
fossil­fuelled energies. 
7.3.6 
Bundle 6: Steering the World’s Rapid 
 Urbanisation towards Sustainability
Urban areas play a key role in the transformation pro­
cess (Section 1.2.4). They consume around three­quar­
ters of global final energy, and are the cause for an even 
higher share of energy­related greenhouse gas emissions 
(GEA, 2011). As far as rapidly growing urban structures 
are concerned, high­carbon path dependencies must 
be prevented, as they would hinder low­carbon deve­
lopment for many decades to come ( Chapters 1, 4). The 
WBGU therefore views steering the current wave of 
urbanisation towards low­carbon development as an 
extremely effective lever that should be as high up as 
possible on the international political agenda. The glo­
bal transformation can only succeed if the rapidly pro­
gressing urbanisation is used as an opportunity for cli­
mate stabilisation (Chapter 5.)
Against this background, the issue of sustainable 
urban development should move to the forefront of 
international consciousness. Due to the enormous time 
pressure, for example, a United Nations global emer­
gency plan for the compliance with certain efficiency 
standards in cities would have to come into force within 
the one or two years. In view of this, the measures 
described in the following are important, yet hardly 
sufficient, steps towards solving the outlined problems.
7.3.6.1 
Low Ambition Level: Improve Global 
 Communication and Information
Initiate Global Progress Report on Urban Energy 
Use
The compilation of regularly published progress reports 
on global urbanisation trends (‘Global Assessment of 
Urban Energy Use’) should provide a scientifically 
substantiated and methodically harmonised overview 
over long­term global urbanisation trends. This would 
improve the scientific and technical foundations for 
decision­makers with regard to urban and regional 
planning, and stimulate international debate of this 
issue. Although the UN Habitat programme’s ‘State of 
the World Cities Reports’, published every two years, 
provide a good basis for understanding current devel­
opment deficit trends and, at least partially, the vulner­
abilities caused by to climate change and how to adapt 
to it. They do however neglect the emissions reduction 
aspect, especially with regard to interactions between 
long­term urbanisation trends and other development 
dynamics (for example global environmental change). 
Remodel UN-Habitat
On the basis of this, UN Habitat should be remodelled 
to allow the programme to lend the urgently required 
dynamics to the international debate on sustain­
able urban development. At a low ambition level, the 
norm­setting role of the UN Habitat programme could 
be strengthened to achieve this, additional human 
resources could be made available, and it could be 
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developed further into a centre of expertise regarding 
sustainable urban development. The climate­compat­
ibility of urban development should  correspondingly 
become the key focus of the World Urban Campaign 
initiated by UN Habitat. Another opportunity is offered 
by the fact that this campaign could intentionally be 
linked with the international Green Economy debate 
being held in the context of the Rio+20 Conference. 
This could lend the requisite additional weight to the 
central transformation field urbanisation at a global 
level. At a medium ambition level, on the other hand, 
a more profound reform of UN Habitat is conceivable, 
which would ultimately lead to the establishment of a 
new organisation (Section 7.3.10.2).
Harmonise Data Collection
As urban and regional planning can make major con­
tributions to climate protection, and there are some 
considerable variations in consumption patterns, the 
progress in these areas should be measurable and com­
parable. Recently, a range of initiatives in this direc­
tion have already been instigated; however, these are 
often distinguished by limited transparency and com­
parability in terms of the methods used (for example 
WRI, 2008; ICLEI, 2009; World Bank, 2010b; EU Cove­
nant of Mayors, 2010). Frequently, the published data 
refers only to restricted relevant partial areas of the city 
(e. g. only those processes, buildings or vehicles that 
are under the municipality’s direct control). The WBGU 
therefore recommends the development of verifyable 
methods and harmonised reporting of cities’ green­
house gas intensity and their carbon footprint which 
cover all the relevant actors and sectors (for example 
energy and transport sector, industry and service sec­
tor, private households and public administration), and 
take into account both direct and indirect emissions. 
Existing data availability deficits must be identified 
and addressed. Moreover, the possibility for coherent 
aggregation with regional and national data should be 
given. This initiative for the harmonisation of regional 
energy statistics and emissions inventories should be 
jointly developed by statistics agency experts, envi­
ronmental ministries, and representatives from natu­
ral and social sciences, and from technical disciplines 
(Chapter  8). Reservations by data protection experts 
and industry advocates regarding the protection of 
local energy consumption data as a trade secret, should 
be weighed up against the common good. To achieve 
this objective, public purse subsidies (for example for 
energy infrastructure on the generator or the consumer 
side) could, for instance, be linked to data transparency 
provisions.
Examples of high­resolution sub­national statis­
tics for direct energy consumption are the British or 
the Swedish communal energy and emissions regis­
ter. Leading by example, the energy consumption data 
for public buildings should be made transparent (Car­
bon Culture, 2011). Examples how to measure indi­
rect emissions (on the side of consumption), that are 
methodically more difficult to record, have been pro­
vided by non­government organisations and scientists 
in many countries (Dawkins et al., 2010). 
7.3.6.2 
Medium Ambition Level: Develop and Implement 
Technologies for Low-Carbon Cities
Establish a World Commission for Low-Carbon 
Urban Planning
The Rio+20 Conference could be used for the founding 
of a ‘World Commission on Low­Carbon Urban Plan­
ning’, modelled on the World Commission on Dams. One 
task would be the independent assessment and evalu­
ation of climate­compatible urban planning activities 
currently being implemented all over the world. Further 
tasks would be ‘best practice’ development, and the 
development of strategies for their transferability. Sim­
ilar to the World Commission on Dams, the World Com­
mission for Urban Planning would include members 
of different interest groups. Contrary to UN Habitat, 
though, it would be more specialised, and would func­
tion as an independent institution outside of the UN 
system. The new World Commission could, for example, 
identify critical infrastructures (new grids, transport 
infrastructure, communication). To put the World Com­
mission for Low­Carbon Urban Planning’s findings into 
operation, the WBGU further  recommends the estab­
lishment of a broadly mandated UN Specialised Agency 
for Sustainable Urbanisation at this ambition level. The 
UN Habitat programme is not adequately equipped to 
deal with this acute problem, and should be incorpo­
rated into this new structure (Section 7.3.10.2).
Timely Integration of High-Capacity Public 
Transport Axes
One of the great dangers of rapidly growing urban 
agglomerations is the delayed planning of integrated 
high­capacity public transport arteries. Once a city fea­
tures a high­income middle class, and with it exten­
sive car ownership, public and non­motorised mobil­
ity is frequently marginalised and at risk. The subse­
quent integration of high­capacity public transport 
systems (underground railway systems, tramway sys­
tems with their own track beds, metropolitan railway 
trains, bus lanes, monorails, etc.) at this point in time 
is fraught with difficulties as it can be carried out only 
very slowly, and, because of the high cost and other 
barriers, only in capitals or selected major cities (for 
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example Bangkok, Shanghai, New Delhi). Cheaper sys­
tems with a similar capacity and service quality such as, 
for instance, bus rapid transit systems with dedicated 
lanes (Curitiba, Sao Paulo, Bogota), however, require 
so much space that they have to be planned well in 
advance, and the space required for their routes must 
be reserved. The co­benefits of express bus systems are 
well­documented. They facilitate effective networking 
with commuter lines and non­motorised forms of trans­
port (cycling and walking), and long­distance transport 
terminals, and integrate the city functionally, thereby 
upgrading areas of the city. 
This kind of architecture can also be an important 
nucleus for the conversion of urban energy infrastruc­
tures, and can later be used as a basis for distribution 
networks. A wide range of renewable energy fuels that 
meet ambitious pollution standards are suitable for 
operating bus systems. Various energy gases, hybrid 
systems and electricity­based technologies have been 
in use for a number of years now. 
Small and medium­sized towns in particular can 
potentially profit from this development as their struc­
tures are not yet ‘blocked’, and they still have some 
room for urban planners to act accordingly. Often, 
however, they are lacking representation, or negotia­
tion skills, in their dealings with central governments or 
the regional development banks. Traffic issues usually 
also cross the lines between administrative authorities 
within a city. 
So far, only two CDM projects have been successful 
in this area: the extension of New Delhi’s underground 
railway system, and Bogota’s Transmillenio BRT sys­
tem. Both were built in capitals. Particularly for smaller 
 cities, it is often not possible to meet the elaborate 
administrative demands of CDM (proof of an indisput­
able baseline, proof of the additionality of the emis­
sions reductions, verifiability and so on). 
A prioritised and simplified recognition of pub­
lic transport systems, for example within the scope of 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), 
should therefore be strived for. Consequently, capacity 
building and active support of small and medium­sized 
cities through development banks should be stepped 
up.
Subsidise the Development and Extension of 
Particularly Suitable Technologies
Some technologies and forms of renewable energy 
are particularly suitable for utilisation in urban areas, 
and special support programmes should therefore be 
decided within the scope of an ‘emergency plan for sus­
tainable urbanisation’. Contrary to most other renew­
able energy sources, geothermal energy is neither sub­
ject to temporal fluctuation, nor does it require much 
space. It makes the reliable provision of very high 
energy densities possible. In electric power generation, 
geothermal energy can easily provide sufficient base 
load. This affordable heat source can be used for a range 
of purposes (heating networks, greenhouses, industrial 
use, etc.). Electric power generation can be an option in 
particularly suitable locations. Solar refrigeration sys­
tems are particularly suitable for use in subtropical and 
tropical cities, as the timing of the resource supply runs 
parallel with the demand, thereby reducing peak time 
load. In many of the world’s regions, the desalination 
of sea and brackish water for metropolitan water use 
already makes an important contribution. 
Overall, the development efforts regarding technol­
ogies such as these must be stepped up. They should 
also take into account the resilience of these systems 
against the risks of climate change (droughts, flood­
ing, heat waves, etc.). For example, disaster preven­
tion measures should include a stock of refrigerated 
(mobile) protection rooms in case of a heat wave.
Within the scope of international cooperation, 
Germany should increase its promotion of technol­
ogy development and technology cooperations (for 
example PPP, joint ventures). This should also include 
allowing access to patents and knowledge. To mitigate 
investment risks, the government should offer collat­
eral securities.
Box 7.3-2
Energy Use Transformation II: Overcoming 
Energy Poverty 
Other than decarbonisation, the second objective of a conver­
sion of the energy systems is the overcoming of energy 
 poverty to provide all people with access to modern, clean 
and safe energy in the form of electricity or gaseous energy 
 carriers by 2030 (WBGU, 2004). To meet this target, the 
developing and newly industrialising countries primarily need 
targeted support to leap­frog past stages of technological 
development, both for the overcoming of energy poverty and 
for the establishment of a sustainable energy infrastructure. 
If this does not succeed, there is a risk of path dependencies 
on high­carbon, fossil­based energy systems that would be 
very difficult and costly to overcome for the next decades. 
Access to energy services is also a precondition for achieving 
the  Millennium Development Goals. In the WBGU’s view, the 
global limiting of the final energy demand is compatible with 
the aim of overcoming energy poverty.  
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Take Action at the Level of Cities and City 
Partnerships
Climate­friendly urban planning (Chapter 5) requires 
extended, independent financing and design options, 
particularly on a community level, where the potential 
for synergies and learning effects is very high. Change 
agents who are especially familiar with the local sit­
uation could, for example, make major contributions 
to the building of low­carbon cities. City partnerships 
and creating room to manoeuvre for change agents 
and movements towards urban low­carbon develop­
ment are increasingly gaining in importance, as already 
existing community climate partnerships or the activ­
ities of individual stakeholders or social groups show 
(Chapter 6). Existing initiatives (climate federation), 
urban stakeholders (Covenant of Mayors, C40), city 
partnerships and stakeholder alliances (ICLEI, Local 
Agenda 21, World Urban Forum) should therefore 
build improved networks at various levels, both inter­
nationally and bilaterally, in order to advance sustain­
able urbanisation.
Adapt Urban and Regional Planning to Cope with 
Unavoidable Climate Change
Urban and regional planning must not only contrib­
ute to the avoidance of dangerous climate change, but 
must also take into account the potential problems to be 
expected as a result of the already unavoidable climate 
change. This applies especially to coastal towns and 
riverside cities. Amongst other things, the increased 
occurrence of urban heat islands must enter into the 
equation. However, such measures also bear the risk 
of ‘mis­adaptation’, for example the increased use of 
high­energy air conditioning units or the construction 
of dykes, which in turn promotes settlements in areas 
prone to flooding. The application of ecological risk 
management criteria (greening of roof spaces, shad­
ing of concrete areas, protection against high tides that 
takes temporary flooding into account, etc.) is there­
fore preferable. Adaptation funding should be allocated 
according to these priorities. 
7.3.6.3 
Medium Ambition Level: Direct Urban and 
 Regional Planning Development Cooperation 
towards Climate-Protection
As far as urban development in developing countries is 
concerned, the first step is establishing the precondi­
tions for future low­carbon growth. The WBGU believes 
that over the past few years, as a result of the focus of 
developmental policy debate on the MDG, several key 
development cooperation (DC) action fields have been 
neglected. These include urban and regional planning 
within the scope of DC. In the course of city or country 
partnerships, Germany could pass on its experiences 
with new business models and urban energy efficiency 
improvement institutions to developing regions. The 
development banks’ programmes should also increas­
ingly focus on sustainable urban development. Fun­
damental deficits in urban planning and administra­
tion should be compensated for by capacity building 
in order to improve the situation for people living in 
slums, and to build up a functioning basic infrastruc­
ture. 
Start a Global Education Initiative for Urban and 
Regional Planners and Architects
The global lack of urban and regional planners and 
architects with the relevant qualifications hinders the 
speedy construction of climate­friendly cities. There­
fore, to be able to meet the imminent challenges, well 
qualified, professional experts are needed. The WBGU 
recommends starting a global training initiative for 
sustainable urban planning and architecture, and the 
extremely speedy establishment and promotion of the 
respective specialised faculties all over the world. 
In addition, the lack of qualified training and edu­
cation centres for urban and regional planners and 
architects in developing countries should be overcome 
within the scope of development cooperation through 
the introduction of university study courses. To ensure 
that their content is always up to date, and that they 
are in line with the respective national standards, 
the courses should be based at, and cooperate with, 
research institutions. 
Support the Institution and Reform of existing 
Urban Planning Schemes 
Many developing countries lack the capacities for low­
carbon urban and regional development, as existing 
regional planning authorities do not have the skilled 
human resources required to deal with aspects of cli­
mate protection, or their resources are already stretched 
to the limits of their capabilities with other tasks (pro­
vision of housing, drinking water, waste management, 
etc.). In both cases, development cooperation can alle­
viate the problem through capacity building. 
Extend Financing Adequately
Measures for the promotion of sustainable urbanisa­
tion should receive financing at a level that is substan­
tially higher than the current one in order to reach the 
required dimensions and acceleration. Germany’s activ­
ities in terms of supporting low­carbon urbanisation in 
Asia within the scope of the Cities Development Initi­
ative for Asia (CDIA), for example, amount to a mere 
€  20 million over 5 years. In light of the huge chal­
lenges, the WBGU considers an amount 100 times 
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that as far more adequate. It is self­evident that high 
demands should be made in terms of good governance 
when it comes to the use of these funds, and the imple­
mentation of urban development guidelines in general. 
7.3.6.4 
High Ambition Level: Large-Scale Launch of 
 Beacon Projects
Beacon Project: Low-Carbon Metropolis
To complement the above mentioned measures aimed 
at smaller and medium­sized cities, the symbolic 
power of megacities should also be utilised. The World 
Bank should therefore support the implementation of 
particu larly ambitious climate protection strategies in 
megacities (for example the five best among the cur­
rently 21 megacities). The WBGU recommends invest­
ments in the region of two­digit billions.
Start EU Initiative for Asia’s Low-Carbon 
Urbanisation
Asia’s current rapid urbanisation is one of the focal 
areas of the global urbanisation trend, as it harbours 
an enormous potential for path dependencies that 
would hinder a low­carbon development for many dec­
ades to come. Recent endeavours to put this topic on 
the agenda of Asia­Europe Meetings (ASEM) have 
failed. The WBGU therefore recommends that Germany 
should call for a joint European initiative, which would 
develop actions to promote low­carbon urbanisation in 
Asia to send out a signal, and mobilise financing instru­
ments. Amongst others, the Asian Development Bank 
and the World Bank should play a role in the financing. 
Experiment: Priority for Sustainable Mobility in the 
Inner City Area of Berlin’s Metropolitan Railway 
System’s Circle Line
Germany can gain significant influence on the inter­
national stage if it also leads by example. More model 
regions (see also the BMBF competition for an ‘energy 
efficient city’) should be developed as testing grounds 
for new concepts. In general, change agents should be 
given room to manoeuvre and to experiment, and com­
munities should embrace the chance to serve as pre­
cisely such spaces. The German architects’ and town 
planners’ climate manifesto ‘Common Sense for the 
World’ (2009) represents an important frame of refer­
ence for this. 
Communities should generally show more courage 
when it comes to ambitious experiments that send out 
a signal, for instance to demonstrate new forms of inner 
city mobility. Instead of funding further road build­
ing schemes almost by default as soon as an increase 
in traffic volume is predicted, future urban lifestyles, 
outlined, for example, in the scenario ‘Morgenstadt’ 
(‘tomorrow’s city’; BMBF, 2010f) should be taken on 
board, and visionary alternative proposals for future­
oriented and modern, sustainable mobility should 
be made. One measure at a high ambition level, for 
instance, would be the creation of a traffic zone that 
lies within the circular line of Berlin’s metropolitan rail­
way system, the S­Bahn, where sustainable mobility 
is given undisputed precedence. The aim should be to 
keep external traffic at bay as far as possible by pro­
viding attractive, alternative mobility options in the 
inner city area defined by the S­Bahn’s circular line. 
Car  owners living in this inner city area defined by the 
circular line should be legally obliged to purchase an 
annual season ticket for the public transport system, in 
this way contributing to its financing. 
The funds released through the sinking costs for road 
traffic infrastructure should be used in favour of sub­
stantial investments into a public transport system that 
works reliably the whole year round and is affordable, 
comfortable and safe. This would increase the quality 
of life in the city, decrease the health hazard posed by 
traffic and its emissions, and make an important con­
tribution to the transformation towards a low­carbon 
society. In part, smaller cities have already set an exam­
ple: through the introduction of a free­of­charge pub­
lic transport system in the Belgian town of Hasselt in 
1996, around ten times more people use public trans­
port (Chapter 6).
International Building Exhibition 2020: Demonstrate 
the Climate Political Potential of an Industrial 
Nation
The government of the city of Berlin is preparing an 
International Building Exhibition (IBA) for 2020. One 
of the themes of this third IBA (the first took place in 
1957, the second in 1987) hosted by the city will be 
climate change and resource efficiency. International 
building exhibitions serve as an architecture and urban 
design showcase, temporarily providing exceptional 
environments. The IBA in Berlin in 2020 should be 
taken both as invitation and opportunity to show this 
modern industrial nation’s skills and potentials when 
it comes to climate protection and adaptation to the 
effects of climate change, in one place in the form of a 
concrete, actually built and actually lived­in model city. 
European consortiums are planning climate­friendly 
cities in China or in the Persian Gulf, but due to Europe’s 
large share of established buildings, there are hardly 
any regions or spaces suitable for the construction of a 
model project. With its generous open spaces, above all 
the already decommissioned, or soon to be decommis­
sioned, airports at Tempelhof and Tegel, the conditions 
for building a German version of a city that is low­car­
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bon, both in terms of living and commercial environ­
ments, are exceptionally good in Berlin. Berlin’s reliable 
public transport system also offers an excellent oppor­
tunity of integrating low­carbon mobility concepts into 
this IBA. No other German city features such a wide 
cross­section of the different types of buildings usu­
ally found in Germany as Berlin does. An IBA under the 
topic of climate change should therefore also include 
exemplary refurbishment, convincing both in ener­
getic and aesthetic terms, but also socially, of some of 
the city’s existing buildings (fractal IBA). The WBGU 
recommends that the IBA concept should focus on the 
issues of climate protection and climate change in the 
sense of extending Berlin’s capital as a city. Ambitious 
project criteria should be defined to ensure that the IBA 
is turned into a beacon project for low­carbon develop­
ment with international appeal. The WBGU further rec­
ommends that the federal government should offer its 
fullest support to this third IBA hosted by the capital, 
both in material as well as idealistic terms, as an inter­
national showcase and proof of the seriousness of Ger­
many’s climate policy objectives. 
7.3.7 
Bundle 7: Advance Climate-Friendly Land Use
A priority of any globally sustainable land­use policy 
must be securing the food supply for just under a billion 
mal­ and undernourished people. Furthermore, there 
will also be a significant rise in the demand for agricul­
tural goods, as the population increase of an additional 
2.6 billion people by 2050 will also mean an increase in 
the number of people with emissions­intensive eating 
habits, i. e. a large volume of animal­derived products. 
The increasing use of bioenergy and bio­based mate­
rials will also mean additional huge waves in terms of 
demand. At the same time, competition for arable land, 
by now a rare commodity, will become even fiercer due 
to soil degra dation, water shortages and increasing cli­
mate impacts. Moreover, there is an international con­
sensus to set aside larger, better connected protected 
areas for the conservation of biodiversity. Turning more 
natural ecosystems into arable land is not a sustainable 
option, for reasons of climate and nature conservation. 
Not least, the necessary mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions from land use is an additional challenge (Sec­
tion 1.2.2). 
For these reasons, the transformation of global 
land use is one of the central tasks for the future. In 
the view of the WBGU, the intensification of agricul­
tural production must not only occur in a sustainable 
way, but new strategies for efficiency increase on the 
demand side, and particularly for the substitution of 
area­intensive or emissions­intensive products must 
be implemented (Section 7.3.7.1). Just under a quar­
ter of global greenhouse gas emissions can be allocated 
to the transformation field land use, both from direct 
agricultural emissions and from land­use changes, the 
latter mainly from deforestation in the tropics (Section 
4.1.7.1). These emissions can be mitigated, but land­
use systems cannot become completely emissions­free, 
not least because of the nitrous oxide resulting from 
the use of nitrogen fertilisers. Without a significant 
contribution from the land­use sector, climate stabili­
sation cannot succeed. Mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions should therefore become another core ele­
ment of new strategies for global, integrated land­use 
management. The following defines the most important 
starting points in the transformation field land use. This 
includes above all forest protection (Section 7.3.7.2), 
mitigating emissions attributed to agricultural produc­
tion (Section 7.3.7.3), and the promotion of climate­
friendly eating habits (Section 7.3.7.4). 
7.3.7.1 
Establish a Global Commission for Sustainable 
Land Use
Transforming global land use should be given a signifi­
cantly higher priority on the political agenda. It should 
be addressed much more at an international level, and 
more firmly institutionalised. The WBGU emphasises 
its recommendation that a ‘Global Commission for Sus­
tainable Land Use’ should be established in order to 
organise this international searching process (WBGU, 
2010a). The commission’s tasks should include the 
identification of particularly outstanding challenges in 
global land use, and the collation of the relevant cur­
rent expert knowledge. On the basis of this, it should 
develop a vision, and the foundation, mechanisms and 
guidelines for global land­use management. The new 
commission, with extensive responsibility for inte­
grated land use which would have to go far beyond agri­
cultural or food security issues in the narrower sense, 
could be affiliated with UNEP, and cooperate with other 
UN organisations such as the FAO. Its findings should 
regularly feature on the international agenda within the 
framework of the agenda of the UNEP Global Ministe­
rial Environment Forum, or the strategically important 
G20. The establishment of such a commission would 
rank as a medium­level ambition. In concrete terms, it 
should be tasked, amongst other things, with the fol­
lowing: 
1. Identification of the scientific status quo of global 
land use: The International Assessment of Agricul­
tural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Devel­
opment (IAASTD, 2009), initiated by the World 
Bank, was an important step on the way to the joint 
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development, together with the various actors and 
their extremely diverging interests, towards a con­
sensus, at least where agriculture is concerned. As 
this first step did not reach an overall consensus 
including all major multinational agricultural com­
panies and important key states, this work should 
continue. In the forest management sector, there is 
widespread agreement on the necessity of stopping 
emissions due to deforestation; however, the appro­
priate international efforts required for the relevant 
consensus formation are lacking. Modelled on the 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 
and the IPBES (Intergovernmental Science­Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services), 
the commission should initiate an integrated assess­
ment of the scientific status quo on global land use 
which takes a cross­sector look at land use and the 
whole chain from land management right up until 
the finished product and its use.
2. Set goals and start initiatives for climate-friendly 
eating habits: As an international target, the WBGU 
recommends the reduction of the global average per 
capita consumption of emissions­intensive food­
stuffs in order to mitigate the increasing land com­
petition. In the industrialised countries, this requires 
less consumption of animal  products. Simultane­
ously, the rapid increase occurring in developing 
and newly industrialising countries must be curbed 
(Chapter 4). To achieve this, the commission should 
stimulate initiatives, for example within the sphere 
of the UN organisations, to encourage international 
cooperation regarding the setting of targets for 
how much land should produce how much of the 
per capita food consumption. The WBGU further 
 recommends the goal of halving agricultural post­
harvest losses by 2050. 
3. Developing a minimum standard for all biomass 
 products: In the medium­term, the commission 
should develop a global biomass standard to regu­
late the production of all kinds of biomass for the 
various uses (food and feed, energetic and material) 
across countries and sectors (WBGU, 2010a). 
4. Evaluate options for global land management: The 
elaborated challenges regarding global land use 
(Section 1.2.5) lead to the question of whether glo­
bal land­use patterns will have to undergo a funda­
mental change in the medium­term. The ‘ideal’ form 
of land use would be forestry or agriculture opti­
mally suited to the respective regional or edaphic 
situation (Schellnhuber and Huber, 2010). The pro­
duction of foodstuffs, for example, would concen­
trate on the comparably rare favourable soils. One 
of the preconditions for such a system, however, 
would be a global agricultural trade without distor­
tions, and a global remuneration of significant eco­
system services, for example for the biodiversity of 
natural ecosystems. The commission should evalu­
ate ideas for such a global land­use management, 
and the framework conditions and instruments this 
would require. 
7.3.7.2 
Sustainable Forest Management and the 
 Mitigation of Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation 
The largest emissions factor in the transformation field 
of land use is land conversion, particularly the conver­
sion of forests and other natural ecosystems into agri­
cultural land. Stopping deforestation is therefore an 
urgent objective. The global deforestation rate remains 
high, and forest carbon storage continues to decrease 
(Section 1.2.5). Important leverage for the transfor­
mation is therefore provided by (national and interna­
tional) financial incentives for the enlargement of for­
est land, the cessation of deforestation and forest deg­
radation, and the conservation and sustainable man­
agement of forests and peatlands. 
Low Ambition Level: Extend Sustainable Forest 
Management
Forest protection and sustainable forest management 
play an important role in CO2 binding and storage 
and the establishment of sinks. However, a purely cli­
mate protection driven transformation does not make 
sense in forest management. The WBGU recommends 
increasing the overall focus on ecosystem services, as 
the availability of safe water and soil quality are also 
decisive for the transformation. To achieve this, incen­
tives and remuneration schemes for ecosystem services 
should be developed further, and implemented. The 
WBGU suggests that the respective individual coun­
tries’ national and international forestry strategies and 
programmes should increasingly take CO2 binding and 
storage, as well as other important ecosystem services, 
into account. This also applies to, for instance, the Ger­
man federal government’s Forestry Strategy 2020, cur­
rently under development. The national obligations 
resulting from the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) should be integrated. In addition, publicly owned 
forest land should lead by example through being man­
aged and certified according to sustainability criteria 
such as those of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). 
Medium Ambition Level: Promote Multiple-Use of 
Forest Product Resources
National raw material strategies for timber, such as, 
for example, the German federal government’s ‘Timber 
Charter’ (Charta für Holz), are particularly important 
Ten Measure Bundles with Major Strategic  Leverage  7.3
301
for the transformation. The rising demand for wood­
fuelled energy and an increase in the use of timber 
products with a long lifecycle to substitute fossil and 
mineral raw materials have led to rising timber prices. 
Raw material strategies often focus on increasing the 
market volume of the raw material wood. Instead, they 
should rather consider the climate­friendliness and the 
conservation of ecosystem services. Forests should be 
managed so that they can continue to function as sig­
nificant carbon sinks in order to promote the transfor­
mation. The focus should be on the multiple use of the 
raw material wood, accompanied by steering measures 
such as, for example, the phasing out of indirect subsi­
dies for high­energy building materials. Public procure­
ment, particularly also in terms of import, should rely 
on wood from forests which are sustainably managed 
and certified (e. g. in accordance with FSC standards). 
Medium Ambition Level: Lend Political Support to 
Agro-Forestry
Agro­forestry schemes contribute to food security, and 
play an increasing role in the adaptation to climate 
change, in terms of carbon sequestration and indirect 
reduction of emissions (ICRAF, 2010). The WBGU there­
fore feels that it would make sense to improve cross­
sector communication in the ministries (rural develop­
ment, agriculture, forest, water and soil management) 
in order to use agro­forestry’s potential to the utmost. 
The required information and incentive schemes must 
also be created, and the legal barriers preventing the 
establishment of agro­forestry that exist in a number 
of countries (including Germany) must be reduced. A 
review of EU agricultural policy should increasingly 
consider and promote agro­forestry through payments 
for ecosystem services. 
Medium Ambition Level: Protect Peatlands
Peatlands are seen as extremely effective ecosystems 
for carbon storage. They therefore have a very impor­
tant role to play in climate protection. The protection 
of peatlands, stopping their drainage, and renaturalis­
ing them is therefore extremely important, and should 
be supported through support programmes and reg­
ulatory policies. Redirecting EU agricultural policy 
towards direct payments for the conservation of eco­
system services, and funds gained on a national level 
through emissions trading, could finance the protection 
of peatlands. 
Medium Ambition Level: Increase Strategic 
Alliances with the Relevant ‘Forest Countries’
Germany has been committed to cooperation with 
the major ‘forest countries’, for example Indonesia, 
China, Brazil, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea and 
the  Democratic Republic of Congo, for many years. By 
extending these sub­global alliances, the technologi­
cal and administrative framework conditions that are 
a precondition for the rapid and successful realisation 
of REDD­plus projects could be developed and tested 
in collaboration (WBGU, 2010b). This applies equally 
to the development of monitoring and reporting sys­
tems for emissions measurement in forest areas, and 
to the question of how to take other important sus­
tainability and development dimensions into account. 
This includes the conservation of the natural forests 
and biodiversity as much as the comprehensive par­
ticipation of all  interest groups, and the improvement 
of the land rights and use rights of indigenous peoples 
and local communities. These long­term oriented alli­
ances allow the integration of the numerous experi­
ences gained in individual projects into bi­ or multi­
lateral strategies, regional networking, and larger­scale 
acceleration. To further the partner countries’ trust in 
the international processes, the release of the already 
pledged additional fast­start funds, and their addition­
ality, must be secured, and an adequate share must be 
reserved for forestry. This is an important precondition 
for advancing strategic alliances with the major forest 
countries.
Medium Ambition Level: Support REDD-plus Interim 
Partnership
With the REDD­plus Interim Partnership, a process for 
international dialogue that deserves serious considera­
tion has been created. Germany can utilise this impor­
tant platform for REDD­plus in order to introduce the 
necessary ecological and social minimum standards and 
financing instruments into the globally rapidly devel­
oping projects and initiatives to complement the cur­
rent negotiations under the UNFCCC.
High Ambition Level: Accelerate Multilateral REDD-
plus Negotiations
A REDD­plus regime within the scope of the UNFCCC 
is urgently required to create the global framework for 
a legally binding mechanism, and to provide the neces­
sary long­term planning security. To allow the anchor­
ing of a schedule, and the global target of reducing glo­
bal deforestation by half by 2020, and completely by 
2030, in the next Conference of the Parties’ set of deci­
sions, the corresponding financial contributions on the 
part of industrialised countries must be made. This is 
required to allow the developing countries to develop 
national strategies in answer to REDD­plus. The forest 
countries need support in establishing baseline, moni­
toring and reporting systems, so that the reduced emis­
sions can be evaluated, and performance­related pay­
ments guaranteed. In addition, a national information 
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system, reporting on compliance with the social and 
ecological standards, should be established. Taking bio­
diversity and the rights of indigenous peoples and local 
communities into account is a decisive precondition for 
a successful REDD­plus regime. The WBGU views it as 
necessary to include incentives for forest conserva­
tion and sustainable forest management in any future 
treaty. Utilisation of the synergies with the Convention 
on Biodiversity (CBD) could be improved, for exam­
ple by referring to the strategic plan laid down by the 
CBD in Nagoya in UNFCCC decisions. It is also impor­
tant to consider a forest definition, or to call for a joint 
UNFCCC, CBD and FAO forest definition, as so far no 
distinction is made between natural forests, managed 
forests and plantations. 
7.3.7.3 
Promote Climate-Friendly Agriculture
Global agriculture must cover the expected rapid growth 
in demand for food, bioenergy and biomass as an indus­
trial feedstock in a sustainable manner, and at the same 
time significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
without the option of making new arable land available 
through deforestation, since deforestation is irreconcil­
able with climate protection and nature conservation. 
This combination of demands is a significant challenge, 
in particular as the productive areas are becoming ever 
rarer through advanced soil degradation, water scarcity 
and climate change (Sections 1.2.5, 4.3.4, 7.3.7.1). 
Around half of global agricultural greenhouse gas 
emissions could be avoided without economic loss, 
above all through improved carbon sequestration in 
the soil, and the mitigation of CH4 emissions from live­
stock production, and N2O emissions from nitrogen fer­
tilisation. However, despite this major potential, only 
little progress has been made in this area over the last 
few decades. Although there is still a need for extensive 
research into low­carbon technologies to avoid emis­
sions (Chapter 8), a great number of these have already 
been developed, and are ready to be used. One big step 
forward would be optimising the financing instruments 
to allow a rapid introduction of these technologies, and 
significantly improving the transfer of this knowledge 
and the technology to developing countries. 
Low Ambition Level: Redirect Investments towards 
Climate-Friendly Agriculture
As in the energy sector (Section 7.3.8), there is not only 
a lack of access to information and technology transfer, 
but also not enough investment in sustainable agricul­
ture and the rural agrarian infrastructure. In the face of 
the substantial investments required by the develop­
ing countries in any case, it is particularly important to 
increase the investments to be expected, and to steer 
them in such a way that synergetic measures for cli­
mate­friendly management and increased production 
enjoy exceptional promotion. Germany should demon­
strate its commitment to this aim both within the EU, 
as well as to international institutions such as the FAO, 
IFAD or the World Bank, and focus its own develop­
ment policy accordingly (Chapter 5). 
Low Ambition Level: Create Incentives for Climate-
Friendly Agriculture
Climate­friendly land management must also benefit 
agricultural enterprises in the long run. Due to the fact 
that monitoring greenhouse gas emissions at farm level 
is somewhat difficult, the incentives should be meas­
ure­related, rather than emissions­based. The WBGU 
would, for instance, advise against the direct tying­
in of agricultural emissions into an emissions trading 
scheme at corporate level, such as the EU ETS. Agri­
cultural climate protection measures should preferably 
enjoy direct funding, for example within the scope of 
the EU. 
Low Ambition Level: Minimise Losses
The implementation of the available measures for 
reducing agricultural post­harvest losses and losses at 
consumer or household level should be emphatically 
advanced. The WBGU recommends the target of halv­
ing agricultural post­harvest losses all along the supply 
chain from farm to consumer by 2050. 
Medium Ambition Level: Use Climate-Friendly 
Agrarian Technologies in Developing Countries
The developing regions offer a substantial potential for 
intensifying agricultural production through the use of 
sustainable agrarian practices. As the standard agrarian 
practices are reasonably well known, this is not so much 
a matter of technology transfer, but rather of strategic 
advice and large­scale capacity building (Chapter 5). 
German federal government and EU bi­ and multi­
lateral development cooperation should here be led by 
IAASTD recommendations, and promote a systematic 
intensification of agricultural production in developing 
countries through the application of current agricul­
tural expertise. Agro­forestry is particularly beneficial 
for the transformation: not only can it help poor farm­
ers to increase their productivity, but it also contributes 
to carbon storage and improves soil carbon sequestra­
tion.
Using more land agriculturally, on the other hand, is 
accompanied by substantial emissions and, not least, 
the loss of biodiversity. As a matter of principle, the 
WBGU therefore recommends arguing against any 
extension of agriculturally used land in bi­ and multi­
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lateral development cooperation and the relevant inter­
national forums.
Medium Ambition Level: Create International 
Framework Conditions for Sustainable Bioenergy
The WBGU confirms that particularly an expanding use 
of bioenergy bears significant risks for various sustain­
ability dimensions (Box 4.1­4; WBGU, 2008). Since 
international agricultural trade renders impact chains 
and impact interactions extremely intransparent, only 
a global regulation framework can therefore guaran­
tee sustainability regarding the use of bioenergy. An 
international consensus on the minimum standard for 
sustainable bioenergy production and a comprehen­
sive international bioenergy strategy should be devel­
oped as soon as possible. One important element is the 
development of a global, GIS­supported land­use regis­
ter with information on the respective production area 
of every single imported bioenergy carrier. The devel­
opment of such a land­use register is not least also a 
research task (Chapter 8). Unless the suggested global 
regulation framework is established, bioenergy should 
be expanded only moderately (WBGU, 2010a). 
High Ambition Level: Liberalise Global Agricultural 
Trade and Reform EU Agricultural Subsidies
The WBGU again emphasises the major significance 
of a rapid and more extensive liberalisation of global 
agricultural trade within the scope of the World Trade 
Organisa tion (WBGU, 2010a). Securing the food supply 
must be the highest priority in the liberalisation of agri­
cultural trade. To achieve this, the global agricultural 
markets should instigate long­term investment and 
productivity increases, particularly in the poorer devel­
oping countries. The removal of import barriers for agri­
cultural produce should be stepped up, particularly in 
the industrialised countries, along with the phasing out 
of export subsidies. Accordingly, the EU should con­
tinue to reduce agrarian subsidies for industrial agri­
cultural production and the export of agricultural pro­
duce soon, and improve market access for developing 
countries. To promote an ecological performance that 
is on par with what society wants, direct performance­
related remuneration is preferable to more general pre­
miums per acreage or company (SRU, 2008). In view 
of the transformation, particularly subsidies favour­
ing livestock production, either directly or indirectly 
(for example feed cultivation or stabling), or the use 
of fossil energy carriers in agriculture (agrarian diesel), 
should be reduced drastically, speedily and EU­wide. 
The liberalisation could result in price increases that 
could have a particularly negative impact on the low­
income food­deficit countries (LIFDC), as net import­
ers of agricultural produce. These should be offset by 
international financial support, compensation and pro­
tection mechanisms (high ambition level; Chapter 4; 
WBGU, 2010a). 
7.3.7.4 
Promote Climate-Friendly Eating Habits
The key focus of the agricultural debate is above all 
how to meet the expected rise in demand with corres­
ponding productivity increases. The transformative 
effect of influencing the demand side, however, should 
not be underestimated. Apart from population growth, 
the most dynamic factor affecting land use, due to the 
huge differences in the emissions intensity of differ­
ent foods, are changing eating habits. In industrialised 
countries, and increasingly, also in the high­income 
social classes of the newly industrialising and devel­
oping countries, the consumption of animal products, 
whose production involves significantly higher green­
house gas emissions than purely plant­based agricul­
tural commodities, is on the increase. Livestock farm­
ing is already the most influential factor with regard to 
anthropogenic land use worldwide. Overall, i. e. directly 
and indirectly, this sector currently claims around 
three­quarters of farmland and is responsible for just 
under a fifth of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emis­
sions (including land used for the cultivation of feed; 
Section 4.1.7.2); however, it also generates income for 
1.3 billion people. 
Low Ambition Level: Increase the Pioneering Role 
played by Public Institutions
Education and information campaigns to raise consum­
ers’ awareness of their behaviour can contribute to vol­
untary changes in consumption patterns. The message 
should be: a low­meat diet that includes a high propor­
tion of preferably organically produced, fresh regional 
and seasonal produce is worth promoting, not just for 
climate protection, but also for health reasons. At the 
same time, awareness of the avoidable emissions and 
costs that are the result of food spoiling and wasting 
in households should be raised. The WBGU advises the 
federal government to step up education, together with 
food labelling identifying the environmental impact, as 
speedily implemented supportive measures to initiate 
this change. 
The WBGU attaches particular importance to the 
pioneering role of state­run and public institutions 
(government agencies, hospitals, etc.). Canteens run 
by public authorities should schedule one or two meat­
free days a week by way of setting an example. The 
educating effect is particularly promising if suitable 
attention is paid to this when catering for schools and 
kindergartens.
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High Ambition Level: Increase Taxation on 
Emissions-Intensive Agricultural Goods
As it is difficult to change consumers’ preferences solely 
by providing better information and role models, addi­
tional price signals, for example through the taxation 
of consumption, ought to be considered. The option of 
including the emissions intensity of foodstuffs as a cri­
terion in the taxation of agricultural products within 
the scope of a tax reform should be examined. 
7.3.8 
Bundle 8: Encourage and Accelerate Investments 
into a Low-Carbon Future
The transformation into a low­carbon society needs 
substantial additional investments in sustainable 
energy and land­use systems. The initial additional glo­
bal investments required for the transformation of the 
energy systems alone are in the region of several US$ 
hundred billion per year: estimates for the additional 
global investments required in 2030 range from at least 
US$ 200 to up to 1,000 billion per year, and assume 
steadily growing annual investment needs. Around half 
of the estimated annual investments, i. e. around US$ 
100–563 billion, has to be invested in developing coun­
tries. Additional financial transfers with regard to the 
REDD­plus mechanism for the avoidance of deforesta­
tion in developing countries are also required. It needs 
approx. US$ 20–33 billion per year (Section 4.5.1) to 
halve global deforestation.
Although these additional investments are partially, 
or even wholly, offset by savings on fossil fuels, signifi­
cant savings will not occur until a much later point in 
time. The core problem of many transformative invest­
ments, such as in efficiency technologies or renew­
able energies, is therefore that the upfront investment 
is extremely high, and is offset only by returns over 
a very long period of time, and rather small annual 
amounts. The amortisation period of such investments 
is therefore often longer, and they yield less than alter­
native investments. For this reason, there is a great 
danger of path dependencies on existing high­carbon 
technologies. 
The central challenge for any government transfor­
mation policy is therefore the speedy redirection of 
the investment flow towards low­carbon technologies 
by making transformative investments more appeal­
ing, and by phasing out current misguided incentives 
and investment barriers. This challenge can only be met 
through the interaction of public and private investors 
or capital lenders, in close cooperation with the inter­
national finance organisations (World Bank, IMF) and 
the development banks.
Gradually Remove Investment Barriers: Increase the 
Yield and Reduce the Risks
In contrast to the established technologies, many of the 
climate­friendly technologies are as yet not competi­
tive without state support. One of the reasons for this 
is that the negative external effects of fossil energy car­
riers are not taken into account when comparing prof­
itability, i. e. these technologies are simply ‘too cheap’. 
Also, currently, there is a lot of regulatory uncertainty 
for political reasons, leading to relatively high market 
risks for investments in (new) low­carbon technologies 
and products. This in turn has the effect that commer­
cial financial institutions do not allocate enough cap­
ital to projects with new, as yet not very well estab­
lished technologies, and these projects therefore are 
not realised, despite the fact that the required funds 
would actually be available in principle. The aim of any 
government policy must therefore be to make transfor­
mational investments more profitable, compared with 
alternative investment projects, and allowing inves­
tors access to enough capital. The risks of such invest­
ments would therefore have to be reduced with the 
help through government support.
Four Pillars for Promoting Investment for a Global 
Transformation into a Low-Carbon Society
To achieve a reduction of the above described invest­
ment risks, four areas would have to be changed, in the 
following referred to as the ‘four pillars’ of promoting 
investment for a transformation towards a low­carbon 
society: Firstly, the state and the international com­
munity would have to create stable framework condi­
tions for low­carbon investments. Secondly, the states 
would have to tap new financing sources to make public 
investments and financial transfers to poorer countries 
possible. Thirdly, new financing mechanisms to encour­
age private investors would have to be established, and 
existing mechanisms would have to be strengthened. 
Fourthly, new business models which reduce the strain 
of high upfront investments should be promoted. The 
interaction of activities regarding these four ‘pillars’ 
should promote investment with the decisive impetus, 
so that changing track towards a low­carbon society 
can succeed. The ambition levels of the recommenda­
tions in the following four areas depend on the level of 
development of the respective countries (indus trialised, 
newly industrialising, or developing), and on the strin­
gency of their political implementation, so ambi tion 
levels are not explicitly identified. 
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7.3.8.1 
Pillar 1: Provide Stable Framework Conditions for 
Climate-Friendly Investments
One important precondition for investments into low­
carbon technologies is that the climate and energy 
political framework conditions offer long­term invest­
ment security, and guarantee attractive yields. The 
most important component of such a regulatory frame­
work, from the WBGU’s point of view, is carbon pric­
ing, as this makes the use of fossil energy carriers more 
expensive whilst bringing forward low­carbon technol­
ogies (Sections 5.2.2, 7.3.2). Investment security and 
the revenue for transformative investments could be 
increased even more if additional technology­specific 
subsidies were granted. Binding efficiency standards 
for buildings, vehicles and energy­consuming prod­
ucts would also contribute to redirecting the invest­
ment flows. 
Create Framework Conditions with Increasing 
Transformative Impact
Stable climate and energy political framework condi­
tions with ambitious targets, for example within the 
scope of a climate protection law or a decarbonisation 
strategy, are preconditions for the relevant investments 
(Section 7.3.1). 
Important components when creating such frame­
work conditions are the further development of the 
European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS), and the 
further diffusion of feed­in tariffs in Europe. However, 
from a global perspective, these instruments alone, as 
they are, have only a very moderate transformative 
impact, due to their geographically restricted scope. 
They are nevertheless important, as they represent a 
model for other countries to follow. With this in mind, 
the German federal government should actively support 
the global diffusion of both carbon pricing instruments 
and technology­specific feed­in tariffs for renewable 
energies (Sections 7.3.2, 7.3.4). Gradually, a very high 
transformative impact could be achieved in this way.
Simultaneously, for carbon pricing to develop its full 
impact, the subsidies enjoyed by fossil energy carri­
ers should be phased out worldwide to eliminate the 
subsidy­based cost advantage of fossil fuels. As a sup­
portive measure, demanding and dynamically evolving 
efficiency standards for buildings, vehicles and energy­
consuming products should also be defined. Existing 
approaches in Germany and Europe, such as, for exam­
ple, the EU Directive on Eco­Design of Energy­Using 
Products, should be strengthened. If these framework 
conditions were binding at a national, supranational 
and international level, they could develop their guid­
ing effect with regard to the investment flow even bet­
ter. 
These measures should be completed at national 
level through tax incentives and also, on the part of the 
capital lenders, for example through explicitly includ­
ing sustainability in the lending decision criteria. Sus­
tainable financial investments should enjoy preferential 
taxation for an interim period. To support grid exten­
sion, a grid regulation should be introduced which, in 
addition to aspects of economic efficiency, also takes 
long­term objectives into account which serve the 
establishment of a sustainable infrastructure.
Aim for the Credible and Long-Term Oriented 
Setting of Framework Conditions through 
International Treaties
Transformative changes of the necessary dimension are 
particularly to be expected if credible, long­term ori­
ented framework conditions are set at a global level in 
the form of international treaties, i. e. if CO2 emissions 
were suitably priced worldwide, if all subsidies for fos­
sil energy carriers were phased out, and if renewable 
energies were systematically supported (Sections 7.3.2, 
7.3.4.). Stable worldwide framework conditions for the 
decarbonisation would direct additional capital towards 
sustainable investments. The strongest transforma­
tive impact could, from the WBGU’s point of view, be 
achieved by establishing a global scheme to limit CO2 
emissions, i. e. implemented through integrating newly 
industrialising and developing countries into a bind­
ing mitigation regime at UN level (Section 7.3.10). This 
could be realised, for example, through cross­national 
emissions trading schemes at corporate level with com­
mon caps (Section  7.3.2). In a system such as this, 
transformative investments would be favoured in two 
ways: on the one hand, the cap results in a powerful 
steering effect for investments in low­carbon technolo­
gies and products. On the other hand, a fair sharing of 
the burden between industrialised, newly industrialis­
ing and developing countries would also trigger signif­
icant financial transfers to developing regions, which 
could be used to finance transformative investments, 
or to support public financing mechanisms (pillar 2).
7.3.8.2 
Pillar 2: Open Up New Financing Sources at State 
Level
Particularly investments in infrastructure, such as 
transmission grids and storage facilities, have a pub­
lic good character, and must therefore be carried by 
the state to a large extent. To guarantee the financ­
ing of investments in infrastructure on the part of the 
state, thereby releasing the funds required to support 
the decarbonisation of the energy systems in develop­
ing countries and private investment projects, all states 
must consider various new opportunities for the gen­
7 Recommendations for Action
306
eration of additional funds. Whilst in the industrial­
ised countries, new funds could be generated through 
carbon pricing on the one hand, and further taxation 
on the other, developing countries largely depend, at 
least in the interim, on financial transfers from bi­ and 
multilateral funds, for example under the UNFCCC. 
The transformative impact in each case depends on the 
earnings, and how they are spend. 
A low transformative impact can be expected from 
moderate carbon pricing schemes in industrialised 
countries, such as, currently, the EU ETS, and from a 
marginal increase of the existing bi­ and multilateral 
funds for the developing countries. If, however, the 
profits from adequate CO2 taxation in as many coun­
tries as possible – including international aviation and 
shipping – or the revenues from the auctioning of emis­
sions allowances in an ambitious emissions trading sys­
tem were to be combined with further income sources 
(for example a moderate financial transaction tax) 
whilst simultaneously reducing the subsidies for fos­
sil energy carriers and agriculture, the available funds 
could reach the level required for the transformation 
(Section 4.5.2). 
Use Carbon Pricing as a Source for Financing the 
Transformation
Carbon pricing, whether in the form of CO2 taxation 
or an emissions trading scheme, can lead to the gen­
eration of substantial revenues at national level. From 
the WBGU’s point of view, it is therefore one of the 
most important new financing sources. The UN Secre­
tary­General’s High­Level Advisory Group on Climate 
Change Financing (AGF) estimates that the introduc­
tion of carbon pricing mechanisms in the industrialised 
countries from 2020 onwards, at a price of US$ 20–25 
per t CO2eq, could generate a total annual revenue of 
US$ 300 billion. Assuming that carbon prices will rise 
in future, and emissions caps will become stricter, the 
WBGU estimates that by around 2030/2040, the reve­
nue generated could be substantially higher. However, 
the revenue can be expected to decrease towards the 
middle of the century, as by then, emissions would have 
gone down drastically, leading to a much lower taxa­
tion basis, or a greatly reduced volume of permits. Part 
of the revenues from carbon pricing should be used 
to finance national investments into the transforma­
tion; however, some of these should also be reserved 
for financial transfers to developing countries. National 
carbon pricing systems should be introduced globally. 
In newly industrialising and developing countries, 
the initial move towards carbon pricing and the par­
allel phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies could become 
part of low­carbon development strategies, and be sup­
ported by financial transfers from industrialised coun­
tries under the UNFCCC (Section 7.3.2).
Open Up Additional Financing Sources
Further sources, apart from the income generated by 
carbon pricing, should be used to secure the financ­
ing needed for the transformation. The phasing out of 
the misguiding energy and agricultural subsidies (Sec­
tion  4.5), already announced by the G20 countries, 
could release substantial public revenues. Potential 
contributions released through the phasing out of fossil 
fuel subsidies in the G20 industrialised countries could 
amount to anything between US$ 8 and 10 billion per 
year, according to AGF estimates (AGF, 2010). The abol­
ishment of these subsidies would also lead to signifi­
cant savings in many developing and newly industri­
alising countries (Section 4.5). The financial resources 
thus released could be used in developing and newly 
industrialising countries for the expansion of an elec­
tric power infrastructure and the provision of access to 
energy on the basis of renewable energies, particularly 
in rural areas. In the area of land use, agricultural sub­
sidies, particularly within the European Union, should 
gradually be phased out and replaced by a system for 
financing the conservation of ecosystem services (Sec­
tions 5.2, 7.3.7). 
In addition, the endeavours regarding the taxation of 
international aviation and shipping – or, alternatively, 
the introduction of an international emissions trading 
scheme for these sectors – should also be advanced. 
According to AGF estimates, if 50 % of the revenue gen­
erated globally through the taxation were to be made 
available for the transformation, this would lead to an 
annual financial input of around US$ 10 billion (AGF, 
2010). The AGF estimates further that an equally sub­
stantial amount could be achieved if an international 
financial transaction tax of a maximum of 0.01  % were 
introduced (AGF, 2010; Section 4.5). However, as the 
impact a financial market transaction tax would have 
on the international financial markets remains unclear, 
the rate of taxation should be kept very low if it were 
introduced, somewhere along the lines of the AGF’s 
sample calculation.
A bundling of income from the various different 
financing sources, and the earmarking of a fixed ratio 
of the income generated in industrialised countries for 
financial transfers to developing countries, would be 
an important step on the way to a low­carbon global 
economy.
Secure Continued Financial Support for the 
Green Climate Fund, and Increase other Bi- and 
Multilateral Funds
Whilst the new financing sources elaborated above 
should above all be used by the industrialised coun­
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tries, at least initially, the transformation in devel­
oping and newly industrialising countries must be 
financed by means of financial transfers. To facilitate 
these, the Green Climate Fund was established dur­
ing the UNFCCC COPs in Copenhagen and Cancún. The 
Annex I Countries pledged to mobilise US$ 100 billion 
per year (Box 4.5­1). However, it is not clear yet how 
exactly these US$ 100 billion are to be generated, and 
to what extent they will pass through the as yet to be 
established fund.
The as yet non­binding pledges by the industrial­
ised countries regarding payments into the Green Cli­
mate Fund should therefore immediately be turned 
into a legally­binding mechanism. Considering the 
amounts required for mitigation and adaptation in the 
developing countries, which are estimated to lie some­
where in the region of three­digit billions (approx. US$ 
300–500 billion from 2020) for mitigation, and in the 
region of two­digit billions for adaptation (approx. US$ 
10–100  billion), the funds should be allocated ade­
quately weighted with regard to the different areas to 
be financed (adaptation, mitigation, technology trans­
fer, capacity building). From the WBGU’s point of view, 
around 60–70 % of the Green Climate Fund monies 
should be allocated to mitigation projects or measures, 
and to technology transfer. The remaining 30–40 % 
should be reserved for the areas of adaptation and 
capacity building.
To promote mitigation measures in newly industri­
alising and developing countries, ways of offering sys­
tematic support through the Green Climate Fund to 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) 
planned by developing countries should be found. In 
the WBGU’s opinion, the NAMAs supported by the 
Fund should be concrete measures that are embed­
ded in extensive low­carbon development strate­
gies; for example, the introduction of carbon pricing, 
the financing of feed­in tariffs for renewable energies 
( Sections 5.2, 7.3.2, 7.3.4), the expansion of grid and 
storage infrastructure (Section 7.3.3), or the introduc­
tion of climate­friendly transport systems in major cit­
ies (Section  7.3.5). NAMAs which bear all the hall­
marks of isolated projects, on the other hand, should 
be  supported only in the LDCs, if at all. 
Unlike other multilateral funds, means from the 
Green Climate Fund should not be assigned in the form 
of loans, but as non­repayable grants. Green Climate 
Fund payments would thereby take on the character of 
true financial transfers, taking into account the indus­
trialised countries’ committment to support the devel­
oping countries’ climate protection endeavours, a fair 
burden sharing, and the industrial countries’ historical 
responsibility with regard to causing climate change 
(Section 7.3.10).
However, the Green Climate Fund will not be suffi­
cient to cover all of the financing needed for the trans­
formation in the world’s developing regions. It is to be 
expected that the required investments will increase 
even more as of 2020. That is why financial means for 
mitigation projects in developing countries funded by 
existing multilateral funds should also be increased. 
Particularly suitable for this would be the World Bank’s 
Carbon Partnership Facility, the GEF Trust Fund, the 
Clean Technology Fund, and the Strategic Climate Fund. 
Contrary to the Green Climate Fund, monies from the 
bi­ and multilateral funds should be released in the 
form of loans and loan guarantees. 
To ensure that the overall balance of direct transfers 
is not reduced through the inclusion of additional loans 
and loan guarantees, the funds pledged by the indus­
trialised countries from 2020 for mitigation (grants and 
loans), adaptation, technology transfer and capacity 
building should in any case exceed the US$ 100 billion. 
Furthermore, it has to be guaranteed that the funds 
are additional with respect to general development aid 
(Box 4.5­2).
Strive for a Global Carbon Market with Fair Burden 
Sharing
As already recommended by the WBGU in Section 
7.3.2, initial moves at national level towards carbon 
pricing should be transformed into a global carbon mar­
ket at business level as soon as possible. In the inter­
ests of fair burden sharing, the revenues from the auc­
tioning of emissions allowances could be redistributed 
to the participating countries, or the emissions rights 
themselves could be shared out amongst the countries 
in accordance with a fair burden concept. The scarcity 
of emissions allowances and the allocation of emis­
sions rights according to a fair burden sharing principle 
would lead to significant financial transfers between 
the participating countries. Comparable financial trans­
fers would be the consequence of the introduction of a 
global emissions cap, i. e. a binding mitigation regime, 
at UN level, with tradable emissions rights, as elabo­
rated in the WBGU budget approach (Section 7.3.10; 
WBGU, 2009). 
A political allocation of emissions rights can, in the 
WBGU’s view, lead to the creation of a predictable 
long­term financing instrument for the transformation, 
whose volume is expected to lie significantly above that 
of the currently planned structures, such as the envis­
aged Green Climate Fund and the existing bi­ and mul­
tilateral funds. 
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7.3.8.3 
Pillar 3: Strengthen Mechanisms to Encourage 
 Private Investments
Public funding is not the only important aspect. On 
the contrary, the majority of the investments must 
be financed by private actors. The state can create 
a favourable environment for such investments by 
reducing the risks for private investors through the 
creation of favourable framework conditions (pillar 1) 
and new financing mechanisms, i. e. by making govern­
ment funds – sourced as elaborated above (pillar 2) – 
available in the form of soft loans and credit guaran­
tees. Experience has shown that government financing 
mechanisms can develop a leverage effect, attracting 
private means at a ratio of approx. 3:1, in some cases up 
to 15:1. The leverage effect increases at the same rate as 
the government funds reduce the risk for private inves­
tors. The transformative effect of government financing 
mechanisms depends on how targeted the government 
funding is being used, i. e. how much the grants are tied 
to certain criteria which guide the investment towards 
a low­carbon economy.
Bundle Public Funding in National Green 
Investment Banks and Involving Institutional 
Investors
Individual countries can, through cheap loans from 
revolving funds or by taking over credit risk guar­
antees, make the initial financing of transformative 
investments easier. Following the UK’s example, cur­
rent funding sources should be consolidated and bun­
dled through forming national Green Investment Banks. 
This would help to achieve the necessary dimension, 
and the awarding criteria could be made sustainable and 
transparent. The Green Investment Banks should pro­
vide a corresponding portfolio, including low­interest 
long­term loans, credit guarantees and risk capital for 
investors in renewable energies and other low­carbon 
technologies. Institutionally, these Green Investment 
Banks should emerge from existing national develop­
ment banks (such as the KfW, in Germany, or the Euro­
pean Investment Bank, at EU level), or be established 
as a major segment of the national development banks’ 
scope of activity. A share of the loans granted by Green 
Investment Banks in industrialised countries should be 
reserved for financing projects in developing countries, 
as is currently the case in the KfW’s global climate pro­
tection fund.
Government financing of Green Investment Banks 
could primarily be topped up with funds from institu­
tional investors, such as pension schemes and insur­
ance companies, to finance the transformation, as these 
tend to have both the requisite capital and a long­term 
investment horizon. Their capital contributions to 
Green Investment Banks could attract a fixed rate of 
interest, along the lines of EU or World Bank climate 
bonds. Such funds, fed by both private and government 
means, would provide institutional investors with the 
chance of making low­risk investments with a steady 
interest rate whilst also providing a way of invest­
ing into a low­carbon future. This would also serve to 
extend the financing available through national Green 
Investment Banks.
Strengthen Equity and Venture Capital Markets
Another important element which would make it  easier 
for private investors to invest preferably in new and 
not yet proven low­carbon technologies is the strength­
ening of equity and venture capital markets, as these 
can be crucial for the availability of important start­
up financing for smaller companies with innovative 
products and technologies. This could be effected, for 
example, by improving the fiscal conditions for private 
equity and venture capital lenders. A further option 
would be the consolidation of public and private risk 
capital in venture capital funds; examples of these are 
the UK Carbon Trust Venture Capital Fund, or California 
Clean Energy Fund. A venture capital fund could also 
be established under the umbrella of a national Green 
Investment Bank.
Make Use of the Catalyst Function of Development 
Banks and Microfinancing
The development banks play a particularly important 
role when it comes to financing the transformation in 
the developing countries. They should extend their reg­
ular granting of loans in the area of renewable ener­
gies and energy efficiency, not least through the jointly 
financed Climate Investment Funds (CIF). The devel­
opment banks’ credit programmes should focus on the 
areas of energy infrastructure, access to sustainable 
energy, expansion of renewable energies, energy effi­
ciency and low­carbon urban infrastructures, as well 
as sustainable land use. Development bank financing 
mechanisms can enable private financing intermediar­
ies in developing countries to grant loans themselves. 
If this were to serve the acquisition of additional funds 
from private investors, it would have a catalyst effect. 
The technical expertise of energy service companies 
(ESCO) and development banks should be firmly inte­
grated into financing solutions, in the form of accompa­
nying consultancy services.
Microfinancing also plays an important role when it 
comes to decentralised renewable energy generation to 
transform the energy systems of developing countries, 
particularly in the rural regions. It also makes a signifi­
cant contribution to overcoming energy poverty with 
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the help of renewable energies. Current German devel­
opment cooperation initiatives should be extended.
Tap the Potential of a Reformed Global Carbon 
Market
The role the international carbon market will play in 
developing countries remains uncertain, due to the lack 
of clarity regarding the future of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The WBGU advises against continuing the CDM mech­
anism in its current form, as this can lead to a weaken­
ing of the industrialised countries’ mitigation targets. 
In its current design, it has also not fulfilled its original 
intention of promoting low­carbon development (Sec­
tion  4.5). From the WBGU’s point of view, the CDM 
should be limited to the least developed countries in 
future. In parallel, the CDM’s development aspect 
should be emphasised, and the mechanism extended to 
cover sectoral measures – similarly to the programme­
based CDM. This reform would, for instance, allow 
the consolidated financing of many smaller and dif­
fuse efficiency potentials in microenterprises and pri­
vate households, for example through financing bio­
mass­fuelled stoves, or solar­powered water heaters. 
A programme­based or sectoral CDM could therefore 
also make a significant contribution to the reduction of 
energy poverty. 
The continuance of the CDM, restricted to LDC, 
however, would have to be accompanied by consider­
ably more ambitious reduction targets in the Annex I 
Countries, and reforms with regards to the attribution 
of emissions credits, for example from HFC­23 projects. 
To promote the transformation in the less poor devel­
oping countries and the newly industrialising countries, 
no mechanism should be relied on that rests on the 
attribution of industrialised countries’ reduction tar­
get mitigations achieved there. As long as these states 
do not have binding emissions caps, which would make 
it possible to integrate them into emissions trading, 
the WBGU recommends restricting them to financial 
transfers. Financial transfers for the implementation of 
NAMAs in the above outlined sense should replace the 
CDM, particularly in newly industrialising countries.
7.3.8.4 
Pillar 4: Encourage New Business Models 
The burden that the high upfront investments repre­
sent for individual investors can be reduced by spread­
ing them ‘across several shoulders’. This can be achieved 
if traditional buyer­seller business models were turned 
into business models with new ownership and financ­
ing structures that reduce investment barriers, and 
change the incentive structure. The more market pene­
tration such business models achieve, and in the more 
countries, the bigger their transformative impact.
Tap Efficiency Gains whilst Reducing Upfront 
Investments
These kinds of models are characterised by the fact that, 
for example, they offer their customers combined pack­
ages in different areas (for example mobility, housing, 
production, and consumption) that include combined 
goods and services, instead of just (tangible) consumer 
goods. The property rights to the goods remain with the 
provider, who is committed to efficient resource uti­
lisation and goods recycling. Already established are 
concepts like car sharing, in the mobility sector, and 
energy contracting through Energy Service Companies 
(ESCO), in the energy supply and energy efficiency sec­
tor (Section 4.3). The tangible goods (i. e. car, heating 
system, energy raw material) again remain the prop­
erty of the provider, whilst the goods required to meet 
user needs are only rented, hired, leased, or used com­
munally together with other customers. Customers pay 
primarily for the (mobility or energy) services they 
have actually used, rather than the provision of a larger 
‘package’ of potentially usable services. 
These kinds of services, or integrated product­serv­
ice systems, should be increasingly advertised and sup­
ported during the course of the transformation, for 
example through tax rebates. In order for the use of 
such business models, which are oriented to services 
rather than consumer goods, to become widespread 
amongst potential users, a fundamental value change 
is required on the part of both private customers and 
businesses (for example with regard to the status value 
attached to consumer goods). 
Increase the Use of Cooperative Financing
Another business and financing model that is impor­
tant for the transformation is cooperative financing, 
which can be particularly useful when it comes to the 
installation of plants for renewable energy generation. 
There are already some examples for this kind of busi­
ness model to be found in Germany. The financing of 
such jointly purchased plants is provided by own as 
well as third party capital, to which a cooperative soci­
ety is more likely to be given access than individuals. 
In many cases, cooperative banks also take on a part 
of the investments. These kinds of energy cooperatives 
can find refinancing through feed­in tariffs. Energy 
cooperatives could also serve as a model for developing 
countries, for the electrification of the rural areas using 
renewable energies. In principle, the cooperative soci­
ety financing model can also be applied to other invest­
ments in low­carbon technologies.
To achieve a high transformative impact, business 
models such as these would have to leave their niche 
existence, and find acceptance on a broad basis. To 
facilitate this, the framework conditions (for example 
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the infrastructure necessary for car sharing) should be 
optimised, so that what is on offer, in terms of flexibil­
ity, cost and ease of access to information, appeals to 
a great number of potential users. In addition, a pub­
lic dialogue on ways towards a low­carbon society, for 
instance complemented by concept competitions and 
themed forums, should be actively encouraged. This 
would serve to give both companies and individuals 
ideas for the development of new business models that 
will pave the way towards a low­carbon future.
7.3.9 
Bundle 9: Reinforce International Climate and 
Energy Policy
As infrastructures for energy generation, transport and 
production have a long lifetime, current global conver­
sion and extension projects must already be geared 
towards climate protection, i. e. climate and energy pol­
icy should be systematically linked. Most of the addi­
tional energy infrastructures are expected to be built in 
developing and newly industrialising countries. There­
fore, climate protection that is geographically limited to 
the more prosperous countries cannot solve the prob­
lem. Global cooperation to make the required invest­
ments in low­carbon development possible for poorer 
countries, and to ensure that climate protection tech­
nologies and the corresponding expert knowledge are 
available to all countries, is therefore indispensable. 
International climate and energy policy is the forum 
for achieving a global consensus on transformation tar­
gets and ambitions. The UN level is also without com­
pare when it comes to negotiations on balancing glo­
bal equity. Although operative goals like the sharing of 
climate protection related knowledge and technologies 
can be advanced on a sub­global level, the strengthen­
ing and institutionalisation of the fragmented interna­
tional energy policy, and its linking to climate policies, 
should nevertheless be systematically pursued to accel­
erate the technological shift.
7.3.9.1 
International Climate Policy Post-Copenhagen and 
Post-Cancún
International climate policy, and particularly the way it 
has developed since the 1992 Earth Summit at Rio de 
Janeiro under the UN umbrella, nowadays represents 
the main normative framework for the transformation 
into a global low­carbon society.
However, the gap between the claims and the reality 
of interna tional climate policy is widening. The deci­
sions agreed at the 16th Conference of the Parties to 
the UNFCCC in Cancún include the long­term goal of 
holding the increase in global average temperature 
below 2 °C above preindustrial levels. The urgent need 
to act was identified, and a review process initiated to 
consider whether the temperature limit should even be 
reduced, down to 1.5 °C (UNFCCC, 2010). An effective 
regime with internationally binding commitments on 
limiting emissions seems to have been shelved for the 
time being. Even the survival of the Kyoto Protocol, 
which currently still regulates just under 30 % of global 
greenhouse gas emissions (excluding land­use change), 
is anything but certain. Climate protection currently 
depends on voluntary pledges by states to restrict 
their emissions – the only aspect that is obligatory is 
the international verification of the reported emissions 
(pledge­and­review procedure). The emissions limita­
tions by 2020 which have currently been pledged are 
not enough, however, to steer global emissions onto a 
path that would allow compliance with the 2 °C guard 
rail (UNEP, 2010a). 
Low Ambition Level: Ambitious Unilateral Targets 
within a Pledge-and-Review System
The absolute minimum in terms of what international 
climate policy should achieve is a tightening of the 
emissions limitations proffered by the states within 
the scope of a pledge­and­review system by 2020 to a 
level which allows compliance with the 2 °C guard rail. 
According to UNEP (2010a), global emissions would 
have to be limited to a maximum of 39–44 Gt CO2eq 
in 2020 for a ‘likely’ (i. e. a probability of more than 
two­thirds) compliance with the 2 °C guard rail. The 
current pledges, however, would result in emissions of 
49–53 Gt CO2eq. 
The WBGU recommends that the German federal 
government should ensure that the unilaterally pledged 
mitigations offered by Germany and the EU under a 
pledge­and­review system, and concessions in terms of 
finance and technology transfers, are guided by princi­
ples of fairness. If the WBGU’s budget approach were 
used for orientation (WBGU, 2009), it could be argued 
that in 2020, each state would deserve a share of per­
mitted emissions that equals its share of the 2010 world 
population. For example, as 1.2 % of the 2010 world 
population lived in Germany, it would be entitled to 
0.53 Gt CO2eq of an overall total of 44 Gt CO2eq. In 
theory, therefore, Germany would have to reduce its 
emissions by 56 %, compared with 1990 (back then, its 
emissions were running at 1.2 Gt CO2eq), to contribute 
its fair share of mitigation, if this scheme were applied. 
This could, for instance, consist of domestic emissions 
reductions of 40 % (including offsets, or CDM), and 
complementary pledges in terms of finance and tech­
nology transfers, which would permit 0.2 Gt CO2eq 
of additional emissions reductions in other countries. 
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Assuming mitigation costs of € 20–40 per t CO2eq, Ger­
many would have to make annual finance and technol­
ogy transfers for mitigation worth at least € 4–8 billion 
in 2020, for example via the Green Climate Fund. 
For the EU, with 7.2 % of the global population, the 
fair share of the 44 Gt CO2eq emissions in 2020 would 
be 3.2 Gt CO2eq, which would mean reducing emissions 
by around 40 % in comparison with 1990 (when emis­
sions were running at 5.37 Gt CO2eq). This could also 
be interpreted as a 30 % emissions reduction within the 
EU, plus annual finance and technology transfers for 
mitigation of € 11–22 billion. The amounts mentioned 
refer to mitigation only. In the view of the WBGU, how­
ever, this would not suffice to free Germany and the 
EU from its obligations to contribute further by way of 
finance and technology transfers to aid adaptation (and 
possibly compensation for climate damages). 
In return, if the global goal is not to be endangered, 
countries whose emission levels are still low, but which 
are on a growth path, i. e. countries which are currently 
required to invest hugely into energy infrastructure 
expansion, must avoid high­carbon expansion paths. 
Above all, this means that these countries must already, 
by 2020, strive for development paths with signifi­
cantly lower emissions than the 2020 per capita share 
of the above mentioned 44 Gt CO2eq would equal. This 
should be supported through the finance and technol­
ogy transfers from high emission countries.
In general, the physical emission reductions 
achieved in the individual countries should be guided 
by the reduction potentials: in order still to reach the 
requisite global reductions in a fragmented mitigation 
regime that is the result of any pledge­and­review pro­
cess, without pushing up the aggregate global mitiga­
tion costs too much, it is necessary for all states to cre­
ate framework conditions which allow the unlocking of 
their mitigation potentials. The development of decar­
bonisation road maps is particularly suitable for this: 
plans such as this should be a condition for access to 
mitigation funds from the Green Climate Fund.
Of overriding importance is that double counting 
is avoided: for example, emissions reductions paid for 
by an industrialised country, but actually achieved in 
a developing country, must obviously be claimed for 
only once as it would otherwise not be possible to com­
pare the emissions limitations pledged by the individ­
ual countries with the globally required mitigation. 
Another problematic issue could be that states that 
had reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol 
which they have more than fulfilled add these surplus 
emissions allowances to their pledged emissions limi­
tations. The volume of these surplus emissions allow­
ances countries plan to offset against their mitigation 
pledges must be taken into account when balancing the 
global ambitions level; the same applies to the crediting 
of emissions reductions achieved in the land­use sector 
(UNEP, 2010a).
It is also essential to develop a long­term global 
emissions target. The development of such a target for 
2050 was decided upon at Cancún. Germany and the 
EU should become actively involved here, and strive to 
ensure that this target is developed under consideration 
of the latest scientific findings.
As it would not be internationally binding, a regime 
such as this would be fragile as far as compliance with 
the 2 °C target is concerned; it is questionable whether 
the USA, for example, would compensate for their 
in adequate ambition level with regard to national emis­
sions reduction with sufficiently high pledges in terms 
of finance and technology transfers. Germany and the 
EU should nevertheless lead the way and pledge emis­
sions reductions, as well as finance and technology 
transfers, that correspond with the above elaborated 
ambition level.
Medium Ambition Level: Form Pioneer Coalitions 
for Mandatory Climate Protection
Not least the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action, 
which is a group of progressive states discoursing on 
the options for global, ambitious and binding climate 
protection, is proof of the willingness of a great number 
of states to go beyond a pledge­and­review process 
when it comes to international climate protection. This 
impetus should be utilised to conclude ambitious par­
tial treaties for climate protection. The EU should play 
an active role here, and advance coalitions both within 
the framework of the UN negotiation process as well as 
outside it. Bi­ and plurilateral pioneer alliances could 
play a major role, for example in terms of forest pro­
tection (Section 7.3.7; WBGU, 2010b), the establish­
ment of low­carbon infrastructures ( Section  7.3.4), 
and the introduction of emissions trading schemes 
( Section 7.3.2). The WBGU believes that pioneer alli­
ances such as these would develop transformative 
dynamics that would also have a positive effect on the 
UN process. They could also heighten the states’ will­
ingness for binding multilateral commitments, as they 
demonstrate the achievability of emissions reductions, 
and make them more calculable. Exchanging experi­
ences, and cooperation on the development of national 
decarbonisation strategies, can also lead to a catalyst 
effect. 
Beyond these alliances, however, the EU should 
also increasingly seek coalitions for a binding treaty 
within the scope of the UNFCCC. Apart from uncon­
ditionally tightening its own reduction targets, the EU 
should also show a clear commitment to continuation 
and further development of the Kyoto Protocol; not, 
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however, without the condition of loophole closing and 
further development. The WBGU believes that a con­
tinuation of the CDM for newly industrialising coun­
tries is not appropriate. Instead, an agreement should 
be sought which links finance and technology transfers 
to an obligatory development of extensive low­carbon 
development strategies. The EU should emphatically 
continue to seek a dialogue with the progressive newly 
industrialising countries to achieve a commitment that 
is as binding as possible on this point. As the host of the 
next climate summit in December 2011, South Africa 
could play a special role here, as could Brazil, which will 
host the Rio+20 Conference in May 2012.
High Ambition Level: Strive for a Comprehensive 
Global Climate Protection Regime
A comprehensive, binding global climate protec­
tion agreement regarding global emissions restriction 
should be the ultimate goal of international climate 
policy. A maximum global emissions budget compati­
ble with the 2 °C guard rail should be agreed for car­
bon dioxide from fossil sources, as these emissions, 
in the long run, are decisive when it comes to cli­
mate protection; milestones on a global emissions path 
that allows compliance with this budget should also 
be agreed (WBGU, 2009). The WBGU has suggested 
a burden sharing based on an equal per capita alloca­
tion of the emissions still permitted. The states should 
agree to present internationally verifiable decarbonisa­
tion road maps that clearly state the planned national 
emissions path up to 2050.  Ideally, these should be 
implemented with flexible mechanisms to make use of 
cost optimisation opportunities (Section 7.3.2). How­
ever, as the global energy systems should already have 
undergone extensive decarbonisation by 2050 (Chap­
ter 4), opportunities for offsetting, or for substituting 
own mitigation efforts by purchased emissions allow­
ances, will decrease as time goes on. A global decarbon­
ised energy system demands that the energy system 
of each and every individual country has been decar­
bonised. As the conversion of energy systems takes 
time (UNEP, 2010a), national decarbonisation road­
maps which take path dependencies in infrastructure 
decisions into account are extremely important. Partic­
ularly the expansion of renewable energies also relies 
on government planning, for example when it comes to 
expanding transcontinental grids and systems for bal­
ancing fluctuations ( Chapter 4).
For the mitigation of CO2 from non­fossil sources 
and other greenhouse gases, separate regulations could 
achieve a more direct impact. The CO2 dynamics asso­
ciated with the terrestrial biosphere differ substan­
tially in many fundamental aspects – such as meas­
urability, reversibility, long­term controllability, inter­
annual fluctuations – from the CO2 fluxes associated 
with the industrial use of coal, mineral oil or natural gas 
(WBGU, 2010a). That is why the WBGU has repeatedly 
suggested the creation of a separate intergovernmen­
tal agreement for the protection of terrestrial carbon 
stocks (WBGU, 2004). Priority should be given to swift 
and effective measures aiming to stop deforestation in 
developing countries. The fluorinated greenhouse gases 
currently covered by the Kyoto Protocol could be dealt 
with in a special agreement modelled on the Montreal 
Protocol, which could lead to accelerated and simpli­
fied mitigation (WBGU, 2009). For short­lived radia­
tive forcing substances as yet unregulated by the Kyoto 
Protocol, for example soot particles and ozone­form­
ing gases, there should be separate agreements directly 
related to national air pollution control.
This kind of globally binding mitigation regime, 
however, will only be enforceable if it is based on the 
 UNFCCC’s fundamental principles of equity, and if 
adaptation to unavoidable climate change is also given 
priority.
7.3.9.2 
International Energy and Technology Policy
The most important pillars of the transformation of glo­
bal energy use towards climate­friendliness are firstly, 
limiting the energy demand whilst at the same time 
guaranteeing all people access to energy, secondly the 
decarbonisation of the energy supply, particularly elec­
tric power generation, and thirdly the introduction of 
new, low­carbon technologies in the transport sec­
tor, in buildings tech nology, and in industry. Interna­
tional cooperation should ensure decisive advances in 
all three of these areas. One important starting point 
for international energy and technology policies is the 
agreement of norms and standards. International coop­
eration can further accelerate technology development: 
a number of key technologies are still in the develop­
ment and test stages, for example in the electromobil­
ity or CCS sector. Ultimately, cooperation also plays an 
important role when it comes to removing barriers pre­
venting the global diffusion of technologies for low­
carbon development. Collaborations such as these not 
only serve the transfer of purely technological knowl­
edge, but also the transfer of a much wider knowledge 
with respect to establishing the requisite framework 
conditions, without which a diffusion of low­carbon 
technologies is not possible.
Currently, there is a lack of legal and institutional 
foundations for an effective international energy policy 
for the transformation. The WBGU recommends utilis­
ing existing organisations to gradually institutionalise a 
global sustainable energy governance. 
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Low Ambition Level: Open-up IEA, Consolidate and 
Strengthen IRENA
The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an influen­
tial global institution. However, its membership, role 
and energy political objectives regarding a sustain­
able energy policy have so far been restricted. The Ger­
man federal government should therefore emphasise 
its support for redirecting IEA content towards sustain­
able forms of energy and energy systems, for increas­
ing transparency regarding its methods, and for con­
tinuing and intensifying the opening process to include 
non­OECD countries. The foundation of the Interna­
tional Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in 2009 
equalled the establishment of a new organisation to 
advance the use of renewable energies in both industr­
ialised and developing countries. In future, IRENA can 
play an important role in the promotion and diffusion 
of renewable energies and the respective industries. 
The WBGU recommends that the German federal gov­
ernment should continue giving its emphatic support 
to the organisation’s development, and to campaign 
intensively for IRENA being accorded a major role with 
regard to global energy issues in order to accelerate the 
expansion of renewable energies, at eye level and in 
cooperation with existing organisations and the civil 
society. 
Medium Ambition Level: Upgrade UN Energy
The link between energy policies and development 
assistance policies on a global level has long been 
neglected. Existing programmes and UN organisations 
have so far had only moderate effects in terms of sus­
tainable energy policy. The WBGU suggests that the 
German federal government should lobby for the fur­
ther promotion of UN Energy as a coordinating plat­
form (inter­agency mechanism) within the UN system, 
and upgrading the organisation to programme level. The 
UN general assembly has declared 2012 the ‘Interna­
tional Year for Sustainable Energy for All’. This should 
be utilised by the international community to agree the 
establishment of an additional Millennium Develop­
ment Goal granting access to modern energy services 
by 2030 for all people (Section 7.3.5).
High Ambition Level: Make IRENA the Central 
Organisation for Global Sustainable Energy Policies
A strong, international energy agency is needed to 
accelerate the global transformation of energy sys­
tems. IRENA’s mandate should be extended to cover all 
energy systems and climate­friendly energy options, 
including system integration issues, and energy effi­
ciency on the demand side. Gradually, IRENA could 
then be developed into an International Sustainable 
Energy Agency, as previously suggested by the WBGU 
(2003). The WBGU advises the German federal govern­
ment to show its fullest commitment to making IRENA 
one of the key organisations for a global sustainable 
energy policy in the long term.
High Ambition Level: Use G20 as the Driving Force 
for a Sustainable Energy and Climate Policy
Considering the urgency of the global energy trans­
formation, far greater political will and leadership is 
required. As an alliance of economically and politically 
leading industrialised and newly industrialising coun­
tries, and with respect to their relevance for global cli­
mate protection, the G20 must play an exceptional role 
here (the G20 are responsible for approx. 80 % of global 
greenhouse gas emissions). As an important member 
of this forum, the German federal government should 
encourage the G20 in their determined pursuit of a sus­
tainable energy politicy agenda, and the creation of the 
institutional foundations required for effective global 
cooperation. 
7.3.10 
Bundle 10: Pursue a Revolution in International 
Cooperation
The theoretical and normative requirements for global 
governance are already known (Chapter 5). On the basis 
of the insights underpinned by this report, and with a 
clear commitment to increasing international coopera­
tion, the WBGU recommends the following points:
1. The UN Conference on Sustainable Development 
(UNCSD, Rio+20 Conference) should be used as 
a chance for setting the course of international 
environmental and developmental policy towards 
improved cooperation and climate­friendliness 
(Section 7.3.10.1).
2. The way should be paved for a comprehensive 
cooperative global governance architecture, with­
out which a worldwide transfor mation to sustain­
ability cannot succeed (Section 7.3.10.2).
7.3.10.1 
International Environmental and Developmental 
Policy in the Context of the Rio+20 Conference 
Presently, the Rio+20 Conference scheduled for 2012 
provides a unique opportunity for elaborating inter­
national environmental and developmental policies. In 
view of the two key issues defined for the conference 
by the UN member states, ‘Green Economy in the Con­
text of Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradi­
cation’, and ‘Institutional Framework for Sustainable 
Develop ment’, the WBGU recommends the following 
steps, in ascending order of ambition level:
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1. The creation of a comprehensive ‘Green Econ­
omy Roadmap’, and profound institutional reforms 
within the scope of the United Nations, 
2. a fundamental redirecting of multilateral environ­
mental and developmental policies towards the 
transformation, 
3. a fundamental restructuring of the United Nations 
(‘United Nations 2.0’).
Low Ambition Level: Agree a Green Economy 
Roadmap and Institutional Reforms
In reaction to the global financial and economic cri­
sis, the United Nations Environmental Programme 
(UNEP) suggested a ‘Global Green New Deal’, introduc­
ing a ‘Green Economy Initiative’ within the scope of 
the United Nations. With the ‘Green Economy Report’ 
(2011), UNEP has now presented the Rio+20 Con­
ference with comprehensive recommendations for a 
‘green’ reorientation of the world economy, for an 
environmentally friendly and climate compatible way 
of doing business, and particularly for the worldwide 
decarbonisation of energy systems. This means that the 
international community at Rio now has a suitable and 
current basis for consultation and decisionmaking.
In this context, the WBGU cautions against repeat­
ing the mistakes made at the 1992 Rio Summit, and 
the ensuing debates on the interpretation of ‘sustain­
able development’: international discussion of the con­
cept and definition of ‘Green Economy’ must not be 
allowed to turn into political escapism, being obscured 
by the three­dimensional understanding of sustainable 
development anchored in Agenda 21. On the contrary, 
the summit should translate the political objectives of 
a ‘Green Economy’ immediately into binding agree­
ments on concrete targets, in this way reaffirming and 
emphasising the commitment to sustainable develop­
ment already voiced back in 1992.
A binding ‘UN Green Economy Roadmap’ with spe­
cific targets in terms of both content and timing should 
be decided in Rio, to be implemented by 2030 within 
the framework of national Green Economy Strategies 
that include verifiable indicators. Apart from a trans­
formation­friendly policy mix, these should especially 
include carbon pricing strategies (Sections 5.2, 7.3.2). 
The individual national strategies should be guided by 
the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsi­
bilities’, taking existing resources and capacities ade­
quately into account. Concrete, quantifiable targets 
and sub­targets, which have proven successful in the 
Millennium Development Goals, should primarily be 
defined for the conversion of energy systems, urban 
development issues, and sustainable land use.
Many states will fail to achieve the framework condi­
tions required at national level without the provision of 
substantial financial funds and technical expertise. This 
should be given adequate consideration when agree­
ing such a roadmap. States which ultimately commit to 
the implementation of the roadmap and its respective 
national strategies and action plans should be offered 
country­specific, tailor­made advice and support by the 
United Nations, in cooperation with the World Bank, 
the regional development banks, and those involved in 
bilateral development cooperation.
Concurrently, international poverty eradication 
strategies, and especially the further implementation of 
the MDG, should be integrated into the higher­ranking 
Green Economy Roadmap in a way that explicitly allows 
its individual targets and sub­targets to directly focus 
on the demands of reaching the set goals in terms of 
environmental and climate protection. Fighting energy 
poverty with renewable energies and improving food 
security through productivity increases by means of 
sustainable agriculture are key starting points for this. 
A permanent coexistence of a conventional agenda for 
growth and a serious Green Economy Roadmap, on the 
other hand, would necessarily have to be considered as 
contradictory, even at a low ambition level.
The implementation of the UN Green Economy Road­
map and the regular monitoring of its progress should 
also be accompanied by long over­due institutional 
reforms. In the long run, the Rio+20 Conference offers 
a unique opportunity of overcoming the unsatisfactory 
ambition level of the currently fragmented endeavours 
for reform. With regard to these, the WBGU repeats its 
recommendation that UNEP should be replaced with a 
newly established UN specialised agency on the envi­
ronment with far reaching authority, or that UNEP itself 
should be extended and upgraded to a world organisa­
tion capable of acting.
Particular attention must be paid to the development 
dimension of international environmental policy. The 
implementation of the Bali Strategic Plan, agreed back 
in 2005, offers a benchmark for the credibility of the 
industrialised nations, as well as a lever for increasing 
the developing countries’ willingness to face reforms, 
and their capability to act (Section 5.4.4.4). Accordingly, 
the Rio+20 Conference also offers a unique chance, in 
view of the Green Economy discussion, for the elabora­
tion of a more fundamental reform of the developmen­
tal policy architecture of the United Nations, and to 
pave the way for corresponding decisions. If the states 
were to miss the chance to bring about concrete reform 
decisions offered by this summit, the explicit and unan­
imous focusing on institutional framework conditions 
would be rendered absurd in front of the global public 
eye.
The organisational linking of environmental and 
development political institutions also offers the chance 
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of countering the one­dimensional view of the United 
Nations, as a service provider for multilateral devel­
opment cooperation, with a broader perspective that 
emphasises the potential transformative leverage of 
multilateral organisation. The WBGU advises the Ger­
man federal government to work towards a coherent 
focusing of the operative strategies of the multilateral 
stakeholders in developmental policy on the demands 
of environmentally and climate friendly growth, to 
bundle their resources particularly in the transforma­
tion fields energy, urban development and land use, 
and to efficiently implement targets accordingly (Sec­
tion 5.4.5).
The respective multilateral organisations should be 
given adequate political and financial support, whilst 
the promotion of conventional development pro­
grammes encouraging high levels of energy and land 
consumption should be reduced and gradually stopped. 
The rapid and consistent focusing of the developmental 
policies of all EU member states and the EU Commis­
sion on this system of objectives would significantly 
strengthen Europe’s role as a pioneer in climate policy.
Medium Ambition Level: Fundamentally Reform 
Multilateral Environmental and Development Policy
An objective that goes further would be an extensive 
reshuffling of the United Nations’ environmental and 
developmental architecture and that of other multilat­
eral development organisations, with a view to trans­
formation­friendly reorganisation. The Rio+20 Confer­
ence would provide the German federal government 
and the EU with the opportunity of immediately initi­
ating a process in pursuit of a reorganisation and refo­
cusing of the major operative development agencies 
(World Bank, Regional Banks, UNDP, UNIDO, etc.) in 
accordance with the objectives of the transformation.
The WBGU generally agrees with the reform rec­
ommendations made by the High Level Group estab­
lished under UN Secretary­General Kofi Annan in 
2006, with regard to system­wide coherence of devel­
opment, humanitarian aid and the environment (‘One 
UNO’), which have so far been insufficiently imple­
mented. They should be pursued more consistently 
than they have been so far, whilst focusing explicitly 
on the demands of the Green Economy Roadmap, and 
an environmentally and climate friendly development 
policy. The Rio+20 Conference offers the best opportu­
nity in the foreseeable future of overcoming the par­
ticular interests of individual special organisations and 
programmes whose structure features the same, or at 
least very similar, members, through authoritative deci­
sions by the summit at the highest international level.
System­wide coherence, focussing on the transfor­
mation towards a low­carbon and sustainable society 
also demands the closure of obvious governance gaps 
in the key transformation fields of energy, urbanisa­
tion and land use on an international level for effective 
multilevel policy­making, and the simultaneous aboli­
tion of transformation­impeding and expensive parallel 
structures (Section 5.4.5). Accordingly, the states meet­
ing at Rio should task the administrative organs of the 
responsible multilateral organisations with the draft­
ing of concrete restructuring plans for their respec­
tive administrative apparatus, to be presented to the 
member states for decision­making within the next two 
years. An approach based on global systemic risks, as 
proposed by the Palais­Royal Initiative to reform the 
global monetary system in the context of the world­
wide financial crisis, appears a suitable way forward 
(Section 5.4.4.2).
Parallel to the proposed climate legislation at a 
national level, the benchmark for any restructuring 
should always be the international climate policy’s 2 °C 
guard rail. In accordance with this reform logic, mul­
tilateral development organisations not able or willing 
to comply with this would therefore lose their right to 
exist. Conversely, completely new organisations would 
have to be created if the global need for cooperation 
and regulation dictated by compliance with the 2 °C 
guard rail cannot foreseeably be met within the scope 
of the suggested reorganisation of already existing 
international organisations.
The outlined roadmap would allow the systematic 
interlinking of poverty­orientation and climate­com­
patibility in international development, energy and 
environmental policies by 2015. To support inter­
governmental reform roadmaps such as these, the 
member states of the international organisations con­
cerned, in particular those who are major contributors, 
should change their national policies and regional pro­
cesses, and commit to the relevant reform plans for the 
reorganisation of their bi­ and multilateral develop­
ment cooperation, their energy cooperation, and their 
foreign economic policy.
High Ambition Level: Strive for a United Nations 2.0
Considering the scale of the described challenges of 
the global environmental and development crisis, the 
WBGU believes that there are plenty of arguments for 
an even more radical approach that would go beyond 
the existing UN architecture, a fundamental restruc­
turing of the organisation. Currently, this hardly seems 
politically feasible, as it assumes a political leadership 
motivated by the realisation of global necessities, espe­
cially on the part of the permanent members of the 
World Security Council, and other western, industrial­
ised nations and ambitious newly industrialising coun­
tries. If this were the case, a reform should start with 
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a review of the UN Charter, and aim for a completely 
restructured United Nations organisation. Its purpose 
would be to take the planetary guard rails into account 
as a guiding principle that governs all UN actions, the 
pursuit of which would guarantee the protection of cli­
mate and environment in order to stabilise the Earth 
system as much as peace, security and development.
If the Rio+20 Conference were at least to commit 
to a vision along these lines, it could serve to initiate a 
intergovernmental consultancy process that would end 
in substantial amendments to the 1945 UN Charter, 
which would equal an appendix to the constitution to 
encompass climate protection at national level. 
This would be the codified equivalent of a global 
social contract under international law, on the basis of 
which contemporary a reform of the United Nations’ 
main bodies could be carried out – for example, a UN 
Council for Sustainable Development could be estab­
lished, on par with the Security Council, to bring the 
United Nations up to date and reflect the 21st century 
– and which would serve as a formal expression of the 
normative need for a global ‘We’ identity. The co­evo­
lution of the international protection of human rights 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shows 
that these kinds of global visions can certainly lead to 
concrete changes in the real world.
7.3.10.2 
Comprehensive Global Governance as the 
Transformation’s Driving Force
The global transformation into an environmentally 
and climate friendly global community cannot succeed 
if it is limited to the narrowly defined political fields 
of environment and development. On the contrary, a 
 generally high level of international cooperation, global 
coordination and political steering are key conditions 
for the success of the transformation towards a low­
carbon society. The trend reversal that is needed for the 
transformation will therefore not be achievable without 
comprehensive, long­term oriented international regu­
latory policies with an equitable world order as their 
goal. In the following, the WBGU outlines three steps 
with progressive ambition levels on the path towards 
the necessary revolution in global cooperation.
Low Ambition Level: Revitalise Multilateralism
A lack of cooperation as far as the key questions of 
global environmental and climate change are concerned 
will almost inevitably lead to an escalation of conflict­
ing interests and the related distribution issues, which 
in turn will cause additional difficulties in dealing con­
structively with any cross­border issues. The key actors 
in world politics, particularly the USA, the EU and 
China, as well as an extended group of states, notably 
the G20, should therefore soon find a mode of interna­
tional diplomacy that will at least allow them to prevent 
the escalation of obvious conflicts of interest.
The WBGU believes that the G20 are a fundamen­
tally suitable constellation of actors with the ability to 
overcome the established, ingrained structures of inter­
national cooperation in favour of a constructive multi­
lateralism, and to become active beyond a global eco­
nomic and financial policy. As a powerful microcosm of 
world regions they can make timely proposals regard­
ing appropriate targets to the more inclusive United 
Nations in the transformation­relevant areas of policy­
making, such as, in particular, energy policy, global land 
use and global urbanisation, and provide impulses to 
guide actions. In addition, the G20 not only carry a high 
level of climate political responsibility, but also have 
correspondingly high potentials for transformation.
The WBGU therefore recommends that the G20, or 
a comparable sub­global constellation, develop a road­
map with directions towards a global transformation 
towards a low­carbon society. To demonstrate credibil­
ity and output legitimacy, such a roadmap would have 
to be drawn up and implemented within the current 
decade. It should, at the earliest opportunity, guide the 
G20 towards making concrete decisions which reflect 
a decidedly global perspective of this problem, and 
which have as their benchmark, at the very least, the 
G20 crisis management in view of the global financial 
crisis. To be capable of ultimately guiding, motivating 
and mobilising the entire international community of 
states in the spirit of the transformation, the leading 
states would also inevitably have to credibly consider 
the interests of smaller and poorer developing coun­
tries without patronising them. At the same time, with 
regard to this, the German federal government and the 
European Union should aim for a high level of ambi­
tion, and meet the ‘rest of the world’ with a committed 
and mediating attitude. If they succeed, the G20 could 
then even become the driving force behind bringing the 
entire UN system up to date.
Medium Ambition Level: Improve Global 
Governance for Transformative Global 
Infrastructure Development
Low­carbon development processes must be acceler­
ated globally, and in numerous economic sectors. As 
this study shows, three fundamental ‘infrastructures’ 
are central to achieving this: energy systems, urban 
areas and land­use systems. Compliance with the 2 °C 
guard rail is only possible if we have changed the course 
towards low­carbon in all three of these pillars of the 
global economy by 2020. On the one hand, energy pol­
icy, land­use management and urban development are 
primarily national issues; on the other hand, a global 
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low­carbon conversion of these three core sectors of 
the global economy in such short time is not conceiva­
ble without international harmonisation processes.
This is a completely new challenge for the interna­
tional community, as so far, global governance mecha­
nisms for a global redirection of the infrastructures in 
the three transformation fields do not exist. All of the 
three fields therefore require the setting of global and 
national transformation targets, or the development of 
national and global transformation corridors, and the 
definition of indicators on whose basis development 
progress can be monitored, the relevant monitoring 
processes can be established, and positive incentives 
for reaching the targets can be introduced (for example 
development cooperation, technology transfer).
These kinds of global governance mechanisms can 
only be realised by capable international organisations. 
Accordingly, in the transformation field of energy, the 
German federal government should actively support 
a shift in IEA objectives towards sustainable energy 
policies and call for improved organisation accessi­
bility for developing countries, and furthermore pro­
mote the strengthening of IRENA as the driving force 
behind the international diffusion of renewable ener­
gies, and the upgrading of the status of UN Energy 
(Section  5.4.5.1). In order to emphasise the issue of 
sustainable urban development, the WBGU suggests 
working directly towards a more profound institutional 
reform as an alternative to the proposed upgrading of 
UN Habitat (low ambition level; Section 7.3.6.1). At a 
medium ambition level, the WBGU recommends the 
establishment of a ‘World Commission on Low­Carbon 
Urban Planning’ and a Global Commission for Sustain­
able Land Use’.
Both commissions could be initiated and mandated 
through the Rio+20 Conference, and should then pro­
ceed to present comprehensive reports by 2015, tak­
ing the corresponding complexity of their respective 
transformation field into account. Based on the report 
produced by the Global Commission for Sustainable 
Land Use, the FAO should ultimately develop a suit­
able range of instruments for redirecting national and 
global land­use pathways towards climate­friendliness. 
To put the World Commission on Low­Carbon Urban 
Planning’s findings into operation, the WBGU further 
recommends the establishment of a broadly mandated 
UN Specialised Agency for Sustainable Urbanisation. 
The UN Habitat programme, not adequately equipped 
to deal with this acute problem, could be incorporated 
into this.
High Ambition Level: Global Governance for a New, 
Equitable Global System
The ultimate aim of any future global governance must 
be the creation of a new, equitable global system whose 
institutions put the international community of states 
in a position, as early as within the first half of the 21st 
century, that leaves them capable of appreciating the 
complex interdependencies of the global society within 
the scope determined by the planetary guard rails, and 
responding in a timely and adequate manner. To be suc­
cessful in the long run, a global system like this must 
not be restricted to action­capable ‘islands’ inhabited 
by those parts of humankind which are currently the 
wealthier ones; it must also include those who are cur­
rently excluded, and will be in the near future: the ‘bot­
tom billion’.
This, however, means that decision­makers in poli­
tics, business and society are facing fundamental politi­
cal and intellectual challenges: politically, it requires a 
historically unprecedented transcending of established 
sovereignty concepts and purely power­driven global 
politics in favour of ensuring the long­term availabil­
ity of global commons. Intellectually, it requires solid 
strategies and concepts that anchor sustainable global 
development in cross­border democratic structures, 
attempt to find answers to 21st century issues of global 
equity and fair distribution, and, not least, can claim 
global legitimacy for themselves.
Both do not equal a utopian demand for a global gov­
ernment or a global state. Instead, the parallel quests of 
global governance theoreticians, cosmopolitans, trans­
nationalists, philosophers of justice and so on must 
focus on legitimately operable norms, rules and proce­
dures, and base themselves on the fundamental prin­
ciple of a virtual global social contract. Such a process 
would represent a quantum leap for civilisation, on par 
with the transition from feudalism to democracy and 
the rule of law in the 17th and 18th centuries, and the 
19th century embedding of markets through the insti­
tutions of the welfare state.
In the WBGU’s view, this is achievable at a global 
level only through the agreement on universal goals. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights imme­
diately comes to mind here as an example that is not 
faultless, but nevertheless encouraging: even though 
the protection of human rights leaves much to be 
desired empirically, the concept of human dignity, and 
the special protection it deserves, is universally recog­
nised. It should therefore also be fundamentally pos­
sible to reach a comparable consensus with regard to 
humanity’s capability for survival within Earth’s plan­
etary guard rails.
A global transformation towards this necessarily 
presupposes extensive ‘Global Enlightenment’, which 
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must be aimed at promoting cooperative behaviour, 
and accelerating the formation of the requisite global 
social standards and debate. Apart from the political 
responsibility to advance transformative policies in the 
basic architecture of economies and infrastructures car­
ried by states and governments, the global civil society 
is also called upon to transport awareness of the trends 
and driving factors of global change in the quest for a 
new ‘Global Enlightenment’ (Chapters 2, 6).
The upcoming Rio+20 Conference offers an immi­
nent and concrete historical chance to serve such an 
education process as a reference frame and anchoring 
point, thereby initiating a paradigm change with long­
term impact. Exactly how this opportunity should be 
taken, and which concrete strategies and actions must 
follow to allow the creation of a new, equitable glo­
bal system, are questions which so far neither scien­
tists nor politicians have been able to fathom clearly, 
or to answer satisfactorily. However, what is evolving 
is an organic search process whose most urgent, decid­
edly action­oriented research issues are outlined by the 
WBGU in the following (Chapter 8).
7.4
Synthesis: The Composition of Measure Bundles
Transformation Strategy Dimensions 
The success of the transformation requires a clever 
composition of measures which include elements of 
the ten strategic bundles whilst being embedded in a 
new global social contract. This contract is based on a 
growing cosmopolitan understanding of humankind as 
‘Earth citizens’, which allows the taking on of responsi­
bilities at a global level – in fact, demands it – and paves 
the way for a new dimension to international coopera­
tion in terms of content and institutions. The new glo­
bal social contract is guided by the real challenges of 
stabilising the climate and the earth system, which the 
WBGU analyses in this study. To follow this path, the 
global community must overcome existing barriers, cor­
rect path dependencies, and advance initiatives for the 
rapid establishment of low­carbon economic and social 
structures.
In the face of the imminent challenges, it is vital 
that politicians do not subscribe to escapism; instead, 
they should, through course setting, acceleration and 
an upscaling of the transformation process, use the 
next decade to pave the way for steps which currently 
still seem visionary, and which have therefore been 
accorded a high ambition level. However, measures of 
this extent will ultimately be required in order to stay 
within the planetary guard rails and facilitate the trans­
formation to sustainability in time.
There is no one and only transformation path, there 
are many. To prioritise the numerous combination pos­
sibilities of strategic measures in order to draft and 
evaluate political strategies for the respective transfor­
mations required in particular countries and regions, 
political decision­makers have four dimensions to con­
sider:
1. Temporal impact: In the short and medium term, this 
is primarily about accelerating the transformation 
to retain the chance of compliance with the plane­
tary guard rails (Section 1.1). For a rapid decarbon­
isation of energy systems, clear carbon price signals 
are vital as a basis for investment and consumption 
decisions. Sustainability research and education ini­
tiatives, on the other hand, tend to impact cumula­
tively, and serve to secure the success of the trans­
formation in the medium and long­term.
2. Geographical scope: Transformation policies cannot 
be successful if they are implemented only in some 
parts of the world. Ultimately, this is about reform 
coalitions, which enable a global economy trend 
reversal towards sustainability. 
3. Overcoming barriers: Current path dependencies 
in a global economic system which continues to 
be fossil­fuel based act as transformation barriers. 
They are threatening to cement the status quo, or 
to increase the cost of the transformation, and must 
be overcome.
4. Support change agents: There are change agents at 
all levels of society and the economy, whose pro­
motion and networking can create the ‘critical mass’ 
needed to shape transformation policies.
Whilst the first two dimensions relate to the urgency of 
rapid, preferably global action for the transformation, 
the latter criteria refer to veto players and actor constel­
lations. Above all, the main concern is to refrain from 
preventing the transformation any longer.
Composition Options
The composition options of different measures with 
varying levels of ambition are arranged along a con­
tinuum between bottom­up approaches, with initially 
limited impact, and the creation of comprehensive glo­
bal structures for the transformation into a low­carbon 
society that are also based on a new understanding of 
the value and limits of national sovereignty. Joint glo­
bal action would be mirrored by a comprehensive and 
binding climate agreement to establish a global cap for 
emissions and instruments for a global emissions trad­
ing scheme, and initiate global governance mechanisms 
for the low­carbon transformation of energy systems, 
urbanisation and land use. 
Along this continuum, however, there are many dif­
ferent starting points which, below the global level and 
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when combined, can certainly initiate the dynamics 
needed for steps that go further. In order to be able to 
credibly launch these kind of polycentric transforma­
tion strategies, the European Union should, as far as 
emissions reductions are concerned, agree to raise its 
own reduction target to at least 30 % for the year 2020, 
complemented by substantial, legally binding interna­
tional climate protection financing commitments.
On the basis of this, ambitious, polycentric transfor­
mation policies can endeavour to trigger climate com­
patible dynamics on different paths.
Geopolitics: Establish Sub-global Pioneer Alliances
One important path for the acceleration of the trans­
formation is the development of a geopolitical strat­
egy for the forging of climate pioneer alliances to aid 
progress in the various transformation fields. For Ger­
many and the EU, the major newly industrialising coun­
tries China, India and Brazil are particularly important 
in this respect. On the one hand, these countries will 
gain in geostrategic significance; on the other hand, 
these are also the countries where the highest emis­
sions increases are to be expected, carrying the risk of 
new and far reaching fossil path dependencies like the 
ones which already exist in the industrialised countries. 
An ambitious and targeted transformation strategy 
could, for example, address the promotion of renewable 
energies, or emissions trading, where pioneer alliances 
set common standards and create structures which 
could then be successively globalised. Such an initia­
tive would hardly be able to effect timely course correc­
tions by the most important actors and of the required 
scale without a concurrent debate on fair burden shar­
ing and decarbonisation efforts.
Create Incentive Structures for Dynamic Actors in 
the Transformation Fields
In the transformation fields, positive incentive systems 
for dynamic actors could speed up the transforma tion 
into a low­carbon society. Thus, generously funded 
programmes for low­carbon investment projects by the 
World Bank and the regional development banks, for 
instance in the sustainable energy services sector and 
urbanisation, could provide considerable incentives for 
leaving the established fossil development path. Sub­
stantial loan programmes for a competition to iden­
tify and support the 10 or 20 most ambitious models 
for the building of low­carbon cities in developing or 
newly industrialising countries could initiate or accel­
erate search processes in that direction. Such strategies 
would also still be effective if there were undue delays 
in the forging of geopolitical alliances.
Political Focus on Transformation Barriers
To break down transformation barriers, a politically 
supported alliance of change agents in the economy, 
civil society and science could develop transforma­
tive impact with regard to the phasing out of direct and 
indirect fossil energy carrier subsidies. This could at 
least partially correct the current blatant market distor­
tions, which are sustained by global annual subsidies in 
the three­digit billion region. This outline of polycentric 
transformation strategies clearly shows the extensive 
scope of options for innovative paths towards climate 
friendliness. The ten bundles of measures developed 
by the WBGU are representative of the wide spectrum 
available for the composition of the requisite strate­
gies. The 2 °C guard rail defines the level of the stand­
ard these measures have to meet. 
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Research and education will play a central role during 
the requisite transformation process into a low­carbon, 
sustainable society, as the realisation of the necessity 
for restructuring the global economy is mainly based 
on scientific knowledge. Despite its clear objectives 
and the already available low­carbon technologies, the 
transformation is a societal search process. In cooper­
ation with politics and society, science is tasked with 
developing visions for a low­carbon society, exploring 
different development paths, and developing climate­
friendly and affordable technological and social inno­
vations. Technological innovations are of major impor­
tance to develop low­carbon alternatives to existing 
production and everyday technologies. Social innova­
tions are necessary to allow the diffusion of low­car­
bon technologies, and to promote individual climate­
friendly behaviour. 
Research should generate both systemic, reflexive 
and anticipative knowledge. This must be additionally 
complemented by extensive participative elements, 
both in terms of social implementation and the research 
process as such, as participation in the transformation 
process itself creates the basis for its legitimation and 
acceptance. Only broadly legitimised politics and poli­
cies can lead to sustainable solutions, and a democratic 
transformation process. 
There are still many open questions regarding the 
long­term transformation ­ these must be answered in 
order to be able to determine how to proceed. On the 
one hand, research helps to clearly define the trans­
formation’s guiding principles, on the other hand, it 
provides technical and social innovations, thereby ena­
bling the transformation process. Ideally, it also leads 
to groundbreaking innovations which impact at the 
appropriate speed, and in various social sub­systems, 
inspiring further innovations.
Education should put people in a position to develop 
an awareness of the problems, and to act responsibly 
and appropriately. To enable education to support the 
transformation, scientific findings must be made com­
prehensible and accessible. Relevant knowledge should 
be communicated through education in all areas and 
to all age groups, from kindergarten to school, voca­
tional training, or university, and extend to lifelong 
‘on­the­job’ learning. Educational institutes should 
increasingly convey and teach orientation knowledge 
for sustainability and the skills necessary for lifelong 
learning and systemic thinking. Besides new curricula 
and degree courses and modules, completely new pro­
fessions might become necessary. Active participation 
in research processes also has an educative effect; fur­
thermore, it also contributes to knowledge generation 
and research legitimation.
Research and education are therefore necessary 
conditions for fulfilling the new social contract for the 
transformation towards a low­carbon society proposed 
by the WBGU. It is research and science’s social respon­
sibility to contribute actively to the success of the 
transformation towards a low­carbon society. The pro­
motion of transformation­relevant research and edu­
cation are therefore key tasks for any proactive state 
(Section 5.4.1). 
A research and education reform unlocks future 
opportunities for those who participate in it. In view 
of this, educational institutes should increasingly teach 
and enable sustainability­oriented knowledge, and 
the skills necessary for lifelong learning and systemic 
thinking. This also includes a better understanding of 
how research gains insights and creates knowledge as 
well as the scope and the limits of the research process. 
In the medium and long term, this will benefit all mem­
bers of society, allowing them to participate more spe­
cifically in the transformation process, thereby advanc­
ing it.
Young scientists could participate in the transforma­
tion process in the role of ‘research pioneers’ by inno­
vatively focusing their individual endeavours on its 
requirements, thereby accelerating the transformation. 
This calls for a systemic, inter­ and transdisciplinary 
approach. 
German science and research policy could emerge as 
an international role model if it continues to develop 
further in the direction already pursued in part, towards 
systemic, transformation­relevant research, thereby 
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actively paving the way for a knowledge­based, trans­
formation­supportive society.
A New Contract Between Society and Science
Against the background of a rapidly changing Earth 
system (Chapter 1), and the resultant necessity for 
transformation, research should also increasingly focus 
on transformation­relevant issues. 
This requires a review and a targeted consolidation of 
research structures as well as contents in terms of their 
present and possible contributions to the transforma­
tion. A new contract between science, society and the 
economy could result in the productive, comprehensive 
transformation­relevant orientation of research and 
science for the demands of the Great Transformation.
This restructuring of sustainability research as part 
of a ‘Global Contract between Science and Society’ was 
already proposed in the 2007 Potsdam Nobel Laureates 
Symposium’s ‘Potsdam Memorandum’ (PIK, 2007). 
Such a contract would result in closer links between 
research and development activities and the socially 
expressed need for knowledge relevant to the transfor­
mation towards a low­carbon society. 
By means of such a contract society would commit 
itself to identify relevant problems, to prioritise them, 
and to communicate them to scientists and researchers. 
Society would also agree to supply appropriate funding 
for the exploration of the identified problems. 
In return, a steadily growing part of the scientific 
community and the economy would commit to increas­
ing its focus on the social objectives within the Great 
Transformation. Scientific research would not only be 
assessed within its own expert community, it would be 
additionally tasked with developing relevant and cred­
ible solutions for the identified problems. In terms of 
policy­making, this would not only mean enhanced 
research funding, but also the task of initiating social 
dialogue on the goals of research and development 
activities. 
8.1
Research for the Transformation
Social transformations are brought about by interre­
lated changes of technologies, social institutions and 
individual behaviours in a range of social sub­systems. 
Technological and social innovations are associated 
with changes in social context which are frequently a 
precondition for the further diffusion of these innova­
tions, and they are therefore mutually dependent.
However, ex ante, no obvious turning or tipping 
points can be identified for clearly indicating the before 
and after of a transformation. Rather, transformations 
are characterised through a concurrence of multiple 
changes, some of which are directly or indirectly inter­
related. So far, these were identifiable only after they 
have taken place (Chapter 3). 
Past transformations have been co­evolutionary 
processes that led to profound and lasting changes. The 
transformation towards a low­carbon society is com­
prehensive, a process encompassing all social areas, in 
which specific actors and actor constellations play an 
important role. In contrast to earlier transformations, 
this one has a declared aim: a climate­friendly, sus­
tainable society (Chapter 1). This transition requires 
changes in almost all sectors of industry and areas of 
society. Transformation­relevant research should there­
fore have a broad spectrum to include as many techno­
logical, economic and social aspects as possible. 
Research should face the – at first glance apparently 
paradoxical – challenge of increasing the probabil­
ity of non­determinable processes, namely the shap­
ing and acceleration of the transformation, by finding 
potentially contributive alternatives. There is already 
an awareness of some options, such as the creation 
of spaces for experiments (Box 5.4­1) or the integra­
tion of social stakeholders’ practical experience­based 
knowledge in cross­disciplinary research. These should 
be expanded. In addition, a systemic­oriented explora­
tion of other options is needed to find new solutions. 
Conceptually, this means the differentiation between 
transformation research and transformative research. 
Transformation research is aimed at understanding 
transformation processes better, its subject are there­
fore transformation processes as such. Transformative 
research supports transformation processes in practi­
cal terms through the development of solutions and 
technical as well as social innovations, including eco­
nomic and social diffusion processes and the possibility 
of their acceleration, and demands, at least in part, a 
systemic perspective and inter­ and cross­disciplinary 
methods, including stakeholder participation (Section 
8.1.4.9). The division in transformation research and 
transformative research serves the purpose of better 
illustration and systematisation; however, the bound­
aries between these disciplines are also blurred, and 
there are areas where they may overlap; in practice, this 
division is therefore not easy to maintain.
8.1.1 
Goals, Requirements and Starting Points
8.1.1.1 
Goals
The intended result of the transformation described 
by the WBGU is a low­carbon, sustainable society. 
To become practicable for individual research strate­
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gies and programmes, the overall objective of climate­
friendlyness should be concretised for the transforma­
tion’s various social elements and action fields. These 
goals could then be integrated in research strategies 
and programmes, and be operationalised. This opera­
tionalisation should provide a reflexive process for the 
identification of partial goals, and for the development 
of suggested measures from research results. It should 
also be open to subsequent adjustment. 
8.1.1.2 
Structural Requirements 
As the challenges and problems during the transition 
into a low­carbon society are not purely technical or 
purely social issues, transformation supportive research 
should take this socio­technical ‘mixed character’ into 
account through interdisciplinarity. 
Interdisciplinarity describes the cooperation of sev­
eral independent individual sciences attempting to find 
an answer to a shared research issue with their own 
methods. Methods are communicated between the dis­
ciplines, and various research aspects are linked, ideally 
leading to new solution strategies; experts from differ­
ent disciplines progressing along parallel lines without 
knowledge exchange is insufficient. Issues on the trans­
formation of systems can only be sensibly addressed if 
ecological, technological and socio­economic aspects 
are linked to do justice to the various different dimen­
sions of the system to be transformed. Natural and 
engineering sciences should therefore cooperate closely 
with social sciences and the humanities. 
The issue places particularly great demands on social 
sciences and the humanities; these areas should there­
fore receive strong support as the organisation of the 
development, assessment, use and diffusion of low­
carbon technologies and behaviours relies on social 
conditions as much as it does on respective technology. 
This also applies to the substitution of climate damag­
ing technologies and behaviours, and the requirement 
of profound changes in production, consumption and 
lifestyles. 
Transdisciplinarity also plays a major role by the 
involvement of relevant stakeholders in the research 
process. Transdisciplinarity encompasses a range of dif­
ferent aspects. Firstly, it means increasing the social rel­
evance of research questions through the involvement 
of stakeholders in setting research goals. Secondly, it 
also applies to the involvement of stakeholders in the 
actual research process, i. e. the combination of scien­
tific and practical knowledge (for example local, tradi­
tional or indigenous knowledge). To achieve and main­
tain acceptance throughout society as a whole and 
legitimation as indispensable factors for the transfor­
mation, research should be carried out with the par­
ticipation of the appropriate stakeholders. It is particu­
larly important that research and development coop­
erate with the business community, most importantly 
with regard to investments. Businesses play a major 
role in the development of prototypes and demonstra­
tion projects, for example, as their financing frequently 
exceeds the budgets of government­funded research 
institutions. However, the involvement of commercial 
enterprises in government­funded research does not 
diminish the need for government funding, as invest­
ments into research and development on a private basis 
are often only inadequately made, due to a lack of mar­
kets, a lack of infrastructure, or a lack of convergence 
between social and economic interests. 
Transformation research should combine and further 
develop existing knowledge with future knowledge by 
means of searching and networking processes. It should 
be a knowledge exchange involving different disci­
plines, but also between basic and applied research. 
This could, for example, be realised by broadly exam­
ining basic research results with regard to their trans­
formation­relevant innovation potential, subsequently 
to be combined with applied research with regard to 
technological realisation or the social implementation 
of transformative actions.
The Great Transformation requires acceleration and 
globality. The decarbonisation of the global economy 
must largely be concluded in 40 years’ time, and, above 
all, it must take place on a global scale. Research (fund­
ing) should address these aspects when considering its 
priorities in terms of content, budget allocation and 
architecture, for example by also funding international 
research projects, also in cooperation with non­OECD 
countries. 
Transformation­relevant research funding pro­
grammes should run over an extended term, as many 
innovations are still in the initial stages; their develop­
ment, optimisation and adaptation will take consider­
able time. This long­term perspective should be applied 
to research funding policy, project and programme con­
tents, and also be evident in the long­term maintenance 
of research capacities and the relevant qualification of 
young academics (Arrow et al., 2009). 
8.1.1.3 
Requirements in Terms of Content
If research is to support the transformation effectively, 
the results will ideally include three requisite compo­
nents: (1) the development and assessment of low­
carbon alternatives in the form of technological and 
social innovations, (2) the definition of the social pre­
conditions for the diffusion of these innovations and 
(3), the development of political strategies and instru­
ments to govern the transformation. The three dimen­
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sions are correlated, leading to interaction. The further 
development of a technology, for example, impacts on 
the preconditions for its diffusion. Simultaneously, any 
change in the social framework conditions impacts on 
the development of alternatives. 
Developing and Assessing Low-Carbon Alternatives
Alternatives are low­carbon technical and social inno­
vations, such as low­emission production processes and 
technologies, new forms of organisation, and sugges­
tions for low­carbon consumption patterns and life­
styles. Low­carbon production technologies and cli­
mate­friendly products must be developed, and they 
must be used. 
Alternatives should be examined with regard to their 
systemic interaction; both in terms of climate­friendly­
ness, the use of natural resources and other environ­
mental impacts, and in terms of global economic and 
social impacts. If presently no sustainable alternatives 
exist in some transformation fields, these should be 
developed. And finally, research should – apart from 
the results useful for the transformation process as such 
– contribute to creating a systemic understanding of 
how fundamental services can be provided with the 
least negative impact on climate, or other sustainability 
aspects, through the combination of technological and 
social solutions. 
The private sector does not invest sufficiently into 
research for radical alternatives, due to the lack of mar­
kets and social anchorage points (such as the required 
infrastructure) (Watson, 2009). In consequence, the 
main responsibility rests with the state, government 
funding is therefore particularly important to allow the 
speedy exploration of alternatives. Research budgets 
should reflect this. 
Determining Conditions for the Diffusion of 
Innovations
The development of low­carbon innovations must be 
closely linked with their diffusion – from national to 
global level. 
Chapters 3 and 6 both note the fact that the diffu­
sion of low­carbon innovations may sometimes require 
considerable changes to existing social orders and 
framework conditions, or that these may be its conse­
quence. The potential bandwidth here ranges from the 
expansion of physical infrastructures to the respective 
legal provisions and standards required for the mar­
ket launch of a product, to the changing of existing 
social norms and individual consumption preferences. 
Research should therefore involve not only the devel­
opment of technical alternatives, but also address the 
requirements of their (global) diffusion. 
Moreover, diffusion depends very much on national 
and regional contexts. These are the result of, for exam­
ple, the various development stages of different coun­
tries and their differing socio­cultural values, political 
systems, power constellations and consumption prefer­
ences. Research should also take these dimensions into 
account, and systemically consider regional variances, 
or adapt already existing alternatives to local contexts. 
Developing Political Strategies and Instruments
Historical transformations took place largely with­
out any steering, even though some individual ele­
ments may have been politically engineered, and with­
out a uniform, clearly defined goal. The transformation 
towards a low­carbon society must be policy­driven 
(Chapters  5,  7). Low­carbon transformation relevant 
research should therefore take political shaping and 
political relevance into account, and suggest appropri­
ate ways of policy­making. Research should include the 
exploration of political strategies and instruments for 
the diffusion of technological and social innovations, 
to be presented to policy­makers as possible courses 
of action.
8.1.1.4 
Overall Requirements in Terms of Research for the 
Transformation
The aims elaborated above, and the demands on research 
with regard to structure and content for the transfor­
mation, result in a range of criteria (Table 8.1­1), allow­
ing the evaluation of current research, and the shaping 
of future work. Central aspects are, on the one hand, 
the integration of the goal of achieving a global low­
carbon transformation by 2050 within the scope of sus­
tainability and, on the other hand, a systemic research 
approach. The integration of this goal stipulates the 
direction research must take, and clearly shows the 
urgent need for acceleration as a consequence of the 
immense time pressure. A systemic perspective aims at 
the change of a system, for example the energy system, 
and not merely on the development of a new technol­
ogy or a new business model. Besides the development 
of an innovation, a systemic perspective must inevita­
bly also explore the issue of how the respective system 
(including innovation use, legal framework conditions, 
competitive technologies and so on) must be adjusted 
to achieve its diffusion. This leads to questions which, 
ultimately, can only be answered by inter­ and transdis­
ciplinary research. 
The expansion of transformation­relevant research 
does not mean that traditional sectoral research loses 
in importance, or that every research project must meet 
all of the named criteria in order to contribute to the 
transformation. Specific disciplinary research without 
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transformation­relevance must, of course, continue to 
enjoy the funding it currently does. However, all inher­
ently transformation­relevant, sectoral and discipli­
nary projects should meet these criteria by default to 
allow systemic research. An electromobility research 
programme should, for instance, include an integral 
research element which examines the implications of 
different electromobility structures, and the transfor­
mation of the transport sector under consideration of 
these technologies.
The WBGU emphasises that freedom of research 
is a major and important element of the science sys­
tem, and central to scientific and social progress. Basic 
research will, and must, also contribute significantly to 
the transformation. However, in view of the fact that 
the current problem is so pressing, the WBGU believes 
that funding and promotion, both for problem­oriented 
basic and applied research – assuming they deal with 
the solving of one of the numerous problematic aspects 
on the path towards a low­carbon society – should 
increasingly also consider the requirements shown in 
Table 8.1­1. This would allow research to give full con­
sideration to the complexity of the issue, and generate 
scientific results which can serve as the basis for ade­
quate social response. 
8.1.2 
Research for the Social Contract
In Chapter 7, the WBGU noted the challenging role 
the state has to play in achieving the transformation 
towards a low­carbon society, and developed a range 
of demands on governmental action, including the rel­
evant measure bundles. Nevertheless, as yet, it is not 
perfectly clear how this path might be shaped in prac­
tical terms. The WBGU has therefore outlined research 
issues relating to the basic requirements for a new 
social contract below, and developed a prototype of the 
new scientific discipline this problem seems to call for. 
8.1.2.1 
Research Issues for the Social Contract
To achieve a global social transformation within the 
planetary boundaries by 2050 requires suitable social 
framework conditions as well as a clear definition of 
fundamental challenges and potential barriers. The fol­
lowing identifies a range of central issues to be clarified. 
Key Factors of the Transformation
The analysis of historical transformation processes 
(Chapter 3) clearly showed that, although there is 
already some knowledge regarding the key factors of 
a transformation (Box 8.1­1), it is only fragmentary 
with regard to their interaction. To develop transfor­
mation strategies, the interaction between these key 
factors should be examined more closely. This also 
applies to the opposition and barriers to the implemen­
tation of sustainable development. Issues which must 
be addressed include: Which actors oppose the low­
carbon/sustainability transformation with the aid of 
which strategies? Which strategies and measures can 
be identified to overcome this opposition, these barri­
ers, and these counteracting forces?
Global Cooperation 
Unresolved issues with regard to the international will­
ingness to cooperate, and the possibilities and lim­
its of global governance, must be explored to imple­
ment the transformation at a globally networked level. 
Present incremental research into further development 
of the international institutional system does not go far 
enough. Global governance research is (currently) pre­
dominately shaped by political science and therefore 
thematically not broad enough to deal with the fun­
damental questions of global cooperation unaided. On 
the contrary, at macrolevel. The context of the plane­
tary boundaries requires close cooperation with natu­
ral and engineering sciences when exploring a form of 
global governance that can potentially support sustain­
able development.
This is even more important when it comes to coop­
erative multilevel politics in the three action fields 
Table 8.1-1
Requirements for research for the transformation.
Source: WBGU
Goal Structure Result components
Global transformation towards a 
low-carbon society by 2050
Systemic
Interdisciplinary
Cross-disciplinary 
Low-carbon innovations
Conditions for diffusion
Global sustainability context International cooperation
Reflexive
Long-term
Political strategies
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Box 8.1-1
Complex causal relationships, illustrated using 
the example of the Industrial Revolution
The ‘causal network’ of groundbreaking innovations 
One of the goals of transformation research, among others, 
should be to identify the parameters and key factors for 
self­propelled and self­proliferating innovation processes by 
means of historical analysis in order to utilise these for future 
developments. 
These kinds of acceleration processes can be illustrated 
using the example of the Industrial Revolution (Box 3.2­1). 
Suitable framework conditions, as described in Box 3.2­1, 
allowed innovations which can be identified as the most 
important drivers of the Industrial Revolution. Figure 8.1­1 
illustrates, in a very simplified way, the key technologies 
which led to the Industrial Revolution, embedded in a net­
work of the major factors impacting its acceleration.
The visual outline should be interpreted as follows, start­
ing with ‘mechanical looms’: the mechanisation of looms, 
which occurred in several stages of innovation, one improv­
ing on the other, in part inspired by offers of prize monies, 
led to the replacement of both manpower and animal power 
with hydropower for the first time in history in 1772, through 
the development of a water­driven spinning machine (‘water­
frame’). The resultant higher productivity in the textile sector 
contributed to meeting the increased demand in the cloth­
ing sector. At the same time, it triggered an increase in the 
demand for cotton. Thanks to a strong naval tradition, over­
seas trade and slavery, this increased demand could be met 
by the colonies.
However, expansion of the fleet, i. e. shipbuilding, had led 
to wood becoming a scare resource – besides the fact that it 
was also needed as firewood. Coal was already being used 
as an alternative. Its extraction proved difficult, though, not 
least because the mines inevitably flooded at regular intervals 
once the groundwater line was reached. At first, the shafts 
were kept dry by manpower and animal power. With the con­
struction of the first large­scale, usable steam engine by Tho­
mas Newcomen in 1712, this limited physical power could be 
replaced, for the first time ever, through steam power. Steam 
engines were constructed in the close vicinity of the pits, and 
powered with coal, the locally available resource. This cre­
ated a positive feedback loop, and coal extraction became 
more lucrative (Sieferle et al., 2006). However, at 0.5 %, the 
efficiency factor of Newcomen’s steam engine was extremely 
limited, and it was subsequently substantially improved by 
James Watt. His partner, Matthew Boulton, recognised the 
potential of an alternative drive power, considering the, 
by then, already wide­spread, man­ or hydropower driven 
mechanical looms, and he invested substantially into devel­
oping the steam engine further.
Around 1785, the Englishman Edmond Cartwright finally 
managed to construct the first automated power loom driven 
by steam. This change of energy basis, from hydropower to 
coal, allowed the production of clothing in unprecedented, 
industrial dimensions, leading to a rapid acceleration of 
already existing processes. The growing demand for steam 
engines also led to a growing demand for iron ore and coal, 
and the demand for the latter increased even more because it 
now also replaced wood in iron smelting. The invention of the 
railway in the early 19th century was the final breakthrough: 
the demand for resources rose in line with the distribution 
opportunities both for textile products and coal, thereby clos­
ing the continuously self­reinforcing loop between individual 
key factors. 
The above sketch is neither exhaustive, nor does it do jus­
tice to the complexity of the overall picture. Each develop­
ment had social implications, and rested on certain social and 
political conditions. These cannot be elaborated in all their 
complexity in this brief abstract. Nevertheless, this excursus 
is intended to provide a cursory insight into the necessity 
of employing a systemic perspective to identify and analyse 
conditions, key factors, and their constellations. 
For the transformation towards a low­carbon society, it is 
vital to not only rely on historical analyses, but to draw on 
the real scope of possibilities in the present, and those of the 
future, with the help of research.
This requires a huge effort from science. Potential key fac­
tors and framework conditions favouring positive feedback 
loops should be systematically identified, thereby  significantly 
increasing the probability of an accelerated transformation. 
Figure 8.1-1
Illustration on the driving, 
interdependent factors of the 
acceleration of the Industrial 
Revolution.
Source: WBGU
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especially relevant to the Great Transformation – 
energy, urbanisation and land use – (Section 5.4.5), 
where technical potential feasibility studies carried 
out in the disciplines of engineering and economics are 
particularly at odds with the socio­scientific knowledge 
regarding the impediments and barriers to realisation 
and action, respectively.
At microlevel, the issue of the human capability 
for cooperation as such is another central factor that 
has so far been largely ignored by global governance 
research. It still remains unclear, for example, whether 
there are natural limits to human intra­ and intersocial 
capability to cooperate, or vice versa, whether humans, 
as ‘cooperative animals’ (Tomasello, 2009), are funda­
mentally capable of developing a global ‘We’ identity, 
as assumed, for instance, by democratisation theory as 
one of the key preconditions for legitimising govern­
ance and decision­making processes (Scharpf, 1999; 
Beisheim and Nuscheler, 2003). To date, the hypothesis 
is that cooperation requires the building up of trust and 
reputation. However, this has been proven to become 
more difficult in line with increases in distance, com­
plexity, and scale of the reference group (Dunbar, 1993; 
Ostrom, 2003).
It must therefore be explored whether and how 
humans and human societies deal with the huge com­
plexity of a globalised world economy, and how they 
can organise stability, security, wealth and fairness in 
a closely linked global community within the planetary 
boundaries. A respective global governance research 
should also focus on the development of political, eco­
nomic and social strategies, and identify the limits of 
human cooperation capabilities, thereby helping to 
overcome them. Fundamental cultural differences in 
the action­guiding theories of democracy and justice 
applicable in individual cultural spheres must necessar­
ily be taken into account. 
In the same context, it must generally be deter­
mined whether there are cognitive boundaries which 
fundamentally overtax humans and human societies, 
and how these can be overcome, if applicable. Respec­
tively, the present relevant knowledge of cognitive sci­
ence, psychology, anthropology, cultural sciences and 
sociology should be assessed within the scope of glo­
bal governance research, to ascertain what bearing, if 
any, this might have on the exploration of international 
cooperation.
With regard to the global transformation process, 
research must maintain its implementation orientation. 
In the contrary, a respective global governance research 
should also focus on the development of political, eco­
nomic and social strategies, and identify the limits of 
human cooperation capabilities, thereby helping to 
overcome them. Fundamental cultural differences in 
action­guiding theories of democracy and justice of 
individual cultural spheres must necessarily be taken 
into account.
Political Organisation and Legitimacy 
The nation state plays a key role during the transforma­
tion into a low­carbon society. It is the transformation’s 
engine, and should generally set the central course at 
national, supranational and international level. There­
fore, interdisciplinary research into a new concept of 
statehood, doing justice to the legitimacy requisite 
for any successful transformation needs, is vital. Both 
OECD and non­OECD countries should be included in 
this analysis. Issues contained in following range of 
topics require closer examination:
 > Long-term perspectives in policy-making: How can a 
long­term orientation, which takes into account the 
different time scales of the impact – culture depend­
ent – human activities have on the Earth system, 
thereby also affecting future generations, be embed­
ded in national and international policy­making 
institutions? Accordingly, it should be clarified how 
governmental organisations, for example ministries 
and state departments, must be designed in order to 
realise the Great Transformation. 
 > Legitimation and participation: Realisation of the 
Great Transformation requires both differentiated 
and comparative research, at both national and 
international level, into how democratic participa­
tion – again at local, national, supranational or inter­
national level – can promote and accelerate accept­
ance and legitimation of political measures required 
for the transformation. Case studies of particularly 
committed social environments and change agents 
lend themselves to analysis. During the course of 
this research, the possibilities of actively integrating 
the participation needs of different actors in govern­
mental transformation efforts should be identified 
and developed. Generally, a fundamental lack of 
analyses regarding democracy performance, and 
democracy audits can be noted.
 > Inclusion of knowledge: Studies should identify how 
(global) knowledge regimes (for example IPCC), local 
expertise (for example climate adaptation in coastal 
regions) and the advisory institutions of parliamen­
tary democracy can be effectively and efficiently 
linked. The required transformation of economy, 
society, policy­making and the legal system depends 
on the integration of knowledge that is constantly 
being updated. It should therefore be examined how 
the present state of (global) scientific knowledge is 
generated, and how it can be integrated in the polit­
ico­legal process of decision­making to achieve the 
appropriate results. 
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Mobilisation of Financial Capital
The acceleration of the transformation – and therefore 
its chances of success in terms of compliance with the 
planetary guard rails – is closely linked to the volume of 
investments in research, innovation and the diffusion 
of technological, social and organisational alternatives 
(Chapters 4 and 5). Apart from the recommendations 
for action with regard to financing the transformation 
made in Chapter 7, there are again some open ques­
tions here that research needs to address. In this con­
text, it should be clarified which actors (state, banks, 
businesses, private households, foundations, interna­
tional organisations) can make the requisite financial 
funds available in which way. The focus should above 
all be on actively developing new investment models. 
This would allow political decision­makers a more tar­
geted selection of appropriate transformation shaping 
and financing measures, and their prompt implemen­
tation.
Legal Framework Conditions
In the area of legal sciences, there has been no adequate 
research to date into how transformative laws should 
be designed to appropriately meet the transformation’s 
challenges. 
Research on the law of technology assessment and 
risk law carried out since the 1970s, examine techno­
logical change from one perspective only, as their start­
ing point is precautionary governmental action to pro­
tect individuals and/or supra­individual interests. The 
law of scientific technology assessment examines the 
extent to which law­making can take the obvious con­
sequences of technological advances systematically 
and comprehensively into account, particularly with 
regard to legislative enactment procedure. Legal risk 
research analyses the legal aspects of the unknown 
risks to human health and the environment typically 
associated with the introduction of new technologies 
or procedures (genetic engineering, nanotechnology). 
Subjects include finding the right balance between the 
conflicting interests of those affected by any risks, and 
issues of public welfare (for example environmental 
protection) and the technology users (for example com­
panies). However, the only recently established legal 
science discipline of innovation research goes beyond 
this by examining the role of the law in relation to inno­
vative developments; it identifies which laws impede, 
and which promote innovation, and analyses whether 
a law contributes to the realisation of public welfare 
aims in innovative processes and avoiding adverse 
effects whilst reaching the declared aim – also during 
the transformation.
In terms of the technological, political, economic and 
social challenges elaborated in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, this 
rudimentary approach to research is not adequate. It 
must be examined how laws should be structured to 
achieve the proven aims of the transformation at vari­
ous legal levels, or at least to promote it, and which laws 
are suitable for this, how the various legal levels should 
be interlinked, and the role of national, European and 
international law, particularly in terms of legitimising 
effect. In other words, the legal sciences must not just 
play a supporting role, accompanying the introduction 
of technological innovations; they must investigate the 
precise structure of the legal framework required for 
the transformation of social, political and economic 
systems. The proposed definition of this field of law 
shall be ‘transformative law’. 
Its first task is the development of a theory of trans­
formative law at a so­called metalevel. It should exam­
ine aspects such as the plausibility of transformative 
innovations, the shaping of transformative processes 
under simultaneous consideration of individual and 
supra­individual interests (for example also those of 
future generations), and law revisability and openness 
to revision. Moreover, a transformative law theory 
should identify and further develop the characteristics 
of this field of jurisprudence. 
There are three fundamental questions to be 
answered:
1. Can transformation into a climate­friendly and sus­
tainable economic world order act as a guiding prin­
ciple at all levels of the law? 
2. What legitimatory role can such a legal principle 
play?
3. Could the basic principles of transformative law, in 
view of the international challenges of a transfor­
mation towards a global sustainable society, pro­
vide the forms, procedures and instruments needed 
to shape a global low­carbon social, economic and 
political order? 
With regard to the latter, it should above all be taken 
into account that some key global level legal mecha­
nisms – such as international law – are currently called 
into question, be it through the failure of the interna­
tional law treaty system or through new technological 
developments threatening state sovereignty ( virtual 
worlds). 
Secondly, it must determine, through analysis of 
specific sectors (energy law, spatial planning law, urban 
planning legislation), the level of existing transforma­
tion­relevant legislation, and to what extent these 
fields – under consideration of constitutional, EU and 
international law parameters – require revision pursu­
ant to the transformation towards a sustainable society. 
Thirdly, analysis and evaluation of the transforma­
tive effect of the three divisions of legal governance, 
i. e. legislation, jurisprudence and the executive admin­
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istrative bodies is needed. The role of the respective 
national and supra­national powers (international 
courts, etc.) has to date not been examined with regard 
to their transformative impact, this should be carried 
out both theoretically and empirically. 
The legal sciences are therefore tasked
 > with the development of a transformative law the­
ory (legal principle, legitimatory function, forms, 
procedures, instruments), 
 > the analysis and assessment of transformative sec­
tors of the law (energy law, spatial planning law, 
urban planning legislation), and the development of 
sector­specific transformation­relevant aims, instru­
ments and procedures,
 > the analysis and assessment of the transformative 
effects of the three powers, i. e. legislation, jurispru­
dence and executive administrative bodies.
To address the issues elaborated above requires intra­
disciplinary (public law, civil and criminal law) and 
interdisciplinary approach (for example social, politi­
cal and economic sciences), and increased international 
legal research networking.
8.1.2.2 
Sustainability Science and Global Change Research
The transformation outlined in this flagship report 
should be regarded as part of a very profound social 
transition towards a low­carbon society (Chapter 1). 
The issues elaborated above (Section 8.1.2.1) represent 
profound societal changes. Their aim is the establish­
ment of the preconditions for the transition into a soci­
ety capable of maintaining its natural life­support sys­
tems through compliance with the planetary bounda­
ries. Taking this perspective, research must address the 
possibilities of profound social changes, and propose 
modification paths, yet it must also exchange knowl­
edge with the sciences investigating changes in the 
natural life­support systems. An attempt to understand 
and structure social change within the scope of plane­
tary boundaries has already been made with the intro­
duction of the sustainability sciences concept, and its 
operationalisation in the form of global change research. 
Sustainability Science 
The term sustainability science (also sustainable devel­
opment research) refers to the consolidation of the 
various efforts to support science and technology dur­
ing the transformation process. Sustainability  science 
is tasked with understanding the consequences of 
anthropogenic activities on nature, and the associated 
repercussive impact on societies, and the exploration 
of options for the avoidance and mitigation of nega­
tive effects from the perspective of sustainable devel­
opment (ICSU et al., 2002). Apart from interdisciplinar­
ity, this also includes aspects of a systemic perspective, 
of political relevance, and of normative focusing. In 
Germany, socio­ecological research is one of the terms 
under which sustainability science has established itself 
(Section 8.1.4.7). It primarily addresses the exploration 
of options for the avoidance of harmful impacts. 
The general term sustainability science also cov­
ers global change research activities. Global change 
research has evolved since the 1980s, and focuses on 
either natural or anthropogenic physical and biogeo­
chemical environmental changes. The Earth is viewed 
as a system, divided into physical, chemical, biological 
and social subsystems whose respective processes and 
interactions determine the earth system’s status quo 
and its development dynamics. 
International Global Transformation Research
Global change research has been institutionalised at a 
global level since 2001, in form of the Earth System Sci­
ence Partnership (ESSP). The ESSP encompasses four 
programmes: Diversitas (an international scientific pro­
gramme on biodiversity), the International Geosphere­
Biosphere Programme, the World Climate Research Pro­
gramme, and the International Human Dimensions Pro­
gramme on Environmental Change. Under the umbrella 
of sustainability research, the first three programmes 
primarily investigate Earth system changes, the role of 
human behaviour on the observed changes, and the 
impact these changes have on societies. 
The International Human Dimensions Programme 
on Global Environmental Change also focused on the 
analysis of the interfaces between natural subsystems 
and the Earth system’s social subsystems: what is the 
anthropogenic impact on the biosphere, biodiversity, or 
the atmosphere, and how do the subsequent changes in 
their turn impact humankind or societies (Clark et al., 
2005; Leemans et al., 2009). Exceptions are the almost 
concluded Industrial Transformation Project, and the 
Earth System Governance Project. Aim of the Indus­
trial Transformation Project was to gain a better under­
standing of the options for combining economic and 
social development with a reduction of harmful envi­
ronmental impacts. Individual sub­projects explore a 
range of transformation­relevant aspects. 
The Earth System Governance Project is not a 
research project with a dedicated aim, but a network 
which links existing international research activities 
investigating governance systems for the avoidance and 
minimisation of anthropogenic negative impacts on the 
Earth system. 
Various ESSP reviews have concluded that the pro­
gramme has delivered key contributions in terms of 
comprehension of the complexity and vulnerability 
of the Earth system, and should be continued in the 
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future. However, the reviews also emphasise that in 
future, global change research must also increase its 
focus on the development of social strategies to achieve 
a sustainable society. Even at the beginning of the glo­
bal debate on global change research, scientists empha­
sised the importance of interdisciplinarity in terms of a 
tighter interlinking of natural and social sciences. How­
ever, to date, this interlinkage has not been adequately 
realised. Future exploration should therefore also focus 
on how social institutions and economies should be 
structured to induce behaviour changes in order to 
achieve global sustainability. This also includes techno­
logical and social innovations, including social accept­
ance of these innovations, to achieve global sustainabil­
ity (Reid et al., 2010; ICSU, 2010).
German Global Change Research
In Germany, the Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research (BMBF) funds various global change research 
projects. Again, as with the ESSP, the focus has so 
far been on understanding the Earth system, and the 
effects human behaviour (for example anthropogenic 
emissions) has had on it. However, future global change 
research in Germany should also increasingly focus on 
issues relevant to the transition towards a low­carbon 
society (NKGCF, 2008). 
8.1.2.3 
A New Research Field: Transformation Research
The necessity of accelerated diffusion of innovations, 
and the integration of systemic perspectives in applied 
research presume knowledge and understanding of 
transformation processes. First steps have already been 
taken, for example within the scope of global change 
research, or the research approaches discussed in Chap­
ter 3; these should however be modified to meet the 
challenge of the Great Transformation. In the view 
of the WBGU, this also requires the establishment of 
a new research field that goes beyond current global 
change research to accompany, support and accelerate 
the search process and the transformation’s global dif­
fusion. 
Better Understanding of Global Transformation 
Processes
Subject of the new, reflexive research field ‘transfor­
mation research’ should be the global transformation 
towards a low­carbon society under consideration of 
the sustainability guard rails and the tight timeframe 
(decarbonisation by 2050). Whilst output­wise, global 
change research is based on a systemic understanding 
of requirements for behavioural change and modifica­
tion, this output also doubles as input for transforma­
tion research. Aim of these research activities is there­
fore a better understanding of global transformation 
processes, their dynamics, the exploration of whether 
it can be shaped, and their acceleration. The WBGU rec­
ommends that the new research field focuses on the 
following key research themes:
Key Research Theme 1: Social Transformation 
Processes and Transformation Ability
The focus of the first key theme is on analysing past and 
present transformation processes and upheavals, with 
the aim of identifying central drivers and framework 
conditions. Already existing research approaches such 
as the transition management approach (Chapter 3), or 
historical transformation or innovation research, can be 
developed further for this purpose.
Apart from an understanding of transformation pro­
cesses, however, an understanding of the preconditions 
required for their political shaping, and to what extent 
societies already meet these requirements, must also be 
gained. 
Key Research Theme 2: Transformation Paths 
The new research field should also be tasked with the 
exploration and vivid illustration of what future soci­
eties which respect the planetary boundaries might 
look like. Possible social development paths and their 
respective implications on other elements of the bio­ 
and sociosphere require cross­disciplinary elaboration 
under consideration of future limits, as shown by way 
of example in Box 8.1­2
This research particularly calls for the integration, 
expansion and redirection of future research, and its 
close cooperation with various disciplinary research 
institutions, and model­based scenario development, 
to determine the modification or further development 
of existing models for possible new paths towards a 
sustainable global society. Potentially, this could also 
take the form of a further development of the BMBF’s 
‘Foresight’ processes. Vice versa, this new research field 
should also assess the impact of different social devel­
opment paths on natural life­support systems and soci­
eties as a whole.
Further subjects for the new research field deal with 
the monitoring, evaluation and the reflexive adjust­
ment of transformation processes depending on subse­
quent progress. This aspect also focuses on the devel­
opment of a (transformation) indicator, or a respective 
set of indicators. 
Key Research Theme 3: Scope for Acceleration
Apart from defining the social preconditions for a suc­
cessfully structuring, or the influenceability of trans­
formation processes, this theme should also examine 
what the options for accelerating such a process are. 
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Particular focus should be on the examination of social 
tipping points and central starting points, as identi­
fied in the first key research theme. Beyond a historical 
understanding, technical expertise is as relevant here as 
it is in insights into intercultural processes, not least in 
terms of the global dimensions and legitimacy. 
Key research theme 4: Global Cooperation and 
Global Transformations
The transformation towards a low­carbon society is 
inevitably also a global process which must be sup­
ported by the appropriate institutions and global gov­
ernance mechanisms. In this context, the as yet to be 
developed field of transformation research must exam­
ine whether and how global governance can support 
the processes investigated in the three key research 
themes elaborated above. This means that transforma­
tion research should examine the role of global gov­
ernance and global cooperation in historical transfor­
mation processes and times of major upheaval to learn 
from the past in order to shape the future. Moreover, 
it should investigate whether and in which form glo­
bal governance can support the structuring of future 
development paths towards climate­friendliness and 
sustainability. Transformation research would also have 
to explore how global governance processes, which are 
extremely time­consuming due to the great number of 
actors and the complexity of interest structures, can be 
accelerated. 
Box 8.1-2
Analysis of possible development paths with 
regard to the energy productivity of land area 
Future paths of the energy productivity of land area
The development of the energy productivity of land area 
(the land area needed for supplying the required per cap­
ita energy amount), and the analysis of its possible future 
paths can be seen as an example for the research content of 
research theme2 of the transformation research. Figure 8.1­2 
 illustrates the facts: it shows the relationship between per 
capita energy land area requirement and per capita annual 
energy turnover, in the past and up to date, and for two 
alternative future scenarios. From the hunter and gatherer 
cultures to the time of the Industrial Revolution, energy pro­
ductivity has significantly increased, particularly due to the 
increasing use of fossil energy sources. 
Society is now at a crossroads (industrial society); research 
should now identify options for future developments, and 
show the respective implications. The red path to ‘high energy 
society’ could, for instance, be followed via nuclear fusion. 
This would require no further physical space; it would, how­
ever, have significant other implications. As fusion technolo­
gies cannot make any significant contribution to the global 
energy supply by 2050, enormous amount of fossil energy 
would have to be used by then if the red path were followed, 
making climate stabilisation impossible. At the same time, 
the pursuit of this path rests on the illusion that the current 
development model can simply be continued. But even if suf­
ficient zero­carbon energy were available, other planetary 
boundaries would be transgressed in the medium­term, if 9 
billion people were to lead a western lifestyle with similarly 
high material flows. 
A development along the green path towards a ‘sustain­
ability culture’ via the use of renewable energies and the tap­
ping of efficiency potentials, on the other hand, leads to 
decentralisation, resulting again in increased land area use. 
The subsequent implications, such as, for example, land­use 
conflicts or conflicts with the local population, or in terms of 
development and implementation of technologies (Sec­
tion 5.4.5.3), should be taken into account and minimised (for 
example through shared use). 
Figure 8.1-2
Development of land area 
productivity. Shown is the per 
capita energy land area requirement 
compared to per capita annual 
energy turnover, in the past and 
up to date (black), and for two 
alternative future scenarios (red and 
green).
Source: WBGU, own illustration 
based on the data sources in 
Table 2.2 from Sieferle et al., 2006
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Problem Analysis, Problem Solving, and Problem 
Communication
In addition to the focus points in terms of content elab­
orated above, the new research field should be defined 
by a range of specific characteristics. In terms of the 
preconditions and possibilities for a global transforma­
tion towards a low­carbon society, this research can 
refer to the extensive knowledge stock of contribu­
tions by the established research traditions with regard 
to some aspects of the transformation process. This 
knowledge should be examined for transformation­rel­
evant issues, and be made available. 
To date, socio­scientific transformation research 
delivers important details and analyses regarding the 
influenceability and social embeddedness of transfor­
mation processes (Chapter 3). The new research field 
can therefore consolidate and combine methods and 
various different theories from a multitude of already 
existing research directions. This includes the socio­ 
scientific research on the transformation of political 
systems, the systemically oriented innovation research, 
historical research, and fresh approaches, such as tran­
sition management (Chapter 3), future studies can also 
deliver some approaches, as can the rather qualitatively 
carried out model and scenario research. In this respect, 
the inclusion of expertise from the engineering sciences 
is also important, as it can provide a thorough assess­
ment of the respective technological potentials and 
implications. Equally, the natural sciences can deliver 
the knowledge needed to analyse the interactions of 
various social development paths with the biosphere.
The new research field ‘transformation research’ is 
necessary as the present research approaches towards 
the integrated exploration of (global) transformation 
processes with a view to the imminent issues of sustain­
ability and limited natural resources must be expanded. 
Inter­ and transdisciplinary research approaches which 
have set themselves the task of overcoming social prob­
lems are just the beginning. However, they must also 
be developed further, in particular with regard to the 
proposed comprehensive perspective. Although there is 
some rudimentary knowledge about decisive transfor­
mation factors, little is known about the interaction of 
the influencing factors, especially in a globalised world. 
The new research field should also pursue a global, cul­
ture comparing perspective whilst accommodating local 
characteristics. A central issue here, as in all research 
for the transformation, is the communication and relay­
ing of research results to policy­makers, as they have 
to make the decisions required to shape the transforma­
tion, and to society as a whole, as, ultimately, society 
will have to assist implementing these transformation 
process relevant decisions. 
8.1.3 
Research Issues for the Transformation Fields
This section describes particularly relevant, trans­
formative (i. e. transformation promoting) research 
issues in the key transformation fields which must be 
answered to achieve the transformation towards a low­
carbon society. This report has already shown some 
first steps and measures for shaping the transforma­
tion (Chapters 5 and 7). The political imperative to act 
is here based on the current knowledge of future envi­
ronmental changes as a consequence of anthropogenic 
activities, and the resultant threat to the natural life­
support systems. In the WBGU’s view, this knowledge 
provides sufficient reasons for political intervention to 
accelerate the transformation. 
Naturally, the further development and expansion 
of this knowledge regarding environmental changes 
will continue to be relevant, not least for the trans­
formation. Earth system science examines, apart from 
other aspects, how rapidly potentially negative impacts 
affect the system, and at what point potentially critical 
thresholds will be exceeded (for example with regard 
to the stability of ice shields, or the survival of coral 
reefs), thereby also providing transformation process 
monitoring. Because these developments determine 
the pressure to act with respect to the transformation, 
and must be explored to allow detailed assessment of 
the various options for action (Chapter 1). In addition, 
these research results are an essential element of a 
reflexive, systemic research approach, which includes 
the option of shifting the research focus to accommo­
date new challenges. 
In the following, the WBGU mainly addresses 
research issues which are priorities in terms of deter­
mining the next steps towards the transformation, 
with the objective of its acceleration (transformative 
research). The issue at hand is therefore to identify 
technological, social and organisational options for the 
avoidance and mitigation of climate damaging impacts 
on the Earth system, and to develop strategies for their 
global diffusion. 
It should be noted here the following list of issues 
is by no means exhaustive, nor is it static. Research 
which, as part of the transformation, represents an 
active searching process, should address the newly 
emerging issues and partial aspects that will evolve 
from the interlinking of individual areas, and from 
the progression of the transformation. The following 
research issues were actually chosen because it can 
be expected that they will contribute significantly to 
acceleration, and to a reflexive understanding of the 
transformation. Because it is assumed that a science 
which addresses the listed subjects under considera­
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tion of the requirements identified in Section 8.1.1 will 
make major contributions to the success of the global 
transformation. However, it is vital that the individual 
issues are addressed systemically, and embedded in the 
context of sustainability at all times. 
To conform with the analyses in Chapters 4 to 6, the 
following research issues have been allocated to the 
three transformation fields, energy, urbanisation and 
land use. 
8.1.3.1 
Transformation of the Energy System
If energy research is to support the transformation effec­
tively, it is vital that the systemic perspective described 
in Section 8.1.1 again plays a key role. The three Ger­
man Academies of Science Leopoldina, acatech and the 
Berlin­Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Human­
ities fully support this notion (Leopoldina, 2009). It 
follows that technology development, which has so far 
been the focus, should only be one field of research, 
embedded within systemic research on the energy sup­
ply needs of human societies and the climate­friendly 
and sustainable provision of energy.
The analysis in Chapter 4 has revealed the following 
priorities for further technology development:
 > Provision of renewable and other zero-carbon ener-
gies: In the long term, to achieve the complete shift 
to an energy system based fully on zero­carbon 
energies as quickly and cost­effectively as possible, 
the various technologies for converting the renewa­
ble energy generated by sun, wind, biomass, water, 
ground heat and the sea must urgently be explored 
further. In all of these areas, research has the poten­
tial to unlock both short­term, incremental, and 
medium­ and long­term, groundbreaking improve­
ments in efficiency and costs (FVEE, 2010).
 > Efficient energy use in all sectors: This is a precondi­
tion for the transformation, presently not adequately 
taken into account by any of the political measures 
under discussion, or in the presently used energy 
models: technologies for the efficient use of electric­
ity, fuels or direct heat from renewable energies 
must be developed (further) in all consumption sec­
tors. A sustainable energy supply can only be 
achieved by containing the (final) energy demand. 
The exploration of end­use efficiency improvements 
must also include new business models for energy 
services.
 > Low-carbon mobility solutions: Endeavours should 
especially focus on the transport sector, as it 
 continues to rely on fossil­based liquid fuels due to 
a lack of modern technologies. Apart from (further 
research into) the use of alternative energy carriers 
such as, for example, renewable gases, which are 
also needed for freight transport, magnetic levita­
tion technology (maglev) should be explored further 
for long distance passenger transport. Particularly 
for short and medium distance mobility it is clear 
that sustainable transport systems not only require 
technological developments, but also interlinked 
research efforts under consideration of health, envi­
ronmental protection and urban aspects. 
 > Urban energy consumption: The specific role of 
urban areas as demand centres for energy, goods and 
services, buildings and mobility is frequently 
ignored, and often features in energy models only 
indirectly. Particularly because of the long lifespan 
of these infrastructure elements, extensive path 
dependencies exist in these areas. At the same time, 
options for climate protection are unlocked if urban 
planning is determinedly guided by greenhouse gas 
efficiency primacy, especially if energy efficiency 
potentials are also realised.
Chapter 4 made it clear that the conversion to renew­
able energies is only achievable if the energy distribu­
tion system undergoes some fundamental changes. In 
consequence, the following technical, economic and 
socio­scientific energy system research issues must be 
explored for the energy system:
 > Future European power grid: The rapid expansion of 
transcontinental power grids (supergrids) in regions, 
where the energy demand is already high, is 
extremely transformation­relevant, as the shift 
towards a low­carbon energy supply can be achieved 
most cost­efficiently within a single energy market. 
The stability and supply security of a continental 
supergrid should therefore be explored on the basis 
of models at the earliest possible point in time. Fur­
thermore, the cost of the various different expan­
sion variants must be determined, and alternative 
financing concepts for the expansion must be 
explored. Europe already has a high density of 
transmission lines, however, these must be modern­
ised and cross­border linked. Moreover, expansion 
must be pursued especially in locations with a high 
resource potential (North Sea/Atlantic coasts: wind; 
southern Europe: solar, etc.). For all of these steps, 
the required legal framework conditions must be 
clarified, and solid participative procedures for plan­
ning and line installation must be developed.
 > Storage technologies: Both continental supergrids, as 
planned for Europe, and decentralised minigrids, 
currently being considered for regions where there is 
no access to electricity as yet to overcome energy 
poverty, will require short­ and long­term storage 
facilities due to the high proportion of fluctuations 
in renewable energy supply. The exploration of dif­
ferent storage technologies and their optimised inte­
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gration into the energy grids should therefore be 
stepped up in future. Energy gases generated 
through the temporary power surplus of renewable 
energies, such as hydrogen or methane, represent a 
sustainable energy resource for fuels which, apart 
from their potential for electromobility use, can also 
lead to an extensively interlinked, integrated energy 
system beyond the electricity­heating­fuel bounda­
ries. 
 > Electricity market of the future: Currently under dis­
cussion is whether, assuming a rising share of fluctu­
ating renewable wind and solar energy, the currently 
marginal costs based electricity market continues to 
provide sufficient incentives for investments in gen­
eration capacities to guarantee supply security on 
the electricity market. The present debate therefore 
includes the discussion of proposals such as the 
introduction of capacity markets for conventional 
peak power stations, in line with discussions on pay­
ments in the balancing power market. The energy 
generated (and therefore the profit achieved on the 
current market) by conventional power stations 
decreases as the share of energy generated through 
wind and photovoltaic technology rises. However, 
their back­up supply is still needed until other 
options such as storage, or balancing with the aid of 
a European supergrid, are available. With regard to 
the fluctuating renewable energies, it must be 
explored which market regulation is the most appro­
priate for financing these plants once they are com­
petitive, and after the German Renewable Energy 
Source Act (Erneuerbare­Energien­Gesetz, EEG) has 
expired. Incentives for an efficient regional and 
 temporal distribution of generation capacities should 
be given. 
 > Impediments and barriers for a supranational energy 
policy: Suitable legal framework conditions are the 
basis for a transformation process that is based on 
scientific insights, as the contemporary situation, in 
contrast to past transformations (Chapter 3), the 
incentives for sustainable production and lifestyles 
must not least be provided by government interven­
tion (Chapter 5). There are still considerable gaps in 
the relevant research: the redirection of the global 
and supra­national energy supply proposed in Chap­
ter 4, for example, assumes a legal framework which, 
to date, does not exist. So far, even the European 
Union does not enjoy the legal authority to compre­
hensively steer the energy supply for its citizens. 
The installation of a trans­European supergrid would 
already require a law­making authority which the 
EU (to date) does not have. Such an extension of EU 
authority would have to be compatible with existing 
regulations, particularly EU constitutional law. To 
what extent restrictions apply, and whether the 
existing authority base might possibly suffice, needs 
to be examined by legal scientists. 
In addition, more general energy use issues must also 
be addressed, particularly illustrating the call for inter­
disciplinarity and a systemic approach:
 > Zero-carbon city: Both existing and currently 
 emerging urban regions require specific research 
approaches to determine cost­effective paths to 
 climate neutrality. Present low­carbon urban devel­
opment projects should be accompanied by socio­ 
scientific research. One aspect is the development of 
‘business concepts’ for both new, prototype cities 
such as Masdar City, and redevelopment projects 
like the one in Bottrop, which also examine the eco­
nomic viability and possible comparative advantages 
of such settlements.
 > Technology portfolio: It should be examined to what 
extent a sustainable global energy system needs to 
be a broad range of technologies, or whether a few 
selected technologies suffice. New modelling 
approaches pursue evolutionary strategies of alter­
native technology trees, and agent­based models of 
evolutionary developments. 
 > Exploitation of energy efficiency potentials: The 
 analysis of barriers impeding the full exploitation of 
energy efficiency potentials, and the development 
of strategies to overcome these, is an important 
research issue which is key to the mobilisation of the 
required investments. It still remains largely unfath­
omable why certain economically viable efficiency 
potentials are not fully exploited, even without car­
bon pricing. Further research is needed here, for 
example on the basis of the principal­agent theory, 
to discover precisely which barriers are responsible 
for this fact, both at individual and commercial level, 
and the role of asymmetric information, incomplete 
contracts and the discounting of future return on 
investment in this respect.
 > Enforcement of existing laws: Both Germany and the 
EU have instigated numerous legal measures to 
increase energy efficiency, for example the Act to 
Promote Energy Savings in Buildings (Energieein­
sparungsgesetz – EnEG), stipulating energy saving 
measures in buildings, and the German Energy Sav­
ings Ordinance (Energieeinsparungsverordnung – 
EnEV). In Germany, recent studies have revealed 
that energy efficiency targets are not even remotely 
realised, due to the lack of implementation at Ger­
man state level (Länder), and a lack of enforcement 
by the responsible state authorities (Ziehm, 2010). 
Intensive empirical research is therefore needed in 
the area of enforcement of efficiency­relevant cli­
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mate protection laws to allow the timely revelation 
of existing deficits and their rectification. 
 > Effective energy efficiency financing models: Further 
in­depth examination is needed with regard to the 
basic question of financing energy efficiency invest­
ments both in an industrial and a private household 
context. The potential role of energy efficiency 
bonds as a financing instrument should, for instance, 
be analysed, as this would redirect the capital of pri­
vate individuals or institutional investors towards 
efficiency investments at an attractive rate of inter­
est. The preconditions and framework conditions 
needed for the diffusion and effectiveness of rela­
tively new linked business and financing models, 
such as, for example, Energy Service Companies 
(ESCO) or Power Purchasing Agreements (PPA) 
should also be investigated more intensively in this 
context.
 > Impact of consumer behaviour: Apart from the uncer­
tainties regarding technical innovations on the sup­
plier side, the lifestyle­guided consumer behaviour 
on the demand side is the biggest source of uncer­
tainties in the development of energy scenarios. 
Socio­scientific research should therefore clarify 
what changes are actually possible on the demand 
side, and what can realistically be expected. The so­
called rebound effect, describing increased con­
sumption as an unwanted consequence of efficiency 
improvements, should also be better understood. 
These findings should be integrated in integrated 
assessment models, and taken into account in the 
development of energy scenarios. They also provide 
a basis for further research to identify the scope for 
effectively influencing consumer behaviour. In this 
context, the best way of raising consumer awareness 
of the impact of their behaviour should also be iden­
tified, to enable consumers to carry out the most 
effective emissions reductions themselves. Not yet 
completely understood is, for example, the signifi­
cance of indirect greenhouse gas emissions (Hert­
wich, 2005; Peters and Hertwich, 2008a,  b; Hert­
wich and Peters, 2009), a concept which examines 
broader regional disaggregation levels (for example 
the urban level), and is increasingly gaining in 
importance.
 > New technologies like CCS or geoengineering require 
society­wide risk assessment and control. Decisions 
are needed on ‘whether at all’, on ‘under what cir­
cumstances’, on ‘the level of risk deemed accepta­
ble’, and on ‘how’ with regard to the use of these 
technologies. The legal framework regarding the 
exploration and utilisation of these kind of technol­
ogies is currently only rudimentary. It is therefore an 
open question whether specific laws are needed 
with regard to research and testing, possibly extend­
ing over a finite period, and subsequently subject to 
review (and evaluation). Social acceptance based on 
participation in the law­making procedures for this 
area is the premise for any effective large­scale test­
ing and development of new technologies if they are 
to find subsequent acceptance in the population. It 
should therefore also be scientifically investigated 
what role early citizen participation could play in the 
development of new statutory foundations and 
transparent communication strategies in law­making 
processes (Section 7.4.3).
As elaborated in Section 8.1.1, it is important that these 
issues are not addressed independently, but inter­ and 
transdisciplinary, and that particularly technology­ori­
ented research refers back to, and is coupled with, the 
general, broader research described above.
8.1.3.2 
Transformation in the Field of Urbanisation
Urban infrastructures are characterised by their long 
lifespan. They set the course for decades and centu­
ries to come, and are the fundamental basis for con­
sumption patterns and scope of action (for example 
with regard to transport needs, and in the buildings 
sector). In view of the urgency with which the emis­
sions trend must be reverted to be able to restrict glo­
bal warming to a maximum of 2 °C, and the currently 
accelerated urbanisation process, this sector is of major 
importance for the transformation (Chapter 1). Science 
should investigate ways in which the globally progress­
ing urbanisation can be steered towards climate­friend­
liness without transgression of the planetary bounda­
ries. Major aspects are:
 > design issues and incentive structures for low­car­
bon urban transformation processes;
 > requirements for international cooperation;
 > essential research issues and joint research on 
urbanisation dynamics and their various sustainabil­
ity implications;
 > development of curricula on sustainable urbanisa­
tion.
Additionally, related paths should be identified to 
show what low­carbon cities might look like in 2030 
in different contexts (rampant urban sprawls in Africa; 
shrinking cities in Europe; cities designed on the draw­
ing board and growing metropolises in Asia,  coalescent 
urban regions in Europe, Asia, America, etc.). Cities 
are characterised by the huge complexity and heter­
ogeneity of actors and interest groups, turning them 
into hotspots of potential social conflict, as well as cli­
mate change impact. Research should here investigate 
how the different aspects can be effectively interlinked 
to reveal sustainable development paths that include 
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all components of sustainable development (ecological, 
economic, social).
Data on Urbanisation Trends
Global basic data on the phenomenon of urbanisa­
tion itself is needed. The UN data so often used is 
based on the respective country­specific definitions 
of urbanisation, which vary greatly. Also, only settle­
ments with more than 500,000 inhabitants are listed, 
which together accommodate less than 50 % of the 
global urban population. Methodically uniform global 
data, such as, for example the remote satellite­imagery 
derived data used for the Global Rural­Urban Mapping 
Project (CIESIN, 2005), is only available for a few indi­
vidual past points in time, and has been collated using 
differing methods. Projections regarding the future 
regional distribution of the global population and its 
socio­economic activities are limited to just a few aca­
demic studies (Grübler et al., 2007).
What would be needed would be complementary 
data that goes beyond these projections, on urban level 
infrastructure equipment and resource consumption. 
Current studies on this subject are largely limited to 
collected individual case studies. Again, these are dom­
inated by capital cities in OECD countries, which rep­
resent the global urban system only to a certain extent 
(GEA, 2011).
In most cases, urban land use and energy consump­
tion currently grow significantly faster than the city’s 
population. Identifying this development’s decisive fac­
tors is a precondition for developing regulating meas­
ures. Additional and methodically comparable data on 
new forms of urban living, working and mobility is 
required to allow simulations of integrated technical 
and social structures. 
Urban Culture and Lifestyle
It must be clarified what low­carbon city cultures and 
lifestyles might look like. Current trends should be ana­
lysed for this. The advent of cheap airlines, for example, 
has brought a rapid increase in weekend trips to major 
European cities, increasing air traffic and the respective 
emissions. On the other hand, cars are losing impor­
tance as a status symbol for younger people in western 
cities, but the new communication media are becom­
ing more important as a status symbol. The question is 
what impact these developments will have on mobil­
ity behaviour, and whether this can be actively influ­
enced. It must also be clarified how large­scale renova­
tion, refurbishment and modernisation processes, par­
ticularly those undertaken for energy saving reasons, 
in established and new residential districts impact on 
urban development and culture, to allow early identifi­
cation of potential undesirable developments and con­
flicting aims in order to be able to avoid them in future. 
Participation in Regional and Urban Planning
To work as efficiently as possible at community level, 
residents and the wider public must be systematically 
involved. Qualitative research into neighbourhood rela­
tions, residential properties and social environments – 
i. e. into social relationships, networks and living con­
ditions – is required. Particularly important research 
issues concern the forms of mediation, expertise and 
local knowledge which might be effective in terms of 
conflict prevention and mediation, to aid the mitiga­
tion of any social resistance against major infrastruc­
tural projects. Deliberative forms of planning and con­
sultation should therefore be developed, and it should 
be investigated how citizen participation in local polit­
ical processes, and participative accompaniment and 
shaping of the above named change processes, can be 
organised in the form of citizen assemblies, community 
parliaments, interest groups and societies. The genera­
tion of transferable data is again an important aspect.
Low-Carbon Regional and Urban Planning
Managing the energy system transformation described 
in Chapter 4, and the transformation of urban areas, 
requires cross­border regional and infrastructure plan­
ning (Section 5.4.5.3). To date, the existing relevant 
legal framework is limited. Its development there­
fore also calls for legal scientific research to take spa­
tial planning experiences and conclusions on board, to 
analyse the available range of instruments, and to draw 
conclusions from this for its further development.
8.1.3.3 
Transformation of Land Use
Transdisciplinary research can develop options for sub­
stantial emissions reductions through sustainable land 
use, and reveal paths, such as, for example, achieving 
the requisite increased food production in a climate­
friendly manner. Research efforts with regard to the 
efficient and fair inclusion of diverging interests, and 
the mitigation of land­use conflicts are hugely impor­
tant for a permanent transformation. Moreover, the 
eating habits of consumers are decisive. The following 
elaborates the research priorities in the subject area of 
land use.
Global Land Use: Monitoring, Models and Scenarios
Model and scenario development are important tools 
for the development of political strategies for the trans­
formation process, as these instruments help to eval­
uate the potentials of global land use in total, and in 
their various sectors. Key to a findings­driven transfor­
mation is therefore the continuous improvement of the 
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amount of land­use data. Apart from more extended 
and detailed land­use monitoring, methods for a relia­
ble quantification of emissions from land­use changes 
(deforestation, land degradation, desertification, soil 
erosion) and agricultural and forestry use, must be 
developed further with the aid of satellite imagery 
and observations at ground level. In addition, mod­
els on future land­use development and the resultant 
greenhouse gas emissions should be improved to allow 
a more accurate determination of this sector’s contri­
bution to total emissions, and to precisely record the 
effectiveness of various mitigation strategies, such as, 
for example, biomass use. Currently, there are only a 
few instruments which allow the simulation of global 
land­use strategies and scenarios. Overall, these works 
are important building blocks for a scientific basis for a 
global vision of future land use (Section 7.3.7).
Sustainability and Indirect Land-Use Changes
Land­use decisions in Germany or Europe can have con­
siderable remote impacts on sustainability, and in par­
ticular greenhouse gas emissions of other regions. Risks 
to the natural environment are caused by the additional 
cultivation of plants for biomass energy or material use, 
triggering or exacerbating direct or indirect land­use 
competition. This shift is given an international dimen­
sion via the world market for agricultural produce. So 
far, their interrelatedness has been difficult to quantify, 
however, they do play a decisive role in greenhouse gas 
balances. These interrelations must be investigated for 
the transformation of land use, as biomass use, in all its 
many varieties, will continue to grow in future, also in 
international trade. In recent years, research into the 
relevant methods or factors has increased, however, the 
results should be analysed in more detail to make them 
less difficult to apply for the various stakeholders. One 
of the aspects that should be improved is the regional 
differentiation with regard to the risks caused by emis­
sions from land­use change. 
In the course of the transformation towards a low­
carbon society, the clear distinction between biomass 
use for food, feed, energy and industry could become 
blurred, as these markets increasingly overlap. Natu­
ral scientific­technical and implementation­oriented 
research on the general sustainability certification of 
biomass should therefore be stepped up.
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation
On the subject of forests, it must be clarified how a for­
estry sector transformation can be achieved in the trop­
ical forest countries. Analyses on the drivers of forest 
loss, and of the reasons for the failure of present for­
est policies and pioneering efforts, form the basis for 
this. Moreover, concepts for sustainable tropical for­
est management must be developed, particularly with 
reference to the potential role of payments for ecosys­
tem services (Section 5.4.5.3). Furthermore, in view of 
the rapidly growing and uncontrolled huge number of 
REDD­plus initiatives and projects under the guidance 
of various international and national organisations, and 
their various ideas for financing REDD­plus, the best 
way to take the required social and ecological stand­
ards into account should also be examined. Various dif­
ferent research questions, regarding, for example, the 
national and international legal framework conditions, 
must be answered to, for instance, ensure that indig­
enous population groups and local communities are 
given the chance to participate, and to guarantee that 
their rights are respected, or to avoid the planting of 
extensive plantation forests in former peatlands. Also 
decisive is the analysis of the best way to formulate, 
or set, different models and incentives to achieve gen­
eral participation in REDD­plus, and the achievement 
of a high investment level. Moreover, it is important to 
understand how the fair and transparent distribution 
of the financial remunerations for REDD­plus can be 
organised, from national down to project level, and to 
what extent aspects of good governance and biodiver­
sity protection can be integrated as co­benefits. 
Agriculture and a Climate-Friendly Diet
Basic knowledge must be improved to develop and 
implement the global transformation aim of a climate­
friendly agriculture and eating habits. It must be clari­
fied how emissions can be reduced over the entire life­
cycle of agricultural produce. With regard to cultiva­
tion, the main task will be improving the proportions 
of organic carbon in the soils (soil recarbonisation) 
through improved soil management. However, this only 
partially concerns natural scientific­technical research; 
it should also be examined why current agricultural 
methods are not changed to tap the existing and well­
known potential for emissions reductions. In this con­
text, the effect of price incentives, subsidies and other 
political instruments must also be investigated. Agricul­
ture requires a number of innovations and their rapid 
diffusion to reduce its negative impacts on soils, cli­
mate and biodiversity, whilst also providing sufficient 
food for 9 billion people. To achieve this, science should 
clarify, on the one hand, which forms really are sustain­
able and climate­friendly. It is also just as important 
to review to what extent a catalogue of ‘best practice’ 
criteria for sustainable and climate­friendly agricul­
ture in the various regions can be developed, and what 
funds and instruments would be required at interna­
tional, national and sub­national level for their practical 
implementation. The transformation towards a climate­
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friendly agricultural sector calls for substantial invest­
ments. In this respect, it must be clarified how existing 
and additional funds may be mobilised, and how farm­
ers could gain access to the necessary capital. 
Transdisciplinary research is also needed to develop 
strategies for the avoidance of post­harvest indirect 
emissions, for example through rotting or wastage. 
Extremely important is the issue of eating habits: which 
trends are apparent in different parts of the world? 
How can instruments be developed to influence these? 
What is the best way to communicate information on 
sustainability and emissions to farmers and consumers? 
It should be clarified to what extent consumer deci­
sions can contribute to increased climate­friendlyness, 
and which price incentives, education and information 
strategies are appropriate for influencing eating habits 
positively towards this end.
Bioenergy Use
The imperative need for a systemic research approach 
becomes most apparent with regard to the subject of 
bioenergy. The WBGU has already stated its position 
on this subject in a previous report (WBGU, 2010a). 
The complex, reciprocal dependence of the technical, 
social, economic and ecological factors of bioenergy 
was exemplarily highlighted by the effects of increased 
bioenergy use on food production; this proves that the 
results of isolated research analyses do not suffice to 
assess the effectiveness of individual mitigation strat­
egies. On the technical side, next generation bioenergy 
use should therefore be explored, which should have 
less impact on food production. From the legal and eco­
nomic perspective, it should be clarified which propor­
tion of agricultural activities for food and bioenergy 
production is economically sensible, and which legal 
framework conditions can be established to ensure that 
particularly the poorest benefit from this economically 
ideal use.
8.1.4 
Analysis of Selected Research Strategies and  
Programmes 
The following sub­chapter analyses to what extent 
the selected research strategies and programmes meet 
transformation research demands, and to what extent 
they already address the research issues highlighted by 
the WBGU. The focus is on general, as well as subject 
specific, European Union and German federal govern­
ment strategies and programmes that are both politi­
cally prominent and thematically relevant. This elab­
oration is by no means a comprehensive evaluation. 
Rather, it intends to highlight the status quo, and start­
ing points for changes, and provides suggestions for 
the further development and direction of German and 
international research policies. 
Strategy and Programme Analysis Guidelines
Analysis and elaboration of the research strategies and 
programmes is based, on the one hand, on the crite­
ria shown in Table 8.1­1; these in turn are based on 
the transformation research demands discussed in 
 Section 8.1.1. On the other hand, they were matched 
with the transformation field research issues identified 
in Section 8.1.3. 
As already elaborated above, a reflexive and sys­
temic approach is key to this research. However, it is 
not included here as a separate criterion, but opera­
tionalised by the requirements of interdisciplinarity, 
transdisciplinarity, international scope, and the consid­
eration of diffusion conditions. 
The translation of the individual requirements into 
different criteria shown in Table 8.1­2 adds transpar­
ency to the analysis and facilitates their discussion. 
The results of the analysis are divided into the analysis 
areas ‘research aims’, ‘research structure’ and ‘research 
results’. They are also presented aggregated across sev­
eral programmes. This allows a highlighting of the cur­
rent research funding environment and reveals general 
transformation­relevant leanings and trends. Overall, 
the analysis rests on documents of a strategic and pro­
grammatic nature, i. e. the following conclusions may 
not necessarily apply to each individual project funded 
within the scope of these particular funding measures. 
8.1.4.1 
European Research Policy
The dedicated aim of current EU research policy is the 
establishment of a single European Research Area by 
2020, to allow the seamless movement of research­
ers, knowledge, and technologies among EU member 
states. The European Research Area as such is intended 
to contribute to the sustainable development and com­
petitiveness of the European Union. 
The basis for its further development is the 2007 
Green Paper on the European Research Area (EU COM, 
2007b). Important EU research policy elements which 
are constitutive to the European Research Area were 
also analysed: the Seventh Framework Research Pro­
gramme’s Cooperation programme (EU  COM, 2006a), 
the Joint Programming of Research Planning instru­
ment (Joint Programming; EU COM, 2008a), the Euro­
pean Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT; EU 
COM, 2008b), and the Joint Technology Initiatives (EU 
COM, 2005, 2007a). 
The thematically relevant strategies Strategic Energy 
Technology Plan (SET Plan; EU COM, 2009a), the Pub­
lic­Private­Partnership (PPP) roadmap for (more) 
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energy­efficient buildings (EU COM, 2010a), and the 
Knowledge and Innovation Centers (Climate KIC, 2011) 
within the scope of the European Institute of Technol­
ogy (EIT) were also considered. 
Goals
Most of these programmes feature climate­friendly­
ness as a direct or indirect partial goal – either in the 
form of integration in broader environmental protec­
tion targets, or as part of the more general objective 
of responding to social challenges. Even if climate­
friendlyness is a directly stated goal, as is the case, for 
example, in the PPP roadmap for (more) energy­effi­
cient buildings or the SET Plan, its level of importance 
is almost always equal to economic development and/
or competitiveness goals. Climate­friendlyness is not 
a goal of the Joint Technology Initiative. One of the 
stated objectives of Joint Programming is the financing 
of research to find solutions to social challenges. 
Of the three major aspects of sustainable develop­
ment – ecology, economy, society – most of the strat­
egies and programmes analysed directly and promi­
nently address the aspects of economic development 
and environmental protection. Social development 
aspects are only taken into account in the Green Paper 
on the development of the European Research Area.
Structure
All programmes and strategies analysed include inter­
disciplinary cooperation as a potential form of coop­
eration. The strategy for the creation of a single Euro­
pean Research Area also envisages the promotion of 
measures to support interdisciplinary research. How­
ever, none of the strategies analysed explicitly demand 
a commitment to interdisciplinarity, nor are the neces­
sarily participating disciplines precisely qualified. Only 
the PPP roadmap for (more) energy­efficient buildings 
formulates a few open research issues, thereby sug­
gesting that engineering and social sciences must coop­
erate to address these. The individual components of 
the Strategic Energy Technology Plan envisage purely 
technical research projects without any input from the 
social sciences.
Stakeholder cooperation is an option within the 
scope of all of the EU policies analysed, and, in most 
cases, an explicitly named goal. The process of creat­
ing an European Research Area names public­private 
cooperation as an explicit goal. However, cooperation is 
not described in detail as the documents analysed are 
broader strategies or frameworks. With a few excep­
tions, if there is any elaboration at all on the form 
stakeholder cooperation is to take, this usually involves 
only corporations. They are also the only stakeholders 
considered for direct involvement in the research pro­
cess. Society and policy­makers are usually named as 
Table 8.1-2
Criteria for the analysis of research funding strategies and programmes.
Source: WBGU
Analysis field Requirements Criteria
Goals Climate-compatibility Sole aim, partial goal, subordinate; conflicting aims
Embedding in the context of 
 sustainability 
Reflection of the interactive impact of own  research 
subject with other environmental problems, effects 
on sustainable growth and global equity in 
distribution
Structure Interdisciplinarity Cooperation between engineering and natural 
 sciences, or social sciences
Social relevance Diffusion of research results to policy-makers and 
society
Transdisciplinarity Co-operation with stakeholders 
Acceleration Political priority, adequate funding
International scope Integration of scientists from non-OECD countries
Results Technological and social innovations Generation of low-carbon alternatives to existing 
technologies and social practices; solution-orien-
tation 
Conditions for diffusion of innovations Consideration of global diffusion, acceptance and 
national or international framework conditions
Political strategies Development and discussion of political measures 
for the improvement of diffusion conditions, or 
transformation realisation
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recipients of research results only. Exceptions are the 
EIT, the EIT­funded Climate Knowledge and Innovation 
Community (KIC) and the Joint Programming Initiative. 
The EIT envisages that funded research should seek 
the dialogue with the civil society. The Climate KIC 
also involves representatives from the civil society, as 
it funds this research, politicians, and representatives 
from universities to aid the development of  curricula. 
Stakeholder research participation is an explicitly 
stated goal of the Joint Programming initiative. Corpo­
rate involvement is also an option, however, premise 
for the realisation of projects is the cooperation of vari­
ous different governments (Public­Public, rather than 
Private­Public). The PPP roadmap for (more) energy­
efficient buildings does not contain any direct refer­
ences on the integration of stakeholders. 
Grants under the Seventh EU Research Programme’s 
section ‘Cooperation’ amount to a total of € 32.4 bil­
lion. € 2.4 billion of this budget is intended for energy 
research, and € 1.9 billion is allocated to environmen­
tal issues, including climate change (EU COM, 2011c). 
The most substantial grants are € 9.1 billion for infor­
mation and communication technologies, and € 6.1 bil­
lion for health­related issues. For the period 2008 to 
2013, the European Energy Institute has a budget of 
€ 309  million, whilst fund for the PPP roadmap for 
(more) energy­efficient buildings amount to € 1 billion 
(2009 to 2013). Within the scope of European research 
funding, the issues of energy and environment/climate 
change are therefore, considering their major relevance 
for the transformation, clearly substantially under­
funded. 
The SET Plan does not fund any research at all as 
such; however, it suggests the amounts which should 
be invested in the various individual technology areas 
under the scope of the European Industrial Initiatives 
(EII) in order to develop affordable low­carbon tech­
nologies. The EU Commission has estimated the total 
investments required by industry, member states and 
EU over ten years to amount to around € 58.5–71.5 bil­
lion, with the funds allocated as shown in Table 8.1­3 
(EU COM, 2009b).
The SET Plan fund allocation clearly shows the EU 
Commission’s priorities; fossil and nuclear energy con­
tinue to enjoy major importance. The WBGU believes 
that wind and power grid technologies should be given 
far greater consideration. It should also be deliberated 
whether the SET Plan should be expanded to include 
not only the supply­side of energy technologies, but 
also the consumer­side, as energy efficiency also plays 
a major strategic role. Scientific research funding stud­
ies have also concluded that research funding priorities 
must shift (Grübler and Riahi, 2010; IEA, 2010b).
Compared to the Seventh EU Research Framework 
Programme and the SET Plan, initiatives which promote 
innovative research concepts, or at least do so rudimen­
tarily, such as the European Energy Institute, are rela­
tively small. The PPP energy­efficient buildings road­
map shows that the EU is certainly in a position to put 
on medium­scale, thematically accomplished research 
programmes in a relatively short time. This should also 
happen for transformation­relevant research pro­
grammes, such as, for example, magnetic levitation 
technology (maglev).
Although the majority of these strategies and pro­
grammes envisages international cooperation as an 
option, it is however a declared aim in only a few 
exceptional cases. International cooperation, if it is 
mentioned at all, is also not embedded in the sustain­
able development context. In the case of the European 
Innovation and Technology Institute, for example, 
international cooperation is merely intended to ensure 
the European economy’s competitiveness. The Strate­
gic Energy Technology Plan recommends international 
cooperation with industrialised countries in the areas of 
safety and social acceptance, and at basic research level. 
The international cooperation with newly industrialis­
ing and developing countries is intended to serve the 
unlocking of new markets for EU­manufactured energy 
technologies. Only the PPP roadmap for (more) energy­
efficient buildings states overcoming climate change as 
the objective of cooperation with developing countries.
Results
Almost all of the strategies and programmes analysed 
support exclusively technological, rather than social, 
innovations. However, the support of technological 
innovations does not unequivocally mean that climate­
friendlyness is their only goal. The Seventh EU Research 
Framework Programme, for example, supports innova­
tions in general, in principle, this also includes climate­
Table 8.1-3
Estimated Total Cost of European Industry Initiatives.
Source: EU COM, 2009b
European Industry 
Initiatives
Estimated Total Cost 
over 10 Years 
[€ billions]
Wind  6
Solar (PV & CSP) 16
Bioenergy  9
CCS 10.5–16.5
Power Grids  2
Nuclear  5–10
Smart Cities 10–12
Research for the Transformation  8.1
341
damaging innovations. One positive example is the EIT, 
which explicitly states the development of new prod­
ucts and services as goals. This also applies to the Joint 
Programming Initiative, on the basis of its stated goal 
of overcoming social challenges, i. e. social innovations 
could also be a goal. The SET Plan, on the other hand, 
explicitly states that only low­carbon technical innova­
tions are its goal. 
Across the board, the reflection of diffusion condi­
tions is taken into account through corporate participa­
tion. Their cooperation in research projects is intended 
to ensure that research leads to marketable products, 
and that these products are then distributed via the 
markets. The fact that further diffusion mechanisms 
besides markets will be required for the envisaged tech­
nological innovations is made clear only in the Strate­
gic Energy Technology Plan and the PPP roadmap for 
more energy­efficient buildings. However, it remains 
open whether the identification of the required diffu­
sion conditions should also be a part of each individual 
research project.
The strategies and programmes analysed provide no 
evidence of any intention of developing political strat­
egies for achieving these diffusion conditions. This is 
certainly due to the fact that the diffusion conditions 
are not explicitly reflected, or compared to existing 
markets. 
8.1.4.2 
German Research Policy
The next sections examine some German federal gov­
ernment cross­thematic research strategies and pro­
grammes: the High­Tech Strategy (BMBF, 2010a), the 
National Research Strategy BioEconomy 2030 (BMBF, 
2010b), the framework programme Research for Sus­
tainable Development (FONA; BMBF, 2009), Social­
ecological Research (SÖF; Pt­DLR, 2007) and the Joint 
Initiative for Research and Innovation (BMBF, 2010g). 
This is followed by an analysis of subject­specific 
research funding programmes. 
Goals
Almost all of the programmes and strategies analysed 
have stated climate protection alongside other environ­
mental goals, and the competitiveness objective. Cli­
mate protection is one of the key action fields in the 
High­Tech Strategy, and in the FONA framework pro­
gramme. BioEconomy and SÖF mention climate­friend­
lyness, and it is one of their priority goals. Only the 
Joint Initiative for Research and Innovation does not 
mention climate protection as a goal, as its main objec­
tive is the creation of dynamic networks within the 
science system and the establishment of partnerships 
between science and industry. 
An explicit reference to sustainability, and to the 
equal importance of all of the three sustainability 
aspects, can be found in both the FONA framework 
programme and the Social­ecological Research Pro­
gramme. The other strategies, and the BioEconomy 
strategy, mention sustainability as a goal, however, 
exactly how much importance is ascribed to each of its 
three dimensions remains unclear. The Joint Initiative 
for Research and Innovation makes no reference at all 
to sustainability. 
Structure
All programmes facilitate interdisciplinarity. It is a 
declared goal in the FONA framework programme, in 
the Social­ecological Research, and in the Joint Ini­
tiative for Research and Innovation. However, only 
the FONA framework programme, the Social­ecologi­
cal Research, and the BioEconomy Research Strategy 
explicitly promote cooperation of natural, engineering 
and social sciences. Within the High­Tech Strategy’s Cli­
mate Protection Programme, socio­economic research 
is still a separate part and not, at least at programmatic 
level, embedded or at all connected to the other pro­
gramme parts, which tend to focus on the natural and 
engineering sciences. 
All programmes include the goal of stakeholder par­
ticipation. However, with the exception of FONA and 
SÖF, these envisaged research programme participants 
are exclusively of a corporate nature. There is no inte­
gration of other social stakeholders. The BioEconomy 
Strategy considers society merely as the recipient of 
research results, it is, however, not involved in setting 
goals or carrying out research. 
International cooperation features in all pro­
grammes. Declared goals of the FONA framework pro­
gramme and the BioEconomy Strategy are academic 
capacity building in developing countries, and coopera­
tion with world­class research institutions. Cooperation 
with China and India is also explicitly mentioned within 
the scope of the High­Tech Strategy. Only the Joint Ini­
tiative for Research and Innovation does not state glo­
bal cooperation to be one of its goals. 
Results
Low­carbon innovations are the goal of most of the 
programmes analysed. Their focus, however, is on tech­
nological innovations. Only the FONA framework pro­
gramme and Social­ecological Research Programme 
also address social innovations. Particularly the Bio­
Economy Research Strategy should focus more on the 
search for social innovations. In view of the expected 
demand increases in the area of land use (Section 1.2), 
the focus should not merely be on increasing produc­
tivity on the supply­side. Research should also con­
8 The Knowledge Society’s Role in the Transformation Process: Recommendations for Research 
342
centrate to a far greater extent on demand­side effi­
ciency strategies and the substitution of particularly 
land­ or emissions­intensive products. Demand drivers 
should be analysed in more detail, and political strate­
gies should be developed. An important driver are eat­
ing habits featuring a high proportion of land­intensive 
animal products, which are hardly likely to be globalis­
able in a sustainable way. Research questions concern­
ing lifestyle changes in conjunction with eating  habits 
should be linked to health research issues. Another 
driver is the development of bioenergy, which can trig­
ger huge waves of increased demand. Uncontrolled 
bioenergy expansion bears significant risks in terms of 
sustainability and food security, and exacerbates land­
use conflicts. In its bioenergy report, the WBGU there­
fore included not only recommendations for technol­
ogy research, but also some bioenergy policy­making 
suggestions, for example with regard to standard set­
ting (WBGU, 2010a).
Both the FONA framework programme and the High­
Tech Strategy address the issue of innovation diffusion 
conditions. However, the High­Tech Strategy narrows 
diffusion conditions down to the aspects of favourable 
investment climate and corporate planning security. 
Only the FONA framework programme explicitly 
states the development of political strategies as one ele­
ment of research. As many social innovations appear to 
have been neglected as such, research into the political 
strategies for the diffusion of these is only rudimentary. 
Particularly the influence of demand for material serv­
ices, for example through prices, should be addressed 
by the BioEconomy Research Strategy.
8.1.4.3 
Energy Research Funding
In the field of energy research, funding in Germany 
largely continues to use the federal government’s super­
ordinated 5th Energy Research Programme for guid­
ance, which is to be reviewed in the spring of 2011. To 
allow an informed in­depth assessment of the strategic 
level of energy research funding in Germany, the 5th 
Energy Research Programme (5. EFP; BMWA, 2005), 
now almost six years old, was analysed along with the 
more current programme texts of relevant programme 
elements in the areas of energy efficiency (BMWi 
2008a, 2010a), smartgrids (BMWi, 2008b, 2010b), 
electromobility (Federal Government, 2010), as well as 
basic energy and environmental research (BMBF, 2008; 
BMU, 2009, 2010b, 2011). The somewhat succinct 
information regarding energy research contained in the 
German Federal Government’s Energy Concept (BMWi 
and BMU, 2010), which alluded preliminarily to some 
of the details later featured in the 6th Energy Research 
Programme, were also taken into account. 
Goals
As an element of environmental protection, climate 
protection is firmly anchored in the German energy pol­
icy goals. All of the programme texts reflect this aspect. 
However, whilst the 5th EFP still includes a balanced 
‘energy mix including hard coal and lignite’ (BMWA, 
2005) as the ultimate energy system to be pursued, 
the 6th Energy Research Programme, according to the 
Energy Concept, is to facilitate ‘the transition into the 
era of renewable energies’. The German federal govern­
ment has therefore taken a step towards the consistent 
concretisation of climate protection by way of a fully 
decarbonised energy system. The unambiguous formu­
lation of this guiding principle as a goal in the 6th EFP 
text would be desirable.
The importance of a secure and generally affordable 
energy supply to the German economy and society is 
emphasised in each case, however without addressing 
national and international distributional effects or the 
international sustainability impacts of different energy 
systems. Environmental compatibility is stated as one 
of the three cornerstones of energy policy. The envi­
ronmental impact of various different energy technolo­
gies, other than their impact on climate, are addressed 
explicitly only in the BMU’s ecological accompanying 
research within the scope of the 5th EFP.
Structure
Energy research funding programmes continue to show 
a deficit with regard to the structural requirements. 
Although interdisciplinarity is sometimes mentioned, 
it is not understood as a central element in targeted 
energy research, except in the sub­programme ‘Basic 
Energy Research 2020+’ (BMBF, 2008). Social sciences 
are referred to only in the BMU’s research on ‘gen­
eral research issues in the field of renewable energies’ 
(BMWA, 2005), and in some energy­relevant environ­
mental research concept projects. Their involvement is 
not a central aspect in any of the research funding pro­
grammes.
The direct participation of business actors in the 
research process is actively pursued, whilst cooperation 
with policy­makers and the civil society in research is 
not mentioned at all. The funding programme ‘Climate 
Protection and Energy Efficiency’ (BMWi, 2008a) 
at least includes a project to support the diffusion of 
the research results, the BINE information service, 
although here again, the primary target group is the 
medium­sized businesses, apart from decision­makers, 
investors, and multipliers in the education sector. 
The amount of energy research funding has sharply 
increased over the past five years, from € 450 mil­
lion in 2005 to € 691 million in 2010 (BMBF, 2010c). 
However, with 5.4 % in 2010 (€ 691 of 12.707 million; 
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BMBF, 2010c), energy research continues to attract a 
relatively insubstantial share of German federal gov­
ernment research and development funding. In 1991, 
at 7.1 %, this share was still considerably higher than 
in 2010; even the absolute value of grants, at slightly 
more than € 700 million, exceeded the 2010 values 
(BMWi, 2011). In 2010, 25.6 % (€ 177 million) were 
spent on nuclear energy research, decommissioning of 
nuclear plants and nuclear fusion research. The remain­
ing funds, totalling € 514 million, were allocated to coal 
and other fossil energy carrier related research and 
development, and research into renewable energies and 
efficient energy use (BMBF, 2010c). 
Whilst the 5th ERP originally enjoyed a budget of € 
1.7 billion over 4 years (BMWA, 2005), the 6th ERP is 
to be more substantially funded through grants from 
the Energy and Climate Fund (BMWi and BMU, 2010). 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates 
that current public funding for research on renewable 
energy, energy efficiency and smartgrids, presently 
US$ 5.5 billion annually, would have to be extended by 
a factor of between 6 and 13 to implement ambitious 
climate protection (IEA, 2010b). The European Com­
mission estimates that by 2020, € 31 billion will have 
to be invested in wind, solar and bioenergy research 
and development in the European Union to meet the 
challenge of climate change, provide energy secur­
ity, and ensure economic competitiveness (EU COM, 
2009b). In view of this, German federal government 
energy research funding should be extended consider­
ably faster than in recent years, with a clear focus on 
renewable energies and efficient energy­use.
The grants extended in the area of nuclear fusion 
research – this field enjoyed grants of € 143 million in 
2010, or 21 % of total energy research funding (BMBF, 
2010c) – are still extremely substantial, and should be 
adjusted to take the current situation into account. By 
2050, i. e. over the period in which the transformation 
towards a low­carbon society must be concluded, power 
plants generating energy from nuclear fusion will not 
be available, The potentially possible long­term contri­
butions to the energy supply from this source should, 
however, not be discounted completely; this could be 
achieved through extending research efforts over a 
longer period of time in order to release funds for work 
with a higher priority.
International research cooperation is an element of 
every large­scale programme. However, this coopera­
tion explicitly focuses on EU and OECD countries, and 
direct EU and IEA cooperation. As noted by the BMWi, 
although only OECD countries are IEA members, the 
IEA at least pursues closer cooperation with the impor­
tant countries: Russia, China, and India (BMWi, 2008a).
Results
In the WBGU’s view, research generally continues to 
focus excessively on technical applications. Identi­
fication of the requisite diffusion conditions, and of 
the political measures potentially suitable to lend the 
appropriate support, continues to enjoy little atten­
tion, although this appears to be changing. The major­
ity of research is carried out in the engineering and nat­
ural science disciplines, i. e. the main focus is the devel­
opment of technological innovations aimed at more 
efficient, cheaper and more environmentally friendly 
energy use. However, there are also other projects pur­
suing the development of new behavioural patterns 
and business models in the area of energy use, par­
ticularly the E­Energy development scheme (BMWi, 
2008b). In future, this focus should also be extended in 
other programmes, especially those relating to energy 
demand and efficiency improvement.
In most cases, energy technology research is viewed 
as a contribution to improving export opportunities 
for German companies; global diffusion is therefore 
taken into account. National framework conditions for 
the blanket implementation of these innovations are 
sometimes taken into consideration, for example in the 
concept ‘The Energy Efficient City’ (BMWi, 2008a). 
Even though a changed energy base has been a decisive 
element in every Great Transformation to date (Chap­
ter 3), and despite the realisation that a systemic change 
to modern, renewable energies is imminent, there is not 
a single research programme for the systematic analysis 
of energy system transformation processes. However, 
within the scope of several programmes, energy sys­
tem and integrated assessment models (Section 4.2) are 
used to develop scenarios to illustrate energy use over 
the next decades (BMWi, 2008a, 2010a; BMU, 2010b). 
It is not clear to what extent these research results are 
used to determine research priorities for individual 
technologies.
The development of political strategies for innova­
tion diffusion does not feature prominently in any of 
the research programmes; at most, these kind of issues 
are addressed in the course of accompanying research.
Content Comparison 
In terms of content, the focus of German federal gov­
ernment research funding in the area of energy has 
clearly shifted in recent years, towards the issues iden­
tified by the WBGU as vital for the realisation of a 
decarbonised energy system.
In 2005’s 5th EFP, the key aspect of ‘Modern Power 
Plant Technologies on the Basis of Coal and Gas’ is 
still top priority, followed by other various renewable 
energy and energy efficiency related aspects. The 6th 
EFP energy concept elaborations, on the other hand, 
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focus exclusively on renewable energies, energy effi­
ciency and questions related to the integration of a func­
tioning energy system, thereby matching the research 
areas identified by the WBGU as priorities with regard 
to the energy system (Section 8.1.3.1). Decisive in this 
context is that this acknowledgment of the priority of 
renewable energies with regard to the future energy 
system during the course of developing the 6th EFP is 
then followed by a further increase in research funding 
focussing on these issues.
To be commended are the content key aspects of 
the ‘E­Energy’ funding programme (BMWi, 2008b), 
and those of the ‘future energy supply grids’ funding 
concept (BMWi, 2010c). Many of these agree with the 
WBGU recommendations regarding smartgrid develop­
ment (Chapters 4, 7). The WBGU suggests a thematic 
expansion from power to energy grids to allow for the 
consideration of systemic energy solutions from the 
outset. 
Overall, both systemic and global issues should play 
an even bigger role in energy research, as this research 
is tasked with discovering stable paths towards achiev­
ing the goals identified in the German federal govern­
ment’s energy concept. Research should step up the 
systemic investigation of the preconditions requisite to 
accelerating the change process, such as, for example, 
social acceptance, the mobilisation of high investments, 
and how to interlink the various elements of the trans­
formation (Section 8.1.3.1).
8.1.4.4 
Urbanisation Research Funding
Several German urbanisation research programmes are 
currently running in the form of bilateral cooperation 
between German and international research institu­
tions. This also includes the Federal Ministry’s of Edu­
cation and Research ‘Future Megacities’ programme 
analysed in the following (BMBF, 2010d). The follow­
ing also elaborates on the Federal Ministry’s of Trans­
port, Building and Urban Development research pro­
gramme ‘Experimental Housing and Urban Develop­
ment’ (ExWoST), as this includes an explicit reference 
to climate with the research field ‘Urban Strategies and 
Potentials to Combat Climate Change’ (BMVBS, 2010b). 
A look at EU research shows that urbanisation 
research is also promoted at this level. According to 
the European Commission, there are over 20 current 
projects dealing with this subject (EU COM, 2010g). 
Goals
Explicit objective of the BMBF programme ‘Future 
Megacities’ is the development of ‘a toolbox, equipped 
with applied, tried and tested and transferable solu­
tions for dealing with the challenges energy efficiency, 
resource consumption and climate change’ (ad hoc 
translation by the WBGU, based on BMBF, 2010d). Cli­
mate­friendlyness is therefore included as a goal. Pro­
grammatically, the necessity of a course change towards 
initiation of the transformation process has also been 
acknowledged. The ExWoSt programme focuses more 
on adaptation to climate change, particularly in the 
property sector. Urbanisation related programmes fre­
quently tend to focus more on adaptation than on miti­
gation potentials. Nevertheless, there is a connection to 
climate protection here in the form of potential energy 
savings, as the programme objective is ‘to plan, develop 
and realise in an exemplary way technical and non­tech­
nical innovations for the establishment of energy­ and 
climate­efficient structures’ (BMVBS, 2010b). Projects 
with a sustainability context running within the scope 
of the Seventh EU Research Framework Programme’s 
Socio­Economic Sciences and Humanities (SSH) fund­
ing are aiming for ‘post­carbon cities’, thereby address­
ing transformation­relevant issues. 
In general, international programmes also consider 
the sustainability context. This is done explicitly in 
the BMBF ‘Future Megacities’ programme. At German 
national level, the BMBVS ExWoSt programme is nar­
rower, due to its (more) specific focus on properties and 
communities, using model plans and pilot projects; it 
does not explicitly take interaction with other sustain­
ability aspects into account. 
Structure
In principle, all of the named programmes feature 
interdisciplinarity. The ‘Future Megacities’ programme 
is broadly structured on account of its ten bilateral 
projects’ thematic key aspects, ranging from hydrology 
(LIWA) to future research (EnerKey), from cooperative 
sciences (Sustainable Hyderabad) to political sciences 
(Metrasys). Nevertheless, more weight is obviously 
accorded to urban and regional planning, and the engi­
neering sciences. Under the BMVBS programme, each 
project is supported by accompanying research. On 
site, this is based on areas such as urban construction 
and traffic (Aachen), urban planning and construction 
(Essen), geography (Nuremberg), but also ecology and 
communication (Syke; BBSR, 2009a). At EU level, the 
various disciplines are also linked, for example ‘Science 
of Citizenship’ and metallurgical engineering (PACT), or 
political sciences and sociology (GILDED). 
All of the named programmes promote stakeholder 
involvement. Cooperation is pursued at different levels: 
local authorities and civil society are involved to the 
same degree as representatives of the economy.
Goals should also be consolidated in order to reach 
a certain dimension in terms of funding. ‘Future Mega­
cities’ receives a total of € 50 million in funding over 
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a period of 9 years (2005–2013) from the framework 
programme ‘Research for Sustainable Development’ 
(FONA), whilst nine cities received grants of up to 
€ 80,000 in connection with the ExWoSt research field 
‘Urban Strategies and Potentials to Combat Climate 
Change’ (BBSR, 2009a). German federal government 
spending on research and development in the funding 
area of spatial and urban development is going down 
again after it had increased for a while. € 16.4 million 
were spent in 2005. The 2009 budget amounted to € 
25.8 million, which was reduced to € 20.5 million in 
2010 (BMBF, 2010d). Government spending on con­
struction research shows a similar trend. In 2005, the 
German federal government spent € 26.9 million, in 
2009, the budget was € 38 million, and in 2010 € 26.4 
million.
As all programmes lack the concrete target of low­
carbon urbanisation by 2050, funding is not of a scale 
commensurate with the tight timeframe and the pres­
sure to act. To be welcomed is the fact that particularly 
the BMBF programme, thanks to numerous coopera­
tion­based projects, aims at internationality. It would 
generally be advisable if development cooperation 
and research were to work together at an international 
level. The Cities Development Initiative for Asia (CDIA), 
for example, promises to generate relevant data whilst 
enjoying funding from the German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). 
Research, however, does not appear to be an integral 
part of the programme here. 
Results
Social relevance through the integration of rele­
vant stakeholders is called for in all cases, as the pro­
grammes pursue applied solutions. It is the focus on 
transferable solutions that makes the development of 
technological and social innovations the implicit goal of 
these programmes, as problematic urbanisation issues 
can only be solved through these. None of the pro­
grammes directly addresses innovation diffusion con­
ditions. However, the BMVBS ExWoSt programme aims 
to identify ‘framework conditions which favour inte­
grated concepts and cooperation to achieve climate 
protection targets’ (ad hoc translation by the WBGU, 
based on BBSR, 2009b). As there is however no focus 
on technical aspects, it is not clear whether the diffu­
sion conditions for technical innovations are taken into 
account here. 
Content Comparison
The issues addressed in the application­oriented pro­
grammes considered are generally to be welcomed, 
as they represent important systemic transformation 
research aspects. 
As they feature international cooperation and a 
focus on solution­oriented research, the programmes 
at least partially match the content recommended by 
the WBGU (Section  8.1.3.2). Accordingly, solution­
oriented approaches reflected in the initiatives should 
enjoy substantially increased funding, and therefore 
considerable expansion, assuming the transformation 
as a concrete, set target. The consolidation of measures, 
and ensuring that the research results and data gener­
ated are transferable are also vital.
Particularly the cultural aspects, which – as they 
determine innovation acceptance and diffusion and 
consumption behaviour – are central to the transfor­
mation success, are not sufficiently taken into account 
in the programmes, or not explicitly mentioned. It is 
therefore to be expected that although cultural aspects 
will impact somewhat as a consequence of international 
cooperation, the targeted generation of relevant data 
and their comparability is being neglected. This also 
applies to legal framework conditions, even though 
ExWoSt is an exception here at national level. 
If rapid transformation is the set normative target, 
as recommended by the WBGU, and in accordance with 
sustainable urbanisation, the present research fields 
contain valuable elements which should be integrated 
into a low­carbon urbanisation research approach at 
global level. 
8.1.4.5 
Land-Use Research Funding
In the area of land use, the German federal government 
research strategies and programmes elaborated above, 
such as the National BioEconomy Research  Strategy 
2030 (BMBF, 2010b), Research for Sustainable Devel­
opment (FONA), and Social­ecological research (SÖF) 
represent an important overall context (Section 8.1.3.2).
In the following, research funding for ‘Sustain­
able Land Management’ (NLM) (BMBF, 2010e), which 
started in 2010, and the Global Research Alliance on 
Agricultural Greenhouse Gases (GRAAG, 2010), in 
which Germany is actively involved, are examined with 
regard to their transformative aspects. In addition, the 
Seventh EU Research Framework Programme’s (FRP7) 
relevant subjects are also considered, i. e. Theme 2: 
‘Food, agriculture, fisheries and biotechnology’, and 
Theme 6: ‘Environment’ (including climate change) (EU 
COM, 2010b, c). 
Goals 
Climate protection is stated as a goal, or partial goal, 
in all of the programmes and strategies analysed. The 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions is anchored 
in the NLM as a partial goal; the contribution of land­
use changes and land management strategies to green­
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house gas emission reduction targets is to be researched 
systemically. Beyond this, any goal­related conflicts 
between best­possible low­carbon land management 
and other social demands, such as food production, bio­
diversity conservation or ecosystem functions are also 
to be investigated. The GRAAG focuses mainly on mak­
ing agriculture more climate­friendly by mitigating the 
emissions intensity in general, and increasing the soil’s 
capability for carbon sequestration. The relevant FP 7 
themes, however, focus on supporting climate change 
adaptation as a research goal; climate­friendlyness as 
such is not directly addressed. 
The analysed programmes are generally embedded 
in a sustainability context. Particularly the NLM, as a 
Research for Sustainable Development (FONA) fund­
ing priority, but also GRAAG are intended to contribute 
directly to sustainable development, in accordance with 
the national sustainability strategy goals and the Ger­
man federal government’s climate protection targets. 
They take the interrelatedness of their own research 
with other problematic sustainability issues into 
account, and consider global sustainable development 
challenges such as food security, for example. The ana­
lysed FRP7 themes are intended to contribute to the 
European Sustainability Strategy.
Structure
All of the analysed programmes pursue and promote 
some kind of interdisciplinary approach. The NLM par­
ticularly pursues an interdisciplinary research approach, 
and the interlinking of sectoral expert knowledge by 
way of acknowledging the complexity of a sustainable 
land management. 
Stakeholder cooperation is addressed in all of the 
measures analysed as a structural element, it does, how­
ever, play a secondary role in the FRP7’s themed sub­
jects. The NLM pursues a transdisciplinary approach in 
order to promote involvement of regional actors and 
recipients and a better understanding of the problems 
so as to be in a position to develop corresponding, prac­
ticable solutions. Beyond this, external communica­
tion and the development of points of interface with 
political processes play an important role so that the 
results can be made available to potential user groups, 
and transferred to international political processes. 
GRAAG also features stakeholder work as an inher­
ent element in order to, on the one hand, be able to 
integrate practical experience into the research process 
and, at the same time, be able to communicate research 
results, technologies and best practices right to the tar­
get groups’ core (research institutes, farmers (associa­
tions), NGO, private sector). 
With € 100 million by 2015, the extent of research 
funding for the NLM is not adequate to meet the huge 
challenge of sustainable land use in a progressive cli­
mate change and food security context. The WBGU 
therefore recommends that NLM research funding 
should be increased to cope with the imminent trans­
formation in the area of land use, and to accelerate it, 
as it must be largely completed by 2050.
The NLM funding measures should concretise the 
German federal government’s strategy for the inter­
nationalisation of science and research. International 
networking is therefore an important aspect in NLM 
research, hence global regions with extremely dynamic 
growth (for example southern Africa, Brazil, China) are 
involved. Germany’s active participation in GRAAG 
is an important step to promote international agricli­
mate research networking, particularly with non­OECD 
countries, and to bring together researchers, as well as 
their research results, from different regions all over 
the world. The FRP7’s themed subjects also state inter­
national cooperation as an important precondition for 
successful research. 
Results
The programmes and strategies generally all mention 
the goal of developing technological and social inno­
vations. The NLM is explicitly tasked with the devel­
opment of innovative technologies and services (for 
instance with regard to the areas of information, advice 
and financing) for sustainable land management. In 
addition, this also includes the important aspect of 
technology impact assessment. Moreover, NLM and 
GRAAG directly refer to innovations intended to lead 
to greenhouse gas emission reductions.
The NLM funding priority emphasises communica­
tion, networking and public relations work. Solutions 
are to be developed and diffused which can help soci­
ety progress towards sustainable development. These 
are to have a role model character, i. e. they are to be 
transferable to other regions, and actor cooperation 
and communication is to be increased. This also covers 
innovative governance and participation models. Par­
ticular consideration, also in terms of implementation, 
is here given to the socio­economic framework condi­
tions for, and the consequences from, the integration 
of climate protection targets in land­use decisions. The 
GRAAG aims to internationally improve the low­carbon 
agricultural research network, to expand platforms and 
make knowledge more accessible, and to communicate 
research results more widely. The regional and national 
exchange between different target groups (research 
institutes, farmers (associations), NGO, private sector) 
on new findings is to be improved. 
Communication of the research results to policy­
makers is generally acknowledged as important in all 
of the programmes and strategies. Within the scope of 
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the NLM, the research results are to be communicated 
to policy­makers and practical applicants, and politi­
cal measures are to be discussed (science policy inter­
face). The research results are also to be taken on board 
in important policy­making processes under CBD and 
UNFCCC. The FRP7 theme subjects analysed state the 
goal of at least supporting policy development. 
Content Comparison 
The NLM funding priority has been reviewed and 
updated in its research approaches. The WBGU wel­
comes the international perspective taken with regard 
to research issues on the interrelated impact and 
mutual dependencies between land management, cli­
mate change and ecosystem services. The systemic 
investigation of future land management under consid­
eration of climatic, but also structurally­demographic 
changes in rural and urban areas also promises impor­
tant impulses and innovative solutions for the transfor­
mation in the subject area of land use.
The GRAAG focuses specifically on innovation solu­
tions for agricultural sector emissions reductions at an 
international level, which the WBGU also views as deci­
sive (Chapter 4). 
The analysed FP 7 theme subjects 2 and 6 view 
climate change under the aspect of adaptation to cli­
mate change and supply security for the population. 
The research issues highlighted by the WBGU are not 
reflected in the analysed theme subjects in terms of 
content; the ‘Greenhouse Gas Management in Euro­
pean Land Use Systems’ project is the only one that 
has any bearing on these in the widest sense (Section 
8.1.3.3).
8.1.4.6 
Funding of Research in the Humanities and Social, 
Economic and Legal Sciences
Considering the priority research issues named above 
(Section 8.1.2), there are also a range of other issues and 
initiatives deserving priority funding besides the large­
scale strategies and programmes which – if correspond­
ingly structured – could provide valuable insights and 
contributions to the transformation. The following were 
examined: Economics for Sustainability (‘WiN’; ecolog­
ical economy 2007; BMBF, 2005, 2009), ‘Knowledge­
based decision making – research on the relationship 
between science, politics and society’ (BMBF, 2011a, 
b), ‘Economics of climate change’ (BMBF, 2011c), ‘Käte 
Hamburger Collegia’ (BMBF, 2011d) and ‘Interaction 
between Natural Sciences and the Humanities’ (BMBF, 
2011e).
Goals
With the exception of WiN, no direct reference to cli­
mate protection, or to any of the three sustainability 
aspects, is made, as the goals are mostly formulated to 
describe the goals in a specific funding context. The 
goals mentioned, such as the investigation of the inter­
action between politics, science and society, long­term 
capacity building in the economic sciences, or a mutual 
augmentation of humanities and natural sciences can 
also have a transformation­supportive effect, although 
feedback with regard to a superordinated common goal 
would also be useful.
Structure
All funding measures mention interdisciplinarity, albeit 
differently designed. Some only demand consideration 
of interdisciplinary aspects within the scope of a pri­
marily disciplinary research (for example ‘Economics of 
climate change’). 
Stakeholder participation in the sense of transdisci­
plinary research is prominently anchored only in WiN, 
which attempts to integrate relevant actors from differ­
ent areas and levels of practical application. Although 
reception of research is given some attention, particu­
larly in politics, there is no plan to involve actors from 
society in the actual research process. The demand for 
‘research with’, rather than ‘research on’, voiced when 
the Käte Hamburger Collegia were announced, should 
therefore be expanded, from the aspect of internation­
ality to this kind of networking between academics and 
stakeholders.
Concerning the promotion of internationality, it 
should be noted that despite mentioning this aspect, 
none of the programmes explicitly refer to a coopera­
tion with research institutions in non­OECD countries. 
Results
To what extent any of the funded research projects 
actually have concrete technical and social innovations 
as their goal is not evident from the programmes. Social 
innovations may potentially be what is meant when the 
development of strategies, for example in the case of 
WiN and ‘Knowledge­based decision making’, or cor­
porate measures, as is the case in ‘Economics for cli­
mate change’, is called for. A clearer definition of the 
research output to include suggestions for (potential) 
direct application, for example in the form of new busi­
ness models, would be advisable in all cases.
There are also no concrete statements from which 
it could be inferred that the formulation of innovation 
diffusion conditions is in any way a research priority. At 
least, during the first WiN funding phase (2005–2008), 
international diffusion processes and their macroeco­
nomic effects were empirically analysed; ‘Economics 
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for climate change’ also highlighted the fact that there 
is a knowledge gap with regard to the diffusion of tech­
nologies and services. A broader examination of dif­
fusion conditions might be introduced as one element 
of the ‘Interaction between Natural Sciences and the 
Humanities’ funding priority. 
The research output focus of the first three initia­
tives named – WiN, ‘Knowledge­based decision mak­
ing’, and ‘Economics of climate change’ – is on for­
mulation and analysis of political instruments. Whilst 
the first and the third tend to concentrate more on the 
development and evaluation of environmental and cli­
mate protection measures, the second initiative hopes 
to build up socio­scientific advisory capacities for 
research policy.
With regard to the research results, the structuring 
of the various programmes therefore shows a job­shar­
ing character. This leads to the question of whether a 
kind of synergy might result from a superordinate coor­
dination and an institutionalised exchange between the 
programmes.
Content Comparison
The contents of the initiatives discussed here are clearly 
defined by the respective specific goal formulation. In 
the case of the collegia, which tend to envisage more 
structural goals, as does ‘Economics of climate change’, 
the research contents can even be chosen quite freely 
by the applicants. The systematic comparison with the 
research issues identified by the WBGU is therefore not 
possible. However, it should be noted that some of the 
issues highlighted by the WBGU are certainly already 
anchored in current projects, such as, for example, glo­
bal fairness issues, or the acceleration and global exten­
sion of diffusion and transformation processes.
8.1.4.7 
Conclusions
The analysis shows that research policy and science are 
addressing the low­carbon transformation, both the­
matically and organisationally. A number of the ana­
lysed research strategies and programmes already take 
subjects, contents and methods on board which ensure 
that the research is led by the demands of the trans­
formation, and therefore produce transformation­rel­
evant knowledge. 
The goal of climate protection is directly or indirectly 
anchored in most of the analysed programmes. Climate­
friendlyness is frequently put on an equal footing with 
the goals of economic growth or competitiveness. The 
interlinking of both goals at strategical level, and the 
operationalisation of this close link through research 
on innovative, low­carbon technologies is reasonable. 
However, the programmatic equality of the goals of cli­
mate protection and economic growth must not lead 
to the illusion that in practice, achieving both goals is 
extremely challenging, and may not always happen at 
the same time. The more general goal of climate pro­
tection should be amended and made more precise 
through the goal of almost complete decarbonisation 
by 2050. It is the precondition for compliance with the 
2 °C guard rail, and requires the vast acceleration of all 
climate protection activities, a fact that research should 
also address.
With regard to embedding research in the sustain­
ability context, it can be noted that the references to 
the social dimension must continue to be expanded. 
The cross­disciplinary research programmes FONA and 
SÖF’s promising approaches on social dimension inte­
gration, and those contained in funding priorities such 
as ‘Sustainable Land Management’ or ‘Future Mega­
cities’ should be extended to all research, for example 
also in the energy area. 
With regard to research structure, the conclusions 
are ambiguous. Although interdisciplinarity is an option 
in all cases, it is never a declared, or even obligatory, 
funding criterion, except under SÖF and Sustainable 
Land Management. In many cases, it can be expected 
that turning strategies into actual research projects will 
lead to interdisciplinary research. However, as long as 
interdisciplinarity is not a set goal and funding crite­
rion, it remains to be seen how often, and in what form, 
it will actually be realised at project level. Particularly 
questionable is whether the all­important cooperation 
between natural and engineering sciences and social 
sciences and humanities will actually take place. 
Ultimately, this rather unusual, but for the transfor­
mation extremely important cooperation depends on 
the research issues identified in each of the funding 
opportunity announcements, and the scientists’ reac­
tion. At programme level it transpires that SÖF in par­
ticular, but also NLM and some elements of urbanisa­
tion research, have a very strong interdisciplinary focus. 
The BioEconomy Research Strategy also emphasises 
the importance of interdisciplinary research. Whether 
the funded programmes will ultimately contain the 
requisite interdisciplinarity between natural, engineer­
ing and social sciences remains to be seen during the 
course of future funding opportunity announcements. 
In the WBGU’s view, other programmes, such as BMWi 
Technology Promotion or the National Mobility Devel­
opment Plan (NEP), do not consider this aspect ade­
quately. 
Likewise, stakeholder participation is also only par­
tially integrated. Although policy­makers and relevant 
social stakeholders are sometimes named as important 
recipients of research results, it is mostly only corpo­
rations that are involved in the actual research pro­
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cess. Corporate involvement is important with regard 
to technological capacities, its capital and market close­
ness. However, the participation of a wider spectrum 
of stakeholders in sustainability research is vital. Posi­
tive exceptions here are SÖF, NLM and EIT. Due to the 
major importance of interdisciplinarity and stakeholder 
participation for transformation research effectiveness, 
the WBGU elaborates these demands in the following in 
more detail (Section 8.1.4.8). 
The global scope of the research, as expressed in 
cooperation with scientists from non­OECD countries, 
is also usually not integrated, apart from in a few excep­
tional cases such as GRAAG. Against the background of 
increasing research and development spending in the 
newly industrialising countries, however, closer inter­
national cooperation seems advisable. In 2007, 1.7 % 
of global GDP, or US$ 1,146 billion, were spent on 
research and development. Scientific capacity build­
ing has dramatically accelerated in the newly industri­
alising countries, particularly in China, India and South 
Korea, due to the 1996 to 2007 phase of global eco­
nomic growth. Accordingly, the newly industrialising 
countries’ overall share of global research and develop­
ment spending has increased, whilst decreasing in the 
USA, the EU and Japan. The USA are still leading glo­
bally, although their share of global R&D spending has 
decreased from 35.1 % in 2002 to 32.5 % in 2007. The 
same applies to the European Union and Japan, whose 
shares reduced over the same period from 26.1 % to 
23.3 %, and from 13.7 % to 12.9 %, respectively. The 
share of global spending on R&D has increased in China 
(from 5 % to 8.9 %), South Korea (from 2.8 % to 3.6 %), 
India (from 1.6 % to 2.2 %), Brazil (from 1.6 % to 1.8 %) 
and South Africa (from 0.3 % to 0.4 %; UNESCO, 2010). 
Research goals are frequently technical innova­
tions. Even though technical developments give impor­
tant transformation­relevant impulses, the transition 
towards a low­carbon society also needs a wide range of 
social innovations. This applies in particular to analysis 
of the demand­side, the area of mobility and, equally, 
the fields of nutrition/dietary habits and consumption 
in general. NEP and the BioEconomy Strategy revealed 
particular deficits in this respect. Positive exceptions 
are, for instance, the multi­faceted foci of the ‘Future 
Megacities’ programme, or the goals of EIT and SÖF.
With regard to reflections on diffusion conditions, it 
was noted that these are often made only via corporate 
participation in the research process. In the course of 
their cooperation, companies are expected to support 
the application of research results in product develop­
ment, and their diffusion across markets. In this respect, 
corporate participation is to be pursued. For the diffu­
sion of low­carbon social innovations, or those techno­
logical innovations that will probably not be market­
ready in the near future, however, corporate participa­
tion is not an adequate substitute for research into dif­
fusion conditions. The development of strategic options 
for promoting the diffusion of low­carbon innovations, 
realised in the form of appropriate policies, or serving 
as inspiration for political measures, should therefore 
become more firmly established. The communication of 
research results alone is an important step, however, it 
cannot replace analysis of innovation diffusion condi­
tions. The research issues identified by the WBGU for 
progressing with, and accelerating, the transformation 
(Section. 8.1.2) have, in many cases, been addressed by 
research funding. Many funding programmes already 
– more or less –take transformation­relevant subjects 
into account. Their budgets, however, are still insuf­
ficient. Promising funding priorities enjoy compara­
tively little financial support, such as, for instance, the 
NLM with € 100 million, or ‘Future Megacities’ with 
€ 50 million. In particular the FP7’s funding distribu­
tion does not focus adequately on the highly transfor­
mation­relevant area of environment, including climate 
protection and energy. 
The distribution of funds in energy research does not 
reflect the requirements of the transformation, both at 
European and German level. Whilst EURATOM makes 
€ 2.75 billion available for nuclear research (nuclear 
fusion and fission) between 2007 and 2011, the other 
energy technologies share the around € 2.3 billion from 
the FP7 Cooperation programme’s energy research 
budget from 2007 to 2013 (EU COM, 2006a,  b). 
Although the predominance of nuclear energy research 
has decreased somewhat over the past decade in Ger­
many, it continues to enjoy the largest technological 
share of federal government energy research funding, 
albeit including nuclear plant decommissioning work. 
The still substantial funding of nuclear fusion research 
(in 2010, € 143 million, or 21 % of the total energy 
research funding budget, were allocated to this area; 
BMBF, 2010c) should also be adapted to the current sit­
uation, as nuclear fusion power plant generated energy 
will not be available by the time the low­carbon trans­
formation should be concluded. Rather than discount­
ing the potentially possible long­term contributions to 
the energy supply from this source completely, research 
efforts should be extended over a longer period of time 
in order to release funds for higher priority projects.
To summarise: research funding must also focus on 
breaking path dependencies faster, and on optimising 
conditions for innovations, both of a structural nature 
and in terms of content. The goal should be the coor­
dinated alignment of individual research programmes 
with regard to their contribution to climate­friendliness 
by 2050. 
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National Starting Points
At a national level, particularly suitable starting points 
for a research that meets the requirements formulated 
for research in Section 8.1.1.4 are provided under the 
German framework programme Research for Sustain­
able Development (FONA), including the funding pri­
ority Social­ecological Research (SÖF). 
FONA conceptually addresses a range of global chal­
lenges such as climate change, water shortages, or the 
threat of biodiversity loss. The promotion measures 
encompass research for a better understanding of the 
Earth system, on innovations development, and on 
their social diffusion. 
The funding priority SÖF refers directly to the 
research approach of the same name, developed by Ger­
man non­university research institutes. The approach 
consolidates cross­disciplinary knowledge to solve con­
crete social sustainability problems. On the one hand, 
this calls for interdisciplinary cooperation between aca­
demics from both natural and social sciences; on the 
other hand, local expert knowledge must be taken 
into account when developing concrete solutions for 
life­world problems. Social actors have therefore been 
integrated into the research process in different ways. 
SÖF is particularly outstanding in terms of its specific 
accompanying research. It collects and synthesises 
research results to communicate them purposefully to 
the relevant research communities and social groups, 
and observes their impact. This research is (also) nor­
mative, as it pursues an ecological social conversion 
that takes both social equity and economic demands 
into account. The FONA framework programme and the 
SÖF funding priority therefore meet almost all points of 
the transformation­relevant research demands. More 
emphasis should be placed on the requirement of a glo­
bal transition towards sustainability and its necessary 
acceleration; the latter in consequence of the almost 
complete reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 
2050, necessary for climate protection. 
8.1.4.8 
Interdisciplinarity 
Section 8.1.1 called attention to the importance of 
interdisciplinarity in transformation­relevant research. 
The analysis in Section 8.1.4.7 led to the conclusion 
that interdisciplinarity is currently not adequately 
anchored at a strategic and programmatic level. How­
ever, integrating interdisciplinarity more firmly as a 
goal in research strategies and programmes will not suf­
fice to actually guarantee it at project level ­ because 
the German science system contains a range of struc­
tural barriers that must be overcome.
Some promising starts with regard to interdisci­
plinarity have been made in Germany. These include 
interdisciplinary research institutes such as the Pots­
dam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), or 
the Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ) in Leip­
zig, but also real or virtual centres and platforms, new 
types of schools such as the Berlin School of Mind and 
Brain, excellence cluster Topoi, Berlin (‘The Formation 
of Space and Knowledge in Ancient Civilisations’), the 
Rachel Carson Center for Environment and Society in 
Munich, funded by the BMBF, the Geocycles research 
centre at Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, or 
interdisciplinary science collegia, such as, for example, 
the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) 
in Potsdam. 
However, scale, structures and, in particular, their 
incentive, accreditation and evaluation mechanisms are 
not enough to lend sufficient weight to interdiscipli­
nary transformation­relevant research and education. 
The scientific community often objects to interdiscipli­
narity; this applies particularly, but not exclusively, to 
universities. 
University management, faculties, scientists and 
students frequently protest against the establishment 
of new kinds of inter­ or transdisciplinary schools and 
colleges, as, for example, recently proposed by the sci­
ence council (WR; 2010a), and are very reluctant to 
permit the extended interdisciplinary combination of 
Bachelor and Masters degree courses. Interdisciplinary 
degree courses are often circumvented with the argu­
ment of a lack of recognised professions for interdisci­
plinarily qualified graduates. Fact is that these days, an 
academic researcher can usually only afford a second, 
interdisciplinary career subsequent to a successful first 
disciplinary career; only few therefore choose this path.
Following the comprehensive statistical bibliograph­
ical evaluation of six research domains between 1975 
and 2005, a quantitative analysis on interdisciplinar­
ity has reached the conclusion that the often­cited 
increase in interdisciplinarity is actually perfunctory, or 
applies only to a small percentage (Porter and Rafols, 
2009). In fact, the number of named research areas and 
citations within the 30­year period analysed actually 
increased by around 50 %, the number of co­authored 
works even by 75 %. Nevertheless, the number of 
actual interdisciplinary publications seemingly only 
rose by 5 % (based on application of a numerical ‘Disci­
plinary Diversity Index’).
Inappropriate incentive systems
The reasons for the inadequate implementation of 
interdisciplinary approaches seem to lie in the sci­
ence system’s gratification and reputation mechanisms: 
these days, scientists must prove their expertise above 
all with the support of disciplinary third­party fund­
ing and publications in high­ranking disciplinary sci­
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entific journals. Particularly in the natural sciences, the 
only publications relevant are those listed in the Cita­
tion Index (ISI Web of Knowledge), this also applies 
to Germany. Under the German system, the habilitation 
or venia legendi being accorded for certain part­disci­
plines can also prevent individual lecturers from taking 
an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approach to 
academic research and teaching. 
At universities, a major share of institutional grants 
is now awarded performance­based. Works published 
extra­disciplinarily – i. e. in a journal outside an aca­
demic’s originally chosen discipline – are usually not 
accredited to scientist working interdisciplinarily. More 
or less the same applies to inter­ or transdisciplinary 
third­party funding procurement or teaching outside of 
their own faculty. 
As a scientist, remaining as monodisciplinary as 
possible whilst also participating in interdisciplinary 
projects both bear their pitfalls. The present assessment 
structure does not necessarily favour the awarding of 
grants to academics from different professional disci­
plines aiming to establish an interdisciplinary research 
project or curriculum. Reviewers for specific disci­
plines are usually referred to, who frequently do not 
believe in a systemic approach and often – perfectly 
logically, from their point of view – assess the disci­
plinary segment to be assessed as underrepresented 
or as lying below a critical mass. The evaluation report 
on the priority funding for the BMBF’s ‘Social­ecolog­
ical Research’ even criticised the fact that, despite the 
conscious, intentional interdisciplinarity, no structural 
effects with regard to interdisciplinary research were 
evident, as the ‘universities, in view of the growing 
competitiveness, tended to stick to their core research 
areas and showed little willingness to open themselves 
up to interdisciplinary research beyond their area’ (ad 
hoc translation by the WBGU). Junior research groups 
subscribing to the interdisciplinarity of SÖF research, 
however, enjoyed no representation in the structure­
giving decision committees (EvaConsult, 2006). 
Instruments for interdisciplinary research 
Suitable existing structures for inter­ and transdisci­
plinary projects are cross­disciplinary and cross­insti­
tutional platforms, centres, colleges, schools, expli­
citly interdisciplinary institutions and the German uni­
versities’ Excellence Initiatives. As German universities 
do not tend to support inter­departmental coopera­
tion, and their faculties tend to be structured mono­ 
or oligo­disciplinarily, implementation appears inade­
quate at present. 
Above all there are few or no existing structures 
that would serve the promotion or fecundity of inte­
grative transformative research. To date, hardly any of 
the Excellence Initiative clusters and graduate schools 
are explicitly transformation­relevant. The excellence 
cluster ‘Topoi’, which investigates the formation and 
transformation of space and knowledge in ancient civi­
lisations, is hosted by the Freie Universität Berlin and 
the Humboldt­Universität Berlin, together with several 
other non­university partners. It is somewhat of an 
exception to the above rule. Also to be viewed posi­
tively are the efforts towards more integrative research 
rating criteria, as recommended, and still under discus­
sion, by the German Council of Science and Humani­
ties, both for the humanities (WR, 2010b) and techni­
cal sciences (WR, 2009). Particularly to be welcomed is 
the fact that the ‘transfer to non­scientific recipients’ 
rating criterion is proposed alongside the criteria of 
‘research quality’ and ‘research facilitation’. It is here 
that transdisciplinary aspects such as stakeholder par­
ticipation or paths for knowledge transfer into society 
should also be integrated. However, apart from briefly 
mentioning the importance of the humanities’ lesser­
sized disciplines in interdisciplinary projects (WR, 
2010b), or inclusion in the list as ‘background informa­
tion’ (WR, 2009), these rating proposals also pay scant 
further attention to interdisciplinarity, let alone in the 
context of a potential evaluation criterion.
8.1.4.9 
The Four Transformative Pillars of the Knowledge 
Society
The elaborations so far show that science relates to the 
transformation in two ways. On the one hand, in the 
form of the transformation research (Tr) proposed by 
the WBGU, it focuses on the forthcoming task of shap­
ing the transformation (Section. 8.1.2). Here, transitory 
processes are explored in order to come to conclusions 
on the factors and causal relations of transformation 
processes. Examples from history can serve as a basis 
for analysing observed transformative moments. The 
subjects of transformation research are therefore the 
basic principles, conditions and progression of trans­
formation processes. 
In contrast, research that meets the requirements 
identified by the WBGU (Section 8.1.1), is defined by 
the WBGU as transformative research (tR). Transforma­
tive research is therefore only indirectly related to the 
transformation through the promotion of conversion 
processes by way of specific innovations in the rele­
vant sectors. It supports transformation processes in 
practical terms through the development of solutions 
and technical and social innovations, including diffu­
sion processes in economy and society, and opportu­
nities for their acceleration, and demands, at least in 
part, systemic perspectives and inter­ as well as trans­
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disciplinary procedure methods, including stakeholder 
participation.
As previously explained, this division in transfor­
mation research and transformative research serves 
the purpose of better illustration and systematisation; 
however, the boundaries between these disciplines are 
also blurred and these areas may sometimes overlap; in 
practice, this division can therefore not be stringently 
maintained (Figure 8.1­3; Section 8.1). Both types of 
research should be mutually inspirational, and sup­
port the transformation through exchange with society, 
economy and policy­makers. This requires an improved, 
differentiated and participative form of science com­
munication. The new media should also be used for this, 
as they provide numerous options for interactive social 
dialogues. 
Education encompasses two dimensions: transfor-
mation education (Te) makes the findings of transfor­
mation research available to society. As ‘education for 
participation’, it critically reflects on the requisite basic 
requirements, such as a thorough understanding of 
the pressure to act and a global sense of responsibility, 
promotes systemic thinking, and generates a systemic 
understanding of different options for action (Colucci­
Gray et al., 2006). It also communicates information on 
the environmental problems that necessitate the trans­
formation, and their scientific exploration. At the same 
time, it generates goals, values and visions to guide the 
actions of individuals towards the necessary direction. 
Transformation education should also have the goal 
of inspiring social participation and political action, as 
both are preconditions for a democratically legitimised 
transformation.
Transformative education (tE) generates an under­
standing of different options for action and solution 
approaches. This includes, for example, encouraging 
informed low­carbon mobility behaviour, sustainabil­
ity­conscious eating habits, or an awareness of cross­
generational responsibilities. Related educational con­
tent would, for example, be innovations that are likely 
to have transformative impact, or which have already 
had one. 
Both educational aspects should communicate the 
basic principle of responsible behaviour to as many 
members of the global community as possible. This 
would also prepare future researchers for their tasks. 
Education for the transformation should not be under­
stood as a mere extension of current educational offer­
ings. Rather, a paradigm change must be brought about, 
towards a well­informed society in which all under­
stand themselves to be transformation agents who 
contribute to the legitimation of the transformation 
process through participating in knowledge generation 
(Section 8.2.2). 
8.2
Education for the Transformation
In the WBGU’s opinion, the transformation towards a 
sustainable, low­carbon society has considerably bet­
ter chances of succeeding if – accompanied by a great 
number of other measures (Chapter 7) – the popula­
tion’s transformation­relevant awareness can be raised 
or sharpened through education. In this context, the 
education sector must also take on more responsibility. 
As an important channel of knowledge communication, 
this sector provides the foundations for each indivi­
dual’s knowledge­based self­concept, thereby contrib­
uting to the establishment of the social preconditions 
needed for the transformation. Transformation research 
should therefore be closely linked to education for the 
transformation. 
Contents to be communicated cover a wide spec­
trum, encompassing both an understanding of indi­
vidual innovations and the comprehensive realisation 
of the necessity for, and also the interdependence of, 
certain individual factors of the transition. The cor­
responding educational content would therefore, for 
example, relate to innovations that are likely to have 
transformative impact, or which have already had a 
transformative impact. The current status quo of scien­
tific knowledge should be presented in an understanda­
ble, yet also differentiated, way, and should be actively, 
and especially participatively, shared with society. 
To facilitate this, education offers should, if possible, 
attempt to establish a relation to the key factors of the 
transformation. For example, renewable energies could 
be a topic in physics lessons, whilst concurrently, inter­
national energy partnerships are being discussed in the 
social science subjects; or geography lessons might, for 
instance, focus on low­carbon cities.
transformative
education (tE)
transformation
education (Te)
transformative
research (tR)
transformation
research (Tr)
Figure 8.1-3
Typification of transformation research and education.
Source: WBGU
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Beyond such focused contents, however, knowledge 
transfer at the points where engineering, Earth system 
and social sciences meet, should also enjoy stronger 
support. Appropriate narratives of change could be 
developed here to illustrate the interrelation of indi­
vidual key factors, thereby integrating systemic think­
ing in education. These could enter the everyday dis­
course through creative forms of knowledge communi­
cation, and be developed further interactively. Through 
an exemplary focus on the role of change agents, an 
awareness of the preconditions for the transformation 
can be firmly ensconced in education. Only a dynamic 
picture of the world allows the contemplation of change 
and communicates the chance to participate positively 
in the shaping of ongoing processes. 
8.2.1 
Challenges of Knowledge Communication
As outlined above, the education sector must be 
involved in creating the requisite foundations for a 
participative culture. It is faced with a range of chal­
lenges or difficulties which have already been described 
quite often in the discussion on sustainability educa­
tion (Rost, 2002). Enabling individuals to view them­
selves as part of the transformation process requires 
far­reaching insights and a certain level of identifica­
tion with the knowledge contents. Both the specifics of 
scientific methods, so far removed from everyday life, 
and the continuously deteriorating trust in science cre­
ate a new point of departure for knowledge communi­
cation to which research and education policies should 
react.
Facilitating the absorption of knowledge becomes 
even more important in the dialogue between science 
and politics when it comes to taking scientific insights 
into account during the policy­making process. Refer­
ring to scientific expert knowledge has become a vital 
element in contemporary governing and international, 
European and national law­making; this specific exper­
tise is particularly indispensable when it comes to envi­
ronmental and technological legislation. This applies 
especially to the low­carbon transformation process, as 
it is distinguished by actions under uncertainty.
Knowledge Growth and Knowledge Weighting
Comprehension of the Earth system and the interre­
lationships between its individual elements (climate, 
water cycle, soils, biodiversity, etc.) is steadily grow­
ing. The knowledge regarding natural and social sys­
tems is extremely complex. Although it mainly rests 
on empirical data, even their interrelationships alone 
are usually incomprehensible to laypersons. The prob­
ability­based models resultant from this data are also 
not always easy to communicate. Against this back­
ground, it becomes obvious that understanding the 
transformation towards a low­carbon, sustainable soci­
ety requires a high degree of comprehension of com­
plex systems and scientific methods. Transformation 
education should take this as its starting point in order 
to make systemic thinking as experienceable in the con­
text of everyday life as possible, and therefore easier to 
understand. Historical abstracts and abstracts focusing 
on transformations could serve to make impact inter­
relatedness comprehensible as the illumination of the 
economic and social consequences of global environ­
mental changes has only just begun. Therefore, educa­
tion policies should increase their respective efforts to 
afford a better understanding of precaution­oriented, 
risk­calculating political action.
In this context, the question of which knowledge 
aspects are particularly relevant to transformation edu­
cation arises, and what level of pure process and sys­
tem knowledge is required. Again, as in the research 
area, a search process should emerge, during the course 
of which successes and newly emerging barriers are 
reflected in education concepts and educative content. 
It is also unclear exactly how much weight should be 
accorded to transformation education and transforma­
tive education, respectively, in knowledge communica­
tion, and how they are to be structured. However, what 
is fundamentally clear is that education should lead to 
a critical understanding of a mixture of problems and 
processes, goals and values, and instructional knowl­
edge. To be able to review and develop these curricula 
(further), certain questions must be answered, such as: 
what is the best way to structure cross­generational 
thinking and action in education? Could new values 
also be possibly generated via education?
Dealing with Complexity and Statistical Probabilities
Science and research play a central role in the assess­
ment of the dimensions of (long­term) potential threat 
that global environmental changes pose to humankind’s 
natural life­support systems. This applies particularly 
to climate change, as, so far, climate change is (hardly) 
directly experienceable, and must be made visible or 
illustrated with the aid of scientific findings or via prox­
ies, i. e. its impact on the biosphere, and communicated 
by political and social actors (Beck, 2007). Structur­
ally, this analysis can be extended to the wider issue 
of the transformation towards sustainability, as a basic 
comprehension of complex systems is also required of 
the broad public; it is the precondition for understand­
ing global environmental problems and transforma­
tion processes in industrialised, developing and newly 
industrialising countries. Interdisciplinary education 
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offers are key towards orientation in a complex world. 
They can ensure comprehension of individual key fac­
tors (for example social or technical innovations) and 
promote systemic thinking. However, at present, edu­
cation offers and relevantly skilled knowledge com­
municators, such as the teaching staff in primary and 
secondary schools, are rare, despite first reformative 
steps in Germany at federal and state level (Programm 
 Transfer­21, 2007). 
Science and Climate Scepticism
Science scepticism tends to spread in leaps and bounds, 
in part, and understandably, for reasons of self­pro­
tection; this should be considered in the deliberations 
regarding education formats and programmes. Science 
scepticism is particularly rife when scientific findings 
impact on own interests, own behaviour, or on how 
each individual perceives humankind as a whole (Lein­
felder, 2010b).
Knowledge particularisation represents a particu­
larly serious problem as the causality context is lost. 
People can therefore feel alienated in a knowledge com­
munity. To relativise knowledge, or to presume intru­
mentalisation purposes, can then serve as self­justifica­
tion in order to avoid having to confront complex facts, 
or facts whose consequences are felt to impact nega­
tively on personal lives (Weingart, 2001; Rauchhaupt, 
2005). This process can be exacerbated through know­
ledge falsification and ideological reservations (Mojon­
Azzi et al., 2002; Fanelli, 2009; Zia und Todd, 2010). 
The loss of trust in science resultant from this is par­
ticularly critical, and therefore in the knowledge society 
(for example Rauchhaupt, 2005), science scepticism in 
education (and research) therefore must be addressed 
as it is vital for the transformation process. 
Climate scepticism is a perfect example to illustrate 
some of the challenges knowledge communication 
should address with regard to the problem of science 
scepticism. A first analysis here could help to identify 
starting points for building up trust in science. In many 
respects, the climate sceptics’ argumentation is quite 
similar to the approach taken by evolution, and other 
science, sceptics. Proven knowledge, for example, is 
often emphatically relativised (‘we don’t know enough 
yet’), or simply disputed (‘climate change is not hap­
pening’). Scientific proof to the contrary is well­known 
and available in an easy­to­understand, consolidated 
form (for example Cook, 2010; Archer and Rahmstorf, 
2010). However, it is above all the argumentation tech­
niques employed that can breed uncertainty. Again 
there are distinct similarities to the techniques used by 
evolution sceptics, particularly fallacies, ambiguous­
ness, false causal relations, appeal to emotion, misuse 
of technical terminology, or discreditation (Neukamm, 
2009).
From Awareness to Action 
Empirically supported knowledge is a premise, but no 
guarantee for the social solving of complex (environ­
mental) problems. The mixed results of current global 
climate policy illustrate particularly well that proven 
expert knowledge, as contained in the IPCC’s assess­
ment reports, alone is not enough to convert insights 
directly, or through mobilisation of the adequately large 
public, into globally effective actions. 
Knowledge appropriation is therefore the first pre­
condition for transformation­supporting actions, it is, 
however, certainly not enough. For this reason, a quite 
justifiably recurring theme in the debate on sustain­
able development education is that education must not 
just be the communication of purely cognitive know­
ledge, but must also encompass, on the one hand, prac­
tical aspects which can be applied to actions and, on the 
other hand, competence building to enable those learn­
ing to reflect on their actions, and empowering them to 
shape their future (de Haan, 2003; Rauchhaupt, 2005). 
Life-Long Learning
Life­long learning is both an urgent necessity and a 
challenge facing science and education (Thielen, 2009). 
The transformation is a process spanning many dec­
ades, and needs the active participation and support of 
a great range of different social actors. Also, the pro­
cess should be continuously reviewed and adapted. The 
content of transformation­relevant education there­
fore changes in the course of a lifespan. In this context, 
there are open questions, such as: how can the moti­
vation for life­long learning be inspired, taught, and 
achieve a steady level of permanence? Is this (only) a 
matter of generating and updating orientation­know­
ledge, or will the re­education of a broader spectrum of 
the working population, for example toward transfor­
mation management, become more important?
Curricula which support an ongoing trust in science 
should make it possible to thoroughly understand the 
scientific process as such. The actual integration of this 
aspect in curricula – for instance by way of example­
based methodology and science history teaching – is 
as necessary as continuous transparency and active 
communication on the part of the scientific commu­
nity. Therefore, the issue is not merely the creation of 
a public understanding of science based on scientific 
findings, but the actual promotion of a public under­
standing of research. 
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8.2.2 
Solutions 
Knowledge acquisition is a requisite, but by no means 
the only precondition for transformation­support­
ing actions. Participation is a step towards action. The 
WBGU expects that latent or immanent acceptance 
barriers – particularly in relation to climate research 
results, biodiversity and agricultural technology 
research – can be reduced through education, in partic­
ular by direct social participation in the research pro­
cess (Rauchhaupt, 2005; Mejlgaard and Stares, 2010). 
Integration of participative elements would promote 
the diffusion and acquisition of knowledge on natu­
ral and environmental events. The inadequate transla­
tion of knowledge into precautionary action to date can 
be addressed particularly with involvement, transpar­
ency, participation and ongoing participative success or 
status monitoring in a range of different environment 
or transformation related fields. Civil society partici­
pation in education is therefore inextricably bound to 
participation in research, they are mutually dependent 
and reinforcing. Respective education and participa­
tive research offerings and structures are therefore an 
important premise for enabling individuals to develop 
both a systemic understanding with regard to the need 
for action, and for making certain solution and action 
options experienceable to promote their acceptance.
Participative Knowledge Society
This report cannot place enough emphasis on the 
importance of civil participation, acceptance and legiti­
macy as a vital element for the transformation towards 
a low­carbon, sustainable society. The research process 
therefore also requires a broad level of social partici­
pation. In addition to the stakeholder participation in 
research goals and pursuit alluded to in Section 8.1, sci­
ence can contribute to a higher level of acceptance of 
transformation­relevant political actions by involving 
non­scientists into the research itself. However, to date, 
research tends to feature few participative elements. 
The evolutionary­biologically anchored curiosity of 
children concerning our environment must be reawak­
ened and permanently appealed to for the sake of sus­
tainability. You can only appreciate the things you know 
to want to protect them. Anyone directly involved in 
research processes and the gaining of scientific insights 
will relate differently to science, and will judge its capa­
bilities, and its limits, differently (Irwin, 1995; Trumbull 
et al., 2000). And vice versa, science benefits when the 
practical knowledge and life­world perceptions of ‘lay­
persons’ complement the various scientific perspectives 
(Funtowitz and Ravetz, 1993; Young and Matthews, 
2007). 
The participative knowledge society needs intensive 
cooperation between science and civil society, during 
the course of which the civil society is participatively 
involved in the sourcing and acquisition of knowledge. 
Ultimately, the responsibility for shaping the trans­
formation will fall to this ‘middle’ social level whose 
knowledge­based state depends on the close coopera­
tion between civil society and scientific findings, i. e. 
research. Civil society participation in knowledge gen­
eration therefore has two interlinked aspects: 1) the 
specific and existing stakeholder knowledge or support 
on the part of the civil society regarding the genera­
tion of new research data discussed in Section 8.1.1.2, 
and 2) the active knowledge acquisition as a foundation 
for the transformation, and therefore the legitimation 
and active support of transformation research and of 
the entire transformation process as a genuine, direct 
or indirect transformation actor.
In the area of knowledge generation and acquisi­
tion with regard to natural and environmental events, 
museums, botanical gardens and zoos increasingly 
offer a multitude of options for intelligent independ­
ent exploration as ‘environment stations’, where sci­
entists and citizens learn together (Daim, 2009; Lein­
felder, 2009, 2010a). Transformation education will 
be anchored even more firmly and permanently when 
the well­informed citizen becomes active as a co­
researcher, rather than reconstructively, and is involved 
in the research process itself at the earliest possible 
stage. These days, it is not unusual for non­professional 
researchers to gather important data and time series for 
scientific data bases and research programmes. Exam­
ples are the International Day for Biological Diversity 
activities, or the established bird and insect monitor­
ing and other projects, such as the European ‘Evolution 
MegaLab’, started in the Darwin Year 2009 to study 
the variability and diffusion of banded snails all over 
Europe (Evolution MegaLab, 2011). The results were 
the basis for important new scientific findings (Silver­
town et al., 2011).
In a participative knowledge society, even the sum 
total of seemingly insignificant individual actions can 
trigger the requisite self­energisation, proliferation 
and acceptance processes which can make a consider­
able contribution towards achieving the transformation 
towards a low­carbon society. The many small­scale sci­
entific research participation projects which are hardly 
interlinked should therefore be strengthened and con­
solidated (for example the biodiversity and environ­
mental monitoring stations). It is important to turn 
purely exemplary, frequently event­related participa­
tive projects into continuous long­term programmes. If 
time series are generated over many years, the involve­
ment of the participating civil society is not only tem­
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porary, but permanent; the citizens are thereby turned 
into permanent research participants. 
An outstanding example for a successful and perma­
nent cooperation between science and civil society is 
Reef Check, a globally active NGO for the monitoring 
and conservation of coral reefs (Box 8.2­1). Without 
Reef Check, the global time series comparative data on 
the condition of coral reefs would never have reached 
the extent it has. Reef Check’s activities have also pro­
vided divers with a new self­understanding, as they 
have started to organise further qualification courses of 
their own accord, and are now also actively involved in 
other areas (lake research). Through their participation, 
the divers can now fully relate to the coral reef knowl­
edge generation process; they no longer view coral 
reefs merely as a venue for an exciting sport or relaxa­
tion, but as precious research objects worth protecting 
due to the ecosystem goods and services they provide.
The German federal government has also recog­
nised the importance of social participation in the 
research process, as not least suggested by the BMBF 
citizen dialogue on future technologies (‘Bürgerdialog 
Zukunfts technologien’) which started in March 2011 
(BMBF, 2011f). It would be desirable to embed future­
relevant issues in the context of the Great Transfor­
mation as early as possible in the course of such dia­
logues. However, citizens must be motivated to iden­
tify with the transformation process through their 
own actions – beyond the staging of dialogue events. 
The same applies to education at school. Initiatives 
such as ‘science exchange’, also initiated by the BMBF 
( Forschungsbörse, BMBF, 2011a), which arranges vis­
its by academics to school classes, are fundamentally to 
be encouraged. However, as far as participation is con­
cerned, scientists are not the only people who should 
‘put out their feelers’ towards society. Rather, society 
should participate actively in the research process, not 
least within the scope of school education. 
New education and research programmes pre­
pared by the German federal government and the EU 
should be structured accordingly. Their motto should 
be  ‘knowledge and education by everyone’, rather 
than ‘knowledge and education for everyone’. Increas­
ingly, the focus should be on Public Understanding of 
Research (PUR) as an element of Public Understanding 
of Science and Humanities (PUSH) (Field and  Powell, 
2001; Feinstein, 2011). A key element for adequate 
PUR is direct and preferably permanent participa­
tion in the research process. The successful ‘Science 
in Dialogue’ initiative, which has been running for 
approximately ten years now by the Stifterverband, 
the business community’s innovation agency for Ger­
man science, with substantial support by the BMBF, for 
example, could be complemented by a particularly ded­
icated participative element (education through active 
research participation), and its operation funded by a 
special BMBF programme.
Establishing Voluntary Social Year ‘Education and 
Research’ 
Intensified and intensive participation of education and 
research with civil society input could also be created 
in the form of a voluntary social year. A joint ‘umbrella 
structure’ would be advisable, covering not only exist­
ing modules, such as the voluntary social or ecological 
year or the development volunteers service ‘weltwärts’, 
but also complementing these by the option of a vol­
untary science and technology year. A voluntary social 
year with different elective modules could here link a 
range of existing options synergetically and structur­
ally to offer new choices. 
Appropriate incentives should be introduced to 
allow a voluntary social year to take the form of a sci­
ence and technology year. This is not about replacing 
functioning concepts. It is rather about the consolida­
tion, organisation and extension of many small­scale 
and hardly interlinked participation projects, particu­
larly in the area of participative research, for example 
the implementation of biodiversity or environmental 
monitoring stations or practical development political 
activities suggested above with the aid of those volun­
teering in these areas. 
The contributions made during a voluntary social 
year should have a permanent impact, i. e. the data 
gathered should be documented and fed into networks 
as experiences to draw on, thereby becoming availa­
ble to everyone. The range and interactive character of 
the new media could be utilised to this end, as own 
activities only obtain a special meaning when others 
can benefit from them. Thus, they become motivating. 
Politically supported motivation for a voluntary ‘civil­
ian service 2.0’ could thereby become another key to 
establishing a participative knowledge society. 
Science and Research Communication 
Scientific processes and insights are complex and often 
communicable to the general public only in a very sim­
plified way. Good science rarely automatically answers 
for successful communication of the insights gained 
and the actions required. A further important dimen­
sion of the participative knowledge society is there­
fore also a well­founded and differentiated science and 
research communication. It is distinguished by science 
presenting, for example, the deductions and reasoning 
behind scenario development and action recommenda­
tions in a way that is also transparent, logical and gen­
erally understandable for laypersons. Authentification 
of the research data, for instance through the illustra­
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tion of source materials, illustrating how research pro­
cesses are based on historical examples, or the addi­
tional, vivid illustration of well­known scientists can 
aid knowledge identification and absorption. In recent 
years, natural science and technical museums have 
increasingly relied on personalisation (Einstein, Dar­
win, Humboldt, Zuse, etc.) as a fresh approach for con­
veying the contents of various scientific fields. 
Exploiting and Stabilising the UN Decade ‘Education 
for Sustainable Development’ Fully and Adding 
Permanence
The low­carbon transformation into a sustainable soci­
ety is only achievable together in dialogue with the civil 
society; the civil society must, ultimately, carry out this 
process. In essence, this thought was one of the rea­
sons behind the establishment of the currently run­
ning UN Decade ‘Education for Sustainable Develop­
ment’ (2005–2014). Education for sustainable devel­
opment means raising sustainable thinking and action 
awareness among children, young people and adults. 
It intends to enable people to make decisions for the 
future with an awareness of how their own actions 
impact on future generations or life in other regions of 
the world. This requires a far more systemically oriented 
education (Colluci­Gray et al., 2006). The Bonn Decla­
ration, drawn up at the UNESCO World Conference on 
Education for Sustainable Development in Bonn, Ger­
many (2009), concludes that education for sustain­
able development is still progressing at an extremely 
varied pace in different countries. The coming years 
will require major efforts by industrial and developing 
countries, the civil society and international organisa­
tions to achieve the desired progress in this area. 
8.3
Recommendations 
A comprehensive transformation towards a low­car­
bon, sustainable society places great demands on the 
development, diffusion, legitimation and application of 
knowledge, and thereby also on the goals and form of 
research and research policies. Both must bear a high 
level of responsibility for the whole of society. 
From the WBGU’s perspective, transformation­ori­
ented research demands substantial additional fund­
ing, in order to be able to become commensurate with 
the dimensions of this challenge. At the same time, 
research policy­makers should also be guided to a far 
greater extent by transformation­relevant research 
demands than has so far been the case when it comes 
to deciding content and structure of research strategies 
and programmes. However, the WBGU is by no means 
advocating a blanket reallocation of funds within the 
German scientific community, and emphasises clearly 
that independent research should continue to enjoy 
a high status. Simultaneously, new social visions and 
para digms should be developed; this can be advanced 
by skilful policy­making on behalf of the government, 
but succeed only if actively supported by science. 
In view of the fact that the transformation is a soci­
etal search process involving all social actors, education 
is also a vital requirement for a successful transforma­
tion. Society can only acquire the requisite capacities 
for active participation in the transformation process 
in all its complexity through a broad spectrum of dif­
ferent and diverse education structures and a review 
of education content. The WBGU believes it has nei­
ther the qualifications nor the competency to carry out 
Box 8.2-1
Reef Check
Under the aegis of the globally active NGO Reef Check, 
divers, fishermen and scientists have been recording the 
‘state of health’ of coral reefs since 1996, based on biological 
and sedimentological proxies for the purpose of a participa­
tive assessment and long­term monitoring project. Numerous 
factors (current situation, temperature situation, epidemics, 
fishery, over­fertilisation, acidification, sludge accumulation, 
pesticide input, storms, tourism, etc.) indicate the condition 
of a reef; nevertheless, the long­term monitoring and the 
comparison of global and regional data allows evaluation of 
individual factors (for instance different damage patterns, 
such as the bleaching caused by El Niño, algae increase due 
to over­fertilisation, over­fishing, storm damage), to create a 
differentiated illustration of the impact of global and regional 
environmental changes that the broad public can also under­
stand and relate to.
The Reef Check Monitoring project gathers biophysical 
indicators with the aid of standardised protocols to obtain 
information on anthropogenic impact on the reefs. The data is 
entered into Excel tables and sent by e­mail to a central data 
input centre. The data is available soon after being collected, 
and serves, together with other scientific data, as the founda­
tion for scientific work and the management of protected 
areas. It flows into global data bases, and via these, into the 
status reports published on a regular basis by the Global Reef 
Coral Monitoring Programs, GCRMN (1998). GCRMN is part 
of the Global Ocean Observing System, jointly supported by 
the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC/
UNESCO) and UNEP, IUCN, the World Bank and the Conven­
tion on Biological Diversity. Hodgson and Liebeler have pro­
vided a comprehensive report on the methods and results of 
the first five years of Reef Check's activities (2002).  
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an elaborate all­encompassing evaluation of present 
transformation­relevant education contents and struc­
tures. Rather, it would just like to point out some of the 
demands that transformation and transformative edu­
cation, which should be based on a common basic prin­
ciple of participation, should meet – as befits a culture 
of democratic participation. 
Because, in the WBGU’s view, it is an indisputable 
fact that the participation of a wide range of social 
environments and different actors, both in education 
and in research, is indispensable in order to, on the one 
hand, generate understanding, acceptance and the abil­
ity to participate in the transformation process and, on 
the other hand, make research results more implemen­
tation­oriented, and therefore relevant, by bringing in 
local, traditional, everyday, and cultural knowledge. 
Science should particularly involve social actors more 
intensively and as early as possible in the research pro­
cess, also through participation in the formulating of 
problematic or research issues, and visions. Not least 
this will (also) help to increase acceptance of research 
results. 
Against this background, the WBGU has devel­
oped the following key recommendations in terms of 
research and education for the transformation. 
8.3.1 
Research
 > Science and research should address the challenges 
of the low­carbon transformation (even more). 
Research should concentrate more on transforma­
tion­relevant issues and subjects, and the new field 
of transformation research. At the same time, it 
should meet various structural requirements, such 
as, for instance, systemic, long­term and inter­ and 
transdisciplinary orientation. It should develop tech­
nological and social low­carbon innovations, evalu­
ate them, and assess the conditions required for their 
global diffusion. This also includes the development, 
evaluation, and public discussion of political strate­
gies and options for action to guide policy­makers. 
Research programmes should therefore reflect these 
demands correspondingly. 
 > The WBGU calls for the creation of a new research 
field, ‘transformation research’, to examine transfor­
mation processes and the social preconditions within 
the scope of planetary boundaries. To develop this 
new field of scientific research, the WBGU proposes 
a socially embedded search and discussion process. 
This process could be overseen by The Alliance of 
Science Organisations in Germany. 
 > Overall, in order to face the current challenges suc­
cessfully and accelerate the transformation, sub­
stantial additional research and development fund­
ing is required. Research should also be coordinated 
and consolidated at EU and international level, as no 
country can develop all of the required solutions on 
its own. 
 > Funding for the central transformation field of 
energy should be increased substantially. The WBGU 
had already recommended in 2003 to increase direct 
public spending on energy research and develop­
ment in the industrialised countries tenfold, largely 
through reallocation. The WBGU maintains this rec­
ommendation, as, according to International Energy 
Agency estimates, the need for further additional 
funding continues (IEA, 2010b). Grants for energy 
generation through nuclear fusion could be stretched 
across a longer term to release funds for higher pri­
ority tasks.
 > The WBGU urges the German federal government to 
raise budgets in the areas spatial and urban develop­
ment and construction technology by a tenfold. At 
the same time, research should focus more on cli­
mate­compatibility, and become internationalised to 
facilitate comprehensive and long­term research on 
low­carbon urbanisation, acknowledging the central 
importance of this transformation field for the suc­
cessful transformation into a climate­friendly soci­
ety.
 > Current German Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research (BMBF) sustainability research funding, 
particularly the framework programme ‘Research for 
Sustainable Development’ (FONA), and ‘Social­eco­
logical Research’ (SÖF) should be significantly 
increased, and SÖF´s global perspective should be 
considerably extended. 
 > Interdisciplinary research should be supported by 
concrete measures. Existing incentive systems need 
to be changed, and new ones introduced. This 
includes, for instance, additional funds for interdis­
ciplinary research project applications, start­up 
financing for interdisciplinary transformation 
research, a prominent scientific award for interdisci­
plinary research, transformation funds, and the con­
sideration of interdisciplinary research for additional 
incentive payments. The WBGU proposes that the 
German Conference of University Presidents the 
Joint Science Conference, the German Research 
Foundation and the Academy of Sciences consult on 
recommendations and directives for the implemen­
tation and rating of interdisciplinary transformation 
research. Interdisciplinary transformation research 
could also be supported through ‘innovation’ or 
‘high­risk­research’ prioritisation, not unlike the 
Leibniz Association’s Senatsausschuss Wettbewerb 
(SAW) competitive procedure categories for 
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 allocating Joint Initiative for Research and Innova­
tion funding.
 > The German federal government should call for 
increased consideration of research for the transfor­
mation in the course of the development of the 
Eighth EU Research Framework Programme, in par­
ticular for extended environmental and energy 
research. 
 > Internationally, Germany and the EU should forge 
stronger transformation­relevant research alliances 
with new, innovative research centres in the newly 
industrialising countries. 
 > In the scope of its development cooperation, Ger­
many should step up the promotion and support of 
education, science and research capacities dealing 
with climate­friendly problem solving in the less 
developed countries. 
 > The WBGU suggests priority consideration of trans­
formation­contributive clusters, schools and future 
concepts during the coming round of the Excellence 
Initiative, and the announcement of one Excellence 
Initiative round dedicated completely to the subject 
of research in a transformation context for a 
 ressource­efficient and sustainable society worth 
living in. 
 > The current review of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is an 
opportunity to direct its activities more consistently 
towards climate­friendlyness and sustainability.
 > Research communication with society and policy­
makers should continue to be improved. Research 
results should increasingly be integrated into the 
political process.
8.3.2 
Education
 > Transformation education should be given a higher 
priority in the German sustainability strategy, and in 
all departmental strategies. It should also be inte­
grated into school and university curricula, voca­
tional qualification, and further studies. This encom­
passes exchange programmes, new combinations of 
bachelor and masters courses, teacher training mod­
ules for transformation­rele vant systemic education, 
and transformation science degree courses. 
 > Through coherent policies, subject­relevant educa­
tion and vocational qualification systems should be 
redesigned in such a way that they can dedicate 
themselves to the requirements of sustainable devel­
opment. At the same time, opportunities for life­
long on­the­job learning should be extended 
through publicly funded further education courses 
and post­graduate qualifications, for example in the 
form of a transformation­relevant ‘sabbatical’ for 
employees. Besides new curricula and degree courses 
and modules, completely new professions might be 
needed. 
 > The WBGU also suggests the establishment of low­
carbon business schools and interdisciplinary facul­
ties for low­carbon land use, energy science, urbani­
sation and transformation­specific management in 
order to lend important support to the transforma­
tion process. 
 > During the UN ‘Decade of Education for Sustainable 
Development’, institutional mechanisms should be 
developed to ensure that sustainable development 
education continues once the decade has passed. A 
– UNESCO initiated – process is conceivable here, 
run not unlike the International Decade for Natural 
Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). The UN named the 
1990s as the decade for natural disaster reduction to 
raise public awareness and support the strategy 
development for combating natural disasters. Once 
the decade was over, various states continued their 
activities in the form of national committees. Suc­
cessful UN Decade of Education for Sustainable 
Development activities could continue in a similar 
way in the form of local and national institutions.
8.3.3 
Interactive Field Education – Research
 > The WBGU recommends the establishment of a Ger­
man federal university with a research and educa­
tion profile that focuses on accelerating the transfor­
mation towards sustainability. Research and teach­
ing should be inter­ and transdisciplinary. 
 > The WBGU suggests an extensive education and 
research programme, ‘Participation in Transforma­
tion Research’, with the objective of education and 
knowledge generation for the benefit of the envi­
ronment and sustainability, achieved through par­
ticipation of non­scientists.
 > Research policy and science should initiate various 
cross­science and cross­social dialogues to be able to 
promote research for the transformation. Dialogues 
and citizens’ forums with topics such as ‘visions for 
a decarbonised society’, ‘requirements for transfor­
mation research’, ‘stepping up inter­ and transdisci­
plinary research’, or ‘priority research issues’ are 
conceivable. This could also include dialogue in a 
cultural and artistic format, for example in museums, 
at future exhibitions or music and short film festi­
vals.
 > Increased involvement of social actors, including so­
called laypersons, in research should be encouraged. 
Establishing participative, networked biodiversity, 
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environment and climate stations, running citizen 
surveys on transformation processes including par­
ticipation in the analysis of results, or self­reflexive 
model participation projects in the areas of, for 
example, electromobility, agriculture or new types of 
housing are appropriate options to achieve this. 
Already existing, successful examples are the annual 
bird counts in Germany and the UK, or the monitor­
ing under the aegis of Reef Check.
 > The community of citizens should be directly 
involved in the formulation of future paths and 
visions, for instance through dialogues processes or 
citizens’ conferences, but also exemplarily through 
participation in the practical realisation of this 
vision. 
 > The WBGU proposes the introduction of a voluntary 
social year in ‘education and research’.
8.3.4 
Concrete Research Priorities in the Three 
 Transformation Fields
Energy
The key aspects of the ‘E­Energy’ funding programme 
(BMWi, 2008b), and those of the future energy supply 
grids funding concept (‘Netze für die Stromversorgung 
der Zukunft’, BMWi, 2010c) are to be commended. 
Many of these comply with the WBGU recommenda­
tions on smartgrid development. The WBGU suggests 
the thematic expansion from power to energy grids to 
allow for systemic energy system solutions from the 
outset.
Existing projects pursuing the development of new 
behavioural patterns and business models in the area 
of energy use, particularly the E­Energy development 
scheme (BMWi, 2008b), are a step in the right direc­
tion. In future, this focus should also be extended in 
other programmes, especially those relating to energy 
demand and efficiency improvements.
Land Use
The WBGU advocates the expansion, financial sup­
port and optimisation of sustainable land management, 
Global Research Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse 
Gases, and socio­ecological research to create the linked 
research initiative that is needed in order to manage 
the huge global challenge of sustainable land use in the 
context of progressive climate change and securing the 
food supply whilst guaranteeing the continued func­
tioning of ecosystem services.
Urbanisation
The numerous, already existing networks which are, 
above all, also dedicated to linking global urbanisation 
research efforts, and in which the German federal gov­
ernment is actually already involved (for example the 
‘European Urban Knowledge Network’), should be con­
solidated, not least also with regard to goals, to achieve 
the required funding dimensions. 
The present urbanisation research programmes 
already partially correspond to WBGU recommenda­
tions in terms of content. Solution­oriented approaches 
with the transformation as a direct and concrete goal 
should be substantially extended and receive increased 
funding. However, the transferability of research 
results and generated data must be ensured. These pro­
grammes should form part of a low­carbon urbanisation 
research approach of global dimensions.
8.3.5 
Conclusions
This analysis by the WBGU shows that research for the 
transformation has already commenced to a certain 
extent. For quite some time now, a number of research 
strategies and programmes have included subjects, con­
tents and methods which ensure that research con­
forms to the requirements of the transformation iden­
tified by the WBGU, and produces knowledge that is 
relevant for this process. What matters now is to con­
solidate this knowledge, to significantly strengthen the 
already existing respective research processes, to glo­
bally diffuse its results and, where necessary, to start 
the new research processes described. 
Overall, research funding must in future also focus 
on breaking path dependencies faster, and on opti­
mising conditions for research innovations, both of a 
structural nature and in terms of content. The goal here 
should be the coordinated structuring of individual 
research programmes with regard to their contribution 
to climate­friendliness by 2050. 
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Aarhus Convention
The Aarhus Convention is the first international law 
treaty to regulate citizen access to information, pub­
lic participation in decision­making and access to jus­
tice in environmental matters. The treaty was signed 
in 1998 in the Danish city of Aarhus under the aegis 
of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), 
and came into force in 2001. To date, 40 European and 
Central Asian countries have ratified the Convention. It 
comprises three pillars: rights of access to information 
on environmental matters, public participation rights in 
environment­related procedures, and access to justice 
in environmental matters. This more prominent role of 
the public in the enforcement of environmental protec­
tion represents a new level in environmental law devel­
opment. 
Anthropocene
The term Anthropocene is used to refer to the Age of 
Humankind and was inspired by names of geologi­
cal epochs (such as the Palaeocene or the Holocene). 
This neologism was first used by Nobel Laureate Paul 
 Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer in 2000 to define the 
geological epoch in which the environmental impacts of 
anthropogenic activities have reached a global dimen­
sion. This has led to a range of ecosystem changes, 
some of which have been considerable, even resulting 
in complete destruction. Two of the most serious conse­
quences of anthropogenic activities are climate change 
and the Antarctic ozone hole.
Carbon leakage
Carbon leakage refers to the (geographical) shifting of 
CO2 emissions as a consequence of national or regional 
climate policy, undermining their effectiveness. Car­
bon leakage can be caused by (1) relocation of compa­
nies from one country (or region) with a climate policy 
to a country without a climate policy due to competi­
tive pressure and operating efficiency considerations, 
(2) substitution of products from countries with climate 
policy by products from countries without climate pol­
icy due to price advantages or (3) increasing demand 
for high­carbon energy carriers or products in coun­
tries without climate policy due to lower global mar­
ket prices for high­carbon energy carriers as a conse­
quence of the decrease in demand in countries with cli­
mate policy.
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS)
CCS is the process of separating the CO2 from combus­
tion processes for energy generation or from industrial 
processes and transporting it to a storage facility for 
sequestration. Its objective is the long­term isolation of 
CO2 from the atmosphere.
Carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2eq) 
Carbon dioxide equivalents are a measure of the degree 
to which a mixture of gases contributes to global 
warming. With the aid of a conversion factor, the Glo­
bal Warming Potential, the climate impact of non­CO2 
greenhouse gases is expressed as the quantity of CO2 
that would cause the equivalent warming effect. This 
makes it possible to include all greenhouse gases in a 
unit and allows a comparison of their individual impact.
Change agents
Change agents is a term used in diffusion, innovation 
and transition research to describe actors who play 
a central role in the initiation and shaping of change 
processes. Initially, these are usually single individu­
als and small groups fulfilling various tasks or func­
tions in transformation processes, including the iden­
tification of alternatives, development, communica­
tion and mediation, synthesis, investing, optimisation, 
 diffusion, etc.
CO2eq
→ Carbon dioxide equivalents
CO2 pricing
CO2 pricing refers to the internalisation of the social 
costs of CO2 emissions by means of a price mechanism. 
CO2 pricing can be introduced through a CO2 tax or by 
restricting CO2 emissions and introducing a tradable 
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permits scheme. In the latter case, the CO2 price for the 
emission of one unit of CO2 is determined on the mar­
ket by supply and demand of emission permits. In the­
ory, the CO2 tax or the amount of CO2 permits issued 
should be set at a level where the price for emitting one 
unit of CO2 reflects the social cost of emissions, i. e. the 
future damage caused by one unit of CO2 emitted in the 
present is discounted. 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP)
CHP plants not only generate electricity from the 
fuel consumed, but also make use of the waste heat. 
This heat can be used in heating systems, for exam­
ple district heating. In industry, it can be used for heat­
dependent production processes. CHP is also used in 
the form of small­scale combined heat and power units.
Decarbonisation
The decarbonisation of energy systems describes the 
historically observable trend of the shift from high­
carbon energy sources (biomass, coal) to less carbon­
intensive fuels (oil and gas), and increasingly, zero­car­
bon energy carriers (solar, wind, hydropower). Mod­
ern energy carriers often also provide a higher energy 
density, they have a much broader range of applica­
tions (for example electricity) and are safer, cleaner, 
and more convenient for the final consumer.
Deliberative participation procedures
A deliberative participation procedure is a procedure 
for a discourse­oriented process to reach a democratic 
consensus and make decisions. Carrying out so­called 
‘Deliberative Opinion Polls‘, political scientist James 
S. Fishkin invited a representative group of citizens 
to jointly discuss a current political topic and develop 
decision­making recommendations. His intention was 
to determine the citizens’ political preferences subse­
quent to having been given the chance to thoroughly 
acquaint themselves with the issue to be decided on 
and discuss it in detail. In practical terms, deliberative 
decision processes should be designed in such a way 
that they really do provide benefits in terms of infor­
mation and reflexion.
Economic growth
An increase of an economy’s performance, measured 
on the basis of actual gross domestic product, i. e. the 
added value of all goods and services produced within 
a certain period of time in comparison to a reference 
period, valued in market prices. Real economic growth 
can for instance be the result of better utilisation of 
existing production capacities, expansion of production 
capacities, or improvements in the quality of products 
produced.
Ecosystem services
Ecosystem services are benefits people gain from eco­
systems. These include supply services such as food or 
water, regulatory services such as protection against 
flooding or against the spread of disease, cultural or 
 recreational services, and support services such as nutri­
ent cycles that maintain Earth’s life­support  systems. 
Emissions trading
Emissions trading is a market­based instrument for lim­
iting or reducing environmentally harmful emissions. 
The emissions volume is restricted and divided into 
tradable permits. Emissions allowances can be traded 
among participants in a trading scheme, ideally result­
ing in a cost­efficient allocation of the set overall reduc­
tion. The Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Conven­
tion on Climate Change introduced this instrument at 
state level for those countries which have undertaken 
commitments. Beyond this, some states or groups of 
states (such as the EU) have introduced emissions trad­
ing schemes in which companies can trade their emis­
sions allowances among themselves.
Energy efficiency
Energy efficiency refers to the technical efficiency of 
end­user devices (for instance household appliances) or 
facilities (for example power plants), most often quan­
tified through their efficiency during energy conver­
sion.
Energy intensity
Energy intensity is the ratio of energy input to gross 
domestic product.
Energy poverty 
Energy poverty refers to a lack of choices to meet basic 
energy needs, and insufficient access to energy services 
that are affordable, reliable, high­quality and safe, and 
cause no undue health or environmental impacts. Coun­
tries where energy poverty is widespread are gener­
ally characterised by low human development. Energy 
poverty affects around 38 % of the world’s population. 
They primarily depend on traditional biomass use. Pol­
lutants from traditional hearths cause more than 1.5 
million deaths each year. 
Feed-in tariff
Feed­in tariffs are payments received for electricity 
fed into the public power grid, for instance from the 
use of renewable energy sources. The feed­in tariff 
has a considerable impact on the economic viability of 
electri city generating plants, and is usually structured 
 degressively over a set period of time.
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Final energy
Final energy is the energy that is available to the final 
user in a usable form subsequent to the conversion of 
primary energy into secondary energy and transport 
to the consumer (for example coal briquettes, electric 
power from sockets, petrol at the petrol station). Final 
energy is the third stage of the energy flow chain from 
primary through secondary to useful energy.
G8/G8+5
An informal forum of heads of state and government 
which took place in the form of a meeting of the G6 
(Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan and 
the USA) for the first time in 1975. Canada joined in 
1976, and Russia in 1998, making up the G8. At G8 
summits, the European Commission is also represented. 
Initially a purely economic summit of the world’s lead­
ing economies, the G7/G8 has since evolved into one 
of the most important forums of global policy­making. 
Since 2005, in reaction to allegations of lacking glo­
bal legitimacy, the five leading → newly industrialis­
ing countries Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South 
Africa have been invited to join in the dialogue as so­
called ‘outreach countries’ to extend it (G8+5). With 
the establishment of the → G20 at heads of state and 
government level, the G8’s dialogue invitation became 
obsolete.
G20
A global forum which formed in 1999 in response to 
economic globalisation and the Asian crisis to discuss 
global economic and financial governance issues. In the 
context of the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, the 
G20 gained significant political weight in other policy 
areas. Through the inclusion of heads of state and gov­
ernment it became established as an alternative forum 
to the →G8/G8+5. The G20 members are Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, China, Germany, France, United King­
dom, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Canada, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Tur­
key, the USA and the European Union.
Global governance
There is no universally agreed definition of the concept 
of global governance; it is sometimes used normatively, 
and sometimes analytically. It generally denotes a deep­
ening of international cooperation and the creation and 
reinforcement of multilateral regimes in order to master 
global challenges. In particular, global governance 
describes the cooperation between states and non­gov­
ernment actors from the global to the local level. The 
term ‘global governance architecture’ refers to the cor­
responding multilateral international structure.
Governance
Governance generally describes a political entity’s gov­
erning and regulation systems. The concept evolved 
as a distinction from the term government, and is 
intended to convey the fact that political control is 
enacted not only hierarchically by the state, but also 
by private actors such as interest­based organisations. 
‘ Governance capacities’ refers to the ability to govern 
through functioning institutions and regulatory sys­
tems.
Great Transformation
The concept of a ‘Great Transformation’ was described 
by the Hungarian economist Karl Polanyi in his 1944 
analysis of the Industrial Revolution, also entitled ‘The 
Great Transformation‘. It examines the comprehensive 
systemic change national economies undergo in inter­
active response to global economic structures. To reflect 
Polanyi’s understanding of transformation, the WBGU 
defines a comprehensive transition to take the → plan­
etary guard rails into account as a Great Transforma­
tion requiring the modification of both the national and 
the global economy within these guard rails in order 
to avoid irreversible damages to the Earth system and 
its ecosystems, and the impact of these damages on 
humankind.
Green Growth
Green Growth is compatible with the conservation of 
natural resources by increasingly redirecting the pro­
duction factors of an economy (land, labour, capital) 
towards environmental­friendly production. The goal 
of Green Growth  is a decoupling of economic growth 
from emissions and resource consumption in absolute 
terms, primarily through the promotion of technolog­
ical innovations. It is hoped that increasing resource 
efficiency and closing material cycles will minimise 
resource extraction in the long term. Green Growth will 
have been achieved when positive economic growth 
does not cause further environmental burdens and 
resource extraction, or these even show a reverse trend.
Guard rails, planetary
Planetary guard rails are a concept introduced by the 
WBGU to describe quantitatively defined damage lim­
its whose transgression would have intolerable or even 
catastrophic consequences. One example is the climate 
protection guard rail, which means that an increase in 
the global mean temperature by more than 2 °C above 
the pre­industrial level should be prevented. Sustain­
able development pathways do not transgress these 
guard rails. The approach is based on the realisation 
that it is hardly possible to define a desirable, sustain­
able future in terms of a state to be achieved. It is, how­
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ever, possible to agree boundaries for a range that is 
recognised as unacceptable, and which society agrees 
to avoid. Compliance with the guard rails is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, criterion for sustainability. 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)
The IRENA was founded in Bonn, Germany, in 2009 by 
75 states as an international governmental organisation 
with the aim of promoting the use of renewable ener­
gies worldwide. Its foundation statute came into force 
in 2010 and was ratified by 148 countries and the EU. 
The organisation is based in Abu Dhabi in the United 
Arab Emirates.
Load management
Balancing of electricity demand and supply by means of 
demand management. Consumers whose demand is not 
tied to certain times can be steered towards demanding 
energy primarily at peak generation times. Generation 
and load management (for example with → smartgrids) 
helps to balance out fluctuations in the supply of elec­
tricity. Industrial production, trade and private house­
holds are all expected to have a sizeable potential for 
load management.
Learning curve
A learning curve describes changes in the ratio between 
expenditure/costs and earnings occurring in line with 
the multiple repetition of a production process, or the 
increasing output volume of a product. Reasons for an 
improved expenditure to earnings ratio are gains due 
to routinisation, technical progress, more cost­effective 
use of production factors and economies of scale, i. e. 
cost savings resulting from the production of a greater 
number of units.
Lock-in effect
The term lock­in effect describes being locked in a cer­
tain situation due to having decided on a certain tech­
nology. High investment costs (sunk costs) or other 
structural limitations prevent a change for reasons of 
economic viability or unmanageable organisation. Cer­
tain technologies can for example have a lock­in effect 
(→ path dependency) when a later change to alter­
native technologies entails substantial costs, or entire 
production chains and social structures would have to 
be adapted.
Multilaterism
Institutionalised cooperation between states in inter­
national organisations (such as the UN) or other regu­
latory mechanisms (for example conventions). Unilat­
eralism, on the other hand, describes a one­sided pol­
icy approach guided by the national interests of a state. 
Unilateralism pursues multilateral solutions to prob­
lems only if they appear necessary in order to protect 
own interests.
Multipolar world order
Term referring to a world order shaped by the competi­
tion between several major powers in the international 
system. Its opposite is unipolarity, in which one sin­
gle powerful actor (hegemon) determines global poli­
tics. The international system conflict between East and 
West during the Cold War represented a bipolar world 
order dominated by the USA and the Soviet Union.
Newly industrialising countries
Countries undergoing a successful fast­track process of 
industrialisation or economic development, i. e. they 
are in the process of becoming industrialised countries 
within a short time span. Social development indicators, 
such as the literacy rate, infant mortality or life expect­
ancy may sometimes lag far behind a country’s eco­
nomic indicators. The acronym BRIC(S) countries (ini­
tially Brazil, Russia, India, China, since 2010 also South 
Africa) was first used by the Goldman Sachs Group in 
2001 in the context of anticipatable global power shifts 
in respect of the global economy’s future growth poles. 
In an international climate policy context, the acronym 
BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) is often used 
to refer to these countries.
Nudges
Nudges is a term first used in the context of ‘libertar­
ian paternalism’ by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. 
Nudges refer to the intentional influencing of decision­
making situations to guide an individual’s decisions into 
a certain direction (they will benefit from), for instance 
by providing the option to opt­out. This is based on 
the insight that individuals are not always in a posi­
tion to make rational decisions under consideration of 
all the relevant information, as this is accompanied by 
high transaction costs and cognitive effort.
Path dependency
Path dependency describes a situation in which an 
ongoing development is determined by historical evo­
lution or past decisions, thereby following a path with 
structures that become increasingly rigid as time goes 
by (→ lock­in effect). One technology becoming pre­
dominant on the market, for example, cannot necessar­
ily be subscribed to the fact that it is the best, but can 
be the result of historical coincidences and of reinforc­
ing feedback processes. Compared to the initial invest­
ments required for a new technology, the costs of the 
‘traditional’ technology are low, as learning effects can 
be drawn on in its application and compatible tech­
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niques and standards can be resorted to.
Primary energy
→ Box 4.1­2
Proactive state
The proactive state is a central element in a → social 
contract for the transformation towards a low­carbon 
society outlined by the WBGU. It conveys two aspects 
frequently thought of as separate or contradicting: on 
the one hand empowerment of a state which actively 
determines priorities in the political multilevel sys­
tem and underlines these with clear signals (for exam­
ple bonus/malus solutions) and, on the other hand, 
the provision of more extensive participation opportu­
nities to citizens to make their voices heard, get more 
involved, and join in decision­making processes.
Rio+20 Conference
→ United Nations Conference on Sustainable Develop­
ment 2012 
Smartgrids
Intelligent networks make it possible to connect elec­
tric power generators, storage facilities and users with 
each other and manage the network by means of infor­
mation technology. This facilitates optimisation of the 
individual network elements. 
Social contract
A social contract is a hypothetical construct which 
substantiates governance systems in so­called con­
tract theories. According to exponents of classical con­
tract theory – including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke 
or Jean­Jacques Rousseau – individuals voluntarily 
come together in a political community and undertake 
to obey its rules and fulfil their duties to protect them­
selves against violence and other evils. The key concept 
of the new social contract developed by the WBGU is 
that individuals and civil societies, states and the inter­
national community, as well as economy and science, 
take on the collective responsibility for preventing dan­
gerous climate change and the conservation of human­
kind’s natural life­support systems. A central element 
of a social contract such as this is a → proactive state.
Supranationality
Characterises a specific type of union of countries that 
differs greatly from the usual cooperation between 
sovereign states; it can therefore be described as being 
‘above the nation state‘, or supranational. Supranation­
ality is distinguished by the unusual fact that an inter­
governmental institution is granted the authority to 
pass legal acts which impact directly on member coun­
tries’ intrastate matters. It is possible only because the 
member states have ceded sovereign rights to the inter­
governmental institution, thereby diminishing their 
own rights. The EU is one example of such a suprana­
tional organisation.
Supergrid
Energy infrastructure for transporting electricity over 
long distances (frequently transcontinental grids). This 
is made possible with moderate energy loss by High 
Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) transmission. 
Sustainable development
In 1987, sustainable development was defined by the 
Brundtland Commission as development that ‘meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs‘. Today, 
there are many different definitions of sustainability. 
Common to all is the requirement that economic, social 
and environmentally­friendly development must go 
hand in hand.
Transformation (transition)
These terms refer to the form and progression of a 
transition or a change; however, they are viewed and 
defined differently in different scientific disciplines 
(including genetics, mathematics, linguistics, technol­
ogy). In this report, the WBGU uses these terms pri­
marily in the sense they are used in socio­scientific 
transition research focusing on the analysis of politi­
cal system changes. As transition research is a branch 
of comparative politics studies, it usually refers to the 
transition from authoritarian regimes to democracies. 
The term transition is here often used synonymously 
with the term transformation, amongst others. The far­
reaching processes of social, economic, cultural and 
political change are always the research subject (see → 
Great Transformation).
UNCSD 2012
→ United Nations Conference on Sustainable Develop­
ment 2012 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development 2012 (UNCSD 2012)
The UNCSD 2012 (also referred to as the Rio+20 Con­
ference) will be held in 2012, twenty years after the 
United Nations Conference and Development (UNCED, 
also known as the 1992 Earth Summit). ‘Green Economy 
in the Context of Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Eradication’ and ‘Institutional Framework for Sustain­
able Development’ are the two key issues defined for 
the UNCSD 2012, again held in Rio de Janeiro, also the 
venue for the UNCED 1992.
Glossary 10
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WBGU budget approach
The WBGU budget approach is a concept for a global 
burden sharing with regard to climate protection. The 
key element of the approach is an agreement among 
the international community of an upper limit or cap 
for the total amount of carbon dioxide that may be 
emitted from fossil sources by 2050 (global budget) 
in order to avoid dangerous climate change. The glo­
bal budget is divided among all countries in propor­
tion to their population. Through an international → 
emissions trading scheme, countries which are likely to 
exceed their budgets due to high per­capita emissions 
can buy additional emissions allowances whilst coun­
tries with low per­capita emissions can generate income 
through the sale of emissions allowances.
World in Transition
A Social Contract for
Sustainability
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World in Transition
A Social Contract for Sustainability
In this report, the WBGU explains the reasons for the desperate need for a post-fossil economic 
strategy, yet it also concludes that the transition to sustainability is achievable, and presents ten 
concrete packages of measures to accelerate the imperative restructuring. If the transformation 
really is to succeed, we have to enter into a social contract for innovation, in the form of a new 
kind of discourse between governments and citizens, both within and beyond the boundaries of 
the nation state. 
“The new WBGU-Study ‘A Social Contract for Sustainability’ appears at a time in which people around 
the world are increasingly committed to creating a future that is both sustainable and climate-safe. 
The study shows that such a future will only be possible if governments, business and  civil society 
collectively set the right course, making the most of regional, national and global cooperation. An 
important call to cross-cutting integrated action, the book deserves wide recognition.”
 
Christiana Figueres
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
